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This book is the result of the collaborative research project Environ-
mental Governance in Latin America (ENGOV) funded by the European
Union (EU). For four years, a team of experts from ten Latin American
and European academic institutions investigated how environmen-
tal governance is currently being shaped in Latin America. In this
joint effort, we were driven by our concerns about widespread eco-
logical degradation, poverty and injustice, as well as by our curiosity
about the ways in which the emergence of new political regimes and
elites, and innovative steps by communities and social organizations,
affects governance practices and nature–society relations. To under-
stand the possibilities and obstacles for sustainable and equitable natural
resource use, a range of case-studies were carried out in Argentina, Chile,
Uruguay, Brazil, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, El Salvador, Costa
Rica, Nicaragua, Guatemala and Mexico. Although some of the research
topics and cases are not included in this volume, their findings have
contributed to the discussions and theoretical reflections in the overall
analysis.
The ENGOV project has been simultaneously challenging and inspir-
ing. The theme of environmental governance is a huge academic enter-
prise because it addresses complex social relations, practices and views
influencing how societies perceive nature and use natural resources.
Combining methods and theories from different fields of the social
sciences is a prerequisite which in practice is fairly demanding. Further-
more, by encompassing political, economic, cultural and environmental
changes, formal as well as informal arrangements, and cross-scale con-
nections, the study of environmental governance can easily become a
‘mission impossible’. Arguably this is even more the case for contem-
porary Latin America, with its variety of local and national conditions
facing rapid-paced changes. Finally, collaborating in an international
research consortium of ten institutional partners and more than 25
researchers from different disciplines, schools of thought and genera-
tions has also proved to be both daring and rewarding. The fact that we
spoke in different academic languages and idiom accents was not only
a hurdle to tackle during our group discussions, but also forced us to
learn from each other’s approaches and convictions, and the founda-
tions on which these are based. As a typical governance process, next
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to misunderstandings, dissonances and unbridgeable differences, the
exchange of different insights and perspectives proved to bring about
refreshing debates and new understandings, nuances and agreements.
Without the ambition to provide a full overview of the environmental
governance in Latin America, we have tried to identify key fields for
research, with an emphasis on new trends or structural problems that
deserve more academic attention. The new insights from each piece of
research contributed to the development of analytical frameworks to
analyse the multiple interconnected processes shaping environmental
governance in the region. This volume is the result of this intricate,
collaborative exercise.
For the realization of this book, several people and institutions
have been indispensable. It would not have been possible without
the extensive support of the EU. Financed under the Seventh Frame-
work Programme, ENGOV enabled the consortium to develop important
new research on environmental governance in Latin America and the
Caribbean, resulting in a long list of publications. We are particu-
larly thankful for the professional guidance of Philippe Keraudren and
Cristina Marcuzzo of the Social Sciences and Humanities division of the
Research and Innovation Directorate General.
We would also like to thank the institutions participating in ENGOV
for their financial and administrative support, including their direc-
tors and the employees who directly assisted the project: Consejo
Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO), Institut de Ciència
i Tecnología Ambientals, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (ICTA-
UAB), Institute de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD), Centre
for Development and the Environment, University of Oslo (SUM-
UiO), Centro de Desenvolvimento Sustentável, Universidade de Brasília
(CDS-UnB), Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, Unidad Xochimilco
(UAM-Xoc), Instituto de Estudios Avanzados, Universidad de Santiago
de Chile (IDEA-USACH), Instituto de Investigaciones Gino Germani
(IIGG) and Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, Sede Quito (UASB-SQ).
We are grateful to our colleagues from CLACSO, and in particular to
Fernanda Saforcada and Guadalupe Rudy, for their continuous sup-
port during the project. We also thank the University of Amsterdam,
which hosts our own Centre for Latin American Research and Docu-
mentation (CEDLA) and was very supportive of ENGOV, in particular
Jan Jacob Sikkema and Bea Krenn. At CEDLA, the solid project sup-
port by Leontien Cremers requires a special mention. Her accurate and
cheerful involvement, including the preparation of the Index of this
volume, has made a difference both for CEDLA’s ENGOV coordination
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team and for all the consortium members. We would also like to thank
María Barrachina for kindly granting permission to use her photo-
graph on the front cover. We are also most grateful to the members
of ENGOV’s international advisory board, who have offered insightful
comments on the draft chapters: Anthony Bebbington (Clark Univer-
sity and University of Manchester), Alberto Cimadamore (University of
Bergen), Edward F. Fischer (Vanderbilt University), Barbara Göbel (Ibero-
Amerikanisches Institut), Leticia Merino Pérez (Universidad Nacional
Autónoma de México), Pedro Roberto Jacobi (Universidade de São Paulo)
and Eduardo Silva (Tulane University). In addition, we are grateful to all
the scholars and students who have contributed to the discussions at
different ENGOV meetings.
Last but not least, we are very grateful to the key project researchers,
not only for the chapter they have contributed but also for their criti-
cal input to other draft chapters and their commitment to the ENGOV
project. With them, we hope this book will inspire both researchers
engaged in the environmental governance debate in Latin America and
young scholars and non-academic readers interested in understanding
the complex society–nature relations in the contemporary world.
Fábio de Castro, Barbara Hogenboom and Michiel Baud
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Society in Contemporary Latin
America
Fábio de Castro, Barbara Hogenboom and Michiel Baud
Introduction
Societal change in Latin America is intimately related to nature and
natural resources. In this resource-rich region, nature–society relations
provide both opportunities and challenges in achieving more fair, equi-
table and sustainable development. Nearly half of the world’s tropical
forests are found in the region, next to several other natural biomes,
which together carry a wealth of biodiversity. It holds one-third of the
world’s freshwater reserves and one-quarter of the potential arable land.
And despite five centuries of extractive activities to serve global mar-
kets, the region still holds large volumes of important mineral reserves,
including oil, gas, iron, copper and gold (Bovarnick, Alpizar and Schnell,
2010). On the other hand, this “biodiversity superpower” has seen a
fast rate of biodiversity loss, increasing ecosystem degradation and one-
third of the world’s carbon emissions, mostly a result of the expansion
of extractive activities and land-use change (UNEP, 2012). Together,
these economic and ecological developments affect a large number of
different social groups in all Latin American countries, primarily in
rural areas but also in cities. Next to mobilizations and conflicts that
attract national and international attention, there are numerous local
socioenvironmental tensions that lead to longstanding economic prob-
lems and social injustice. Although these tensions have been part of
the region’s history, the accelerated pace of change, the spatial scale of
impact, and the widening of social and conservation demands all point
to the urgency of Latin America’s current environmental challenges
(Baud, Castro and Hogenboom, 2011).
Since Latin America’s insertion into the world system, the extrac-
tion of natural resources has been central to its economic, social
1
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and political development. This has led to continuous tensions and
antagonisms about access to natural resources, the distribution and
use of revenues, and the distribution, compensation and preven-
tion of environmental and social costs (Alimonda, 2011). In Latin
America, issues of poverty, inequality and environmental protection
are thus closely intertwined. Despite academic studies showing the
risks of being a global provider of foodstuffs, energy, metals and
environmental services without appropriate institutional arrangements,
not much progress has been made in successfully tackling problems
of underdevelopment (Bunker, 1988), impoverishment/marginalization
(Martinez-Alier, 2002), inequality (Therborn, 2011), accumulation by
dispossession (Harvey, 2003), and disempowerment and dependency in
rural communities (Painter and Durham, 1995).
After a long history of elite capture and foreign exploitation of
Latin American mines, agrarian lands and, later, oil and gas resources,
social and political forces started to push forward reforms such as the
nationalization of oil and metals, and the distribution of land in the
twentieth century. Nevertheless, access to resources, revenues and power
remained unequally distributed at local, national and international lev-
els. The neoliberal regimes of the late twentieth century went against
previous redistributive policies (Liverman and Vilas, 2006). This period
was marked by greater attention to both environmental protection
and decentralized decision-making (Larson, 2003). However, restricted
funding and liberalized markets limited the potential to break with
historically established patterns.
This new environmental, social and institutional context also
changed environmental governance in Latin America. Both in rural and
urban areas, poor citizens became more vulnerable due to environmen-
tal degradation and the increased intensity and frequency of climate
disasters, including droughts, flooding, hurricanes and glacier retreat
(Rios and Veiga, 2010). In many countries, especially in South America,
a new phase of widespread civic discontent and mobilization of groups
against exclusion, poverty, inequality and technocratic policies started
in the 1990s (Harris, 2003). While many groups only called for socioe-
conomic redistribution, indigenous movements, landless farmers and
environmental organizations also demanded different policies towards
land and nature (Carruthers, 2008; Urkidi and Walter, 2011; Latta and
Whitmann, 2012).
Since the turn of the twenty-first century, Latin America has expe-
rienced radical developments that have changed the dynamics of
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environmental governance. As will be discussed in greater detail later
in this chapter, democratic elections resulted in a number of left-
ist governments that promised inclusionary development and more
participatory decision-making. Their reforms included a more promi-
nent role of the state in the extraction of non-renewable resources
and the redistribution of revenues. At least symbolically, attention to
the environment also increased. The new regimes and their policies
have thus attempted to combine measures geared towards the reduc-
tion of poverty and social exclusion with policies that enhance national
control over natural resources and improve environmental protection.
Simultaneously, the global commodity boom brought extra revenues
and foreign investments, thereby intensifying resource extraction and
leading to problems of environmental degradation and more intense
environmental conflicts (Fernández Jilberto and Hogenboom, 2010;
Hogenboom, 2012).
Institutional adaptations played an important role in these trans-
formations, as illustrated by the debate about the global sustainable
development model. The narrative of social justice and the plural devel-
opment model, established in the 1990s with strong participation by
civil society organizations, was gradually replaced by narratives of insti-
tutional fixes and technological innovations (Mol, 2003). This led to
a new model, framed as the Green Economy, which shifted the focus
from social and political questions about deepened environmental cit-
izenship and justice to a more technological and economic approach
focused on the commodification of nature.1 As a result, the model of
participation through citizenship has gradually been reframed by partic-
ipation through compensation, as installed by the post-neoliberal state
in the context of an urbanized region.
This volume seeks to analyse the features, dynamics and direction of
contemporary environmental governance in Latin America. Building on
various local and national cases, it presents formal and informal prac-
tices of management concerning renewable and non-renewable natural
resources. It also shows how rights to nature are perceived, contested
and reshaped in the context of rapid social, institutional and envi-
ronmental changes on multiple scales. It combines elements of power
relations, diversity, complexity and dynamics in socioenvironmental
systems in order to tackle this process through a cross-scale, multiactor
and dialectical perspective (Robbins, 2012). One particular strength of
this political ecological approach is the explicit emphasis on the social
and institutional dynamics that shape social interactions and natural
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resource use patterns (Zimmerer and Bassett, 2003). Moreover, it takes
into account the multiple conceptualizations of and claims over nature
as part of a contested sphere, which we denominate “environmental
governance”.
The three parts of this book address the changing context, social inter-
actions and institutional adaptations in contemporary nature–society
relations in Latin America. Part I introduces the socioenvironmental
context through a focus on the historical legacy of Latin American
environmentalist thinking, the increasing pressure on the region’s envi-
ronment due to the global demand for its natural resources, and the
rich ecological knowledge within local communities. These chapters
set the stage to analyse the recent transformations of nature–society
relations in the region. Part II addresses the politics of nature, raising
issues related to the role of powerful actors – the state, elite and cor-
porations – and their interactions in shaping discourses and practices
regarding natural resource use. These processes are explored through
the analysis of new policy models deployed by post-neoliberal gov-
ernments, the role of new and old elites and their interactions, the
narratives around the water–energy–mining nexus by contesting actors,
and strategies for poverty alleviation. In Part III, new and emerging
forms of environmental governance that tackle issues of participation,
autonomy and environmental security are examined. The analysis of
the implementation of REDD+ (reducing emissions from deforestation
and forest degradation), the controversial international compensatory
scheme to prevent climate change, addresses how participatory mecha-
nisms have become invited spaces of selected legitimized groups while
the bottom-up initiatives of community-based autonomous economies
and local consultations to mining projects that address the struggles
for effective inclusion, wellbeing and justice emerged from resistance
movements.
In general, this volume aims to understand environmental gover-
nance in Latin America by looking into the ways in which historical
legacies and current socioenvironmental contexts are driving new social
interactions and institutional adaptations among multiple actors. The
chapters cover a range of Latin American countries, mostly based on
empirical data from multiple contexts, actors and production systems,
and focus on transnational, national or subnational processes. Together
they provide an overview of current regionwide trends, and a variety
of themes and approaches to environmental governance, which feeds
lively and sometimes heated debates in academia as well as in civil
society and policy-making circles.
Fábio de Castro, Barbara Hogenboom and Michiel Baud 5
Environmental governance as a field of inquiry
Environmental governance offers an analytical perspective that com-
bines socioenvironmental research with development-oriented gov-
ernance research (Lemos and Agrawal, 2006). Socioenvironmental
research addresses the interplay between environmental and social
change. In this context, as in this introductory chapter, the social
dimension is broadly defined, also encompassing cultural, economic,
political and institutional relations. Governance research addresses the
way in which society organizes itself in order to solve its dilemmas
and create new opportunities. Until the 1980s, social scientists work-
ing in Latin American countries focused on concepts of governability as
the region faced unstable political conditions and structural challenges
such as inequality, violence, corruption and limited citizenship. How-
ever, the growing emphasis on formal institutions and market-driven
mechanisms of neoliberal governance quickly attracted the attention
of social scientists to a perspective of governance as a social process
that influences the level of governability (Kooiman, 2003). This per-
spective criticized the normative perspective of “good governance”
introduced by the World Bank in the seminal report Governance and
Development (1992). According to this document, the solution to over-
come underdevelopment should be self-governance. The World Bank
proposed a roadmap to achieve so-called good governance based on
three pillars: a “small state” through deregulation; “market incentives”
though privatization and liberalization; and “participation” through
decentralization and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Subse-
quent World Bank reports further elaborated this international agenda,
stressing in a rather technocratic approach, the need for effective state
institutions to achieve development in a global context of liberalized
markets (Demmers, Fernández Jilberto and Hogenboom, 2004). Alter-
natively, social science scholars use (environmental) governance to
emphasize social relations and, in particular, the tension between con-
servation and development goals in order to understand the interplay
among social, institutional and environmental change.
The environmental governance research builds on a range of theoreti-
cal schools, including new institutionalism (Ostrom, 1990; Young, 1999;
Biermann and Pattberg, 2008), sociopolitical studies (Kooiman et al.,
2005; Lemos and Agrawal, 2006) and sociocultural approaches (Cleaver,
2002; Alimonda and Gandásegui, 2006; Castro, 2008; Gudynas, 2011).
Despite their different theoretical and methodological stands (see
Castro, 2013), they all address social behaviour towards natural
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resources as a complex arrangement of formal and informal interac-
tions among state and non-state actors across different scales, driven by
ecological and social factors. In this book we follow a similar approach
and define environmental governance as the process of formulating and
contesting images and designs, and implementing procedures and prac-
tices that shape the access, control and use of natural resources among
different actors.
In recent decades, environmental governance in Latin America has
undergone major transformations. We observe multiple layers of gover-
nance, mediated by formal and informal social interactions, which have
gradually evolved over time. Nevertheless, a particular arrangement has
typically dominated discourses and practices at the national level. As of
the 1940s, state-centred governance mode increasingly dominated most
of the region. Particularly during the period of military dictatorship,
decision-making processes were based on bureaucratic authoritarian
regimes and top-down procedures controlled by a technocratic elite and
grounded in a strong nationalist discourse of state sovereignty.
In the 1990s, most Latin American countries underwent a soci-
etal change through democratization, political decentralization and
neoliberal restructuring. Civil government and electoral democracy
were (re-)established and the former exclusionary governance gave way
to electoral forms of political representation. At the same time, the role
of the state was limited by far-reaching structural adjustment policies
imposed by international institutions, in particular the International
Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development
Bank (Liverman and Villas, 2006). Self-governance mode, as concep-
tualized by the World Bank, calls for a small role of national states,
and reliance mainly on market-based mechanisms such as privatization,
self-designed corporate conduct guides (e.g. corporate social responsibil-
ity (CSR)) and voluntary mechanisms (certification and compensation
schemes). While promising environmentally and socially sound initia-
tives, the market-based approach to self-governance primarily sought
to improve the image of transnationally operating companies vis-à-vis
their shareholders and to consequently ease their insertion into host
countries (Lyon, 2009).
At the same time, self-governance mode, as conceptualized by polit-
ical scientists (e.g. Ostrom, 1990), includes mostly local governance
systems shaped through collective action to regulate access to and use
of natural resources. This governance mode, long overlooked by policy-
makers, became visible through a large number of community-based
management studies (see McCay and Acheson, 1990; Berkes and Folke,
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1998) and was brought to the attention of society at large by environ-
mental justice movements that built on socioenvironmental discourses
and political connections with transnational activism networks (Keck
and Sikkink, 1998). While self-governance through collective action
became important in more remote areas during this period (Schmink
and Jouve-Martín, 2011), in areas of large-scale economic production
a type of self-governance based on market-based mechanisms thrived,
leading to a wave of natural resource privatization in the region. As these
two governance systems collided, local social relations were disrupted
(Bebbington, 2012), and local elites and transnational corporations were
strengthened (Larson, 2003; Perreault, 2005). This led to an intensifica-
tion of local conflicts that often had national and global repercussions
(Walter and Martinez-Alier, 2012). Combined with other political and
social demands, environmental conflicts contributed to major political
transformations and may be considered to have been instrumental in
the election of left-leaning parties in many Latin American countries.
As part of this struggle for resources, participatory governance mode
emerged in the 2000s as an alternative to the previously proposed
monolithic governance modes. This was part of the project to deepen
democracy and citizenship by the new Latin American governments.
Grounded in discourses of social justice, equity and poverty allevia-
tion, participation of civil society organizations has become a central
element of environmental governance in the region. Instead of state-,
community- or market-based governance, participatory governance is
based on partnerships among relevant actors to set goals and to design
and implement initiatives. Participatory governance ranges from co-
management models, in which state and local communities develop
a sustainable plan for traditional territories (Castro, 2012), to more
complex arrangements that include multistakeholders and multiscale
institutions, such as that of climate governance. Here, governments,
transnational social movements and transnational corporations are
engaged in the shaping of an international institutional arrangement
that combines semilegal agreements to tackle climate change and
related environmental issues, such as emission targets, Agenda 21 and
the Convention on Biological Diversity (Biermann and Pattberg, 2008).
Participatory environmental governance therefore takes place in a
contested political space where different actors struggle to strengthen
their positions. More than a new governance mode, it represents a
new layer in hybrid governance models composed by state-centred,
market-based and local-based mechanisms. To what extent participation
can actually be fostered, inequalities diminished and the environment
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protected in this complex arrangement depends on the way different
images of nature–society relations are negotiated, how problems are pri-
oritized, and how compatible the proposed solutions are with the social,
institutional and environmental context. In this respect, Latin America
has recently experienced some interesting new trends.
Recent trends in Latin American environmental
governance
Environmental governance in Latin America is a contradictory process.
The dominating discourse of participatory governance in several Latin
American countries is accompanied by increasing socioenvironmental
conflicts.2 In the centre of this contradiction are the changes to the
socioenvironmental context observed in the last decade. The impres-
sive economic and social progress of the 2000s and the new approaches
to poverty alleviation, redistribution and sovereignty were supported
by large segments of the population. However, social programmes
were usually based on increased public revenues from extractive activ-
ities, both through booming global commodity markets and through
higher national taxes and royalties (Hogenboom, 2012). As many
countries deepened their dependence on the extractive use of natural
resources, this prompted a “reprimarization” of the economy. As soon
as these tendencies became evident, the problems and contradictions
of (neo)extractivism and the possibilities for post-extractivist develop-
ment strategies became the subject of vivid debates in countries such
as Ecuador (Ecuador Debate, 2011), Bolivia (Radhuber, 2014), Argentina
(Giaracca and Teubal, 2013) and Peru (Alayza and Gudynas, 2011).
Critics of extractivism point to the new partnerships between the
national state and transnational corporations, which simultaneously
reinforced state-centred and market-based principles of governance.
Despite the increasing implementation of impact assessments and prior
consultations, the involvement of local stakeholders in decision-making
processes remains very limited (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2012). Grassroots
organizations, human rights activists and environmentalists accordingly
denounce the imposition of top-down arrangements. Next to the lim-
ited influence of civil society, and especially of marginalized groups,
they call attention to the increasing criminalization of social mobi-
lization against large-scale projects of mining, oil and gas extraction,
hydroelectricity or infrastructure.
These processes reinforced the longstanding tension between the
commodification of nature and the “safeguard of nature” (Silva, 2012).
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On the one hand, governments and corporations are receiving support
from the urban population to further the expansion of extractive activ-
ities in order to fulfil urgent societal needs. On the other hand, rural
communities, indigenous organizations and environmentalists stress
the relevance of nature for ecological sustainability, social reproduc-
tion and cultural notions of belonging rooted in local cosmologies.
The implications for the safeguard of nature and local communities in
the region have been complex and contested. Facilitated by national
policies, large companies are attracted to resource-endowed areas to
supply the increasing global demand for commodities. The expansion
of extractive activities has deepened the pressure on the natural envi-
ronment and its local residents. This has become particularly clear
in the Amazon, where the rapid expansion of a range of large- and
small-scale activities (Dijck, 2014) threatens the livelihoods of indige-
nous and other communities, sparking numerous conflicts and violent
clashes (Alimonda, Hoetmer and Saavedra Celestino, 2009; Gavaldà i
Palacin, 2013; Vásquez, 2014). However, Maristella Svampa (2011) also
notes that due to a convergence between indigenous communitarian
views and environmental discourses, an interesting ecoterritorial turn
in socioenvironmental struggles has come about.
The frequency and intensity of socioenvironmental conflicts indi-
cate that, in the context of democracy and post-neoliberal develop-
ment models, major dilemmas between conservation and development
remain. For the solution of these dilemmas, a range of proposals and
actions have been brought forward that are meant to bring actors
together to find new forms of more consensual environmental gov-
ernance. The existing proposals can be categorized as one of two
contrasting models.
On the one hand we can distinguish a tendency that we call neode-
sarrollismo (new developmentalism). This refers to mainly business-like
proposals that rely on institutional engineering, technological mod-
ernization and market-based mechanisms to bring about efficient and
sustainable use of natural resources. This model tends to dominate pol-
icy circles in most Latin American governments. It is closely related to
the globally dominant environmental governance model known as the
Green Economy. Grounded in neoinstitutionalism, the model relies on
institutional fixes to fine-tune market-based incentives in order to drive
collaborative behaviour and sustainable practices (UNEP, 2011). The
Green Economy model assumes that shortcomings such as asymmet-
ric relationships, injustices and unsustainable behaviour can turn into
more equitable and sustainable outcomes through proper institutional
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design (Biermann, 2007). By relying on institutional engineering, solu-
tions are based on apolitical means such as innovation of technology
(de Mol, 2003) and “green” consumptive behaviour (Dobson, 2003).
The pragmatism of this approach finds fertile ground among elite
groups because it addresses the dilemmas around equity, sustainable
development and conservation from within the capitalist market-based
structure. Its advocates rely on market-based incentives and compensa-
tion schemes, such as REDD and payment for ecosystem services (PES),
as mechanisms to replace state regulation, minimize conflict-related
costs and improve corporate image. The model also fits well into the
institutional ethos of a technocratic state apparatus, which tends to
rely on blueprint institutional designs. Finally, it satisfies part of the
environmentalist agenda, including several international environmen-
tal NGOs such as the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Conservation
International and the Nature Conservancy. These transnational orga-
nizations have gradually moved towards an agenda of compensation
schemes and market-based incentives in order to promote sustainable
behaviour among corporations, states and local communities (Hall,
2012).
On the opposite side, we find a number of proposals that envision
a radically different model of production and environmental gover-
nance, brought together under the label of Buen Vivir (“good living”).
This tendency includes a range of alternative conceptions of nature
and human–nature relations that depart from indigenous ideas about
the relationship between human production and the environment and
rights of nature (Gudynas, 2011). The proposals recommend a bottom-
up and unorthodox environmental governance perspective, which calls
for the transformation, or even the end, of the hegemonic capitalist
model that is considered to be the very source of environmental degra-
dation and injustice. Their advocates argue that neodesarrollismo and its
connection with the Green Economy only mean a repackaging of old
development models to maintain unequal power relations on multiple
scales. Instead of the technocratic belief in “institutional deficiencies”
that only need to be fixed, they consider these deficiencies to be the
very foundation of asymmetric relationships and environmental degra-
dation (Alimonda, 2011). They argue that institutional fixes will hardly
be effective in solving socioenvironmental problems unless the unequal
power relations between different social groups and the basic founda-
tions of the market-based economy are properly addressed (Gudynas,
2009). Grounded in discourses of wellbeing, civil rights and a plural
state, advocates leaning towards this narrative argue that capitalism is
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limited to tackling issues of justice, equity and sustainability, and they
call for alternative models of heterodox economy, such as degrowth
(Russi et al., 2008) and the solidarity economy (Barkin and Lemus,
2011), or local practices such as agroforestry (Altieri and Toledo, 2011)
and community-based management systems (Bray, Merino and Barry,
2005).
The Buen Vivir model has provoked two kinds of criticism. On the
one hand, some observers consider the anti-market basis of these ideas
to be unfeasible and unrealistic. In their view it is impossible in today’s
world not to participate in the market economy. Other observers focus
on the governments that want to implement these ideas, such as those
of Bolivia and Ecuador. They criticize the lack of clarity in the concept of
Buen Vivir and highlight the contradictions that its supposed implemen-
tation engenders (Bretón Solo de Zaldívar, 2013). They argue that, in
practice, these ideas serve as an excuse for continuing developmentalist
and extractive models.
It is clear that both neodesarrollismo and Buen Vivir have their flaws
and contradictions. In practice, we can see that most governments in
Latin America today combine elements of both models. Indeed, we can
speak of a mixed governance model, in which governments and other
actors eclectically use different models to implement their practices or
to formulate their demands. In this way multilayered and flexible insti-
tutional arrangements are continuously constructed and reconstructed
through a process of hybridization and bricolage (Cleaver, 2002).
To understand projects of environmental governance in Latin America
today, we need to start from the fact that they emanate from different
actors who have particular historical experiences and use a variety of
local, national and global discourses. These projects at the same time
present a number of often contradictory goals and proposals. In the last
instance they aim to find solutions or create new opportunities for this
predicament of a balance between productive activities, societal equality
and environmental policies. In the remainder of this introduction, we
will try to shed light on the consequences of these complex proposals
for environmental governance.
Environmental governance as a social process
Environmental governance is thus embedded within a historical, envi-
ronmental and social context that is continuously shaped by political
struggles, environmental change and contested values of nature over
time (Miller, 2007). Environmental attributes, such as availability and
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distribution of renewable and non-renewable natural resources, influ-
ence access to production territories by different stakeholders (see
Haarstad, 2012). Social attributes – such as consumption patterns,
poverty and inequality levels, democracy and citizenship, cultural diver-
sity, and economic growth – are some of the driving factors underlying
the actions of Latin American societies to shape multiple patterns of the
exploitation and protection of nature (Latta and Wittman, 2012). In par-
ticular, institutional arrangements that define the “rules of the game” –
which include both formal and informal practices and mechanisms
mediating social-environment relations on multiple scales – are based
on different sets of principles, values and images of nature, conservation
and development.
To understand how environmental governance takes place in the
region, we have to look at the intricate and heterogeneous environ-
mental, social and institutional arrangements in Latin America (see
Helmke and Levitsky, 2006). Changes in the social, institutional and
environmental context continuously reshape the set of opportunities
and constraints for different actors, triggering new social interactions
and institutional adaptations.
In these highly complex and dynamic processes, multiple actors make
use of elements of different, often contrasting, discourses to legitimate
their proposals or projects. To disentangle and unpack the practical and
discursive contradictions of today’s environmental governance in Latin
America, we identify three analytical lines that are reflected through-
out this book. First, perceptions, values and discourses are important
because they show the variety of images of nature, environmental prob-
lems and possible solutions among different social groups. Second,
social interactions further give shape to people’s actions and relations
towards decision-making processes. And third, institutional change and
adaptations are the result of concrete efforts to deal with these different
and often conflicting images and a multitude of social interactions.
Perceptions, values and discourses
Perceptions and values are fiercely contested by different actors accord-
ing to their representations of nature. The contestation over values,
principles and knowledge sources guiding the way nature is concep-
tualized is one of the key elements of environmental governance. The
way nature conservation is framed directly influences how environmen-
tal dilemmas are problematized, how solutions are designed and how
priorities and trade-offs between conflicting goals are set. The more
actors are engaged in environmental governance, the more complex and
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heterogeneous the images become. The central question is how these
complex dynamics lead to specific forms of environmental governance,
and maybe even more importantly, how these forms can be directed
towards social inclusion and environmental sustainability.
As argued by Martinez-Alier, Baud and Sejenovich (Chapter 1), Latin
America has a long epistemological and political tradition in relation
to the balance between human production, natural resources and the
environment. This academic perspective goes in the same direction
as indigenous cosmologies, in which nature is an integrated part of
their lives. By using a range of illustrative examples, Kleiche-Dray and
Waast (Chapter 3) describe in detail how cultural practices are intimately
related to production and food systems. Similarly, Barker and Lemus
(Chapter 10) explain how cultural perspectives of nature form the core
concept of indigenous peasant communality.
While indigenous and peasant communities tend to perceive nature
as important for symbolic meanings and for sustaining their livelihoods,
extraction-oriented images connect nature to the interests of exploiting
its resources and generating revenues. The latter images have been espe-
cially advocated by national governments and large companies. Inter-
estingly, although Andean governments today also use the symbolic
indigenous images of Pachamama and Buen Vivir in their discourses,
their meaning has been reframed (see Teijlingen and Hogenboom,
2014). The governments have adapted such images to a political agenda
in which nature mainly serves to support national development. This
leads to the coexistence of seemingly competing images and discourses,
such as Buen Vivir with the idea of the so-called país minero (mining
country), as explained in detail by Andrade (Chapter 4).
Parker, Baigorrotegui and Estenssoro (Chapter 6) demonstrate how
the discourses of private companies resemble those of the national
Latin American governments. Through multiple – and often contrast-
ing – discourses, large private companies strive to defend their inter-
ests, to confront contested political contexts and to legitimate their
projects. However, while national governments define the control of
natural resources as an element of national sovereignty, corporate actors
interpret the dilemmas of environmental governance as transcending
national boundaries, such as in the case of the fictitious United Repub-
lic of Soybeans, the agricultural area covering parts of Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay and Bolivia that is controlled by the world’s largest food
companies (see Grain, 2013).
Environmentalists’ images of nature also transcend national inter-
ests and boundaries, and often pit them against national governments
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and interest groups. However, their views contrast with indigenous
communities or companies by defining nature as a biophysical entity,
characterized by its ecological function of biodiversity repository and
carbon sink with direct implications in regulating the global climate.
By using metaphors such as “Earth’s lung” or “carbon sink”, or superla-
tives such as megabiodiversity spots, biomes such as the Amazon are
usually emphasized over other ecosystems, as shown by the REDD+ case
described by Aguilar-Støen, Toni and Hirsch (Chapter 8).
In sum, whether a lifestyle, a commodity or a biological stock,
nature’s multiple images and values create dissonance among stake-
holders’ perceptions of nature-related problems and possible solutions.
At the core of this dilemma is the struggle over meanings of nature, con-
servation, development and participation. The consequences of these
different perceptions and the contradictions within existing discourses
become apparent in concrete social interactions.
Social interactions
Social interactions are the propeller of environmental governance.
Through their ambitions to deepen democracy and foment popular
participation, often in response to social demands and mobilization,
Latin American governments have expanded the range of actors and
interests involved in environmental governance. Even though these
ambitions may have often been confined to discourse and rhetoric,
they have opened political spaces for more varied and dynamic social
interactions. As a result, decisions regarding environmental dilemmas
in Latin America today involve a range of actors that may hold multi-
ple political and identity positions. These positions may be strategically
shifted according to new opportunities and constraints that emerge
from changes in the socioenvironmental context. Because they con-
cern concrete decisions that present technical, economic and political
choices and ambiguities, social interactions are dynamic and constantly
swing between the opposites of cooperative or accommodating to con-
flictive and resisting relations. In this intricate social interaction, the
struggle to participate and control the decision-making process is a
central element of environmental governance.
It is interesting to note that the relevance of participation for effec-
tive solutions to economic, social and conservation challenges is no
longer questioned by the elite groups. As Chapter 6 shows, even the
most conservative and market-oriented stakeholders acknowledge the
importance of the inclusion of local or marginalized groups. In fact,
participation has become a central element in official documents drafted
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by government agencies, corporations, donors and multigovernmen-
tal agreements. However, the participation of local communities has
been framed in terms of them being recipients of compensatory benefits
decided by other legitimated actors.
In the case of mining consultations, Walter and Urkidi (Chapter 11)
argue that companies try to demobilize local participation with tech-
nological solutions and false promises. Through top-down procedures,
they only give local populations the opportunity to be informed in order
to legitimize their activity. In the case of REDD+, Chapter 8 argues that
projects are dominated by “invited” actors who decide which knowl-
edge tools, goals and models are legitimized. What remains for the local
populations is some compensation in the form of money or material
facilities. Despite the different territorial and political contexts, both of
these chapters demonstrate the dangers of framing participation as a
distribution of compensatory measures.
The reframing of participation through compensation has emerged
from coalitions between the state and other elite groups. Chapter 4 and
Bull and Aguilar-Støen’s Chapter 5 focus on state-business coalitions for
the expansion of extractive industries. The former focuses on the politi-
cal and economic agenda of the state based on natural resources, while
the latter describes how this process has driven new forms of political
interactions between the state and the new and old elite. Chapter 8
focuses on the NGOs, experts and state coalition for the expansion of
protected areas.
The unfulfilled promises of participatory policies combined with the
increased exploitation of natural resources in many Latin American
regions have fuelled socioenvironmental conflicts almost at the same
pace as the implementation of participatory initiatives. According to
Martinez-Alier and Walter (Chapter 2), these conflicts concentrate on
the distribution of the ecological debt and basically emerge from the
unequal exchange of material between different parts of the world.
In addition, as Sejenovich (Chapter 7) shows, dominant production
processes have high social and environmental costs. To end poverty
and realize sustainable development, social rights as well as ecological
limits need to be fully integrated into governance processes. In recent
years, some progress has been made in this direction. To regain their
protagonism in environmental governance, various local communities
have developed and designed bottom-up decision-making processes to
defend their local interests and to keep their autonomy in shaping their
livelihood strategies (see chapters 9, 10 and 11).
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These bottom-up solutions are built on environmental justice net-
works and peasant and indigenous movements, an instrumental strat-
egy in the struggle for access and control over natural resources in
Latin America (Carruthers, 2008). They struggle to empower themselves
through a discourse of human–nature interdependency and territorial
autonomy. In this process, local actors try to scale down the decision-
making process. Chapter 10 argues that locally developed economic
models are the only way to liberate subalterns from their marginalized
position in the capitalist structure. Chapter 2 shows how local com-
munities organize themselves around glocal (global–local) networks in
order to reclaim their political position within the capitalist structure.
At the implementation level, a myriad of initiatives have been observed
on the ground. Local communities draw on their local knowledge and
institutions in order to develop new strategies to tackle new challenges.
In some cases they have actively designed their own decision-making
systems to counter the manipulative consultations carried out by pri-
vate companies, as described in detail in Chapter 11. In other cases,
communities have engaged in commercial activities by building on their
social capital to develop their technical and entrepreneurial capacity (see
Merino’s Chapter 9).
In sum, the increasing tension between environmental justice and
post-neoliberal policies is characterized by a dynamic reshaping of
strategies among contesting actors. This central element of environmen-
tal governance drives new institutional adaptations based on discourse,
relationships and practices on the ground.
Institutional change and adaptation
Institutional adaptations involve strategies developed by different actors
to increase their ability to be included or to define the “rules of the
game” in environmental governance. These adaptations comprise for-
mal and informal mechanisms, and range from discourse reshaping
and new communication strategies to innovative initiatives, technolo-
gies and knowledge integration. Latin America has been the stage for
two key forms of institutional adaptation among different contesting
actors: the reshaping of environmental discourse and the rescaling of
environmental governance.
Generally, dominant actors have reframed their discourses in order to
fit their interests and objectives into a “green growth” agenda. Corpo-
rations favour models based on technological innovation while leftist
governments argue for the expansion of extractive activities in order
to reach social objectives. The ideologies and discourses of the new
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so-called post-neoliberal governments in Latin America have greatly
influenced the adaptations of environmental governance. By fram-
ing natural resources as a national wealth to solve inequality prob-
lems, they have strengthened the state’s political position vis-à-vis the
transnational corporate sector. This has allowed them to acquire a
more central position in the governance of natural resources and to
impose stronger conditions for the exploitation of natural resources.
The increased income from taxes and royalties on natural resource use
have allowed for a redistribution of benefits among different stakeholder
groups, resulting in decreasing poverty and income inequality in the
region, even though the problem of structural poverty still needs to be
resolved (see Chapter 7).
Among several actors, gradual shifts may be observed in environmen-
tal attitudes, mechanisms and practices. The state has been instrumental
in reformulating procedures for the socioenvironmental assessment of
extractive industries and infrastructure expansion, decision-making pro-
cesses and control over environmental conflicts. To prevent further
legislative restrictions, and in response to social pressures, corporations
have become proactive in the development of a discourse in which they
hold a key role in solving societal problems. This discourse has materi-
alized through the CSR framework, which promises to reconcile their
productive activities with social and environmental demands. Many
researchers and environmentalists, on the other hand, have adapted to
the new context by claiming their “expert” role as knowledge-holder of
the technical information that is necessary to design better policies.
These different discursive strategies mediate the institutional changes
promoted by contesting actors. At the national level, Chapter 4’s anal-
ysis of the state in Andean countries reveals the strong role of the
recentralization of environmental governance as a key strategy of post-
neoliberal states in order to subsidize the accomplishment of their social
policies. Chapter 5 offers several examples in which elite groups try
to ensure their access to land and natural resources through different
means (see also Otero, 2010; Borras et al., 2012; Harstaad, 2012). In some
other cases, however, different governmental levels may compete for
control of the decision-making process. The REDD+ implementation
process provides an illustrative example of tensions between differ-
ent governmental levels in the attempt to recentralize or decentralize
the funding scheme to compensate forest-protection initiatives. In the
current “race” for the implementation of REDD+ in Brazil, state gov-
ernments have built state-level coalitions in order to bypass national
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governments and reach out to different international funding schemes
(Chapter 8).
Politically less powerful actors also strive to rescale decision-making
processes in order to overcome undesirable policies and develop-
ments, structural constraints or environmental degradation. Chapter 11
describes the efforts of local communities to build up both glocal con-
nections and coalitions with local governments in order to have control
over consultations and decide about the implementation of mining
projects in Latin America. According to Chapter 10, the scaling down
of environmental governance to the local level is fundamental in safe-
guarding the self-determination of local communities. Chapter 9 argues
that social capital and institutional strength in communities are key fac-
tors for the protection of forest commons and for local capacities to face
traditional and emergent pressures on forest ecosystems.
The extent to which local communities and social movements suc-
ceed in bringing about institutional change partly depends on their
interactions with other actors. In this respect it is also important to
point out that social actors (the state, corporations, communities, etc.)
are not homogeneous entities. They may consist of various groups
with different power, interests and positions, which may shift over
time. Local governments, for example, occasionally confront central
governments by developing alliances with local communities or other
state agencies. Also, experts from corporations, governments and envi-
ronmental organizations may take very different stances on energy
efficiency, production technologies and social responsibilities, despite
the fact that they work in the same sector or country (see the analysis
of views and discourses of strategic actors in Chapter 6). In some cases,
environmentalists support local communities against development poli-
cies that promote the expansion of infrastructure and extractive indus-
tries in fragile ecosystems (Chapter 11). In other cases, they may
favour compensatory schemes in conservation policies, regardless of the
criticism raised by environmental justice movements (Chapter 8).
In sum, while the central state has repositioned itself in processes of
environmental governance of Latin America, institutional adaptation to
the new contexts, discourses and demands has come from a range of
(contesting) actors, and the interactions among them, across multiple
scales. Overall, elite groups have tried to adjust some of their dis-
courses and practices in order to partly comply with new demands and
regulations, without having to give up their prominent position. Simul-
taneously, various marginalized groups have attempted to strike back by
(re-)establishing and (re)appropriating local decision-making processes
Fábio de Castro, Barbara Hogenboom and Michiel Baud 19
in order to regain their autonomy. To what extent these institutional
adaptations may lead to structural transformations in environmental
governance remains to be seen.
Environmental governance in the making
Environmental governance is a social arena of multiple demands, goals
and images of nature, in which priorities and trade-offs are negoti-
ated according to the interests of those who are able to influence
decision-making. In Latin America, several social and institutional
arrangements through which environmental governance takes place are
currently changing. Trends such as the repositioning of the national
state (Chapter 4), the emergence of new elite groups (Chapter 5) and the
development of new mining technologies (Chapter 6) are largely sup-
portive of the increasing resource extraction for global markets, which is
a cause for numerous environmental conflicts in the region (Chapter 2).
At the same time, however, new communication means (Chapter 11),
knowledge exchanges (chapters 3 and 9), increased attention for social
rights (Chapter 7) and strengthened bottom-up organizations (chapters
9, 10 and 11) create opportunities for marginalized groups to counter
top-down political and economic processes that greatly affect the lives
of people who have limited voice.
Whether new trends in Latin America’s environmental governance
will prove to have transformative implications depends on how rel-
evant actors are involved in the process. In this respect, the contri-
butions to this book reveal profound tensions between the compen-
satory approaches favoured by governments and corporations (chapters
4, 5, 6, 7 and 8), and the participatory proposals and practices of
socioenvironmental analysis, political decision-making and economic
production that are championed by local communities and activists
(chapters 2, 3, 9, 10 and 11). Although compensation can be a means
for dealing with social and environmental debts and injustices, an
overly strong emphasis on local “damage control”, financial repara-
tion and social projects not only legitimizes practices that threaten
the integrity of fragile ecosystems but also jeopardizes a protagonist
role of local communities in environmental governance. While a sec-
ond generation of environmental justice movements is taking a lead
in struggles over resource-related meanings and rights (Chapter 2),
compensatory policies gain space in Latin America in the context of
resource-based economic growth and poverty reduction (chapters 4
and 7).
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The tension between participatory and compensatory approaches is
in practice often not so evident or clear-cut. Take, for instance, the
political visibility of injustices and the institutionalization of rights
granted to marginalized groups, especially indigenous peoples, since
the 1990s. While meaningful progress has undoubtedly been made,
this is partly overshadowed by neoliberal and post-neoliberal insti-
tutional adaptations that give greater power to corporations and the
state, and more room to expansionary large-scale production and infras-
tructure projects that tend to threaten the livelihoods of some of the
same marginalized groups. By the same token, participation, formerly
defined as full involvement of local groups in decision-making over
socioenvironmental change, has been reframed to include marginal-
ized groups mainly as co-beneficiaries through compensation schemes.
Paradoxically, as state agencies more actively promote participatory
initiatives, local populations may in fact be less actively involved in
decision-making. And especially when coalitions between the state
and corporations foster the expansion of natural resource exploitation
(chapters 2, 4 and 5), the genuine participation and empowerment of
local communities has been limited, and in some cases protests have
even been criminalized in the name of progress and national security
(Chapter 11; see also Taylor, 2011; Saguier, 2012; Zibechi, 2012).
In addition to economic and social compensation, the fast transfor-
mation of rural areas reveals a trend towards territorial compensation,
in which some protected areas are supposed to make up for the vast
areas where large-scale productive or extractive activities are basically
given a free hand (Castro, 2014; see also Zimmerer, 2011). The expan-
sion of protected areas (e.g. parks, reserves and ethnic communities)
by national governments is primarily aimed at protecting forests, coin-
ciding with national and international climate change and biodiversity
policies (Chapter 8; see also Castro, 2013). In many cases, the expan-
sion of these activities and infrastructure takes place in environmentally
and socially sensitive areas, and forces peasants and traditional commu-
nities to fight for their autonomy, food and land security. Meanwhile,
from this ongoing territorial reconfiguration, new inequalities, injus-
tices and vulnerabilities emerge. While productive territories become
gradually more concentrated in the hands of elite groups, secluded pro-
tected areas where land-use activities are limited by market constraints
and restrictive rules are allocated to the rural poor.
Finally, this book’s collection of studies shows that in order to
tackle the current and emerging socioenvironmental problems in Latin
America, three main challenges must be urgently addressed: first, the
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political challenge of promoting democracy and citizenship in a public
space that is safeguarded for effective participation in the agenda-setting
and negotiation of conflicting interests; second, the social challenge of
ensuring the improvement of wellbeing through food and land security,
social reproduction and self-determination of marginalized groups; and
third, the environmental challenge of protecting ecological integrity,
carbon emission mitigation and adaptation to climate change.
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Origins and Perspectives of Latin
American Environmentalism
Joan Martinez-Alier, Michiel Baud and Héctor Sejenovich
Introduction
The debate on the socioenvironmental challenges faced by Latin
America has a long history. This history is crucial to understanding Latin
American perspectives on environmental governance and, above all, to
understanding the specific characteristics which determine these per-
spectives. Traditional debates on environmental governance tend to see
the Western debates on nature and environment as determining views
and perspectives on a global scale. The suggestion is that Latin American
environmental debates were directed by the changing views in the
industrialized world. This chapter, however, suggests that Latin America
has developed its own strands and perspectives on environmental issues
which were emerging from its peculiar historical position. A focus on the
specific, and to a large extent autonomous, knowledge development on
nature and environment allow us to understand the determining roots
of Latin American ideas on environmental governance.
Latin American environmental ideas are closely connected to an envi-
ronmental history since the Spanish Conquest, which was characterized
by a dramatic drop in population and a series of export booms driven
by one commodity after another. An early case in point may be the
exportation of guano from Peru that amounted to about 11 million tons
over 40 years, from 1840 to 1880, and was based on the exploitation of
indentured Chinese workers (Gootenberg, 1993). In the last decades of
the nineteenth century and in the beginning of the twentieth century,
the entire Latin American region experienced a dramatic boom in agri-
culture for exportation. New crops such as coffee, cacao and banana,
along with more traditional goods such as sugar, changed the economic
and ecological context of much of Latin America as well as the lives of
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large sectors of its population. The agrarian frontier expanded, and large
territories, often in the interior of the new republics, were deforested
and occupied by new forms of agriculture. The expansion of coffee cul-
tivation in Antioquia, Colombia, and of cacao in the interior of Ilhéus
in the north-east of Brazil have been iconic examples, just like rubber
and henequen in southern and south-eastern Mexico, the banana belt
in Central America, Colombia and Ecuador, and the occupation of the
Pampas in Argentina and southern Brazil (for a number of examples, see
Topic, Marichal and Frank, 2006). Cuban sugar export increased from
1 million tons per year around 1900 to 3 million tons by 1920, causing
dramatic deforestation on the island (Funes Monzote, 2004a, 2004b).
This sacrifice was unaccounted for in the modernizing ideology of the
time, epitomized by Arango Parreño’s slogan of 1770, “sin azúcar no hay
país” (“without sugar, no country”) (Moreno Fraginals, 1978).
This expansion of the agrarian frontier was accompanied by ideolo-
gies of progress, the incorporation of new business elites, and a strong
dependence on the international market. With the Chilean triumph in
the Pacific War (1879–1883) and the incorporation of Antofagasta and
Tarapacá, Chile became the world’s principal producer of the mineral
saltpetre. The exportation of this sodium nitrate increased until 1914
and remained constant until the crisis of 1929, oscillating between 1.5
and 3 million tons per year (Miller and Greenhill, 2006). This provoked
an economic boom like the country had not experienced before.
In the beginning of the twentieth century, the oil industry in
Venezuela and Mexico began to grow, causing ecological and social dis-
asters at a scale unknown at the time (Santiago, 2006). This process
continues today: the calculation (in tons) of primary materials that are
exported (West and Schandl, 2013) reveals a multiplication of four, from
1970 to 2010.1 As an example, Venezuela exports roughly 120 million
tons of oil per year.
Recently, with the expansion of the Chinese economy, the extraction
of natural resources (not only minerals and oil but also agrarian prod-
ucts, such as soy) has grown at an extraordinary rate. The Government
of Uruguay is considering exporting 18 million tons of iron ore per year
under the Aratirí project. Meanwhile, Chile exports 5 million tons of
copper per year, which requires the removal of land, enormous pro-
duction of slag and a large input of energy. Colombia exports almost
100 million tons of coal per year; Brazil annually exports 400 million
tons of soy and iron ore. There are signs that the recent economic
bonanza from primary exports is coming to a halt in 2015, reinforcing
the critiques from the “post-extractivist” school. However, this might be
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only a temporary situation. New supplies of energy and materials from
Latin America will find markets, and domestic and foreign demand.
The beginning
The population of the American continent suffered an enormous drop
during the Spanish colonization. The population was drastically reduced
by the exploitation to which it was subjected, but the “Great Dying”, as
it was called by Eric Wolf (1982: 133ff), was primarily due to the spread
of infectious diseases. From an estimated 140 million people in the year
1500, only 40 million were registered 60 years later (Tudela, 1990; also
Sánchez-Albornoz, 1984). The American population, which had a size
comparable to that of Europe at the time, dropped some 80%. This his-
torical process is unparalleled in other continents with the exception of
Australia and a few other places in the world (e.g. the Canary Islands,
Hawaii) that have experienced a similar phenomenon. The decrease in
the native population – and its slow substitution by an immigrant pop-
ulation in the neo-European (as they were called by Crosby, 2004) and
also later in the humid tropics – should be understood as a biological as
well as a military process. The conquistadores arrived in new territories
in search of riches. They had little mercy for the native population and,
unwittingly but also relentlessly, they contaminated it with new fatal
illnesses.
However, the depopulation in the first century after the colonization
can not only be attributed to the arrival of Hernán Cortés and Francisco
Pizarro and their troops in the former Mexican and Andean empires
(or even before they arrived, as death travelled fast). The archaeology
of the Amazon today confirms the existence of population densities
much greater than those during several centuries following the con-
quest. There had already been collapses of empires, and perhaps also
of populations before the Spanish Conquest, such as in the Mayan
territory, but what happened in the American demography after 1492
had no precedent on a continental scale and throughout the history of
mankind.
Today’s low population density in Latin America (with local excep-
tions such as El Salvador and Haiti) negates one of the principle
arguments in ecological thinking, namely, that population density is the
key problem of environmental degradation. Nowhere in Latin America
is there an issue of overpopulation as in Europe (with densities of up
to 300 people per square kilometre in Germany, Italy and England) or
in India and Bangladesh. In Latin America, population increase later
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became an explicit policy of modernist governments. In this sense, the
famous remark by Argentinian Juan Bautista Alberdi in 1852, “to govern
is to populate”, is symbolic of the mindset of the Latin American elites
of that time. Much later, during the time of the military dictatorship
(1964–1986), the Brazilian state – in its geopolitical delirium – called for
an increase in birth rate in order to populate the Amazon against foreign
threats.
Ecology and demographics thus changed rapidly in the context
of early colonization. Under the rule of one single dynasty – the
Habsburgs – for the first 200 years, the Spanish American territories saw
enormous ecological and demographic changes. Invasive species arrived
(Melville, 1999), whereas the expansion of modern mining methods
(modern in technology and scale) in regions such as Potosí, Zacatecas
and also Minas Gerais led to a great decrease in population and enor-
mous pollution by mercury (Machado Araoz, 2014). In a later stage, the
frontiers of silver and gold extraction and – almost always at the same
time – of deforestation moved to those of sugarcane in the Caribbean
and the north-east of Brazil, and later the regions that produced and
exported coffee, rubber, wood such as mahogany and quebracho, meat,
banana, soy, copper, oil and coal, iron ore and bauxite (Brannstrom,
2004).
Conservationist environmentalism
Despite the anthropogenic changes that happened before and after
1492, Latin America managed to conserve immense biological diver-
sity in many of its diverse ecosystems. The Amazon had scarcely been
touched before the rubber whirlwind at the end of the nineteenth
century. This enormous biological richness attracted the attention of
European explorers such as Alexander von Humboldt (1769–1859), the
renowned Prussian scientist. Without his explorations of this part of
the world that came to be known as the “Neotropics”, biogeography,
the study of the geographical distribution of plants and other life
forms, would not have been developed in the same way. His inten-
tion, which he never accomplished, was to return to Latin America once
it had become independent and to direct an academy with scientific
correspondents from Mexico to Patagonia.
On 29 July 1822, when he was in Paris, Humboldt wrote a let-
ter to Simon Bolívar introducing him to the young mining experts,
Jean Baptiste Boussingault and Mariano de Rivero. Some years later,
in his Memoria sobre el Guano de los Pájaros (1827), Mariano de Rivero
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remembered how Humboldt had given samples of guano to Fourcroy
and Vauquelin who analysed the chemical elements of this fertilizer. Still
later, Mariano de Rivero regretted that Peru had not durably invested
the revenues from guano exports in a policy that we now call “weak
sustainability” (Alcalde Mongrut, 1966). This renewable product was
exported at such a rate that it led to its depletion. It should have been
invested in businesses that could have generated permanent income.
This proposal is similar to that which was later proposed by Uslar Pietri
in Venezuela in 1936, baptized as the “sowing of the oil” (sembrar el
petróleo) (Martínez-Alier and Roca, 2013: 116–117).
Humboldt described the geology, volcanoes, biogeography and the
richness of species of the American territories that he visited between
1799 and 1805. Later – and largely due to Darwin – Latin America
came to hold a privileged role in the science of biological evolution.
Darwin’s explanation of the origin of species owes much to his trip to
America during the Beagle mission (from 1831 to 1836) to collect mate-
rials. He came up with ideas that eventually, after his crucial stay in
the Galápagos, led him to express his astonishment at the number of
endemic species, given that the islands had only come to exist in a geo-
logically recent period. By observing finches and variations in the size
and form of their beaks (which ecotourists continue to discuss today),
he concluded that only one race of such birds had arrived and estab-
lished itself on the archipelago, and that new species had arisen through
adaptation to specific food sources.
South America was therefore crucial to the history and evolution of
biology as well as the history of agrarian chemistry and the develop-
ment of the idea of “social metabolism”. By 1840, Liebig, Boussingault
and other scientists, based on the analysis of Peruvian guano and other
fertilizers, determined that plants need three principal nutrients – phos-
phor, potassium and nitrogen – and that agriculture should evolve from
a system of plundering to one of restitution (McCosh, 1984: 81–82). The
fertilizing properties of guano were known by the historic inhabitants of
Peru but had not been described or analysed in chemical terms. Guano
had global importance – it was exported as a fertilizer but also served and
strongly influenced the minds of the agrarian chemists (Gootenberg,
1993; Cushman, 2013).
In the course of the nineteenth century, conservationist environ-
mentalism increased. Most intellectuals and politicians lived in parts
of Latin American cities which were somewhat removed from the envi-
ronmental destruction caused by mining and by the agro-export model.
Gradually, however, urban populations also started to be confronted by
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issues of pollution and environmental destruction in their own habitat.
This was most directly the case with dirty water, sanitation and infec-
tious diseases, which alarmed urban elites. The growth of cities also led
to environmental destruction and deforestation to which they could
not close their eyes. Warren Dean presented some impressive estimates
about urban-led deforestation in Brazil. He calculated that a city such as
Rio de Janeiro consumed at least 270,000 tons of firewood every year in
the 1880s (almost 20% provided by mangroves). For the construction of
a small brick house, 37 tons of firewood may have been needed. This
would mean that the buildings of the city of Rio de Janeiro by 1890 cost
the deforestation of 200 square kilometres (Dean, 1995: 196–197). He
may have overstated his case and exaggerated the importance of wood
as the principal source of energy for Brazil’s urban growth (Brannstrom,
2005), but there is no doubt that the relentless progress promoted by
Latin American elites came at the cost of rapid deforestation.
These developments led to a plethora of environmental research. The
distinct biomes of the Americas have all had their iconic researchers.
The dry tropical forest of the Chaco was studied by the great ecologist
Jorge Morello (1932–2013). He sponsored excellent collective research at
the University of Buenos Aires, on the Pampas and the Chaco, and also
on the coastal areas and the conurbation of Buenos Aires (e.g. Morello
and Matteucci, 2000). He occupied the post of director of National Parks
for a short time under the government of Raúl Alfonsín. In the eco-
logical and political history of Argentina, the logging of red quebracho
for railroad ties and the export of tannin for tanneries (by the British
company La Forestal) in Santa Fe and in the Chaco during the first
40 years of the twentieth century played a notable role. In Argentina
there has been active conservationism since the end of the nineteenth
century, responsible for the creation of various national parks in differ-
ent ecosystems. The dedication of Maximina Monasterio to the study
of the Andean páramo has been similar to that of Jorge Morello in the
Chaco. Born of a Galician refugee family in Argentina, educated and
graduated with a doctorate in ecology in France, with long sojourns in
Bolivia and exiled to Venezuela in 1966, she has been a crucial figure in
research on and education about the Andean highlands from Venezuela
to Ecuador. Monasterio studied, in her own words, “from the frailejones
to the potatoes” (i.e. both the “wild” and the agricultural biodiversity
of the highlands) (Monasterio, 2003). Today the ecosystemic services
provided by the páramos are common knowledge – as sources of water
for the people in the lowlands and their livestock. Thus in Colombia
the biodiversity research institute (Instituto de Investigación de Recursos
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Biológicos) “Alexander von Humboldt” is currently in charge of delimit-
ing and protecting the páramo ecosystems, and in this way of preventing
coal mining in such areas.
In Mexico, Arturo Gómez Pompa, a biologist at the National
Autonomous University of Mexico (Universidad Nacional Autónoma
de México (UNAM)) and of the same generation as Morello and
Monasterio, studied the ecology of tropical forests and ethnobotany
(see http://www.agomezpompa.org). He was one of the most promi-
nent voices in denouncing deforestation in south-east Mexico. He is
also known for having discovered the chocolate tree in the Mayan
jungle. The idea of the cultivated jungle (or the “cultured jungle”, as
Philippe Descola (1986) called the Amazonian Achuar forest) became
very important in Latin American conservationism.
Conservationism in Latin American is a consequence of foreign influ-
ence but it also has its own local tradition. It uses universal and more
or less strict instruments, such as the Constitution of the National
Parks, the inclusion of wetlands and marshes in the list of the inter-
national Ramsar Convention, and the Biosphere Reserves sponsored
by UNESCO. The natural reserves have sometimes been protected by
the support of international conservationism. However, many countries
rightly stress the importance of their own national scientists and public
policy-makers in the designing of conservationist policies. In Peru, the
forest engineer Marc Dourojeanni played an important role in establish-
ing protected areas – around 1970 during the administration of Velasco
Alvarado – to save both the vicuña in the Andean highlands and the
Amazonian forests (Dourojeanni, 1988, 1990). In Mexico the conser-
vation efforts of figures such as Enrique Beltrán and Miguel Angel de
Quevedo (Simonian, 1995) are still well remembered 100 years later.
In Ecuador, Nicolás Cuví has highlighted the figure of Acosta Solís,
botanist and conservationist, with one foot in his country and the
other in the USA (Cuví, 2005). The latter’s research on the remnants
of the quinine tree (the tree that is on the shield of the Republic of
Peru) became suddenly relevant by the Second World War when the
US troops were fighting in the Pacific tropics and were threatened by
malaria.
More than a century ago, part of the Amazon suffered from the
onslaught of the rubber boom, which had a significant negative impact
on indigenous populations. Another principal threat is perhaps the
global climate change that could convert the rainforest into savannah.
Meanwhile, the Atlantic Forest in Brazil, the forests of southern Mexico
and Central America, like the forests of southern Chile and Argentina,
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were largely destroyed in the twentieth century by grazing, agricul-
tural crops and monocultures of trees such as pine and eucalyptus. José
Augusto Pádua has explained how the statesman José Bonifacio pre-
dicted the destruction of the coastal forests as early as the moment of
Brazilian independence. Conservationists such as Alberto Torres (born
in 1865 on a plantation in Rio de Janeiro that was already in decline
because of soil erosion) also publicly deplored the forest destruction in
the march of extractivist civilization towards the interior (Pádua, 2002,
2010; see also Drummond, 1997).
It is noteworthy to mention that, in the conservation movement of
80 years ago, there was already a major controversy. Ciriacy-Wantrup
suggested that “conservationism itself may not mean non-use”. This
Berkeley economist anticipated an economic approach to sustainability.
His major book was published in 1952 and its translation (by Edmundo
Flores, an agricultural economist), published in Mexico in 1957, had an
important impact on the region (Ciriacy-Wantrup, 1957).
In summary, there is a Latin American conservationist tradition with
deep historic roots. It found scientific support in the sciences of bio-
geography and conservation biology, and also, later, in the economics
of natural resources and the study of watersheds. Different from the
popular environmentalism and the agroecology and post-development
movements that we shall analyse below, this conservationist trend has
had powerful support in the North, among organizations such as the
International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), the WWF and
other international institutions, such as the US Resources for the Future,
and the Smithsonian.
Agroecology and post-developmentalism
The agroecological pride of the Andean and Mesoamerican regions
(with authors such as Chilean Miguel Altieri and Mexican Victor
Toledo) (Altieri and Toledo, 2011) has roots that are even older than
conservationism, but it did not manifest itself significantly until the
1970s and 1980s. A good example of this new visibility was the Andean
Project for Peasant Technologies (PRATEC) in Peru, which was estab-
lished by dissident agronomists from the school of La Molina. In this
school they had learned the technological simplification as the result of
the focus on the main export crops, sugar and cotton, that included the
elimination of native varieties of coloured cotton. They reacted against
this teaching (Proyecto SEINPA, 1990) and were critical of the notion of
uniform “development”. They were responsible for the first edition in
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Spanish in 1996 of The Development Dictionary edited by Wolfgang Sachs,
a post-developmentalist classic (Sachs, 1981). They began to research
and apply the agrarian epistemologies of the indigenous inhabitants of
the Sierra, expressed in the conservation and use of many varieties and
species of seeds.
Latin American environmentalism is different from that of the
USA as it has drawn significantly from ancestral agricultural prac-
tices and respect for indigenous knowledge. There is a line from
the agroecological studies and practices of the influential agronomist
from Chapingo, Efrain Hernández Xolocotzi (1913–1991), whose career
(in the USA and in Mexico) culminated in a substantial and competent
school of Mexican ethnoecologists, to the peasant movement in Mexico
which manifests itself in the twenty-first century under the motto “with-
out maize, no country” (sin maíz no hay país) (Esteva and Marielle,
2003). Victor Toledo (La Jornada, 5 August 2014) asserts that the indige-
nous agrarian Mesoamerican civilization survives and persists: “These
indigenous populations are the principle opponents to the industrial
civilization model.” Indigenous agriculture and agroforestry are major
sources of Latin America environmentalism.
In order to understand traditional Latin American agricultural sys-
tems, it is necessary to enter into a “dialogue of knowledges”, if not
a rejection of Western thought. The communities whose situation and
practices have been studied by anthropologists and agronomists bring to
the table their own perspectives and knowledge to guide the research,
an idea that Robert Chambers of Sussex University (Chambers, 1983)
developed from Paulo Freire and Orlando Fals Borda, important Latin
American intellectuals. This dialogue of knowledges is also shared by
environmentalists in other contexts, such as in Funtowicz and Ravetz’s
doctrine of “post-normal science”, which supports and even requires an
“extended peer review” in situations of technological uncertainty and
of urgent decisions (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 2000).
Even more radically, political ecologist Héctor Alimonda explains
that environmental degradation is caused by “persistent colonialism”.
He writes: “Over five centuries, entire ecosystems were destroyed
by the implementation of monoculture export crops” (2011: 22).
“Colonialism” is also useful for interpreting the environmental crisis
in terms of the loss of indigenous knowledge and cultures, true “epis-
temicides” (Sousa Santos’ word) that cannot be compensated by either
Western science or by a dialogue of knowledges.
Patterns of economic and environmental sustainability in pre-
Hispanic societies, which we know from archaeology or which have
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survived with many changes, express the social values of these societies.
They are more useful for the period in which we live because they ques-
tion the illusion of universal, uniformizing development. Arturo Escobar
(1995, 2010) and Gustavo Esteva (who met with Ivan Illich in 1983)
have been outstanding thinkers in the field of post-developmentalism,
previous or parallel to the discussion of degrowth, décroissance or “pros-
perity without growth” in Europe.2 They have deep roots in the Latin
American mindset (or Abya-Yala, as it is sometimes called) but they also
find inspiration in Ivan Illich, Cornelius Castoriadis and André Gorz,
political ecologists of the 1970s, and in authors from India, such as
Ashish Nandy and Shiv Visvanathan.
In Ecuador, the political debate after 2007 has introduced the concept
of Sumak Kawsay, Buen Vivir, possibly after many hundreds or thou-
sands of years of verbal usage. Since the year 2000, the concept has
been revisited in articles and theses by Quechua intellectuals such as
Carlos Eloy Viteri. Viteri comes from the Amazonian village of Sarayaku,
which prevented a local oil-extraction project, and his ideas have been
heavily influenced by this situation. Sumak Kawsay was converted into
a national objective included in the Ecuadorian constitution of 2008,
introduced under the presidency of Alberto Acosta in the constituent
assembly (Hidalgo-Capitán et al., 2014).
Beyond disputes over the merits of these constitutional developments,
the fact is that putting Sumak Kawsay central is very different from say-
ing that the main objective being pursued is economic growth or even
sustainable development. Sumak Kawsay is something similar to a sol-
idary and ecological economy, which had already existed and needed to
be recovered. It is a concept related to “post-developmentalism”.
Governments and international organizations: “Our own
agenda”
Since the last decades of the nineteenth century, there have been voices
of scientists as well as writers criticizing the indiscriminate use of nat-
ural resources, but they were never heard amid the obsession with the
modernity of the time (Baud, 2013). In the second half of the twentieth
century, the critique became more coherent and politically articulate.
Although it occurred in the context of a global debate, it showed a
markedly Latin American perspective and influenced the creation of
what is now called an “environmental institutionalism” with new min-
istries, laws and regulations. Since Rachel Carson published The Silent
Spring in 1962, and especially since the Meadows Report to the Club of
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Rome in 1972, international environmentalism has taken off. At first
this debate was scarcely considered by Latin American governments
or by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
(Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (ECLAC/CEPAL)).
For them the problem of underdevelopment and poverty was the bigger
issue, and their main objective was to augment the productive capacity
of the region and to consolidate its economic expansion. Nevertheless,
in those decades, all national governments created legal and administra-
tive structures for natural resource management. It is important to note
the creation of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) at a
worldwide level and furthermore the active participation of the Regional
Office for Latin America and the Caribbean, which from 1975 onwards
promoted courses and debates in all Latin American countries, effec-
tively training university professors, NGOs, and personnel from natural
resources and environment administrations.
With the support of UNEP, the Spanish Iniciativa de Copenhague
para Centroamérica y México (CIFCA) was created and a multitude
of courses and seminars were organized in Latin America and Europe.
In 1980 the Latin American governments and universities decided to
create their own Environmental Education Network. The Argentinian
economist Héctor Sejenovich and the Colombian philosopher Augusto
Angel Maya elaborated a plan for training and research. All countries
had an office from the Environmental Education Network (Red de
Formación Ambiental), in large part with governmental organizations
but also with NGOs. In Europe a debate was initiated by Sicco Mansholt,
president of the European Commission, who converted to the “growth
below zero” doctrine upon reading the Meadows Report. This European
debate, which involved the participation of André Gorz, Edgar Morin,
Herbert Marcuse and other early ecological thinkers, was published in
Santiago de Chile in 1972 and in Buenos Aires in 1975 with the spectac-
ular title Ecology and Revolution (Marcuse, 1975). However, the book does
not seem to have been influential, perhaps because of Latin America’s
military-led neoliberal backlash at the time.
In fact, the first articulated response to the environmental problems
in Latin America came in the 1970s from the Bariloche Foundation in
Argentina which in 1976 published the report Catastrophe or New Society?
Latin American World Model (Herrera et al., 1976). In this report, various
specialists such as Gilberto Gallopin developed a new environmental
model for Latin America, in which the idea of the scarcity of natu-
ral resources was basically rejected. Gudynas (1999: 110) observes that
these ideas were considered a direct attack on the idea of development
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and progress for Latin America. As a logical consequence, the reaction
to the Meadows Report was negative, as is evident in the writings of
Amilcar Herrera and Helio Jaguaribe (1973; see also Estenssoro Saavedra,
2014, cap. 7). The general conviction was that Latin American natu-
ral resources were abundant and that it was necessary to exploit them
in order to develop the region. The Bariloche group emphasized two
issues: the low population density of Latin America and its enormous
and unknown ecological potentials. Latin American diplomats started
to reject notions of “limits to growth” and believed that Latin America
could resolve its problems of poverty and development, and at the same
time achieve a more sustainable model, drawing also on the world’s sol-
idarity. This line of thought was very clear in Brazil, where the national
ideology focused on the Amazon (Garfield, 2013). Before the Stockholm
Conference of 1972, João Augusto de Araujo Castro, Brazilian diplo-
mat of the United Nations, had asked for “a worldwide compromise on
development” from and towards the poor countries. He talked of “a con-
tamination of opulence and a contamination of poverty” (Estenssoro
Saavedra, 2014: 129).
Since the mid-1970s, under the influence of Ignacy Sachs (who was
a university professor in Paris and travelled to Mexico and Brazil),
the notion of “ecodevelopment” spread (e.g. Sachs, 1981, 2008), long
before sustainable development would triumph in the rhetoric of the
Brundtland Report of 1987. Various Latin American authors, from
within official organisms or as consultants or university professors, and
people involved in activism – including Enrique Leff, Vicente Sánchez,
Victor Toledo and Augusto Angel Maya – were inspired by the idea
of ecodevelopment. As part of the actions of UNEP, and along with
the participation of the University of Tehran (under the direction of
Mohammad Taghi Fharyar), a network of ecodevelopment projects
was established. In 1976 the first Symposium on Ecodevelopment was
hosted at UNAM, organized by Enrique Leff.
In October 1974, UNEP organized a famous conference in Cocoyoc,
Mexico. It was here that the so-called Charter of Obligations and Rights
of the States was proclaimed. Above all else, Article 30 about environ-
mental governance was important: “The protection, the preservation
and the betterment of the environment for current and future genera-
tions is the responsibility of all States. They should try to establish their
own environmental and development policies in accordance with this
responsibility. The environmental policies of all States should promote
and not adversely affect the current and future potential of development
of developing countries.”
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In the 1970s and 1980s, ministries of the environment were created in
various countries. The influence of UNESCO’s Man and Biosphere (MAB)
programme was evident, generating new interdisciplinary activity.
An example is the reference to urban ecology and human settlements by
Martha Schteingart at the Colegio de México (Schteingart y Graizbord,
1998). In economic management, Héctor Sejenovich proposed that to
minimize degradation and waste it is necessary to take all costs into
account, including those of the reproduction of nature (research, regen-
eration, control and management), and also all the potential benefits,
for an integrated management of resources or, rather, an integrated man-
agement of the natural patrimony. The Latin American Council of Social
Sciences (El Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO))
formed a working group on environment and development in 1978,
led by Sejenovich (Estenssoro Saavedra, 2014, cap. 8). In Colombia, in
the National Institute of Renewable Natural Resources and Environ-
ment (Instituto Nacional de los Recursos Naturales Renovables y del
Ambiente (INDERENA)), Julio Carrizosa and Margarita Merino de Botero
(who would later represent South America in the Brundtland Commis-
sion) began to take action. No less important was Anibal Patiño, whose
early work addressed environmental problems in the Cauca Valley in
Colombia (Patiño, 1991).
Environmental issues arrived at CEPAL in the form of a book edited by
Osvaldo Sunkel and Nicolo Gligo, Estilos de desarrollo y medio ambiente
en la América Latina (1981), published after developing activities for
more than one year along with the UNEP Regional Office. They empha-
sized the notion of the ecosystem, the understanding that all of us
are part of the same ecosystem and that there is a direct relation-
ship between that which happens in society and in nature (Sunkel
and Gligo, 1981). In his contribution to the book, Raúl Prebisch (who,
as an economist, had been oblivious to environmental issues during
his long and brilliant career) observed from the periphery that “the
environmental crisis was generated by the centre’s irrational capitalist
development model”. He also mentioned the danger of excessive car-
bon dioxide emissions from rich countries. However, the book found
little response within CEPAL, despite the efforts of Axel Dourojeanni
and Nicolo Gligo himself. CEPAL has not been a leader of environ-
mental thought in Latin America. Nowadays the economic crisis of
“extractivism” (the rapidly deteriorating terms of trade in 2014–2015,
partly because of excessive global investment in the extractive indus-
tries) has caught CEPAL by surprise, just as both the neoliberal and the
national-popular governments.
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Back in the 1980s, the UNEP Regional Office discussed several other
issues around the binary development and environment. One of the
questions addressed the roles that the small producers and large busi-
ness owners play in the deterioration of nature. Some sustained that, as
peasants were obliged to occupy lands of lesser quality at the agricultural
frontier, they generated soil degradation. However, other indicators exist
that support the view that the processes of degradation and dilapidation
were caused by large landowners.
Later, in response to the Brundtland Report of 1987, another study
called Our Own Agenda was elaborated by UNEP and Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB), and coordinated by the hydraulic engi-
neer Arnaldo Gabaldón (the Venezuelan minister of the environment)
(Gabaldón, 1994).3 Gilberto Gallopin, Vicente Sánchez and other expert
authors participated, proposing to the governments, to the NGOs and
to society at large that the agenda be incorporated into the Rio meeting
of 1992. Part of this work was published in more accessible language
by Sejenovich and Panario (1996). All of this contributed, on the one
hand, to the United Nations’ Agenda 21 and, on the other hand –
within civil society – to the various alternative Treaties of NGOs in Rio
1992. At the official conference, the Convention on Climate Change
and the Biodiversity Convention were signed by all countries (with the
sole exception of the USA). At that time, a prominent Latin American
representative was Jose Lutzenberger, who had published the ecological
manifest, End of the Future? (Fim do Futuro?) in 1976. As Brazilian minis-
ter of the environment, Lutzenberger asked in 1992 that the World Bank
not lent any more money to Brazil (Hochstetler and Keck, 2007: 74ff).
He was forced to resign.
In parallel meetings to Rio 1992, popular environmentalism emerged
in a very public and urgent fashion. In fact, 1,500 organizations from
all over the world met to debate the treaties that the governments were
discussing, and effectively drafted alternative treaties that were much
more exigent, including one about “ecological debt” (Alternative Treaty,
n. 13). Despite all of this, the anti-environmentalist prejudice in Latin
American official circles continued for decades, until today. Instead
of using Chico Mendes (assassinated in December 1988) as a symbol
of popular Latin American environmentalism, an international official
conflict evolved over the interpretation of the struggle of rubber tappers
against deforestation. Fearing initiatives that would internationalize the
Amazon, so as to not passively let Brazil destroy it, the president of Brazil
conspicuously left a public meeting.
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In conclusion, from Stockholm in 1972 until Rio+20 in 2012, Latin
American governments have emphasized that the solution to the envi-
ronmental problem does not consist of halting economic growth, but
rather that the main and ultimate solution resides in changing the
unequal distribution of power and wealth in the world, and by stimu-
lating distinct styles of development in accordance with each ecolog-
ical and social reality at national and continental levels (Estenssoro
Saavedra, 2014: 155). At the governmental level there was, and is
still, a lack of a sense of urgency about the continuing destruction of
biodiversity and about climate change (the concentration of carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere rose from 360 ppm to 400 ppm between
1992 and 2012). Empathy for popular ecology has also been missing.
Neither peasant agroecology nor post-developmentalism nor popu-
lar environmentalism – as discussed below – has been part of Latin
America’s official “own agenda”.
Popular environmentalism
Governmental and international debates over new environmental poli-
cies occurred at the same time that a debate emerged in civil society
which quickly grew stronger. Influenced by the new ideas of Liberation
Theology and different social movements in the region, a widely shared
critique of the economic growth models in Latin America would give
voice to a popular environmentalism, or the environmentalism of the
poor. It drew from the ideas of two important Latin American thinkers.
Paulo Freire emphasized social and environmental justice, local knowl-
edge, the morality of political decisions, and respect for the planet and
its diverse habitats. These ideas led some to adopt a fundamental rejec-
tion of capitalism; others regarded it as an agenda that was more cultural
and moral, and which could present an alternative to materialist devel-
opmentalism. The other thinker with great influence in the debate was
the Uruguayan writer Eduardo Galeano. In his 1971 book Open Veins
of Latin America (Las Venas Abiertas de América Latina), he presented
a ferocious critique of the extractivist logic throughout all of Latin
America’s history. The book became an iconic text in the debates over
the consequences of extractive capitalism and the social and ecological
destruction in the region. In recent years another Uruguayan, Eduardo
Gudynas (2009), attracted many followers for his elaboration of “post-
extractivism”. Meanwhile, Maristella Svampa leads a flourishing group
of Argentinean authors doing excellent political ecology research with
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an “anti-extractivist” agenda (Svampa, 2011, 2013, 2015), as do Gian
Carlo Delgado in Mexico (Delgado Ramos, 2000) and Mario A. Pérez
Rincón in Colombia (Pérez-Rincón, 2006, 2014).
In the 1970s and 1980s, nationalist-popular political parties (in the
style of Peronismo in Argentina and the American Popular Revolution-
ary Alliance (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) in Peru,
before their incongruent neoliberal moments with presidents Menem
and Alan García) had protested against the insertion of Latin America
in the world economy as provider of raw materials and with episodes of
terrible indebtedness. And they were joined by other political currents.
For example, the influential Argentinian economist Aldo Ferrer of the
Radical Party presented a well-argued plea for “living within our means”
in 1983 (Ferrer, 1983). This has been replaced in recent times by a “com-
modity consensus” (or a new “Beijing consensus”) at an official level.
Beyond the government and international debates directed towards
new public environmental policies and beyond university research, a
popular environmentalism developed with greater force encompassing
movements that are sometimes purely reactive and that, in general, do
not aspire to achieve political influence per se. Instead they emerged as
a reaction to specific environmental problems, which are often local but
have worldwide importance. In this sense, one can see Latin American
agroenvironmentalism as an international movement that is not only
defensive but one that also makes propositions that show the “pro-
ductive ecological rationality” about which Enrique Leff speaks (Leff,
2004).
Much of the resistance manifested in popular environmentalism did
not create permanent alternatives but was rather linked at one point or
another to specific places of mineral extraction or investment projects.
The protests in Mexico in the 1980s against the nuclear plant in Laguna
Verde present a now distant example. There have been many instances
of resistance to dams, which lasted for decades and eventually led to
nothing. The local movement in Ecuador against copper mining in Intag
is a current example. They resisted and succeeded against Mitsubishi in
1995 and against Ascendant Copper (of Canada) in 2006, and devel-
oped productive alternatives such as the trade of organic coffee and
ecotourism. After these victories, in 2014 it suffered the ravages of Presi-
dent Correa’s policies (“we shall leave extractivism behind through more
extractivism”) in alliance with the state-owned company Codelco of
Chile.4
Popular environmentalism, otherwise known as the environmentalism
of the poor and indigenous, is above all the expression of a “moral
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economy” that confronts commodification and manifests itself in the
commodity-extraction frontiers (Martínez-Alier, 1992, 2005). The peas-
ant and indigenous populations protest against the extractive industries
of minerals and biomass, using distinct languages of valuation. They
succeed in halting conflictive projects in perhaps 20% of the cases,
according to the inventories of the EJOLT (Environmental Justice Orga-
nizations, Liabilities and Trade) Project (www.ejatlas.org). Sometimes
they demand monetary compensation for the damage inflicted or for
that which they are going to suffer; other times they argue in terms
of inalienable territorial rights, they appeal to Convention 169 of the
International Labour Organization (ILO), or they argue that landmarks
that are going to be destroyed (hills, rivers, lakes) are sacred. They
oppose the loss of common goods and natural resources that they
need to live and survive. Not only in the countryside but also in the
city there are groups of relatively poor citizens who, without being
“card-carrying” environmentalists, protest when they lose green areas of
public use, demand space for pedestrians or cyclists, and practise urban
horticulture.
Today, this Latin American popular environmentalism congregates
in (virtual) networks of information and agitation such as those of
the Observatory of Mining Conflicts in Latin America (Observatório de
Conflitos Mineiros da América Latina (OCMAL)) and the Latin American
Observatory of Environmental Conflicts (Observatorio Latinoamericano
de Conflictos Ambientales (OLCA)), both based in Chile. There are
parallels and connections (through international networks such as
Oilwatch, the World Rainforest Movement (WRM), the Vía Campesina
and Latin American Coordination of Rural Organizations (Coordinadora
Latinoamericana de Organizaciones del Campo (CLOC)) with resistance
movements in India and Africa, and there are also similarities with
the movement for environmental justice in the USA. Networks such
as the MAB (Movement of People Affected by Dams/Movimento dos
Atingidos por Barragens) in Brazil and MAPDER (Movement of those
Affected by Dams and in Defence of Rivers/Movimiento Mexicano de
Afectados por las Presas y en Defensa de los Rios) in Mexico (which
oppose dams) are also connected with international movements. This
popular environmentalism has made itself visible in a great number
of local conflicts that have arisen in recent decades. In Latin America,
in almost half of the cases collected in the Environmental Justice Atlas
(www.ejatlas.org), the indigenous or African-American populations par-
ticipate as actors in such ecological-distributive conflicts. There are also
new networks of statistical political ecology (Pérez Rincón, 2014).
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Popular environmentalism does not only have indigenous roots; reli-
gion was also important. The book by Brazilian theologian Leonardo
Boff, Ecology: Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor (1996), stands out along
with the leadership of former priest Marco Arana in Peru in the move-
ment and political party Tierra y Libertad (Land and Liberty), founded
after several years of resistance in Cajamarca against the Yanacocha
Mine. Previously there was a movement called Movement of Priests for
the Third World, which played an important role in the slums (villas
miserias) in Argentina and in general with the poor. It was harshly
repressed and obliged to dissolve itself, but it reappeared 20 years later in
the agrarian leagues of north-eastern Argentina, forming environmen-
tal movements in the fight against the soy production that invades the
Chaco forest. Alongside this process emerged a non-governmental net-
work called Doctors of the Fumigated Towns (Médicos de los Pueblos
Fumigados por Glifosato), which supports the substantial movement
called Let’s Stop Fumigating (Paremos de Fumigar), with emblematic
activists such as Sofia Gatica in Córdoba (Goldman Prize) of the Moth-
ers of Ituzangó (Madres de Ituzangó) movement.5 In Brazil, the active
presence of the Pastoral da Terra is noted in land conflicts in the north
of the country (Porto et al., 2013).
The term “ecological debt” was first used in 1991 by Latin American
organizations that were opposed to the loss of the ozone layer and to cli-
mate change (Robleto and Marcelo, 1992), and it was applied a little later
to the results of ecologically unequal trade and instances of “biopiracy”.
There are other slogans or expressions, such as “water is worth more
than gold” (el agua vale más que el oro), “water justice” (justicia hídrica),
“living rivers” (ríos vivos), “climate justice” (justicia climática), “tree plan-
tations are not forests” (las plantaciones no son bosques) (Carrere and
Lohman, 1996), “food sovereignty” (soberanía alimentaria, from Vía
Campesina) and, more recently, “energy sovereignty”, which were born
in or have been spread across the continent. Environmental justice asso-
ciations also ask for an international criminal court for environmental
damages and an international convention about “ecocide”. This is truly
very distant from the rhetoric of the “green economy” deployed by the
United Nations in the Rio+20 conference of June 2012, not to mention
the super-oxymoron of “green growth”.
One of the important elements of the environmental justice move-
ment is the word “biopiracy”, introduced in 1993 by Pat Mooney (of the
Rural Advancement Foundation International (RAFI), which is today
Action Group on Erosion, Technology and Concentration (ETC)), and
spread on a worldwide scale by Vandana Shiva, frequent visitor to
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Latin American countries. In Latin America, Carlos Vicente, author of
numerous books on the subject, coordinates the Action for Biodiversity
Network. What started as allegations by environmental justice activist
organizations against biopiracy has now been converted into legal
actions of some governments or court cases in megadiverse countries.
In Peru, as in Brazil, the state authorities now speak of “biopiracy”.
Even the Brazilian minister of the environment, Izabella Teixeira, said
in March 2012 – after having fined some companies – that opportuni-
ties to advance in the economic valorization of biodiversity should be
avoided so as not to “disguise biopiracy actions”.6
In the regulation of investment projects, advances have been made in
imposing a process of public audience for environmental impact assess-
ments (EIAs), which are crucial moments in many socioenvironmental
conflicts (Wagner, 2014). The EIAs sometimes provide a setting of par-
ticipation or of struggle, and allow advancement towards participatory
environmental governance. In Tambogrande, Peru, the refusal of the
population to participate in a rigged EIA public audience was a step
towards a referendum or popular consultation in 2002.7
Environmental conflicts do not only consist of local populations on
one side and corporations on the other. Local and international NGOs
participate, along with state representatives, in a multitude of conflicts
not only over the administrative management of the EIAs or granting of
mining or oil concessions, but also through other legal channels (with
spectacular cases, such as the recent suspension of the Barrick Gold
Pascua Lama project in Chile, after investments of thousands of millions
of dollars), including court cases. Legislative authorities also sometimes
intervene in favour of environmentalism, such as in the prohibition of
open-pit mining by various provincial legislatures in Argentina (Wagner,
2014). Mediation bodies can also intervene, such as the ombudsman
(Defensoría del Pueblo) in Peru and Bolivia. However, in other instances,
quite often the police, military and private security forces protected by
the state intervene against popular environmentalists. Although there
is a consensus between neoliberal and national-popular governments
in attributing environmentalism to foreign influences and interpret-
ing it as a phenomenon of “full bellies”, it is impossible to ignore the
numerous outbreaks of bottom-up environmental mobilizations all over
Latin America and the hundreds of victims killed in environmental con-
flicts in Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala, Colombia, Peru, Brazil and other
countries documented by Global Witness, by the OCMAL inventories,
the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fundação Oswaldo Cruz (FIOCRUZ))
map of Brazil (Porto et al., 2013), and the EJ Atlas (www.ejatlas.org).
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A Latin American ecosocialism?
In the 1980s, new ideas about socioecological politics in Latin America
emerged. Authors such as Victor Toledo, Enrique Leff, José Augusto
Pádua and Ivan Restrepo formulated more radical ideas about the politi-
cal context of environmental governance. Augusto Angel Maya’s explicit
message (1996, 2002) was to avoid interpreting environmental problems
as exclusively ecological or technological. He understood the environ-
ment as an object of study in all the scientific disciplines, from the nat-
ural sciences and technologies to sciences that study human behaviour.
Beginning in the 1980s, activist groups such as the Political Ecology
Institute (Instituto de Ecología Política) in Chile, Censat in Colombia,
Ecological Action (Acción Ecologica) in Ecuador (composed of young
female biologists), REDES (Amigos de la Tierra Uruguay/Friends of the
Earth) in Uruguay, FASE (Federação de Órgãos para Assistência Social
e Educacional/ Federation of Organizations for Social and Educational
Assistance) in Brazil with Julianna Malerba, and others have emerged.
There is a strong Latin American environmental thinking that enumer-
ates, and denounces the multitude of environmental conflicts that the
growth of the social metabolism brings with it. Some 20 years later,
these views have not only been expressed in writings and manifestos
of social actors and alternative thinkers of post-developmentalism,
of agroecology and of popular environmentalism, but also in some
national constitutions, in the discourses of government officials and
even by some ministers.
After the defeat in 2005 of the US plans to promote the Free Trade Area
of the Americas (FTAA), new leftwing, progressive governments emerged
with the electoral victories of Evo Morales in Bolivia (2005) and Rafael
Correa in Ecuador (2006). In the following years it even seemed that an
international “official” environmental leadership could arise from South
America. The Ecuadorian Constitution of 2008, for example, has been
a very important symbol of environmental thinking in Latin America,
with the presence of Alberto Acosta – ex-president of the Constituent
Assembly – in a multitude of forums. Another example was the radical
speech of Ecuador representative Fánder Falconí, at the failed climate
change conference in Copenhagen in 2009, when he made reference
to the ecological debt or climate debt of the North with the South. He
compared the poor countries with “passive smokers” and he defended
the Yasuni Ishpingo-Tambococha-Tiputini (ITT) initiative to “leave the
oil below ground” in front of more than 150 presidents of state and
leaders of government.8
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The contradictions of the new leftwing governments, which had
to choose between environmental protection and economic growth,
became clear when only a few weeks later Falconí resigned as minis-
ter of foreign affairs because of President Correa’s refusal to take the
Yasuni ITT initiative forward. In Cochabamba, Bolivia, in April of 2010,
a large meeting was held after the failure of the United Nations meeting
in Copenhagen, attempting to position Evo Morales as an environmen-
tal leader of the South, but neither he nor his vice president, García
Linera (who believes that environmentalism is a luxury for the rich),
was in favour of concrete measures regarding environmental protec-
tion. They went rather for the exploitation of the Amazon as in the
plan for the TIPNIS (Isiboro Secure National Park and Indigenous Ter-
ritory/Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Secure) highway.
The Bolivian ambassador to the UN, Pablo Solón, was alone in the
insistence on the responsibility of the developed countries for climate
change in December of 2010 in Cancún in one more ineffectual climate
conference.9
The inability of Latin American governments to take on environment-
alism as a main issue, and even more the repression and “criminaliza-
tion” of popular environmentalism, is opening up space for a political
environmentalism that is opposed to neoliberal as much as it is to
the national-popular governments. Both share the “commodities con-
sensus” (Svampa, 2013). This is leading to a mature Latin American
environmentalist political thinking, albeit incipient, proposing new
principles of international environmental governance, and also criti-
cizing extractivism and environmentally unequal trade in the defence
of the rights of nature, the human right to water, and the integral and
sustainable management of resources for the benefit of local livelihoods.
In support of ecosocialism, Enrique Leff in Ecology and Capital (1986)
and James O’Connor (in the first issue of the journal Capitalism, Nature,
Socialism (1988)) explained that the growing social and environmental
costs caused by economic growth are also the catalysts for an explosion
of environmental protest (Leff, 1986, 2012). Currently we see a major
global process of dispossessing indigenous and peasant lands by private
or state enterprises: expropriating mangroves by the shrimp industry,
and land-grabbing for tree plantations and agrofuels, for megamining
and dams, and for the extraction of gas and oil. These are neocolonial
processes of appropriating natural resources and territories where new
actors, such as Chinese companies, appear. There is also much resis-
tance in urban areas, including recycling cooperatives of “scavengers”
of urban waste, who play a very important and under-recognized role.
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The Latin American Network of Recyclers and Urban Reclaimers has
come into existence which has attained notable success in places such
as Bogotá under the leadership of Nohra Padilla, who won the 2014
Goldman Prize for grassroots environmentalism.
Conclusion
A common element of Latin American environmentalist thought
(absent in Europe and also in India, for example) is the awareness of
the demographic disaster brought about by the European Conquest.
This led to a perhaps justified disdain for Malthusian approaches in
the region. The environmentalism of Paul Ehrlich with his focus on
the “population bomb” was never successful in Latin America, where
the population density is generally low (in comparison with Europe,
East Asia and South Asia). Since the beginning of the 1970s, there has
been a profound discussion among Latin American governments and
on the part of the UNEP Regional Office to establish a shared envi-
ronmental position. The 1972 Meadows Report, The Limits of Growth,
garnered a general rejection in official circles in Latin America. It was
emphasized that the problem was not the finite supply of resources but
rather their distribution. However, 40 years after this debate, we have
indeed found that today there are “planetary boundaries” of resources
and sinks. Current world trends are negative in regard to the loss of
biodiversity and climate change. Above and beyond this initial neg-
ative reaction in the 1970s and 1980s from official circles, and the
search for a “Latin America agenda” of its own, we have identified a
set of environmental ideas and practices that have emerged in Latin
America and which in part coincide and in part diverge from other
continents:
• awareness of the demographic disaster after the conquest and a
widespread rejection of the Malthusian approach to the problem of
overpopulation;
• an agroenvironmental pride, especially present in Mesoamerica and
the Andes (and absent in the USA);
• a shared admiration by European and Latin American science (since
1800, with Alexander von Humboldt) for the great biological richness
of the continent in its diverse ecosystems, together with conservation
programmes implemented since the nineteenth century;
• a keen awareness of global political and economic inequality, and
the consequent plundering of natural resources in the region; this
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awareness runs from the time of colonial exploitation through to
today;
• the rejection by Latin American governments – since Stockholm in
1972 – of the idea of limits to growth, defining an agenda that pro-
posed distinct “styles of development” but eventually accepting a
confusing notion of “sustainable development”;
• from the 1980s onwards, a growing number of socioenvironmental
conflicts that gave way to “popular environmentalism” with net-
works of activists that denounce the extraction of natural resources
and the destruction of the commons;
• the validity of ancient indigenous worldviews, the celebration of
Pachamama that is recognized in the constitutions of Bolivia and
Ecuador, the respect for nature in Afro-American communities, and
the contributions of liberation theology; also, on a cultural level, the
presence of ecology in twentieth-century literature.
There is clearly a Latin American conservationist environmentalism that
is common with other continents: a shared admiration of European
science (which is also American science) since Humboldt because of
the enormous biodiversity of Latin America’s many diverse ecosystems,
which were only partially explored. The extraordinary biological rich-
ness of not only the Amazonian rainforest but also of other ecosystems
(such as the Atlantic forest in Brazil, mangroves and coral reefs, the
Andean highlands, the tropical dry forests, the Pantanal, and other wet-
lands and marshes) are seen as a promise of the economic potential
that is not yet confirmed and, on the other hand, periodically leads to
protests against “biopiracy”.
Conflicts around the extraction and export of natural resources are
increasing in Latin America. The resistance against the exploitation
of nature has led to the growth of popular environmentalism, to
environmental justice movements, to protests against climate injus-
tice and water injustice, and to the defence of the commons. Latin
American politicians and public administrators have basically ignored
this movement of the environmentalism of the poor, but they have not
suppressed it.
Recently, however, there have been signs of an emerging post-
extractivist and post-developmentalist environmentalism that attack
impartially both the neoliberal and the national-popular governments.
Some would call it ecosocialism. This political environmentalism is very
distinct from that of European green parties that focus on “ecoeffi-
ciency”. Post-extractivism is intellectually powerful but still politically
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weak, although it seems much reinforced by the declining terms of
trade of 2014–2015. This movement attempts to include new concrete
proposals for continental and international governance, such as oil
and open-pit mining moratoria, campaigns against dams and against
the “green deserts” of pine and eucalyptus trees, and the defence of
peasant seeds. Rather than the objective of economic growth or devel-
opment, it proposes an objective of Buen Vivir and also to give rights
to nature (as in the 2008 Constitution of Ecuador). The Latin American
concept of “ecological debt” has been very fruitful and has provoked
important debates, as has the emphasis on the human right to water,
supported by Bolivia on the experience of the Cochabamba “water wars”
of 2000. Latin America is at a crossroads where various critical polit-
ical and economic theories are seeking a point of convergence with
environmentalism, which will give it the opportunity to present a real
alternative to extractivism. One of the crucial challenges will be to trans-
fer these debates to the new circles of politicians and policy-makers.
This has been a permanent challenge in Latin American environmental
history, but today it has a renewed intensity.
Notes
1. Chapter 2 gives statistics on the social metabolism.
2. For Esteva’s analysis of the meanings of “development”, see https://
desarrolloxxi.files.wordpress.com/2010/05/desarrollogustavoesteva1.pdf
3. See Garcia-Guadilla (2013) for an interesting account of “neoextractivism”
and its conflicts in today’s Venezuela.
4. www.http://codelcoecuador.com/news/ and Rafael Correa, Discurso para la
XIV Cumbre Iberoamericana, Veracruz, Mexico, 8 December 2014: “Debemos
hacer uso del extractivismo para salir de él”.




7. See Chapter 11 about local referenda or popular consultations against mining
investments.
8. See https://mail.uevora.pt/pipermail/ambio/2009-December/015749.html,
taken from the webpage of the Ministry of Foreign Relations of Ecuador.
9. Chapter 4 compares post-neoliberal environmental governance in Ecuador
and Bolivia.
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2
Social Metabolism and Conflicts
over Extractivism
Joan Martinez-Alier and Mariana Walter
Introduction
The natural resource conflict dimension of environmental governance
is usually centred on the social and political aspects of production
systems and has hardly addressed the biophysical features of the nat-
ural resources themselves. Here we aim to address renewable and
non-renewable resource-extraction conflicts in Latin America in the con-
text of a changing global social metabolism and increasing demands
for environmental justice (M’Gonigle, 1999; Sneddon, Howarth and
Norgaard, 2006; Gerber, Veuthey and Martínez-Alier, 2009; Martinez-
Alier et al., 2010). “Social metabolism” refers to the manner in which
human societies organize their growing exchanges of energy and mate-
rials with the environment (Fischer-Kowalski, 1997; Martinez-Alier,
2009). In this chapter we use a sociometabolic approach to exam-
ine the material flows (extraction, exports, imports) of Latin American
economies and furthermore look into the socioenvironmental pressures
and conflicts that they cause. Sociometabolic trends can be appraised
using different and complementary indicators. For instance, the Human
Appropriation of Net Primary Production (HANPP) measures to what
extent human activities appropriate the biomass available each year
for ecosystems (Haberl et al., 2007). Other examples are indicators that
study virtual water flows, the energy return on investment (EROI) or
a product life cycle. Each indicator provides information on different
aspects of our economic performance.
In this chapter we will address the economy-wide material flow anal-
ysis (MFA) in more detail. The MFA is “a consistent compilation of the
overall material inputs into national economies, the material accumu-
lation within the economic system and the material outputs to other
economies or to the environment” (EUROSTAT, 2001: 17). MFA aims
58
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to complement the system of national accounting with a compatible
system of biophysical national accounts, using tonnes per year as the
key unit of measurement. Such methodology provides a picture of the
physical dimension of the economy, where the total turnover of energy
and materials of the socioeconomic system can be analysed histori-
cally or cross-sectioned through the accounting of input flows (tonnes
of biomass, fossil fuels, construction minerals, etc.) or output flows
(tonnes of materials exported, waste or pollutant generated). Focusing
on the input side by taking into account all materials that enter into
the national economy allows for an acknowledgment of the physical
dimension of foreign trade and can determine the amount of all out-
puts transferred to the environment (Gonzalez-Martinez and Schandl,
2008). While MFA presents some limitations regarding, for instance, the
qualitative differences between materials (i.e. toxicity, environmental
or social context of extraction), it offers a picture of the overall evo-
lution of the pressures exerted by an economy to extract renewable and
non-renewable resources.
A social metabolic approach acknowledges that inputs into the econ-
omy ultimately become outputs from the economy in the form of waste
(except for the part that accumulates as a stock, as in buildings). The
main output in volume from rich economies (apart from wastewater) is
carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels, the excessive produc-
tion of which is a main source of climate change. Solid wastes produced
by the economy are disposed of locally (in landfills or incinerators),
or sometimes exported to distant regions or countries. All goods cir-
culate through “commodity chains” (Raikes, Friis Jensen and Ponte,
2000) – that is, from cradle to grave or from point of extraction to waste
disposal. Ecological distribution conflicts occur at different stages as
peasant or tribal groups, national or multinational companies, national
governments, local or international NGOs, and consumer groups are all
stakeholders.
Economic change generally occurs for the benefit of some groups and
at the expense of other existing or future groups (Hornborg, 2009).
Externalities can be positive (like the free environmental services pro-
vided by a forest) or negative. Negative externalities are not seen here
as market failures but rather as (provisional) cost-shifting successes
(Kapp, 1950). Optimistic views regarding ecological modernization, the
“dematerialization” of the economy (Stern, 2004), are confronted with
the reality of increased inputs of energy and materials into the world
economy, thereby increasing the production of waste and ecological
distribution conflicts.
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Ecological distribution conflicts are struggles over the burdens of pol-
lution or over the sacrifices made to extract resources, and they arise
from inequalities of income and power (Martinez-Alier and O’Connor,
1996; Douguet, O’Connor and Noel, 2008). The concept of ecological
distributive conflicts is born of the intersection between the fields of
ecological economics and political ecology, which links the emergence
of environmental conflicts in the global South with the growth of the
metabolism of societies in the global North (which includes parts of
China). Political ecology focuses on the exercise of power in environ-
mental conflicts. In other words, the question is: Who has the power
to impose decisions on resource extraction, land use, pollution levels,
biodiversity loss, and more importantly, who has the power to deter-
mine the procedures to impose such decisions (Martinez-Alier, 2001,
2002; Robbins, 2004)?
Ecological distribution conflicts emerge from the structural asymme-
tries in the burdens of pollution and in the access to natural resources
that are grounded in unequal distributions of power and income, and in
social inequalities of ethnicity, caste, social class and gender (Martínez-
Alier, 1997; Martinez-Alier et al., 2011). As processes of valuation surpass
economic rationality in attempts to assign market prices and chrema-
tistic costs to the environment, social actors mobilize for material and
symbolic interests (of survival, identity, autonomy and quality of life),
beyond strictly economic demands of property, means of production,
employment, income distribution and development (Leff, 2003). Some-
times the local actors claim redistribution, leading to conflicts that are
often part of, or lead to, larger struggles of gender, class, caste and
ethnicity (Agarwal, 1994; Robbins, 2004). Hence the concept of “envi-
ronmental justice” is important. It was born in the USA (Bullard, 1990)
and it has gained growing acceptance in extractive industries, water use
and waste-disposal conflicts all over the word (Urkidi and Walter, 2011).
Not all conflicts are born from immediate metabolic needs. Demand for
certain commodities such as gold arises in part from the search to have
an investment outlet that furthermore allows for speculation. Other
metals, such as copper, can also be stored and used as guarantees for
speculative loans. The fact remains that both energy-carriers (coal, gas,
oil) and metallic minerals are inputs for the industrial economy and that
their use, in total, grows more or less in proportion to the growth of the
economy.
In this chapter, we analyse the material flows of Latin American
countries and their implications in terms of socioenvironmental con-
flict. First, we present an overview of recent material-flow studies
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conducted in this region. Second, we examine in further detail the
socioenvironmental pressures exerted by the extraction of renewable
and non-renewable materials. We propose a classification of extractive
conflicts based on the commodity at stake. With this double approach
we address the process of growing primarization of Latin American
economies, its trends and some of its drivers, while simultaneously
exploring the local pressures and conflicts that this process is foster-
ing. At the macroeconomic level, we point to the paradox that the large
physical exports are unable, or scarcely able, to finance the imports so
that many countries are falling into commercial deficits.
Latin American sociometabolic trends
Different indicators can be used to analyse Latin American sociometa-
bolic features and trends. Here we consider recent MFA studies con-
ducted on Latin American economies and discuss their implications
in terms of socioenvironmental pressures and injustices. MFAs have
been conducted in most Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) countries, but only recently has research been
conducted in the Latin American region and some of its countries in
particular, such as Argentina (Perez-Manrique et al., 2013), Colombia
and Ecuador (Russi et al., 2008; Vallejo, Pérez Rincón and Martinez-Alier,
2011; West and Schandl, 2013; Samaniego, Vallejo and Martinez-Alier,
2014). MFAs conducted on the overall region indicate that there was a
four-fold increase in material flows between 1970 and 2008 for domes-
tic consumption and also for exports. The Latin American economy
has certainly not become “dematerialized” – one could compare such
trends with other geographical regions, such as Europe, where the rate
of increase in material extraction has been much lower, or with India,
which has a lower rate of material extraction per capita than Latin
America and which is not a net exporter in physical terms (Singh
et al., 2012). Such physical indicators are useful for characterizing the
economic structure of countries and regions.
Latin American economies, and particularly South American
economies, have a persistent and increasing physical trade deficit (West
and Schandl, 2013). The physical trade balance (PTB) is the difference
between the number of tonnes of materials that are imported by an
economy and the number of tonnes that are exported. The monetary
trade balance (MTB) is the difference between how much is paid for
the imports and how much is earned by exports in monetary terms.
Exports in tonnes are larger than imports in tonnes, resulting in a
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Figure 2.1 Latin America physical trade deficit in million tonnes, 1970–2008
Source: UNEP and CSIRO, 2013.
“deficit” in the same sense that would be applied to a tree plantation
that grows less than the harvest rate. Figure 2.1 presents a yearly PTB of
the Latin America region (including Mexico) per type of material from
1970 and 2008. Note in Figure 2.1 the increased physical trade deficit
for metal ores and industrial minerals, which reflects the growing pres-
sure to extract and export these materials. While one tonne of uranium
is, of course, environmentally very different from one tonne of sand
and gravel, or one tonne of cellulose from one tonne of shrimp, our
aim here is to show trends within broad material categories, where the
shift in the composition by commodities is not that important. Later we
take a closer look at the different commodities within the categories of
biomass and metal ores.
There are internal and external pressures to increase the extraction
of materials, for domestic use and for export. Such increasing pressures
to extract materials displace the commodity frontiers (Moore, 2000) to
new territories often inhabited by peasant and indigenous groups, who
complain accordingly as we signal in further detail in the next section
(Conde and Walter, 2014). In regard to external trade, trends point
to a structural persistence of an “ecologically unequal exchange”. This
concept challenges the argument that exports from developing nations
foster economic growth and development, and points to the physical
and socioenvironmental trade-offs at play (Hornborg, 1998; Muradian
and Martinez-Alier, 2001; Bunker, 2007). Studies in this field highlight
how poor countries are exporting goods at prices that do not take into
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account local externalities or depletion of natural resources, in exchange
for the purchase of expensive goods and services from richer regions.
One can measure ecologically unequal trade in terms of the inequality of
various dimensions, such as hours of labour, hectares of land, tonnes of
materials, water footprints, and joules or calories. When all or most indi-
cators point in a similar direction, then we can state that there has been
an unequal exchange (Hornborg, 2006). Ecologically unequal exchange
arises from the structural fact that the metropolitan regions or countries
require increasing amounts of energy and materials at cheap prices for
their metabolism.
The terms of trade are persistently negative for South America as a
whole and for most countries individually (one tonne of imports is
always more expensive than one tonne of exports, from two to five
times) in the very long term. However, the terms of trade improved
somewhat in the first decade of the twenty-first century, fuelling a wave
of optimism regarding economic growth but later deteriorating again
(Samaniego, Vallejo and Martinez-Alier, 2014). Currently, the large phys-
ical exports can scarcely pay for the imports in most South American
countries. A large physical trade deficit does not imply a positive MTB,
and, on the contrary, recent LA trends point to simultaneous physi-
cal and monetary deficits. Either in 2013 or 2014, or in both years,
there were commercial deficits in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and
other countries. While Argentina’s commercial surplus has been much
reduced, there is now a need to finance commercial deficits (Samaniego,
Vallejo and Martinez-Alier, 2014). For Argentina, our analysis of the
external trade over a long period (1970–2009) shows (Figure 2.2) small
monetary surpluses since the end of the 1990s (in 2001–2002 the sur-
plus increased because the economic crisis violently reduced imports).
Such small monetary surpluses almost disappeared in 2013–2014. From
a physical point of view, Argentina has exported increasing amounts
(in tonnes) since the early 1990s (between three and four times its
imports in tonnes), thus demonstrating structurally negative terms of
trade.
We do not enter into a detailed study here of the physical structure
of external trade in the sense of looking at its biomass, mineral and
fossil-fuel components (Perez-Manrique et al., 2013; West and Schandl,
2013). We point out, however, that Argentina exports – like Brazil –
large amounts of biomass. In comparison, another large South American
country, Colombia, does not export large amounts of biomass products
but it does export large amounts of coal. The PTB of Colombia shows
long-term trends that are not very different from those of Argentina,
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Figure 2.2 Argentina’s physical and monetary external trade flows, 1970–2009
Source: Walter et al. (2013).
namely, physical exports exceed physical imports by a factor of no
less than three (Figure 2.3). It must be noted that Colombia’s large
physical exports (which entail large unpaid socioenvironmental liabil-
ities) are now unable to pay for the imports. As Figure 2.3 shows, in
2011, Colombia exported about 120 million tonnes and imported about
30 million tonnes, leaving a physical trade deficit of more than 90 mil-
lion tonnes. This is for a country of more than 45 million inhabitants.
Argentina, with a population of about 40 million, has reached exports
of about 100 million tonnes and imports of about 30 million tonnes
(Perez-Manrique et al., 2013). Similar trends, with slight differences, are
identified in Brazil, Ecuador and Peru. Growing exports in tonnes (of dif-
ferent commodities) are not succeeding in improving the MTBs due to
the negative terms of trade (Vallejo, Pérez Rincón and Martinez-Alier,
2011; Pérez-Rincón, 2014; Samaniego, Vallejo and Martinez-Alier, 2014).
To conclude this section, the critiques against extractivism have a
double economic foundation. Domestic extraction and exports increase
as they are driven by internal and external demand. Raw materials-
based economies incur disproportionate environmental costs, which
are not factored into the price of commodities (Rice, 2007; Jorgenson,
2009; Roberts and Parks, 2009). Moreover, exhaustion of resources is
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Figure 2.3 Physical trade balance of Colombia, 1990–2011
Source: Samaniego et al. (2014) based on COMTRADE, DANE.
renamed as “production” and it sustains periodic periods of bonanza.
Outside demand does increase because of the metabolic needs of the
world industrial economy. The recent growth of Asian economies, and
China in particular, is exacerbating the primarization of Latin American
economies by boosting the pressure to extract environmentally sensi-
tive resources (Muradian, Walter and Martinez-Alier, 2012). Recently,
an absurd situation has been reached: not only are the environmental
costs of the booming extractive activities not accounted for, and the
exhausted resources not replenished, but, moreover, the great excess
of physical exports over imports is not able to pay for the imports.
The commercial deficits will have to be compensated for by foreign
investments or other forms of debt, which in due course will produce
repayments to foreign countries. These are becoming key drivers that
strengthen extraction trends, thereby expanding the commodity fron-
tiers and reaching areas of high biodiversity and cultural value – the land
of indigenous and peasant communities.
Extractive conflicts in Latin America
As pointed out in the previous section, there is an ongoing boom in
the extraction of commodities in Latin America, and a large share of
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these materials is exported. This boom has been related to an increase
in the number of extractive conflicts, which we frame as “ecological
distribution conflicts”. In order to elucidate the connections between
sociometabolic trends and extractive conflicts, we propose a typology
based on the commodity at stake. For each commodity type we will
briefly explain some key features and illustrate with examples. Each
commodity has its particularities and, as a result, different typologies
could be proposed. We don’t claim that the one used here is the best
or the only possible one, but we use it as a guiding tool to distinguish
key trends and features. We propose a classification that distinguishes
between biomass (crops, plantations, fisheries) and minerals (metal ores,
fuels, industrial, construction materials).
Within this typology, other subclassifications could be considered. For
instance, from a social metabolism point of view, another distinction
can be made between precious materials and bulk commodities when
considering metallic minerals or biomass products (Wallerstein, 1974).
Precious materials, such as diamonds, gold or shrimp, have a high eco-
nomic value per unit of weight but are physically not necessary as inputs
for the metabolism of the importing countries, compared with “bulk
commodities”, such as oil, gas, copper, iron, wood or soyabeans. This
distinction does not mean that gold does not play an important social
and economic role in the world of jewellery-making, in the world of love
and marriage (as in India) or in the world of financial investments (Ali,
2006), but the difference stands in the point of view of the metabolism
of the importing economies. Moreover, this difference is also related
to different drivers for extraction and the related socioenvironmental
pressure exerted.
Biomass
Extractive conflicts related to biomass involve a range of activities,
including soy, oil palm and timber production, plantations, fisheries,
and mangrove destruction and other deforestation. We could also
include related conflicts such as those over the use of glyphosate (for the
production of genetically modified organisms, such as soy) and over the
implementation of projects for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation
and Forest Degradation (REDD).
Let us consider here the case of Argentina (Perez-Manrique et al.,
2013). As shown in Figure 2.4, biomass is the predominant mate-
rial flow of this economy. On average, biomass represents 70% of all
materials extracted in the country from 1970 to 2009, of which 71%
comprise fodder for livestock (forage, silage, grazing and by-products),
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Figure 2.4 Domestic extraction in Argentina, 1970–2009
Source: Walter et al. (2013).
2% fishing and forestry biomass, and 27% crops. From 1997 to 2009,
biomass extraction from primary crops increased from 50 megatonnes
(Mt (1 million tonnes)) to 137 Mt, mainly for export. Soyabeans con-
stitute the predominant flow within the primary crops. According to
Pengue (2001), soyabeans (mostly genetically modified) have displaced
other domestically produced crops such as cereals, roots, tubers, vegeta-
bles and melons. Indeed, during the period studied, these crops have
decreased their participation in the primary crop extraction from 44%
to 25% for cereals, from 6% to 2% for roots and tubers, and from 5%
to 2% for vegetables and melons. From 1970 to 2009, Argentina’s soy-
abean production jumped from 26,000 tonnes to 30.9 Mt. This growth
was driven by high international prices for this commodity from the
1990s onwards, and by technological factors such as the mechaniza-
tion of agriculture, and the introduction of transgenic soyabeans and
chemical weeding with glyphosate (Teubal, 2006). Since the introduc-
tion of genetically modified soyabeans in Argentina in 1996, this crop
represents an average of 26% of all primary crops.
The rise in crop production led to the expansion of the agricultural
frontier, thereby clearing land and forest as well as displacing indigenous
and rural communities. Since the 1990s, Argentina has been experienc-
ing one of the largest processes of deforestation in the history of the
country (UMSEF, 2007). This entails new issues, such as the weakening
of food security, as crops are mainly exported and the production of
locally consumed crops is decreasing. The growing use of agrochemicals
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produces water, air and soil pollution, and causes health impacts on
the surrounding populations (Binimelis, Pengue and Monterroso, 2009).
The harvested area of soyabeans multiplied from 38,000 hectares (Ha)
in 1970 to 18 million Ha in 2009, accounting for more than half of
the total agricultural land (MAGyP, 2011). The predominant biomass
flow in the economy of Argentina is still grazing, foraging, silage and
by-products. Nevertheless, the expansion of soyabean crops diminished
the amount of land available for cattle-grazing. Millions of hectares
that were in agricultural-cattle rotation have been allocated to perma-
nent agriculture, while livestock increasingly depends on feed crops (i.e.
cereal, soymeal) (Santarcángelo and Fal, 2009; PEA, 2010).
These trends have contributed to an increased number of conflicts
over land in Argentina, as peasants and indigenous groups are con-
fronted with the expansion of the soy-extraction frontier into their
lands (Aranda, 2010). The expansion of the agricultural frontier has led
to the clearing of lands and forest, as well as the displacement of many
indigenous and rural populations (Teubal, 2006). This has resulted in
various conflicts over access to land. This is the case for the inhabitants
of La Primavera (Formosa, Argentina), who have been displaced by the
expansion of soy production ever since 2008. Indigenous communities
have been dispossessed of their lands, and the Qom people are struggling
to recover 5,000 Ha (Asociación Civil Nodo Tau, 2010; García-López and
Arizpe, 2010).
The increased use of chemicals in genetically modified (GM) crops
has also triggered an increasing number of conflicts related to the health
impacts. This is the case for the “mothers of Ituzaingó” of Cordoba, who
lead a movement that is mainly composed of women who since 2001
have been demanding that the provincial government stop the air fumi-
gation of soy fields. The spraying of large amounts of glyphosate near
urban areas was causing cases of cancer (mostly in children) and birth
defects induced by contamination. In 2009 the movement succeeded in
forbidding the spraying of this product in urban areas (GRR, 2009). Inci-
dentally, some invasive species such as Aleppo sorghum (or Johnsson
grass) acquired resistance to glyphosate spraying, and as a result agricul-
ture steps not only into a pesticide treadmill but also into a “transgenic
treadmill” (Binimelis, Pengue and Monterroso, 2009).
Tree plantations have similarly been the subject of socioenvironmental
conflicts. As analysed by Gerber (2011), industrial tree plantations for
wood, palm oil and rubber production are among the fastest-growing
monocultures and are currently being promoted as carbon sinks and
energy producers. Such plantations are causing a large number of
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conflicts between companies and local populations, mostly in the trop-
ics and subtropics. Relying on the most comprehensive literature review
to date, corresponding to 58 worldwide conflict cases (drawing on
the WRM database), Gerber (2011) finds that the prominent cause of
resistance is related to corporate control over land that results in dis-
placements and the end of local uses of ecosystems as they are replaced
by monocultures.
Biomass conflicts related to fisheries and shrimp aquaculture are also
relevant in Latin America. Let us briefly consider here the environmental
injustices related to the promotion of the shrimp aquaculture indus-
try in Central America, in the Gulf of Fonseca region of Nicaragua and
Honduras on the Pacific Coast. This is one of the most densely popu-
lated areas in Central America and also one of the poorest. This regional
economy depends, to a large extent, on artisanal fishing, specifically
shellfish harvesting. Industrial aquaculture activities began in Honduras
at the start of the 1970s and in Nicaragua in the second half of the
1980s with small-scale projects. Nowadays this activity has sharply
increased. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of
the United Nations, in 2008 production had reached 26,584 tonnes, and
14,690 tonnes in Honduras and Nicaragua, respectively. This implies an
increase in total production of more than 200% in both countries over
ten years (1998–2008). Most of the production is for export, mainly
to the USA and to European markets. Where there were once estuar-
ies and natural lagoons, nowadays there are large ponds for producing
shrimp. In Nicaragua the surface area under production expanded from
771 Ha in 1989 to 10,396 Ha in 2009, and in Honduras from 750 Ha in
1985 to 14,954 Ha in 2000 (Mestre Montserrat and Ortega Cerdà, 2012).
What was supposed to become a source of wealth for the regional
economy has disempowered local fishing communities, which have
seen their access to natural resources enclosed and limited. This has
triggered serious social conflicts in the region. The industrial sites
are located in areas populated by poor communities that rely on the
communal use of coastal resources. The main response of the shrimp
industry to the theft of their product has been the armed surveillance of
their lands, both private and public. This has been a common practice
in Nicaragua since 2008, when an agreement was established between
the Association of Aquaculturalists of Nicaragua and the armed forces.
These measures have further limited the access of local communities to
coastal resources, fostering conflict and further impoverishing the pop-
ulation, thereby increasing social marginalization and unrest. As Mestre
Montserrat and Ortega Cerdà (2012) indicate, successive conflicts
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between security forces protecting aquaculture farms and local fisher-
men have caused various injuries and at least one death in Nicaragua,
and twelve deaths in Honduras. Fishermen have reported cases in which
navigation to their fishing grounds through the estuarine channels has
been restricted, along with cases of detention and harassment – in the
form of constant demands for documentation to be shown – at sea. In
Honduras, people engaged in campaigns to resist the expansion of the
shrimp industry into protected areas have also been detained.
In Latin America, as elsewhere, the views of social groups involved
in such conflicts over biomass are expressed in different “languages”,
using, for example, discourses about land and territorial dispossession,
territorial rights, biopiracy, consultation rights, health impacts (due to
chemical use), food sovereignty, human rights (given criminalization
and militarization of extractive activities) and democracy. Unsustainable
biomass extraction is also linked with conflicts over the rights of nature
and of future generations, as biodiversity and nature’s genetic pool are
affected (by reducing the diversity of crops or advancing towards high-
diversity areas). Potential future conflicts could also arise as intensive
agricultural practices affect the long-term quality of soils (Pengue, 2001,
2004; Binimelis, Pengue and Monterroso, 2009).
Minerals
Mineral mining includes a range of commodities that can be grouped as
metals (e.g. copper, gold, silver, iron, bauxite, uranium, nickel), mineral
fuels (e.g. oil, gas, coal, shale oil), industrial minerals (e.g. phosphates,
asbestos, salt) and construction minerals (e.g. sand, gravel, stones). The
general stages of the mining process are shared: exploration to locate
and characterize the mineral deposits, exploitation to mine the ores,
mineral processing to refine the mineral, and transport to the consum-
ing economies. However, the features and impacts of each commodity
vary. Here we present some key features of the different minerals, and
analyse in more detail metal and fuel minerals whose extraction is
currently triggering significant debates in Latin America.
Metal ores
The extraction boom of raw materials in Latin American has been par-
ticularly significant for metal ores (see Figure 2.5). While in 1970 the
weight of industrial and metal ores accounted for 10% of the total
material flows of Latin America, in 2009 it reached 25%. In fact, in
2009, industrial and metals ores were, after biomass, the second greatest
material extracted and, in part, exported from the region, accounting
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Figure 2.5 Domestic extraction in Latin America by major category of material,
1970–2008
Source: UNEP and CSIRO (2013).
for 2,100 million tonnes of ores (West and Schandl, 2013). In 2012,
Latin America provided 45% of the global copper output, as well as
50% of silver, 26% of molybdenum, 21% of zinc and 20% of gold
(Henriquez, 2012), attracting a third of global metal-mining investments
(US$210 billion) (Ericsson and Larsson, 2013). We will address with
some detail metal ore extraction features and trends that are currently
related to a boom of conflicts in Latin America.
One of the particularities of the metal-mining production chain is that
its initial stages are characterized by low value but high environmental
cost: resource extraction and then processing/refining have the highest
impact. Later stages, such as assembling, are estimated to have less envi-
ronmental impact but generate the majority of the economic value. This
relationship represents a general trend of the impact/value curve that
also applies more generally to other products that use metal ores (Giurco
et al., 2010). Moreover, the socioenvironmental impacts of resource
extraction increase when ore grades decline, as more waste is gener-
ated. As pressure to extract ores increases and the extraction frontier
expands, reaching lower quality deposits, the environmental pressures
in the stages of extraction and processing become greater (Giurco et al.,
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Table 2.1 General conversion factors of gross ore versus metal content and ore
concentrate











Source: Based on Schoer et al. (2012).
2010). Table 2.1 presents general conversion factors for the relationship
between metal ores or concentrates and the gross ore that is mined. This
factor is derived from the average of the annual business reports of about
160 metal mines in the world (Schoer et al., 2012).
Precious materials, such as gold, have the highest generation of over-
burden. As indicated in Table 2.1, to obtain 2 grams of gold, an average
of 1 tonne of gross ore has to be mined. As the price per unit of pre-
cious metals is higher than for bulk metals, it becomes economically
feasible to extract ore of decreasing quality or grade, entailing the pro-
cessing of larger amounts of ore in open-cast mining and, as a result,
generating increasing amounts of waste rock and tailings. This has also
been made possible with the development of (more intensive) process-
ing techniques that allow miners to obtain metals from decreasing ore
concentrations (i.e. cyanide leaching for gold) (Bridge, 2004).
Moreover, other studies point to a worldwide decline in the quality
of ore.1 As the high-grade ores have been depleted, the mining fron-
tier moves to lower-grade ores, with increasing environmental costs.
The decline in the quality of ores has direct implications in terms of
land intervention of mining activities, as larger mines (open-pit min-
ing) have to be built and larger quantities of waste rock – especially
sensitive in the case of sulphidic material that has the potential to gen-
erate acid drainages2 – are generated (Bridge, 2004; Giurco et al., 2010;
Mudd, 2010). For instance, recent studies conducted in the gold-mining
sector in Australia indicate that, as ore quality decreases, the amount
of water and energy used in the mining process increases significantly.
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This trend overlaps with other environmental pressures, such as larger
requirements of chemical inputs and larger amounts of waste (Mudd,
2007a, 2007b; Giurco et al., 2010; Prior et al., 2012).
The significance of these trends grows as we consider the expansion of
the mining frontier to sensitive and critical ecosystems, such as tropical
and cloud forests, or the very high mountains next to pasturelands and
glaciers. These are also the homes of indigenous people. As pointed out
by Bridge (2004), an increasing proportion of mineral exploration and
investment expenditures during the 1990s targeted the tropical areas
around the globe, reaching ecologically sensitive and/or high-value con-
servation areas. The International Union for Conservation of Nature
(IUCN) has raised concerns related to the expansion of the mining, gas
and oil frontier in World Heritage Sites, demanding protection for them
(IUCN, 2011). Furthermore, recent studies led by scholars and activists
are pointing to the large overlap of mining concessions with the land of
peasants and indigenous people in Latin America (Bebbington, 2012b).
For instance, de Echave (2009, quoted in Bebbington, 2012b) estimates
that over half of Peruvian peasant communities are affected by mining
projects or concessions. According to the EJOLT database (see below),
in Latin America, indigenous peoples are present in over 50% of the
environmental conflicts recorded to date in this registry (Pérez-Rincón,
2014). Chapter 11 on community consultations analyses in more detail
some aspects of metal-mining conflicts in Latin America.
Moreover, it is important to stress that in the case of mining activities,
ecoefficiency and technological approaches are limited. As the environ-
mental impacts of mineral extraction can be reduced but not eliminated
(Bridge, 2004), inputs to the mining process – such as water, energy
or chemical compounds – can be reduced (per unit of production), the
management of waste can be improved (e.g. better membranes to isolate
waste from soil), and mining sites can be rehabilitated (e.g. revegeta-
tion). However, mineral mining necessarily modifies the environment
to some degree. Moreover, operationalizing ecoefficiency in the mining
sector is complicated by the fact that mining (unlike other industrial
processes) is a segregative process that cannot avoid the production of
large volumes of waste. This is increasingly significant considering the
wider trends of declining ore qualities. Along the same vein, Giurco et al.
(2010) maintain that mineral resource depletion is as much about falling
resource quality (decreasing ores) and accessibility (distant and difficult
to extract, with higher social and environmental costs and related con-
flicts) as it is about a reduction in resource quantity and availability.
As follows, Prior and colleagues (2012) suggest that the “peak metal”
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(the time when extraction can no longer rise to meet the demand)
has more to do with a carefully weighed decision that considers the
social and environmental implications of continuing to extract than a
question of existing metal quantities available.
In early 2014, OCMAL, a network of organizations that records large-
scale metal-mining conflicts, listed 203 active conflicts affecting 308
communities. According to OCMAL (2014), the largest number of min-
ing conflicts are found in Peru (35), Chile (35), Argentina (26), Mexico
(32), Brazil (20), Colombia (12), Bolivia (9) and Ecuador (7). Central
America as a whole also has many mining conflicts. The impact of
large-scale metal-mining activities on water, land, health, livelihoods
and rights raises concerns among communities that feel disempow-
ered by official decision-making procedures that place a premium on
ecoefficiency and pecuniary criteria. Governments and mining compa-
nies frame complaints as being politically motivated and misinformed
(Walter, 2014), but such a widespread wave of complaints (and so much
violence against the protestors, at least in some countries) is evidence of
a vigorous grassroots social movement.
Mineral fuels
This category includes a diversity of commodities, such as oil, natu-
ral gas and shale-gas fracking. We could also consider energy-related
conflicts related to thermoelectricity plants. Oil is the main source
of energy of modern societies; it is an essential input for the exoso-
matic energy metabolism of contemporary rich economies (transport,
industry, etc.). The growth of the world economy has relied on fossil
fuels over the last century, and the oil demand and consumption have
increased steadily throughout the twentieth century. However, since the
1960s, there has been a decrease in the number of new discoveries of
conventional oil reservoirs. Moreover, recent discoveries reveal decreas-
ing quality, thus implying larger economic and environmental costs
(Tsoskounoglou, Ayerides and Tritopoulou, 2008). As the pressure to find
and extract conventional and unconventional fossil fuels augments, the
frontiers of exploration and extraction expand, reaching environmental
and socially sensitive locations.
One area in Latin America where the expansion of the oil-mining
frontier has strongly impacted one of the culturally and biologically
most diverse regions on Earth is in the Peruvian Amazon. Orta-Martínez
and Finer (2010) indicate that since the 1920s, oil exploration and
extraction in this region have threatened both biodiversity and indige-
nous peoples, particularly those living in voluntary isolation. They argue
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that the phenomenon of peak oil, combined with rising demand and
consumption, is pushing oil extraction into the most remote corners
of the world. As modern patterns of production and consumption, and
high oil prices, are forcing a new oil exploratory boom in the Peruvian
Amazon, conflicts are spreading across indigenous territories, new forms
of resistance appear, and indigenous political organizations are born.
The expanding oil and gas frontiers are overlapping with the lands of
indigenous peoples, some of whom were previously uncontacted, which
fosters conflict, disease and unrest among these communities (Finer and
Orta-Martínez, 2010; Orta-Martínez and Finer, 2010; Gavaldà, 2013).
An important case of struggle over the environmental injustices of oil
extraction is in Lago Agrio, in the Ecuadorian Amazon. Between 1964
and 1992, Texaco’s oil operations polluted the northern region of the
Amazon forest in Ecuador, spanning 1 million Ha inhabited by vari-
ous indigenous communities and resulting in environmental and health
damage. Texaco was bought by Chevron in 2001. In 1993, local residents
and indigenous communities filed a class-action lawsuit against Texaco
in the District Court in New York for damages caused to their health and
to the environment. For ten years the case was stalled in the US Courts,
until 2003, when eventually the trial was moved to the Ecuadorian
Amazon town of Lago Agrio. In 2011, in a landmark judgement, the
local Sucumbios court sentenced Chevron Texaco to pay US$9.5 billion
to the Frente de Defensa de la Amazonia, which would be doubled if the
company did not publicly apologize. The court decision was upheld in
2012. Chevron has refused to pay and activists have tried to seize the
company assets in third-party countries, such as Canada and Argentina.
Industrial and construction minerals
Industrial minerals include those used in industrial and agricultural
processes. These minerals have different levels of toxicity and the pres-
sures to extract them depend on their industrial uses. There are, for
instance, conflicts related to the asbestos-mining in different places in
Latin America. An example is the conflict of Sao Felix do Amianto in the
state of Bahia (Brazil), which was open between 1939 and 1967 in the
towns of Bom Jesus da Serra and Poçoes. There are many claims asking
for compensation for health impacts, from workers both in the mine
and in the factory.
There are also conflicts related to industrial minerals that are less
toxic, such as phosphates. For instance, the Bayovar mine that is located
in the north of Peru and is owned by Vale produces 5 million tonnes of
phosphates per year (EJOLT, 2014).
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Construction minerals are materials such as sand and gravel that are
related to urbanization processes and infrastructure construction. These
materials travel less than other materials because of their relatively low
price per unit of weight, and for this reason they tend to be near the
sites of processing and final use. As follows, conflicts over quarries are
usually related to conflicts over processing plants (e.g. cement factories).
An example of conflicts related to sand and gravel extraction is in Rio
Tunjuelo (Bogotá, Colombia), one of the main sources of construction
minerals in Bogotá. Some 50 years of extraction of sands and gravels
have changed the urban landscape, shaping large holes in the ground.
These holes are 30, 50 or 70 m deep and have diameters that reach sev-
eral hundreds of metres. In 2002, in order to avoid the impact of a
serious flood, old mining holes were used as water reservoirs to divert
overflowing water from the Tunjuelo River. Flooded quarries became
a source of infections and bad odours, as abandoned quarries became
water oxidation ponds. Social unrest was born from the impact of aban-
doned quarries on water, and the environmental impacts related to the
nearby processing plants. Another example is the conflict in San Juan
Sacatepequez in Guatemala, where indigenous communities fostered a
local consultation to stop the opening of a quarry and its processing
plant on their lands. These activities were promoted by the national
government without the consent of local inhabitants (EJOLT, 2014).
Conflicts at different points in the commodity chain
The classification presented here focuses on extractive activities, but
conflicts can emerge at other stages of the life cycle of a commodity.
In such a way, material extraction is connected to environmental and
social pressures at different localities and to social groups that exceed the
specific place where extraction is occurring. We point to four key stages
related to the life cycle of a (raw material) commodity where conflicts
emerge: extraction, transport, processing and final disposal.
First, conflicts can arise at the site of extraction. We have previously
pointed out some of the socioenvironmental pressures and conflicts
directly related to extraction.
Second, the transport of raw materials to processing plants is also
related to noise, dust and air pollution. This stage also includes the
impacts and conflicts related to the construction of transport infras-
tructures, such as pipelines and ports. An example of the tensions
related to these activities is the Initiative for the Integration of the
Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA), led by a group of Latin
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American governments with the support of the Interamerican Devel-
opment Bank (IDB) and the Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF).
The IIRSA initiative aims to improve the connection of Latin American
economies, connecting the Pacific and Atlantic oceans to facilitate the
extraction and export of Latin American raw materials. It includes the
construction of hydroways, gas and oil pipelines, ports and so forth.
IIRSA-related projects are giving way to numerous large conflicts in
the region (Svampa, 2012; Gavaldà, 2013), as these infrastructures are
reaching the lands of distant communities that are also areas of high
biodiversity and landscape value.
Third, processing plants usually require energy, water and chemi-
cal substances, and can also affect the quality of soil, air, and surface
and underground waters, triggering health problems and social conflict.
A paradigmatic case is La Oroya in Peru. La Oroya is a mining town in
the Peruvian Andes that, since 1922, has been the site of a polymetallic
smelter. This has produced toxic emissions and wastes from the plant.
Recently the smelter was recycling scrap metals imported through El
Callao (Lima’s harbour) and taken up by railway to La Oroya, which
has suffered from critical levels of air pollution and is considered to be
one of the most polluted places on Earth (Blacksmith Institute, 2006).
Owned by the Missouri-based Doe Run Corporation, the smelter was
long signalled as responsible for the dangerously high lead levels found
in children’s blood.
Fourth, conflicts can arise when commodities reach the end of their
life cycle and are discarded. Waste generation also includes impacts on
soil, air and water generated during extraction, transport and processing
(e.g. mining waste ponds and landfills). Climate change could be seen as
a waste-disposal conflict because we have exceeded the capacity of new
terrestrial vegetation and the oceans to absorb the carbon dioxide pro-
duced, and therefore its concentration in the atmosphere has increased
to 402 ppm.
New approaches to studying environmental conflicts:
A statistical political ecology
Since the 2000s, various groups have been creating online databases that
register information on ongoing socioenvironmental conflicts in Latin
America and beyond. These databases reflect an effort initiated by NGOs
and social movements to make visible the increasing environmental
injustices that communities confront. More recently, universities and
research projects have also engaged in such systematization initiatives.
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Some aim at mapping out environmental conflicts in one country, such
as a recent inventory of over 80 conflicts in Colombia (Pérez-Rincón,
2014) and the Brazilian Mapa da Injustiça Ambiental e Saúde (Envi-
ronmental Injustice and Health Map, by FIOCRUZ). In addition, there
is a growing number of databases recording socioenvironmental con-
flicts throughout the region, including OLCA, and worldwide, such as
our EJOLT project (Martinez-Alier et al., 2011). There are also databases
focused on specific issues, such as tree plantations (see WRM), mining
(OCMAL) and land-grabbing (Genetic Resources Action International
(GRAIN)). Furthermore, there are important efforts being made to report
on processes of protest and “criminalization” of activists or human
rights violations in Latin America and the Caribbean (OCMAL, 2013;
Toledo, Garrido and Barrera Bassols, 2013). This “criminalization of
protest” refers to different processes that range from government offi-
cials and politicians who promote and apply laws that typify protest
as unacceptable social behaviour and label protest as sabotage, terror-
ism or an obstruction of public space; to protesting organizations as
illicit associations or publicly framing protestors as criminals (Saavedra,
2013); and, most dramatically, to the reality of countries such as Brazil,
Mexico, Colombia and Peru, where environmental activists are being
killed while defending livelihoods and nature (see the lists provided by
Global Witness). The ENGOV project has created an inventory of Latin
American databases and maps (available at www.engov.eu), while the
global inventory by EJOLT allows us to analyse and compare different
features of numerous extractive conflicts (available at www.ejatlas.org).
Conclusion
In this chapter we have explained the main trends in the social
metabolism of Latin America and have focused on one of the main
indicators, the material flows. In the last 40 years the extraction of mate-
rials has increased four-fold, far more than the population. A substantial
part of the extracted materials (whether biomass, fossil fuels or metal
ores, although not the building materials) goes to exports. We have
developed a typology of conflicts according to the commodities in ques-
tion. Many grassroots environmental organizations, and also academics
and state bodies, are aware that there are more ecological distribution
conflicts, and they contribute to environmental governance by making
them visible through inventories and maps.
In regard to external trade and economic policies, we have insisted
that at present most South American economies have large physical
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trade deficits (in tonnes), and simultaneously they have or are about to
have commercial trade deficits (in monetary terms). That is to say, the
large physical exports that carry heavy ecological and social rucksacks
are scarcely able to pay for the imports. In all of South America there are
huge exports in volume (tonnes of oil, coal, iron ore, soyabeans, wood,
copper, etc.) and yet several countries (Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela
and Ecuador) have monetary commercial deficits. Remarkably, the
recent “extractivist” trend happens both in countries with national-
popular governments and in those with neoliberal governments. Even
President Mujica of Uruguay favoured an iron-mining project with the
Indian company Zamin Ferrous Metals in 2014. This project aims to
export 18 million tonnes per year during the next 20 years – about 6
tonnes per inhabitant – leaving behind large environmental liabilities.
There are structurally unfavourable terms of trade for Latin American
countries exporting natural resources. First, persistent physical trade
deficits are recorded. We call it a “deficit” because natural resources
are lost or depleted. In recent years, this trend has been accompanied
by a monetary trade deficit that affects both small and large coun-
tries. Brazil had, between January and March of 2014, a trade deficit
of US$6,072 million. This is the highest deficit for a quarter in 21 years,
while Argentina has seen its monetary trade surplus sharply decrease
between 2012 and the first quarter of 2014. Monetary trade deficits must
be balanced by other income in the current account or in the capital
account balance. The inflow of foreign direct investment can offset the
trade deficit but it will generate income that will later leave the country.
Increased indebtedness will lead to a need to export more and more,
causing further environmental damage and social conflict.
While the demand for raw materials that are not recycled (e.g. fos-
sil fuels) or only partly recycled (e.g. metals) is likely to remain over
time, even without economic growth in the world system, the social and
environmental costs of extraction are increasing as the grade of metallic
minerals and the EROI decreases. This is the case as oil or gas is extracted
from distant places, as also happens with timber, soy or palm oil. At the
same time, even if in the long term the demands remain, prices can fall
sharply due to variations in the business cycles. Overall, reprimarization
is a risky economic strategy. Therefore, it is not surprising that new Latin
American voices call for different economic policies. For them, the local
complaints against extractive industries (including biomass extraction)
should not be seen as instances of NIMBY (“not in my backyard”) or as
attacks on the state, but instead as useful contributions towards a change
in environmental governance.
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Therefore the criticism of South American post-extractivist scholars
(Maristella Svampa, Eduardo Gudynas, Alberto Acosta) not only has a
social and environmental basis but also has economic and democratic
foundations. The export of raw materials depletes natural resources and
causes pollution and conflicts with local populations. Governments use
repression as a method to facilitate raw-material extraction. On the
other hand, the prices of these major exports are cheap in comparison to
imports, hence a new march along the route to debt. These tendencies
point to the need for a change in policies. In fact, there have been some
attempts to curb the export of raw materials through public policies such
as the Yasuní-ITT initiative in Ecuador from 2007 to 2013, aimed at leav-
ing oil in the ground under zones with exceptionally high biodiversity
in the Ecuadorian Amazon. Popular resistance is also expressed in many
existing protests, often arguing in terms of indigenous land rights. And
new institutions arise as referenda or local consultations (see Chapter
11). These local protests and initiatives for environmental justice are a
response to the power of corporations and governments, a power that
leads to a deficit in local democracy. In sum, next to physical and mon-
etary trade deficits, the export of raw materials also produces a deficit in
local democracy.
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Notes
1. A recent industry study signals that, “With declining ore grades exacerbated
by increasing energy and other costs, and significant deposits being found at
greater depths or in more remote areas, the average capital costs for copper
production capacity in new mines increased an average of 15% per year over
the past 20 years, with much of the increase evident since 2008” (SNL Metals
Economics Group, 2013).
2. Mining-related chemical pollution can be generated by the release into the
environment of reagents added during mineral processing, such as the sul-
phuric acid that is used for the leaching of copper oxides, or the mercury or
cyanide used to process gold. Pollution is also caused by the oxidation that
naturally occurs in minerals that are present in the ore as a result of expo-
sure to air, water and/or bacteria. Many metal ores, such as nickel, copper and
lead, occur in the rock as sulphides. The contact with oxygen and water trig-
gers an oxidation process that forms sulphuric acid. This process can result in
the formation of acid rock drainages. This process has been pointed out as one
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of the main environmental challenges of the mining industry (Bridge, 2004;
Government of Australia, 2007; Giurco et al., 2010).
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Indigenous Knowledge in Mexico:
Between Environmentalism and
Rural Development
Mina Kleiche-Dray and Roland Waast
Introduction
Since the 1990s, several international agreements (Article 8J of the
Biological Diversity Convention, 1992) and international protocols
(Nagoya Protocol, 2010) have begun to assess the capacity of indige-
nous knowledge to contribute to socioeconomic progress as well as to
environmental protection. In the course of this process, the knowl-
edge and practices of peasants and natives have been called to the
rescue to resolve a number of new problems. These include the loss of
biodiversity, threats from carbon dioxide emissions and environmen-
tal conservation, with consequent debates about the property rights
of local and autochthonous populations – such as that on “biopiracy”
versus “bioprospection”. However, the farming methods favoured by
the indigenous populations often conflict with national development
projects oriented towards the market economy. This discrepancy gives
rise to tensions and to local, national and international conflicts that
can be observed throughout Latin America. They are typified in a coun-
try such as Mexico, which will serve here as an example. Mexico has
been the subject of a number of studies1 and is often seen as a laboratory
of both ideas and long-term development projects related to these issues.
It has 12% of the biodiversity of the planet; natural vegetation occupies
more than 71% of its territory, and its forest resources occupy 64.8 mil-
lion Ha,2 70% of which belong to autochthonous and peasant commu-
nities (OCDE, 2013). Agriculture remains a highly important activity in
the country, covering 24% of the territory (102 million Ha), of which
half is ejidataria (communal land covered by extension services). Some
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16 million of its 112 million inhabitants identify themselves as belong-
ing to the población indígena and 7 million speak a native language. The
population that lives in the areas of greatest biodiversity is generally
classified as being one of the poorest. Some 88% of the 1,033 indigenous
municipalities are classified as being in “great poverty”. In fact, Mexico
is the country that has the most revealing poverty rate in the OCDE.3
Furthermore, its natural resources are deteriorating, under pressure from
grazing, from slashing and burning brush in preparation for tillage, from
excessive tillage and from intensive irrigation (OCDE, 2007). In this con-
text, more and more social movements and proponents of environmen-
tal projects – such as the local branch of Vía Campesina – have emerged.
They rely on autochthonous knowledge in the struggle against the rapid
expansion of intensive agriculture, the monoculture of GM organisms,
extensive ranching, biofuels, land-grabbing and extractive industries.
Of course, these social movements are by no means recent. How-
ever, everything indicates that they have gained a fresh impulse from
the institutionalization of a national environmental policy, the boom
of alternative rural development projects and the initiatives of new
actors, such as movements of identity assertion and the national and
international NGOs that support them (i.e. GRAIN).
These new actors favour decentralized management of natural
resources, the setting up of local seed banks, the promotion of an
agriculture free from chemical inputs, and the development of local
markets. Family farming and small-scale agriculture – a political cate-
gory that also covers the agricultural practices of the native and peasant
populations – constitute the prime area targeted by their projects.
In this complex context, “developmentalist” policies enter into com-
petition with new projects classified as “socioenvironmental” (Léonard
and Foyer, 2011).
New issues consist of the acknowledgement of indigenous and peas-
ant knowledge, and its inclusion in the design, elaboration, implemen-
tation, execution and evaluation of projects that support family and
small-scale agriculture.
Similarly, questions have arisen regarding ways of setting up a
national environmental project that would involve native and peasant
populations as well as new actors – NGOs, state and municipal author-
ities, and national and international private organizations (including
large farmers and multinational firms) – in governance and decision-
making. How can a sustainable and equitable use of natural resources
be guaranteed? Is such an environmental project compatible with a
particular development project?
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This chapter focuses on the sociocognitive dynamics underlying the
practical use of natural resources in family and small-scale agriculture.
We shall first review the literature in social science studies and in Latin-
American post-colonial studies on these dynamics. We shall then turn
to the treatment of indigenous knowledge in mainstream social sciences
and its promotion by certain policy-makers. Finally we will analyse
the pragmatic combination of autochthonous and scientific knowledge
in the process of governance, incorporating environmental matters by
means of constant political, local and historical reconfiguration. These
field perspectives are based on work in the Mixteca region (State of
Oaxaca, Mexico).
Decolonizing indigenous and peasant knowledge
The objective of this chapter is to understand how, on the one hand,
indigenous and peasant knowledge penetrates technoscientific knowl-
edge and how, on the other hand, it becomes part of rural-development
projects and environmental issues. Of major help in this attempt are the
general concepts of “translation” (Callon and Latour, 1981; Akrich et al.,
2006), “boundary-object” (Leigh Star and Griesemer, 1989; Trompette
and Vinck, 2009) and “transcodification” (Lascoumes, 1994). They have
been forged in the field of social studies of science in order to deal with
similar problems (Callon, 1986 on scientists, fishermen and the plan
to breed sea shells). These concepts postulate a continuity between the
logics of knowledge production and political logics, and a centrality of
the dynamics of translation and hybridization in different epistemic
spheres (Harding, 1997). Social studies of science examine the medi-
ations between knowledge of differing types (and especially between
scientific and profane knowledge), and between scientific knowledge
and the political logics involved in action.4
Meanwhile, the anthropology of local knowledge has analysed the
categories grouped under the term “traditional knowledge”. Agrawal
(1995, 2002) points out the context of their use (and the political dimen-
sions involved in asymmetrical exploitation of this knowledge com-
pared with that of “scientific knowledge”), particularly in development
projects. In regard to environmental issues, several authors have stressed
the embedding of different types of knowledge in their conditions of
production, their historical, social and institutional settings, and the
need to study the full context of practices and circulation when they are
put into operation (Fairhead and Leach, 2003; Goldman et al., 2011).5
All these aspects have to be analysed if one is to understand exchanges
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between types of knowledge and the construction of new hybridized
forms in the processes of environmental governance. These various
types of knowledge also have to be viewed in the asymmetrical per-
spective of North/South encounters (Gaillard et al., 1997; Escobar, 1995;
Waast, 1996) and centre/periphery geopolitical relationships (Polanco,
1989; Raj, 2007).
Other useful perspectives have been developed over the last
15 years in Latin American post-colonial studies (Escobar, 2003;
Boidin, 2010). Their Latin American proponents (e.g. in the
Modernity/Coloniality/Decoloniality (M/C/D) programme, school of
thought represented in Latin America) have catalysed a current of
critical rethinking of “Eurocentric modernity”. Using the notion of
coloniality of power and of knowledge (Quijano, 1994; Lander, 2000;
Mignolo, 2000; Dussel, 2007), the M/C/D programme describes colo-
nization in a much more complex way, going beyond the conventional
analysis in terms of political and economic oppression. A racial and eth-
nic classification of the world has given rise to a cultural oppression in
which only one type of awareness and a single form of reason are taken
into account. It is on this basis that geocultural identities have been
attributed to the regions and populations of the world (Crespo, 2014).
The notion of “coloniality” reveals three parallel processes of “mod-
ernization”: (1) the exclusion of other cultures or civilizations from
participation in the construction of modernity; (2) the imposition of
geocultural identities (Crespo, 2014); and (3) the exclusion of any forms
of knowledge (other than the colonial) in the historical construction
of the world. The M/C/D programme is an invitation to perform a
“decolonial spin” (Castro Gomez and Grosfoguel, 2007) that involves
taking into account the various places of enunciation and their critical
or resistant approach towards colonial modernity. The programme uses
the notion of “frontier epistemology” (Mignolo, 2007) to rewrite the
narrative of modernity from alternative standpoints, re-evaluating dom-
inated cultures and peoples and their histories of resistance. It aims, for
instance, to retell the history of Latin America by taking into account
relationships between society and nature.
The essential “coloniality of nature” in Latin America is linked to
the disruption of indigenous ecosystems and methods of production,
annulling the potential autonomy of these societies (Leff, 1986; Castro
Herrera, 1996) and leading to a “subalternation” of the dominated bod-
ies of both human beings and nature (Castro-Gómez, 2005). Arturo
Escobar uses the concept of “nature regimes” to define the processes,
articulating modes of perception and experience that determine the
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ways of using space. These processes are identified as “resistance”,
“compromise” and “hybridization”.
Taken up by political ecology, along with the notion of “colonized
nature” (Escobar, 2011), this sort of thinking enables us to understand
that the categories of “traditional knowledge” and “local knowledge”
can only be grasped in opposition to that of “scientific knowledge”.
All knowledge is produced within social, political and economic rela-
tionships of certain types. And the actors who promote one or another
type of knowledge in modern society always do so through a binary
classification: modernity/coloniality or universality/pluriversality.
“Decolonizing nature” involves understanding, first and foremost,
how “subaltern knowledge” has been identified and characterized by
science – that is, disqualified, and sometimes reappropriated in down-
graded form as a mere resource – and also the ways in which all actors
relate to nature. Nature is not merely seen as a resource but in a different
framework altogether: as culture.
From “traditional and local” to “indigenous” knowledge
This statement by A. Escobar leads us to examine the ways in which
mainstream science has treated indigenous knowledge.
In the early 1980s, agronomists, in evaluating the technical compo-
nent of farmers’ agricultural practices, began to write about indigenous
knowledge and know-how. The agronomists resumed observations and
studies made by naturalists, ethnologists and linguists during and after
the colonial period, focusing on instruments (tools), crop rotation,
preparation of the land and so on. Within the social sciences, special-
ists in “development” subsequently took up the topic, accompanied by
a few anthropologists.6 This eventually muted into a craze, despite the
fact that level-headed specialists stressed that local knowledge should
not be made into a fetish.
In the 1990s the notion moved from agricultural questions to envi-
ronmental studies, passing from issues of production and productivity
to those of conservation and the management of natural resources.
It came to the attention of experts, research centres and interna-
tional organizations (Bell, 1979; Chambers, 1988). Many anthropolo-
gists climbed on the bandwagon. Their intervention opened up two
distinct perspectives. On the one hand, the majority supported recog-
nition of traditional knowledge, as it represented for them – at the
very least – new fields of study, new sources of finance for applied
anthropology, and access to a “specialist” status. On the other hand,
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the term “indigenous knowledge” began to develop as a more militant
concept, highlighting the dependence and marginalization of “indige-
nous” peoples. This latter term differs from the previously predominant
notions of “traditional” and “local knowledge”, which have now come
to be seen as condescending. The former term is linked to a moderniz-
ing project for society, and the latter to the universality of “scientific
knowledge”. These two notions enabled that of “indigenous knowl-
edge” to emerge as a relatively open-minded alternative. Its promoters
stressed that indigenous knowledge cannot be reduced to a recipe for
development (Agrawal, 1995; Sillitoe, 1998). The notion of “indigenous
knowledge” has been instrumental to the recognition of local knowl-
edge in the legal field, in that of intellectual property rights and more
generally in the right of peoples to their own culture.
Work on this subject continued to develop in the 2000s, massively
appropriated in environmental studies and anthropology. In these cir-
cles, there has been passionate debate on the subject. The arguments
deployed have often helped “indigenous” peoples and peasants to
obtain the benefits brought about by development as well as greater
political autonomy.7 The journal Human Ecology has become a major
vector of this environmental and anthropological work.8 The notion of
“traditional knowledge” has since followed its own developmental path,
with a strong environmental focus. Many authors use the two concepts –
traditional and indigenous – interchangeably (Godoy et al., 2005).
As for Latin America, the local history of all these notions is not very
different. The term “indigenous knowledge” appeared very early on and
spread primarily through Brazil, Mexico, Bolivia and Chile. Interest-
ingly, it eventually deserted scientific literature and was linked mainly
to social movements. At present there are few studies published on the
topic in the social sciences and humanities. Possibly the recognition of
intellectual property rights after the Rio Conference in 1992 put an end
to debate in the region.9
Very few studies deal with the way in which companies avoid complex
negotiations with local communities – buying, for example, medici-
nal plants on local markets, and hiring and training collectors and
growers of plants required for natural cosmetics. Likewise, few authors
now undertake studies of traditional knowledge in regard to medic-
inal plants, experiments with traditional knowledge in public health
services, and discussions about climate change and other current issues.
While the term “indigenous knowledge” has been fading out, that
of “agroecology” has grown in popularity, especially in Latin America.
Agroecology as a scientific field valorizes native and peasant farming
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practices as a socioproductive alternative to modern agriculture (Altieri
et al., 2006) that is also environmentally friendly. According to its
protagonists, native and peasant practices can inspire the ecological
scientific approach and at the same time become a sustainable way of
farming.
Scientific and institutional interest in indigenous and peasant farm-
ing practices is not really new, however. In Mexico, a key figure in
this intellectual tradition was Efraim Hernandez Xolocotzi (known as
Efraim H.X.), an agronomist who was educated in the USA and taught
at the University of Chapingo. He was called back to Mexico to support
the Green Revolution at its very beginning but soon became critical
of it (Jiménez Sánchez, 1984). He contributed to the creation of an
agroecological movement in Mexico. Basically, his objective was to show
how important it was to study traditional agrosystems, stressing the
fact that resource scarcity drives man’s creativity and encourages him
to develop a set of cultural and productive practices to adapt to the
environment and to the conditions of production (Díaz León and Cruz
León, 1998). According to Efraim H.X. and his disciples, especially Victor
Toledo (1992), “the indigenous model” of agriculture can serve as a basis
for the development of agroecological knowledge and practices. In the
1980s a socialist current in Mexico – consisting primarily of biologists,
ethnobotanists and agronomists – joined in social and environmental
thinking and engaged directly with native and peasant communities.
Agroecology has been politicized in different ways for different pur-
poses, depending on whether it is being promoted by academic activists,
by peasants, by religious militants, by agronomy advisors or by officials.
This can be said about projects ranging from the design of public poli-
cies to initiatives of an extremely local nature. This is what we will now
discuss, tracing this shift in the political field and, in particular, in public
rural development policies aimed at small-scale family farming.
Indigenous knowledge as a lever for rural development and
environmental policies
After a period of liberalization of structural adaptation plans following
the financial crisis of 1982 – which resulted in the ratification of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the political and
financial crisis of 1994–2005 – Mexican agriculture had to face inter-
national competition in a context of market deregulation and trade
liberalization. A policy of food security10 replaced that of food self-
sufficiency, which had been the credo of agrarian reform and the Green
Revolution. By the 1990s the ejidos had been privatized and extension
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services reduced. As a result, foreign purchases of foodstuffs increased
(Warman, 2001).11
Nevertheless, political discourse has continued to defend the impor-
tance of developing autonomous and efficient agrifood systems. In a
country where only 6% of farmers are classified as “modern”,12 the
Mexican Government has had to propose various programmes and mea-
sures to mitigate the impacts of rising food prices for the poorest strata
of the population (Gravel, 2009). The main measures aimed at the poor-
est farmers were a distribution of grants according to cultivated acreage
(such as the so-called Procampo Programme) and aid to the poorest
women (Progresa/Oportunidad). The less marginalized categories were
urged to adopt the Green Revolution technology package (hybrids, fer-
tilizers, pesticides and mechanization) in programmes such as Object
Income and Masagro.
Thus in 2007 the state designed a new national policy for rural
development as a whole. With the programme Nuevo Programa Especial
Concurrente (PEC), the government began to take an interest in the
integration of the native and peasant population into national devel-
opment. This PEC was launched in areas of great and very great
marginalization, the population itself taking part, thanks to the orga-
nization of a forum (Foro de Consulta Popular), to which all stakeholders
in the rural sector were invited.13
However, only 15.7% of all financial resources considered in the
PEC were directed towards the support of agricultural food production
(Gomez-Oliver, 2008). Furthermore, programmes that targeted small
farmers – either by distributing a technology package or by grant-
ing subsidies – encouraged deforestation, and this gave rise to further
intensification of farming.
This seems to be at odds with the aim of developing a national
environmental policy. Yet ratification of the Convention on Biological
Diversity and recognition of native struggles (in the San Andrés agree-
ments of 1994) finally led to the creation of the Environment Ministry
(the Secretariat of the Environment and Natural Resources/Secretaria de
Medio Ambinete y Recursos Naturales (SEMARNAT)) in 1994. An envi-
ronmental policy that attempts to integrate the international standards
of Agenda 2114 was established. In 2000 a National Plan for Sustainable
Development was adopted. To top it off, in 2000 the Mexican Constitu-
tion was changed so as to acknowledge the cultural and ethnic diversity
of Mexican society. This particular interest has been reinforced since
2007 in the sustainable development programmes in which ecological
viability is treated as one of the five cornerstones of federal action. This
functions in tandem with the Sector Programme for the Environment
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and Natural Resources, the objective of which is to “associate the con-
servation of natural capital with economic and social development”
(OCDE, 2013: 40). The dual process involved in the recognition of
indigenous knowledge has thus been made part of the development
pattern for agricultural and environmental policies.
In this dual ministerial context, the Mexican Government undertook
the task of integrating the participation of the native and peasant pop-
ulation into its agricultural policy and also into its political agenda,
thereby institutionalizing national environmental policy.
The Ministry of the Environment has confirmed that “the native pop-
ulations that maintain a very close link with natural resources and
biodiversity actively support sustainable development through on-site
conservation of ecosystems and natural habitats, and the maintenance
and recuperation of viable populations of species in their natural
surroundings”.15
In 1997 the Ministry of the Environment initiated the Conserva-
tion and Restoration Programme of soils. In 1998 it launched the
National Reforestation Programme and other programmes that sought
to combine economic and social development with environmental con-
servation. The objective was to devote economic resources to National
Protected Areas and to the restoration of regions identified as priorities
from an environmental perspective.
The main tools that the government has used have always been
aimed at the conservation of biodiversity and of forests, in accordance
with the National Strategy for Biodiversity (2000), complemented by
the Mexican Strategy for the Conservation of Plants (which has existed
since 2008 and was revised in 2012) and subsequently enhanced by the
National Strategy combating invasive species. Major programmes within
this framework have been specifically dedicated to native and peasant
populations.
A twist was introduced, however, when the Ministry of the Envi-
ronment developed its Regional Sustainable Development Programme
(Programa de Desarrollo Regional Sustentable (PRODERS)) in an attempt
to link the environmentalist vision to a developmentalist one. The
programme was presented as a comprehensive initiative by means of
which SEMARNAT contributed to the support of sustainable develop-
ment in poor rural regions. These regions often include native and
peasant populations who live where the major biological and environ-
mental riches are located, far from the rural nodes. The management
of this programme was supposed to be decentralized and participative,
based on a long-term vision (Toledo and Bartra, 2000).
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Thus it would seem that – despite almost ten years of government
efforts to institutionalize an environmental policy linked to the devel-
opment of sustainable agriculture in the most disadvantaged areas of the
country – most observers agree that the main thrust of agricultural pol-
icy has been, and remains, the pursuit of greater productivity (OCDE,
2013). The bulk of financial resources are still being oriented towards
commercial agriculture and “modern farmers”: the most important sub-
jects in the sector. This conclusion is congruent with the criticism
emanating from the post-colonial school, which interprets from these
policies a vision based on denial of all rationality and veritable knowl-
edge in other forms of culture. This attitude does not leave room for
any concepts other than those of a modernizing society and its links to
high-productivity projects. Ultimately, it leaves no space for plurality or,
in the words of Arturo Escobar, “pluriversity” (Escobar, 2011). Although
this trend presents itself globally, the fact remains that conflicting log-
ics – even at a government level – mean that heterogeneous projects
are now being implemented for merely practical reasons. Several studies
have attempted to bring visibility to the success of various local expe-
riences that overcome this contradiction between developmental and
environmental concerns. The government – notably two ministries
(Environment and Agriculture: SEMARNAT and SAGARPA (Secretaria de
Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación)) – gave
direct or indirect support to these local experiences, particularly (a
recent development) various civil society groups that had made progress
in the conservation of soil and water, the protection of biodiversity and
wildlife, and the autonomy of their food systems. We shall now describe
a case of this sort that illustrates the importance of practical reason in
action.
Towards an institutionalization of native and peasant
knowledge
We will now deal with a case study that needs to be contextualized.
Its whole story takes place in the Mixteca Region of Oaxaca, Mexico.
To begin, we will discuss traditional knowledge and its evolution over
the course of time.
Construction of agricultural knowledge and practices, and their
exchange over the course of time
The Mixteca region of south-east Mexico covers the eastern part of
Oaxaca state. It extends over an area of 4 million Ha, in which there are
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221 municipalities, 155 of them located in the state of Oaxaca. It is in
the Mixteca region that the largest “indigenous population” of Mexico
is concentrated, with more than 1 million people (34% of the Oaxaca
population)16 (INEGI, 2010). Mixtec inhabitants belong, however, to a
diversity of peoples: Chocholteca, Tlapaneca, Nahuatl, Triqui, Zapotec
and Amuzgo (Rivas Guevara et al., 2009). Their history is traversed by
episodes of expropriation and reappropriation of their land.
The Aztecs and later the Spanish colonized the region and divided
local political entities into small communities, grabbing the best land.
Since the Mexican independence, the Agricultural Reform has redis-
tributed the haciendas (large farming units) into ejidos, the privatization
of which has been authorized by federal law since the 1990s. The result
has been a broad diversity of land use and tenure in the native and peas-
ant communities of the Mixteca – bienes comunales (commons), ejidos
(public lands with extension services), tierras de uso común (collective
lands managed by means of community meetings) and tierras privadas
(private lands). Control is highly concentrated: 1.7% of the ejidos and
communities control 70% of the land, and 0.41% of the private prop-
erties cover 20% of the total of privatized lands. Thus more than 85%
of private units and ejidos are smaller than 5 Ha (Sanchez Lopez, 2013).
This inequality has generated agrarian conflicts that continue to this
very day.
However, despite this conflict-ridden history, periods of tranquillity
have made it possible to introduce new plants, and new techniques
of cultivation and food preparation, since colonization. This has been
due to exchanges among communities during religious festivals and
at markets, and migration to other regions (Katz, 1994, 2002). During
the colonial period, the cultivation of wheat and sugarcane, exten-
sive ranching, and the breeding of silkworms and cochineal progressed,
gaining economic importance (Long and Attolini, 2009; Lazos, 2012).
With the decline of the silk industry and cochineal at the end of the
nineteenth century, artisanal palm weaving gained importance, driven
primarily by the Spaniards, who managed to establish an international
market. On the other hand, deforestation and the erosion of soils wors-
ened when goats were introduced and lime was exploited (Velásquez,
2002).
Subsequently the Mexican Government’s “developmentalist” project
also had an impact on these dynamics, by influencing local agricultural
practices. From 1935 to 1988, the Mexican Government implemented
more than 19 “developmentalist” programmes (Altieri et al., 2006) ded-
icated to crops ranging from cochineal, fruit trees, coffee, hybrid corn,
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and vegetables to livestock and the improvement of agricultural infras-
tructure. During the 1970s the government also tried to promote a
Green Revolution technology package (improved seeds, mechanization,
the use of fertilizers and chemical pesticides) by means of aids and
extension services within the framework of its Integrated Rural Develop-
ment Programme (Programa Integral de Desarrollo Rural (PIDER)). Though
PIDER achieved a significant volume of production, it led to the loss
of native varieties of maize, beans and squash; the contamination of
soil and water; the overexploitation of aquifers; deforestation; and soil
erosion (Altieri et al., 2006).
The government saw the main problems of the Mixteca as matters of
water and soil. By the 1970s, it tried to recover the Mixtecan technique
of terraced agriculture that the inhabitants had lost (Mendoza García,
2002, 2004). This had been used in small valleys and heavy rainfall
areas. The federal government attempted to restore the ancient terraces
using heavy machinery. Facing poor results, it decreed that the Mixteca
was unable to sustain the development of an alimentary agriculture.
The main replacement project was to plant palm trees to supply a craft
industry. As of 1973, weavers were organized into cooperatives (Velasco
Rodriguez, 1994) supported by the Palm Trust (Fideicomiso de la Palma
(FIDEPAL)). Unfortunately, the government neither managed to consol-
idate this cottage industry nor to diversify the uses of woven palm fibre.
Marketing, support for cultivation, the development and exploitation of
palm plantations, and the industrialization and export of goods made
from natural fibres all disappeared during the 1990s.
Despite these setbacks, today in the Mixteca, small-scale and fam-
ily farming cover areas larger than in other Mexican regions. Some 30
years ago, most of the Mixtec population was involved in agriculture.
But migration has had a profound impact – especially since the 1990s,
which saw extensive migration to the United States. Emigration now
accounts for more than 30% of the population (Lazos, 2012). This has
weakened local institutions considerably, including mutual aid, collec-
tive work (such as the guetza and tequio)17 and social networks. The
milpa – the food and agriculture system, associating representations and
rituals with the cultivation of maize, beans and squash – seems to sub-
sist only in homes that need fresh maize for the festivities of the Day of
the Dead, which maintain a symbolic link with the land (Lazos, 2012).
All the varieties of maize that needed a lot of work and a lot of space
have gradually been abandoned and replaced by commercial crops, such
as passion fruit and new varieties of tomatoes that are grown in gar-
dens and greenhouses18 (Katz, 1994). Today the farming system has to
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be complemented by additional income from welfare programmes and
remittances sent by emigrant relatives. Thus the native and peasant pop-
ulation tends, on the one hand, to diversify their diet by buying more
meat and industrial food and beverages; on the other hand, they con-
sume fewer of the wild greens (quelites) that were always seen as “poor
people’s food” (Katz, 1992).
The “farmer to farmer” model in the Mixteca region
(Oaxaca state)
Life is difficult, and modernity, cash crops and intensive technology
are attractive; but there are alternatives. Our case study accounts for
a civil society group (Centro de Estudios de Tecnologías Alternativas para
México/Center for the Study of Appropriate Technologies for Mexico
(CETAMEX)) and the institution that was finally built by its efforts. Insti-
tutions of this sort were set up with the support of the government,
although sometimes the support was indirect, as in the case of the Cen-
ter for Comprehensive Peasant Development in the Mixteca (Centro de
Desarrollo Integral Campesino de la Mixteca (CEDICAM)).
The CETAMEX group has roots in the vast experience of the team
that worked with civil society in the Mixteca Alta from 1983 to 1997.
CETAMEX (headquartered in Mexico, DF) is financed by the World
Neighbors organization (Vecinos Mundiales), whose objective is to resolve
internal community conflicts by means of collective work performed
for the benefits of the community (Blauert, 1990). World Neighbors is a
Protestant religious organization that comes from Oklahoma. It formed
links with a Catholic movement, Pastoral de la Tierra, which emerged in
indigenous and peasant communities in the Mixteca region of the state
of Oaxaca in the 1980s, with the help of Guatemalan peasants who were
there on missionary service for World Neighbors organization.
Thanks to the advice and support of these Guatemalan peasants,
catechists of Pastoral de la Tierra as agricultural development promot-
ers (Holz-Giménez, 2006) – who also gave agricultural advice derived
from their own peasant experience – and the technology support of
people from CETAMEX, a project was launched in Santiago Tilantongo
(a Mixtecan municipality) by Jesús León Santos, a local farmer.19 This
was in the early 1980s, and Santos and his colleagues received some
funding from World Neighbors (Blauert and Quintanar, 2000). They
decided to adopt the strategy of the World Neighbors movement
(i.e. to work only with local authorities and to avoid direct dealings
with federal government agencies (Bunch, 1985)) and to build up
farmer-to-farmer networks (campesino a campesino), which focused on
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improving native and peasant farming practices (Boege and Carranza,
2009; Holt-Giménez, 2010).
Initially the “parent group” of CETAMEX provided services that were
instrumental to promoting the use of organic fertilizers, reforestation,
and the construction of tree nurseries in the municipalities of Yodocono
and Tilantongo by 1982 (Altieri et al., 2006). Jesús León Santos and his
colleagues subsequently worked in different municipalities and in nine
communities (Nochtixltan and neighbouring communities) of Mixteca
Alta. They restored the fertility of the soil when the surface layer was
exposed to the effects of agents of erosion (air, water and anthropogenic
activity). They made fundamental contributions to the recovery of the
tequio (yeta or guetza), to mutual aid and to collaborative organization
of work. They also recovered several techniques such as barbecho (long-
fallow land), recorte (delumping), rayada (planting in rows), cajeteada
(planting corn or cornfields in pits or bowls), coa (plowing), yunta (the
yoke) and other local devices that retained moisture and prevented
soil compaction. Subsequently, to improve the soil, they used green
manures (bocashi) and selected their own seeds. They dug trenches on
field borders and on slopes of land, forming terraces to prevent erosion,
to maintain moisture and to revive springs (Rivas Guevara, 2008; Rivas
Guevara et al., 2009). As a first step they undertook reforestation, using
local tree species that could generate firewood, timber and wood for
crafts, and they created a new organization of community nurseries.
Their second step was to restore the cultivation of maices de cajete by
accumulating in ravines a water supply and the limon that had been
swept away by landslides. This system (known as jollas) makes it possi-
ble to use residual soil moisture at the end of the rainy season to plant
maices and thus avoid a hunger gap by guaranteeing a full year’s har-
vest of maize. The jollas system was created by the Mixtecs between
the pre-classical and the post-classical ages in response to demographic
pressure (Romero Frizzi, 1990); until the 1980s it functioned in the sub-
region of the Mixteca Alta (in the Nochixtlan, Tiaxiaco, Teposcolula and
Coixtlehuaca districts). At the time, this crop system was the second
most important in the Oaxacan Mixteca (Romero Penaloza et al., 1986).
It is worth noting that, in a region where tequio and/or the guetza
had often been abandoned, the conservation and restoration of soil and
water required intensive labour.
Fortunately, the Ministry of the Environment became concerned with
soil erosion, and subsequently the government launched a national
programme for soil conservation (PRODERS). This included a specific
project (ProArbol) that benefited CETAMEX. Free, adapted trees were
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distributed, enabling the CETAMEX members to save time and labour
and to concentrate on agrifood systems.
Major institutions, such as the General Directorate of Regional Pro-
grammes, were established to harmonize the programmes of different
ministries. This was notably instrumental in bringing together the
three ministries of the Environment, Agriculture and Social Devel-
opment in support of the Sustainable Productive Development in
Marginal Rural Areas (Programa de Desarrollo Productivo Sustentable en
Zonas Marginadas Rurales (PDPSZRM)) programme. In the late 1990s,
this programme, supervised by eight secretariats, implemented about
50 regional projects. The community was considered to be the basic
territorial unit within Regional Development Councils (which brought
together institutional and civil-society actors in prioritized microre-
gions). These councils had to design and implement development plans
whenever involvement of the community was needed. PRODERS also
organized local workshops for training and for developing new skills in
communities.
In 1989 a new institution was created in the Mixtec region itself:
CEDICAM. This brings us back to the beginning of our story: that of a
peasant movement (CETAMEX, see above). CEDICAM (Hita Nuni in the
Mixtec language) is based in Asuncion Nochixtlan. Its role is to promote
the “farmer to farmer” relationships by means of workshops and educa-
tional demonstrations. It consists of 12 Mixtec farmers who have qual-
ified as demonstrators in the 14 Tilantongo communities. Jesús León
Santos is one of the founding members of CEDICAM. He is also in charge
of networking with support agencies, including Mexican governmental
programmes. Santos argues that care for water and soil are essential for
sustainable agriculture (Velásquez Hernández and Santos, 2006).
Finally, the pioneers who were involved in the beginnings of the
CETAMEX farmers’ group have recovered both their agricultural prac-
tices and a balanced diet. Others are following the same path, but
this is not why they have been praised throughout the world. What is
admired, above all, is their contribution to ecology (conservation of soil
and water, and reforestation). In 2008 their main representative, Jesús
León Santos, was awarded the annual international Goldman Environ-
mental Prize in recognition of their efforts. Santos embodies the success
of traditional peasant and indigenous agricultural practices in combat-
ing desertification. He has spread the word to all arenas in which the
environment is an issue of concern.
Several experiments of this type (see Chapter 10) have shown that
the initiatives of communities themselves, supported by civil-society
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associations, constitute a warning call to governments. The govern-
ments, in turn, rely on these institutions to design and implement
appropriate programmes. One of the most important actions in this
programme, which has made Mexico an international model, is the
National Programme for Payment of Environmental Services (PES),
which covers 3.25 million Ha of forest. The ProArbol Programme estab-
lishes the principle of financial compensation for all actions that retard
deforestation and promote the recovery of forest soils.
The teachings that have brought the Mexican experience into the
limelight concern potentials and limits of projects that are “truly alter-
native”, and which at some point need to rely on the state’s capacity for
action. In a way, this shows that nothing can be done without the state,
but that with only state support nothing can be done at all.
Conclusion
In Mexico the issue of environmental governance is linked to that
of social and economic development by its explicit objective: “food
sovereignty”. We have examined this relationship at different levels –
national, regional and local – and we have found that effective envi-
ronmental governance calls for a simultaneous analysis of Mexican
agricultural policy as a whole, including the “traditional” practices
of the native and peasant world. Moreover, our analyses have been
diachronic as well as synchronic, and historical as well as structural.
Their aim is to clarify, identify and characterize economic trends and
the ways in which different sorts of knowledge contribute to this aim, by
their interplay in the process of constructing environmental standards.
We have described the construction of environmental governance in
the Mixteca region in Mexico, which is home to numerous native and
small-scale peasant communities, known for both its food requirements
and its exemplary efforts in reforestation over the past 30 years. The
environmental governance process has been worked out here in terms
of participation. In practice this implies the integration, accommoda-
tion and hybridization of traditional native and peasant knowledge.
How do these different sorts of knowledge fit in with knowledge of
the modern technoscientific sort? We have attempted to unpack the
intellectual framework involved and the steps through which the pro-
cess passes. We have relied on a theoretical framework that involves
both science and technology studies (STS) and post-colonial studies
(with its Latin American version, the M/C/D Programme). We have
explained that a historical trend has assigned a subordinate place to
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indigenous knowledge; but also that, for practical reasons, it is translated
and exchanged when it is acted upon. Exchanges can be structural (e.g.
in the Green Revolution) or merely circumstantial (e.g. in the course
of colonization). They can also take place between different agricul-
tural communities that have different types of knowledge. Since ancient
times, market places have been the locus of an exchange of plants
(and the ways to grow them) – that is, for an exchange, adaptation
and transposition of knowledge brought in from abroad. Native and
peasant knowledge is not fixed; it evolves, just as technoscientific knowl-
edge does. “Pre-modern” knowledge has now come to inspire a number
of academic works, and has also influenced technical and ecological
thinking. Attention has been drawn to it, and it itself has become an
object of knowledge. We have shown that this upsurge of scientists’
interest has been aligned with the policy debates of the day, in such
matters as technology and agriculture, ecology and the environment,
and cultural and social issues. There is now in Mexico an agroecological
approach that is recognized by the academy and that is used by technical
operators.
All of this has drawn attention to the weight of practical consider-
ations in the evolution and reception of different sorts of knowledge,
including scientific knowledge. Practical reasons not only spur a few
dissident approaches but also orient the action of farmers and govern-
ments. We have dealt, to some extent, with the case of a local initiative
promoted by native and small-holding farmers. They began by resist-
ing the options and programmes designed for them by the Ministry
of Agriculture, but subsequently attempted to gain self-sufficiency by
restoring their traditional collaboration and recovering discontinued
agricultural techniques. In doing so they have contributed to the con-
servation of soils and wooded areas, and this in turn has brought them
recognition and help from the Ministry of the Environment. Action can
change perspectives, with some actors learning to see others in new
ways and opening up opportunities to build alternative projects through
interaction with partners who had not originally been envisaged.
To what extent can autochthonous and peasant populations seize
such opportunities, which are generally based on “secondary contra-
dictions”? The answer to this question is less clear. There are many
contradictions between environmental and agricultural policy. There is,
however, a dominant trend. In Mexico it would seem that (intensive)
agriculture has gained the upper hand. But this does not prevent other
concerns (social and environmental) from being asserted. There has
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been a focus on environmental protection through reforestation. Refor-
estation programmes have fostered the creation of opportunities for
participation at a microregional level, complementing policies dedicated
to nature reserves and support for community initiatives. Simultane-
ously, however, the “productivist” agricultural programme designed for
marginal areas (Procampo) has been repeated (at least for 2007–2012),
despite the fact that is has accentuated deforestation. History shows
also that state support, direct or indirect, is necessary for small-scale
initiatives to blossom, if not during their take-off period then at least
for their subsequent development and replication in other regions.
Unfortunately, today there is a downward trend in budgets dedicated
to environmental protection and rural development.20 This makes new
local initiatives even more precarious.
Therefore, despite the number of programmes that have been devoted
to marginalized populations over the last ten years, the National Strat-
egy seems to lack an overall plan of action. What direction will this
policy take? How will it take into account the multiple experiments that
have been carried out in the more vulnerable and marginalized regions?
Similar contradictions exist at an international level. The Biodiversity
Convention made a breakthrough when it obtained the FAO’s agree-
ment on phytogenetic resources, recognizing that autochthonous peo-
ples owned pro parte biodiversity and its uses. But its implementation
is still in question. It is true, furthermore, that recognition of the
important part played by peasant and indigenous family agriculture
(providing 70% of the global food production; the FAO dedicated the
year 2014 to this sector) could have a leveraging effect in promoting an
operational recognition of native and peasant knowledge. However, few
people argue that it would be enough to feed the planet, to alleviate
dramatic famines throughout the world and to supply large cities. This
is what accounts for the dual system that exists today, and what legiti-
mates the pursuit of other avenues of (scientific) research. For example,
another Mexican citizen, Dr Sanjaya Rajaram, won a World Food Prize
in 2014 for his work on the genetic improvement of maize, thanks to
biotechnology.21
At the preparatory meetings of the international climate conference
(COP21), held in Paris at the end of 2015, a wish was expressed: to
combine concern for family and peasant farming with thinking about
climate change. It is yet to be seen whether the international confer-
ence will provide native and peasant knowledge with a real opportunity
to contribute to the construction of policies dealing with climate issues.
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Notes
1. Notably, studies of WP5 “Building and Exchanging Knowledges on Natural
Resources in Latin America” within the ENGOV EU Programme.
2. Forests occupy 33% of the territory with 200,000 different species, which
puts it in 12th place internationally, 2nd place in terms of variety of
ecosystems and 4th in terms for species (OCDE, 2013).
3. It also appears in 12th place of the countries with the greatest inequality in
terms of income.
4. Until now they have dealt little with specific mediations in agriculture
projects, especially between scientific knowledge and native or peasant
knowledge.
5. This analysis is detailed in Foyer et al. (2014).
6. The works in this field are abundant. We primarily cite Howes and Chambers
(1979); Howes (1979); and O’Keefe and Howes (1979).
7. See the Waast and Rossi report (2014). The most cited works are Davis and
Wagner (2003); Woods (2002); Greene (2004); and Turner, Davidson-Hunt
and O’Flaherty (2003), cited in Waast and Rossi (2014).
8. See Hassink (2005); Berkes and Turner (2006); Godoy et al. (2005); Greene
(2004); Aswani and Lauer (2006); and Kirsch (2001), cited in Waast and Rossi
(2014).
9. The issue was resumed in Mexico after the controversy surrounding the
International Cooperative Biodiversity Group-Maya (ICBG-MAYA) project
in 2000: on the one hand it was denounced as “biopiracy” and on the
other hand it was advocated as a development project respectful of local
communities. See Alarcón Lavín (2011); see also Barreda (2001).
10. Food security is related to the healthy diet of a maximum of persons all
over the world. Perhaps the social and indigenous movement forged the
food sovereignty movement, which means that each group of people should
design its own agriculture policy according to its needs and culture.
11. It has been observed that imports increased from 74% to 84% for oil, from
22% to 40% for cereals, from 18% to 27% for meat, and from 15% to 24%
for milk. Despite the great proportion of the population linked to agricul-
ture, Mexico has become one of the main import countries of agricultural
products (in third place after the EU and Japan).
12. In other words, with sufficient capacity to integrate into the market. See
Gravel (2009).
13. Seven regional forums of public consultation – coordinated by the
Interministerial Commission for Sustainable Rural Development (Comisión
Intersecretarial para el Desarrollo Rural Sustentable (CIDRS)) – were created with
the objective of collecting the proposals and viewpoints of the rural popu-
lation on five topics, among which were nutrition, welfare and care for the
environment.
14. It was initially created as the Ministry of the Environment, Natural Resources
and Fishing (Semamap) in 1994, but it later became the Ministry of the
Environment and Natural Resources. Today, climate change is included
within the transformation of the agency, changing the National Institute of
Ecology (INE) into the National Institute of Ecology and Climate Change
(INECC). The National Commission on Biodiversity (CONABIO) and the
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reformulation and strengthening of the General Law of Ecological Equilib-
rium and Environmental Protection (LGEEPA, 1996) are also included. See
Léonard and Foyer (2011).
15. The fundamental initiative in this regard is the Indigenous Peoples and Envi-
ronmental Programme 2007–2012. See SEMARNAT, México, 2009, http://
www.semarnat.gob.mx/apoyossubsidios/programmeasparalospueblosindigenas/
Documents/programprogrammemea%20de%20pueblos%20indigenas%
20y%20medio%20ambiente.pdf, date accessed 15 September 2014.
16. Population in Oaxaca State, 3.8 million (INEGI, 2010).
17. Flores Quintero, G. (2005) has clarified what differentiates guetza from tequio.
In effect, despite what had been written, it has been shown that guetza is the
collective work that was institutionalized during the colonial era. Tequio is a
náhuatl word that designates the community service of the adult members
of the community, whose origin dates back to colonial times.
18. Esther Katz has observed how, in the last 30 years, the variety of cultivated
species has diminished considerably. This is the case for the maize of the
humid highlands. See Katz and Kleiche (2013).
19. Olga Elena Lara, interview with Jesus Santos León, http://ssheltonimages.
com/play/ptk9uDK0XuU/Part_1 (date accessed 15 September 2014).
20. By 2011 the budget of SAGARPA was 73 billion Mexican pesos, while the
budget for the environment fell to 51.2 billion Mexican pesos (out of which
12.6% was for marginalized areas: 0.99 billion Mexican pesos went to the
Comisión Nacional de Áreas Naturales Protegidas (CONANP) versus 3.35 bil-
lion Mexican pesos in 2002) and 6.42 billion Mexican pesos to the Comisión
Nacional Forestal (CONAFOR) (OCDE, 2013).
21. Dr Sanjaya Rajaram belongs to Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento de
Maíz y Trigo (CIMMYT), an organization that played a key role in the Green
Revolution of the 1960s.
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Introduction
In 2005 and 2006, anti-neoliberal coalitions won the elections in Bolivia
and Ecuador, respectively. In both countries, this development put an
end to the rules that had regulated the use of natural resources in
hydrocarbon extraction during the latter part of the twentieth century
(Hogenboom, 2014). The post-neoliberal governments constructed new
institutions for the governance of extractive-industry activities. The new
rules of the game have changed the way in which the Andean countries
govern extractive industries. It has not put an end to their dependence
on income generated from natural resources, but it has changed the way
in which that income is distributed.
The process of change from neoliberalism to post-neoliberalism was
fast, and fraught with confusion and abandoned experiments. This
chapter describes that process. Two analytical objectives guide this
description. First, I will identify the factors that guided the changes from
neoliberalism to post-neoliberalism; and second, I will analyse the pos-
sibilities for the governance of mineral and hydrocarbon wealth and the
creation of a “government of nature” that were opened up by the new
regulatory framework.
Natural resources, rentier states, development
and post-neoliberalism
The contemporary debate about development based on natural
resources has existed since the 1990s. Numerous academic studies con-
ducted in that decade called attention to the relationship between
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income from natural resources and development, highlighting the neg-
ative impact of the former on the latter. In this century, however, the
findings of those pioneering studies have been disputed by a growing
body of literature primarily focused on political economy (Sachs and
Warner, 1995; Karl, 2007; Whatchenkon, 1999; Auty and Gebb, 2001;
Ross, 2001; Robinson, Tovik and Verdier, 2006; Acemoglu and Robinson,
2012).
The thesis of the “natural resources curse” questioned the policies
advanced by international financial institutions and transnational com-
panies. These stakeholders argued that the developing countries in
the process of development could exploit their comparative advan-
tages in the field of natural resources to accelerate their development
(Bebbington et al., 2008). The neoliberal governments of the 1990s
adopted this thesis. Critical studies developed in recent decades have
examined the economic and social effects of those policies, stressing the
effects of the rents from natural resources on the political and economic
development of countries with an abundance of these resources.
The consequent debate failed to resolve the issue in the field of
resource economics (Iimi, 2007; Collier, 2010), but not in the field of
political institutions. In fact, political scientists and political economists
who specialize in development have shown that an economy based on
the extraction of natural resources actually has a negative impact on
the development of political institutions that manage the appropriation
and use of state income for these extractive activities (Bebbington et al.,
2008; Collier, 2010). This adverse effect is mediated by a specifically
political variable: the adoption of a rentier model of natural resource
governance by the governmental decision-makers. The policy of the
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and transnational companies
would instigate the governments of the developing countries to adopt
some type of regulatory institution that would – in the medium and
short term – guide the evolution towards a rentier state and very proba-
bly towards the creation of the conditions that produce an effect known
as the “natural resource curse” (Bebbington et al., 2008).
Some Latin American scholars have criticized the idea of develop-
ment based on natural resources in the thesis known as the “extractivist
model”: to the negative impacts of income from natural resources would
have to be added two specifically Latin American effects. On the one
hand, resource-based growth would have impeded the Latin American
countries from earning great international autonomy. On the other
hand, extractivist revenues would have induced the formation of a state
that, in addition to being rentier, was also predatory by nature. This
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effect would be especially serious since that predation occurs in areas
inhabited by indigenous peoples, thereby affecting particularly fragile
ecosystems. Both effects thus imply a predatory and dependent capital-
ist social trajectory (Acosta, 2003; Acosta and Schuldt, 2009; Gudynas,
2012, 2009).
In recent years, various scholars have criticized the negative consen-
sus on resource-based development. The criticisms have been focused on
two major areas. First, the simple relationship between the abundance
of natural resources and poor development does not hold. The evidence
of countries rich in natural resources shows that – under certain condi-
tions – they could achieve high income levels, relative equality, and a
great degree of economic diversification, and that they are democracies.
More importantly, these achievements have occurred among developed
countries (Canada, the USA, the UK, Australia, Norway) as well as emerg-
ing countries (Brazil, Chile, South Africa, Indonesia) and developing
countries (Botswana is typically the most cited example, but increasingly
Bolivia and Ecuador are mentioned as well) (Dunning, 2008; Gylfason,
2012; Hujo, 2012; Thorp et al., 2012).
The second area of criticism has to do with the double directionality of
the effects of rents from natural resources. A boom of natural resources
can have a favourable effect on authoritarianism or on democracy; it can
augment the interest of predatory elites who are in control of the state
to preserve their control over the distribution of income (Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2010); and it can simultaneously mitigate the redistribution
of private income, thus increasing the appeal of democracy (Dunning,
2008). Similarly, it is possible that a natural resource boom would elevate
the costs of economic diversification, but an active state could pay those
costs from the tax revenue that it obtains from natural resource income
(Bebbington, 2012; Thorp, 2012). By investing those fiscal resources
in institutions that promote coordination between emerging economic
sectors and the accumulation of human capital, the state would favour
economic diversification (Dietsche, 2012; Ascher, 2012; Guajardo, 2012;
Orihuela and Thorp, 2012).
This controversy can be resolved by distinguishing the rentier states
from other types of state (Dunning, 2008). The key variable is not the
abundance of resources but rather the abundance of rents that pro-
duces effects on the states. The exploitation of mineral resources, oil
and gas generates revenues for the states and, given certain conditions,
can transform them into rentier states. Why does this happen?
Rentier states support themselves on a set of regulations that gov-
ern the extractive industries. These rules determine the conditions of
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access to natural resources: how and how much of the profits obtained
by extractive industries will be appropriated by the states; and who inter-
venes in the key decisions to authorize extractive activities and in the
decisions corresponding to the distribution of income. This set of rules
constitutes the core of natural resource governance.
Recent discussions have stressed the point that the distribution of
income is the primary source of conflict and debate in rentier states.
In particular, the literature asserts that such income may be used by
governments in two ways. It can lead to a concentration of economic
and political power in the hands of the elite. On the other hand, govern-
ments can also choose to use the revenues to reduce dependence on nat-
ural resources, diversify the economy, and provide benefit to the major-
ity of its citizens. Bebbington (2012) has indicated that, in the study
of development in the Andes, special consideration should be given to
conflicts surrounding the extractive industries since they “have great
significance for national and subnational political economic change”.
On the other hand, Gylfasson (2010) has argued that the investment
of mineral incomes in social development is an integral strategy of eco-
nomic growth. In particular, he states that “the level and composition
of government expenditure should make a difference for growth”.
Taking advantage of studies advanced by ecological economics and
political ecology, social movements, environmental organizations, and
intellectuals from Latin America as well as from outside the region have
looked at the extraction of natural resources as something more than
just development. The common element in these diverse perspectives
is that they value the sustainability of ecosystems and society in a way
that is entirely different from the utilitarianism inherent in mainstream
economic thought (Nelson, 1995).
A second common element is the double criticism of neoliberal cap-
italism and the idea of development itself (e.g. Acosta, 2003; Gudynas,
2009; Alimonda, 2011; Escobar, 2011). The main thesis of this criticism
is that the expansion of capitalism constantly requires new sources of
natural resources, whose exploitation exclusively benefits industrialized
countries, and in the short and medium term it generates an “illusion
of development” in Latin American countries. This illusion is character-
ized by cycles of rapid economic growth, with partial and fragmented
modernization of societies. These cycles are illusory to the extent that
they have historically proved to be unsustainable over time. The cyclical
behaviour produces great costs for societies, particularly the destruction
of highly diverse ecosystems and the destruction of human populations
whose way of life has been radically altered by the presence of extractive
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activities. These costs tend to crystallize in the political organization of
Latin American societies, which aims to preserve and enhance social
inequality and to keep the rural poor and indigenous populations out of
political decisions.
The Latin American literature is very closely related to the argu-
ments advanced by European and Anglo-Saxon ecological economists
and ecological sociologists. The first have shown that the economic
growth experienced by Latin American countries during natural resource
booms has only been achieved on the basis of an unequal exchange
of material flow (Vallejo, 2009; Martínez-Alier et al., 2010; Muradian
et al., 2012). Similarly, Muradian et al. (2012) have noted that recent
technological innovations in the extractive industries have made the
exploitation of mineral and hydrocarbon deposits – located in remote
areas inhabited by indigenous peoples (the Ecuadorian and Bolivian
Amazon, for example) – economically profitable. The expansion of the
“extractive frontier” implies the accelerated destruction of ecosystems
that are essential for planetary survival, along with an increase in
socioenvironmental conflicts that put the cohesion of Latin American,
and especially Andean, societies at risk.
Environmentalist literature has made visible two innate elements of
the rentier basis of the Bolivian and Ecuadorian states. First, the con-
struction of rentier states represents a set of enormous environmental
and social costs that are not only ignored by the literature of political
economy and development economics but are also actively kept out of
public discussion by academics, international financial institutions and
the governments that have controlled these states. Second, the set of
rules that govern the extractive industries in the rentier states is insuf-
ficient to achieve the objective of an environmental governance that
ensures the sustainability of societies.
The set of debates that I have outlined allows me to present the
central argument of this chapter in order to display and analyse in
the next section the evidence offered by Bolivia and Ecuador on what
I have called “post-neoliberal environmental governance”. Analytically,
post-neoliberal environmental governance in Bolivia and Ecuador – and
possibly in other Latin American rentier states – can be understood as
a system of three layers. In the centre would be the rules of natural
resources governance. These are the rules that govern the extraction of
resources and the production of revenues for the states. At this level the
number of actors is minimal since it only includes governmental elites,
certain state agencies and the companies (public and/or private) that
conduct mining activities.
118 The Government of Nature
A second layer would consist of the rules that govern the distribu-
tion of income, particularly that which is intended to be some type of
compensation for populations especially affected by extractive activities.
It also includes rules that establish monitoring capabilities for the envi-
ronmental damage caused by extractive activities and the organizational
responsibility for such damage. This layer includes high-level policy-
makers and specialized state agencies – just as in the previous level –
but also other stakeholders such as organized citizen groups and pro-
fessional experts who act as consultants for the assessment, monitoring
and determination of environmental damage (van Dijck, 2014).
Finally, the third layer would contain the general way in which the
relationships between the state, society and nature (or environment)
are regulated. Besides being the least formalized of all the layers, it is
also that which supports the greatest number of actors, and is espe-
cially open to the participation of citizens who, for whatever reason,
have some interest in the decisions to be adopted about nature and
the use of resources in their society. Therefore this is the level where
organizations of environmental activists, specialized citizen groups (e.g.
academic communities) and other groups are active.
Bolivia and Ecuador: From the reconfiguration
of rent-seeking to environmental governance
In order to function, the Bolivian and Ecuadorian states depend on the
flow of rents to their treasuries. Both states capture this income directly
from the activity of extractive industries of minerals and hydrocarbons,
and these rents substitute other sources that are more politically expen-
sive to obtain (e.g. taxes). Thanks to these rents, the states can carry out
distributive policies that are less expensive than their alternatives (e.g.
urban or rural property reforms). These characteristics interact to pro-
duce an overall effect of acceptance of the government in power and
more generally of the state.
Beginning in the years from 2000 to 2002, approximately, Bolivia
and Ecuador have regained significant economic growth rates; and this
growth has been accompanied by significant reductions in poverty and
inequality.1 These trends are due to three main factors. First is the
increase in world-market prices of the oil, gas and minerals exported by
both countries.2 Second, the Andean states have recovered their ability
to capture the rents produced by the exploitation of natural resources.
Third, the governments have invested in improving the state capacity to
manage the rents, orienting them towards the broad distribution of the
Pablo Andrade A. 119
benefits of economic growth, and – to a lesser extent – trying to induce
a change in the relationships between the rentier sector and the produc-
tion of their economies. These trends are interdependent and mutually
reinforcing.3 The Bolivian and Ecuadorian states have improved their
distributive capacities and therefore have contributed to improving the
quality of life of their populations – especially the poorest – because
they have the fiscal resources captured from extractive industry activ-
ities (Paredes, 2012). At the same time, the increased capacity of the
Bolivian and Ecuadorian states to capture rents from natural resources
has improved their tax bases.
The current situation in Bolivia and Ecuador contrasts sharply with
that which dominated in the last decades of the twentieth century.4
During that time, both states significantly reduced their capacities to
provide social services to the poor populations, such as health, educa-
tion and money transfers. Low international prices of natural resources
and the inability of the governments to increase state revenues pre-
vented states from implementing distributive policies. Therefore, in the
1980s and 1990s, Bolivia and Ecuador experienced a continued deteri-
oration of the living conditions of the population, increased poverty –
particularly in rural areas – and growing inequality (Lefeber, 2003).
The current natural resources boom is not, however, the cause of the
formation of Bolivia and Ecuador as rentier states but rather only of
its reactivation and reconfiguration. The Revolution of 1952, in Bolivia,
and the oil boom of the 1970s – for both countries – were key events
that shaped the current rentier states, as will be discussed below.
Bolivia
During the boom period of tin (1910–1954) and before the national-
ization of the mines in 1952, “the State’s attempts to capture more
rent . . . implied a substantial redistributive dynamic . . . any capture of
rent by the State for purposes of greater public spending would tend
to redistribute income from the tin oligarchy to . . . the rest of the pop-
ulation” (Dunning, 2008: 235). In simplified terms, the pressure of the
social groups excluded from mining revenues – particularly tin workers
and reformist intellectual groups – generated attempts by the govern-
ments to capture mining revenues, which were answered by the mining
oligarchy with coups d’état and repression. The state wanted to be
rentier, but the property ownership and the economic and political
power of the mining elite would not allow it. The Bolivian adminis-
trations during those years had a single resource to expand its fiscal
base: to increase taxes on the non-mining sector of the economy,
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which increased the discontent of the non-mining classes. Finally, this
dynamic exploded with the Revolution of 1952.
The capture of the state by the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement
(Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR)) and the Bolivian
Workers’ Union (Central Obrera Boliviana (COB)) in 1952 led to the
nationalization of the mines in October of that same year and the forma-
tion of the state company Mining Corporation of Bolivia (Corporación
Minera de Bolivia (COMIBOL)) (Paredes, 2012). Thanks to this direct
control over mineral income, the mines became the main source of state
income and the fuel for public spending in the rest of the economy.
Between 1952 and 1964, when a military coup d’état put an end to the
revolution, the Bolivian state used mining income to moderate the dis-
tributive conflict, to invest in the development of other sectors of the
economy – particularly the manufacturing sector and the growth of the
agricultural sector of eastern Bolivia – and to create a national citizen-
ship (Klein, 2008; Soruco, 2010; Crabtree and Crabtree-Condor, 2012).
However, domestic and international economic factors – primarily the
prolonged and severe decline in the price of tin – conspired against this
first attempt at the configuration of the Bolivian rentier state.
The decisive factor for the configuration of the current rentier state
came with the oil boom of the 1970s. The administration of Hugo
Bánzer approved a Hydrocarbon Law in 1972 that allowed for the open-
ing of oil concessions, thus establishing new ways of capturing income.
Oil exploitation throughout the 1970s expanded exponentially: in 1974,
oil revenues allowed the state to balance its accounts, and in 1978, oil
and natural gas exports represented 30% of Bolivian exports (Miranda,
2008). As Dunning notes, “by the end of the 1970s Bolivia had clearly
witnessed an oil boom that . . . exerted a substantial impact on the coffers
of the fisc” (Dunning, 2008: 244).
Although oil production and oil prices on the world market declined
in the 1980s, oil revenues increased their share in the state treasury.
In effect, the administration of Jaime Paz Zamora obligated the YPFB
(Yacimientos Petroleros Fiscales de Bolivia) by law to transfer an increas-
ing portion of its income to the central government, amounting to 60%
of state revenues. In the 1990s the dependency of oil revenues tended to
decline. This development initiated the neoliberal phase of the Bolivian
state.
Confronted with serious macroeconomic imbalances, the government
of Víctor Paz Estenssoro commissioned the minister of planning at the
time – and future president – Gonzalo Sánchez de Losada to imple-
ment a reform of the oil sector. Inspired by neoliberal ideology, Sánchez
de Losada pushed back the participation of the Bolivian state in oil
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revenues from 50% to 18% (Dunning, 2008). The idea behind these
cuts was to attract foreign investment for the exploration of new oil
fields and to develop the exploitation of newly discovered deposits
of natural gas. Tax revenues from oil income dropped dramatically,
reaching a low of only 7% of total tax revenues (Dunning, 2008).
On the other hand, although foreign investment actually flowed into
gas exploitation – especially from 1997 onwards – Sánchez de Losada’s
reforms prevented this development from contributing significantly to
government revenues. Instead, Latin American companies (Petrobras,
Pluspetrol) and transnational non-Latin American companies (Repsol,
British Gas, Amoco-British Petroleum, Total ELF) benefited mainly from
the exploitation of gas.
The growing opposition of popular sectors and of leftwing politicians
to the effects of capitalization and the increased expectations of gas
as the motor of a renewed national development finally exploded in
2003 in opposition to the government project of constructing a pipeline
from the East to Chile. The Gas War put an end to the second adminis-
tration of Sánchez de Losada. This led to an end of the political struggle
for the capture of natural resource revenues by the Bolivian state, which
caused a rapid turnover of governments between 2003 and 2005.
The neoliberal experiment of disarming the Bolivian rentier state
came to an end with the election of Evo Morales as president. The
Morales government nationalized the Bolivian oil and gas industry
again in 2006, increasing the state’s share in the income of the sector
to 82%, although the effective participation of the state was stabilized
at 50% of revenues after 2007 (Miranda, 2008). Finally, in 2009, the state
secured its control over non-renewable natural resources in a way that
was favourable to the central government, and to the detriment of the
grievances of the Media Luna departments (Santa Cruz, Tarija, El Beni)
and of the claims of the organized indigenous peoples in the Indige-
nous Native Peasant Territories, where the hydrocarbon deposits were
located (Humphreys-Bebbington, 2012). The importance of these devel-
opments has been widely recognized and disseminated by the Bolivian
Government, which in 2013 stated that the nationalization of hydro-
carbons had “generated more than $5 million USD for redistribution”,
and that YPFB had become “the country’s largest business corporation”
(President of the Republic, 2013).
Ecuador
More so than Bolivia, Ecuador benefited from the boom in oil prices
in the 1970s. Along with the beginning of oil exploitation in the
Ecuadorian Amazon, the military conducted a coup d’état and embraced
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a programme of oil nationalization and development guided by the
state. The military government of General Rodríguez Lara (1972–1976)
explicitly followed a policy of “planting oil”. This consisted of the
investment of fiscal oil revenue into infrastructure as well as industry
loans and other policies that sought to diversify the country’s industrial
foundation and to improve its productivity – and that of the agri-
cultural sector. While there is still debate about the achievements of
the Rodríguez Lara government (North, 1985; Conaghan, 1988), there
is a consensus that this administration actually succeeded in institu-
tionalizing a path of development that linked the country’s economic
growth, maintenance and expansion of infrastructure and government
capabilities with the provision of comprehensive tax revenue from oil
exports.
The development towards a rentier state was completed in two phases.
In the first phase (1972–1976) a progressive fraction of the military con-
trolled the state and maintained nationalist and inclusive development
policies, although without much support from weak popular sectors.
The second phase (1976–1979) actually halted some of those policies
and instead used oil revenues as collateral to obtain international loans
that were used to pay a bloated state sector, and as a source of cheap
loans channelled into a dominant rentier class (Acosta, 2003; Larrea,
2009; Oleas, 2013). In both instances, tax collection – except those
obtained in customs – practically stopped to the point that, according to
Acosta (2003), “the dictator himself, Guillermo Rodríguez Lara, boasted
decades later that in his government taxes were not collected. Any fis-
cal emergency, when oil revenues were insufficient or declining due to
economic reasons, was covered by foreign loans.”
In 1979 the military gave back the state government to elected civil-
ian governments. The first civilian government (1979–1984) partially
resumed the project of the progressive military government, using oil
revenues to postpone adjustments to the economy and to increase social
investment (Oleas, 2013). However, the impact of the international debt
crisis in 1982 and the deterioration of international oil prices tested the
ability of these civilian governments to handle the problems that they
had inherited from the rentier state: a mostly inefficient, oligopolistic
and slow-growing industry, rising urban and rural poverty, and so forth.
The institutions that made the capture of oil revenues possible in
the 1970s remained practically unchanged in the 1980s. Only at the
end of the decade, as a result of a sharp drop in oil prices, did the
Ecuadorian Government make efforts to reduce direct state control over
some elements of the oil industry and to attract foreign investment.
Pablo Andrade A. 123
During the government of Sixto Durán Ballén (1992–1996), a politi-
cian of clearly neoliberal orientation, the state ceded a large part of
its regulatory capacity and economic participation to private compa-
nies, and simultaneously reduced its oversight of mining activities.
In an attempt to attract private transnational companies, state partici-
pation – in the form of royalties – decreased in favour of the creation
of income taxes. In this period there was a systematic increase in
socioenvironmental conflicts with indigenous peoples residing in the
Amazon.
Oil revenues improved from 2002 onwards with the opening of new
oil fields and the construction of a pipeline complementary to that
which was constructed in the 1970s. Acosta described the situation in
2003: “Ecuador will be what it has always been, a primary producer
country. And oil looms as the source of income that will alleviate pres-
sures . . . The wager is how to produce and transport the greatest quantity
of crude oil.” This was a situation that, according to the author, was not
beneficial to the state because the developments of the 1980s and 1990s
had reduced the production capacity of the state oil company. The cap-
ture of oil rents by the state had decreased significantly (from 80% in
the late 1970s to 18% at the beginning of the 2000s).
This bleak picture changed dramatically with the election of the cur-
rent president, Rafael Correa, in 2006 (re-elected in 2009 and 2013).
Armed with overwhelming electoral support, the new administration
resuscitated the 1970s scheme of controlling oil revenues: he cancelled
existing contracts, returned most of the concessions to the state, obliged
companies to cede most of their income to the state, and strengthened
the state oil company. All of these changes occurred just in time for
the boom in international oil prices of recent years (Ray and Kozameh,
2012).
The reconfiguration of what I have named “the core of post-neoliberal
environmental governance” in Bolivia and Ecuador happened within
the institutional patterns established in the 1970s evolution towards
rentier states. The current boom revives the countries’ historical her-
itage, as shown in Table 4.1.
Endowed with abundant fiscal resources, the Bolivian and Ecuadorian
governments have managed to distribute income by investing in social
policies that seek to improve the living conditions of citizens, and to
undertake ambitious programmes of industrialization and technological
innovation (SENPLADES, 2013; Agenda Bolivia 2025, 2013). This aspect
corresponds with the component of income distribution and it can be
explained by two factors. First, in both countries the struggle for control
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Table 4.1 Income capture in Bolivia and Ecuador
Mechanism of income capture Bolivia Ecuador
Royalties 18% 13.5%
Profit and export taxes 69.5% 60%
Total share of income 87.5% 73.5%
Non-taxed mechanisms YPFB PETROECUADOR
Source: UNASUR (2013), prepared by the author.
of the rentier state was resolved in the second half of 2000 in favour of
rival political elites from the traditional oligarchies who had controlled
their respective states during the 1980s and 1990s. Second, the pressure
for a better distribution of wealth that developed in those years came
from organized popular sectors, including rural groups affected by the
exploitation of natural resources.
In short, political developments in previous years pushed for an
income distribution different from that which predominated in the
years of neoliberalism. However, since these developments incorpo-
rated new demands, they led to increased attention by the Bolivian and
Ecuadorian governments to the themes relegated to the resource agenda
that prevailed in the last quarter of the twentieth century, particularly
the environmental costs of the extractive industries.
The current Bolivian and Ecuadorian governments originate from het-
erogeneous coalitions in middle-class and popular urban sectors, and –
more in the case of Bolivia than Ecuador – rural sectors. Silva (2009) dis-
tinguishes two forms of inclusion of the popular sectors. On one hand,
the ruling party in Bolivia – Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS) – achieves
the direct incorporation of popular sectors into the state government
in the form of a classic party of the masses. Furthermore, the ruling
party in Ecuador – Alianza País – is an electoral machine that had a
strong mobilization, and participation of indigenous and peasant orga-
nizations, social movements with environmental roots, and NGOs from
2006 to 2009 (Becker, 2011; Andrade, 2012; Ortíz, 2013; Silva, 2013).
The difference between the origins and mechanisms of the incorpora-
tion of the governments is important. In Bolivia, the social support of
the organized indigenous and peasants is key for the survival of the gov-
ernment. This factor has significantly influenced the discourse – strongly
tinged by indigenous Bolivian ideology – and the way in which the
project of Vivir Bien/Buen Vivir is configured. In Ecuador, the indigenous
have maintained a tense relationship with the government of President
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Correa as well as a progressive distancing from environmental organiza-
tions since 2010. This item is also reflected in the discourse of Buen Vivir
(Dominguez and Caria, 2013).
One would expect, given these differences, that the policies of the two
governments with respect to the economy–society–nature relationship
would also be distinct. A government with high indigenous participa-
tion should have a policy that is more pro-environment than one with
low participation; however, this is not the case. In fact, if a difference
exists between Bolivia and Ecuador, it is in the degree of translation
of environmental concerns into specialized state agencies. The strange
thing is that, contrary to the prediction by indigenous theorists, the
degree of incorporation of the environmental issue in Ecuador is higher
than in Bolivia.
Environmental compensations and claims
Political sociological studies of the state administration (or manage-
ment) of the environment have shown that it is composed of the
following elements: a network of actors who operate – within and out-
side the state – around problems defined as “environmental”; certain
professionals who define the situation and develop solutions to prob-
lems; institutional rules of the political process of decision-making; and
the cultural ideas that legitimate these decisions (Lahusen and Münch,
2001). I have suggested that in Bolivia and Ecuador the core of resource
governance consists of a strict set of governmental actors, namely, spe-
cialized ministers and state companies. Institutional rules in this core
are highly formalized in their respective constitutions (state ownership
of oil, gas and minerals being the basic rule). The relevant professions
are basically administration, geology and – to a lesser extent – a diverse
set of “environmental consultants”. Finally, the cultural ideas that legiti-
mate decisions are fairly simply: oil, gas and minerals are resources to be
exploited for the benefit of national development (SENPLADES, 2013;
Framework Law of Mother Earth and Integral Development for Living
Well O431 Official Gazette, 2012; Agenda Bolivia 2025, 2013).
Outside this nucleus, both Bolivia and Ecuador have ministries of the
environment (the Ministry of Environment of Ecuador (MAE) and the
Ministry of Environment and Water in Bolivia (MAyA)), departments
and other state agencies that integrate a diverse network of profession-
als. Also, in both cases, final decisions are taken by the government.
The principles that structure the cultural ideas of this sector are precau-
tion, the need to restore environmental damage; the prevention of such
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damages; and the concern for ensuring sustainability. The diagnosis of
environmental problems includes, in both cases – and even more clearly
in Ecuador – checking for damages caused by oil activities, such as defor-
estation, soil and water pollution, and loss of biodiversity and cultural
diversity.
The solution to the detected problems is also common. In Ecuador,
environmental governance is defined as the realization of the “citi-
zen’s right to live in a healthy environment, free of pollution and
sustainable, and the guarantee of the rights of nature through compre-
hensive planning to manage habitats, to manage resources efficiently, to
holistically repair and return life systems to real harmony with nature”
(SENPLADES, 2013: 222). The Bolivian Government affirms that it has
an obligation to “create the conditions to ensure the sustainability of
the State itself in all its territorial areas in order to attain the stan-
dards of Living Well . . . to incorporate integral development in harmony
and balance with Mother Earth in order to Live Well in the policies,
rules, strategies, plans, programmes and projects at the central level
of the State and of the autonomous territorial entities . . . to formulate,
implement, monitor and evaluate policies, standards, strategies, plans,
programmes and projects for the compliance of the objects, targets and
indicators of Living Well, through integral development . . . ” (Gaceta
Oficial, 2012: 12).
In both countries, and as the culmination of long historical evolu-
tions of the twentieth century (Baud and Ospina, 2013), the respective
ministries of the environment administer “systems of environmental
management”. Key components of these systems are national parks
and ecological reserves. In Ecuador the National System of Protected
Areas (Sistema Nacional de Áreas Protegidas (SNAP)) comprises the
State Heritage of National Areas (Patrimonio de Áreas Naturales del
Estado (PANE)) – managed by the central government – and three other
“subsystems” to make room for the participation of subnational gov-
ernments, organized local communities and the private sector: “the
Autonomous Decentralised Governments, the Subsystem of Protected
Community Areas and the Subsystem of Private Protected Areas”.
Together these areas of conservation and protection comprise nearly
8 million Ha of the country.
The Bolivian Government, meanwhile, has organized a complex insti-
tutional framework that grants powers to the Public Ministry, the
Ombudsman of Mother Earth, the Agro-environmental Court, the Min-
istry of Environment, and the Plurinational Council for Living Well in
Harmony and Balance with Mother Earth. It integrates the ministry
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of Developmental Planning (the Bolivian equivalent to the Secretaría
Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo/National Secretary for Planning
and Development (SENPLADES)), the Autonomous Departmental Gov-
ernments and so forth. This organization multiplies the actors and entry
points in environmental issues. As in Ecuador, the basic component of
this system is the National System of Protected Areas (Sistema Nacional
de Áreas Protegidas (SERNAP)). The Plurinational Council is directly
hinged to the presidency of the Republic.
Another important environmental agenda of the two countries is cli-
mate change. The respective ministries and other state agencies have
created plans for adaptation to and mitigation of climate change. The
development of this theme, and of the environmental agencies overall,
has relied heavily on international cooperation. Prominent interna-
tional actors, who are common to both countries, are the World Bank,
UNEP and the official German cooperation.
Finally, the Bolivian and Ecuadorian governments agree that the rich
biodiversity of the two countries provides opportunities for some kind
of “green” development, and they have advanced policies in this direc-
tion. Since 2001, Ecuador has been developing a National Program of
Bio-knowledge, whose management depends on the ministries of envi-
ronment and agriculture under the National Biosafety Framework (MAE,
2013; Andrade and Zenteno, 2014). In Bolivia the “Framework Law . . . ”
and the “Bolivia Agenda, 2025” contemplate a similar development, but
the government has not made progress in the implementation of these
policies.
As indicated above, the Ecuadorian environmental policy differs from
that of Bolivia in the importance that it gives to the environmental dam-
age caused by oil exploitation. Since 2008 the Ecuador’s government
has promoted an active policy of environmental remediation, exe-
cuted by the Reparation Program of Environmental and Social Liabilities
(Programa de Reparación de Pasivos Ambientales y Sociales (PRAS)).
The notion of “shared responsibility” – between the state and local
communities in the management of environmental problems that pre-
vail in institutional environmental designs – opens up opportunities
for the participation of local communities and municipal, provin-
cial and (in Bolivia) departmental governments. The role of scientific
knowledge in this layer of environmental governance is important.
Agencies generate and require scientific knowledge for the installation of
environmental indicator systems, environmental accounts, early detec-
tion of environmental damage and so on. This necessity has created
state organizations populated by local experts – specialized in public
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administration and in certain branches of knowledge, such as biol-
ogy and geography – and scientists mostly of international origin or
trained in first-world universities (Andrade and Zenteno, 2014, http://
www.conocimiento.gob.ec).
Although the Bolivian Government shares this point of view to a
great extent, it gives senior ranking to the generation of knowledge and
technology to add value to “food processing, lithium, gas and hydro-
carbons . . . ” (Agenda Bolivia 2025, 2013). In fact, the sixth objective of
the development of the Bolivian Government’s agenda indicates that
such technological advances will be accompanied by an increase in
hydrocarbon and metallic and non-metallic minerals. The incorpora-
tion of technology refers not only to processes of industrialization but
also to minimizing environmental damage.
In summary, this level of post-neoliberal environmental governance –
summarized in Table 4.2 – incorporates not only a range of actors but
also well-established international actors and issues of the global envi-
ronmental agenda (deforestation, environmental remediation, envi-
ronmental services, climate change, etc.). The latter should not be
surprising given that the state agencies that organize the sector origi-
nated precisely from pressures and institutional global designs, or they
at least count on international cooperation for their operation. Environ-
mental administration is focused on environmental management, and
its basic attention is devoted to widely accepted global issues – defor-
estation, the preservation and administration of water resources, the
remediation of various forms of environmental pollution, and increas-
ingly climate change – and its function is to produce public policies
on these issues. Its fundamental political component is the adminis-
tration of national and international resources for the reproduction of
environmental management.
There remains to be examined the third layer. Unlike the previous two
layers, which are directly hinged to the state, this last one is the domain
of civil society. Even when it resorts to formal rules, it is mainly infor-
mal and is open to a number of state and non-state actors. This level is
important because, on the one hand, it has provided some of the discur-
sive resources that comprise the environmental rhetoric of the Bolivian
and Ecuadorian governments and, on the other hand, civil actors use
this rhetoric as a resource of political action.
A cursory examination of the rhetoric of “living well” and “good liv-
ing”, in Bolivia and Ecuador, respectively, indicates the constant appeal
to three ideas: harmony with nature, the sacredness of nature (revealed
in the frequent use of names such as Mother Earth and Pachamama), and
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Table 4.2 Environmental administration in Bolivia and Ecuador
Bolivia Ecuador
Formal rules Framework Law Constitution
Agenda Patriótica 2025 National Plan for Living
Well
Specific laws Specific laws








Other actors Subnational governments Subnational governments
International cooperation International
cooperation




















Climate change Climate change
the rights of this entity. The Ecuadorian Constitution, both in its pream-
ble and in its Chapter 4, recognizes the right of Ecuadorians to live in
a healthy and balanced environment, in harmony with nature. A simi-
lar phrase appears in Chapter 1, Article 1 of the Bolivian “Framework
Law . . . ” in the form of “comprehensive and balanced development”
and as a guarantee of the “continuity of the regenerative capacity of the
systems and components of Mother Earth”. The “living well” and “good
living” discourses also agree on two other points. First, this state of har-
mony does not exist at the moment, but it will be obtained in the more
or less distant future as a result of social efforts led by the state. Second,
a key component of this company is the respect and use of “ancestral
knowledge” (“originating” in the Bolivian rhetoric) (SENPLADES, 2009,
2013; Domínguez and Caria, 2013).
Regardless of the ideological value that these discourses may have
to legitimate governmental actions, “living well” and “good living”
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have encouraged complaints, protests and demands of indigenous and
environmentalist actors as much in Ecuador as in Bolivia. In effect, the
anti-mining protests in Ecuador in 2012, the staging of anti-mining ref-
erenda in that country (see Chapter 11, this volume) and the failed
Yasuní-ITT initiative articulated the idea that the achievement of “good
living” depended on at least three conditions. These comprised the
preservation of ecological balance, the need for governments to take
into account the voice of those who are possibly affected (van Teijlingen,
2013), and, in the case of Yasuní, the obligation of the Ecuadorian state
to preserve cultures whose ancestral knowledge preserves the rights of
nature (Rival, 2012). In Bolivia the conflict over TIPNIS national park
was also articulated and could be processed through the resource of the
“living well” and rights of nature rhetorics (Ortiz, 2013).
Both the Yasuní-ITT initiative and the TIPNIS conflicts show some of
the processes, mechanisms, actors, potentials and limits of the “living
well” and “good living” rhetorics. In both cases, policies initiated by
their respective governments tried to protect the rights of the indige-
nous peoples who lived in areas of the Amazon. Similarly, in both
cases these policies implied that the state would abstain from exploit-
ing oil resources in those territories. Finally, when both governments
changed their policies, they incited intense conflicts between the exec-
utives and national indigenous and environmentalist groups that had
international support.
In summary, the third layer provides discursive and legal resources
for stakeholders to advance their environmental demands. These actors
are, in principle, any group of citizens; and even those citizens are
not limited to national boundaries as they may be international orga-
nizations. In special circumstances – such as the temporary control of
the state by “green” coalitions – actors, issues and modes of operation
that arise in this sphere can become national and international pub-
lic policies (Sodërbaum, 2000), as happened in Ecuador between 2007
and 2010. In Bolivia this position was occupied by indigenous move-
ment organizations (Hogenboom, 2014). However, when that careful
step contradicts the preservation of the core of natural resource gover-
nance in a rentier state, these same actors and themes are again expelled
to the periphery, as indeed happened with the Yasuní-ITT initiative and
the Bolivian TIPNIS conflict. The expulsion depends on how the decisive
power is organized in the Bolivian and Ecuadorian states. In both cases
the standard decisive power falls on the president and state agencies that
are nuclear to the rentier states; this group can veto policies that would
infringe on their reproduction.
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Conclusion
The Bolivian and Ecuadorian experiences show that although new forms
of regulating the exploitation and use (income) of natural resources
can be created, they have prioritized the preservation of the states’
access to income and, by implication, of the extractivist activities them-
selves. This burden differentiates environmental government at various
levels, as long as their existence does not compromise the reproduc-
tion circuit of the rentier state (extraction cycle, income and distri-
bution). Bolivia and Ecuador have abundant natural resources, both
in the narrow sense of mineral resources – oil and gas – and in the
extended sense of ecosystem diversity. Additionally, in both countries
the long-term historical development has been towards the installa-
tion and consolidation of rentier states. The current commodity boom
created room so that governments that might have followed a differ-
ent path opted to recreate the rentier states of the 1970s. The policy
option resulted in the differentiated post-neoliberal mode of environ-
mental governance that is currently being consolidated in the two
countries.
In both countries the original formation of the rentier states depended
both on internal political struggles and the existence of high inter-
national prices for hydrocarbons – and in the case of tin in post-war
Bolivia, the collapse of these international markets. The current reacti-
vation of the rentier states reflects factors similar to those of the past:
the boom in mineral exports enabled the Bolivian and Ecuadorian gov-
ernments to reconfigure the rent-seeking mechanisms that ensure their
access to the abundant returns produced by extraction and export to
international markets. This development, in turn, increased the abil-
ity of states to provide basic services, and consequently legitimized the
extractive activities supported (and to some extent controlled) by the
states.
The explanation is not only economic. Politics has also played a role
in creating post-neoliberal environmental governance. The Bolivian and
Ecuadorian governments are the result of processes of dispute over the
use of natural resources. The arrival of new players to the control of the
state, and the means by which they attained that power, would seem to
explain the construction of a sort of macroideology with strong environ-
mental tones: “living well” and “good living”. This element completes
the set of environmental governance and gives it ideological coherence.
The regulation of natural resources, including the use of income from
exploitation, makes sense only to the extent that it serves a greater
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purpose: to achieve a new relationship between Bolivian and Ecuadorian
societies and their natural surroundings.
The dynamics of post-neoliberal environmental governance are com-
plex. On the one hand, the rentier status of the Bolivian and Ecuadorian
states promotes the social and biological reproduction of societies and
new attempts at industrialization. On the other hand, rentier states
have an interest in promoting the expansion of resource frontiers,
which compromise fragile ecosystems and the survival of rural societies,
thereby increasing political conflicts. However, it is still incipient and
relatively exclusive, and its mechanisms are insufficient to solve the
operation/preservation dilemma. Finally, the open possibilities in the
ideological or cultural layer provide symbolic and material resources for
the expression of socioenvironmental conflicts, and some mechanisms
for its processing. However, its implementation depends on the strength
of the democratic regime.
It is reasonable to assume that the tensions, conflicts and dynamics
that gave rise to the current mode of environmental governance will
continue to influence future developments. At the moment, however,
it is difficult to say if at some point in this development it will orga-
nize itself in a more pluralistic and open way than it is at present, or
whether – as in periods of decline in international prices – it will be
reconfigured in an increasingly exclusive and unstable direction.
Notes
1. In Bolivia, poverty improved more rapidly than inequality, which actually
seems to be increasing, while in Ecuador the two indicators have decreased
simultaneously and at accelerated rates. A report from the Central Bank of
that country indicates that the accelerated rate is due to two factors: “the
improvement of the international environment” and the degree of destruc-
tion provoked by the crisis of 1998–2002. See Dirección General de Estudios,
Banco Central del Ecuador, La Economía Ecuatoriana luego de 10 años de
Dolarización (The Ecuadorian Economy After 10 Years of Dolarisation) (Quito:
Banco Central del Ecuador).
2. The exportation of minerals is not important for Ecuador, but the high prices
of mineral ores have stimulated the government to promote the develop-
ment, albeit still incipient, of metal mining in Ecuador, for which Chinese
investments have flowed into the country.
3. For an overview of the financing of social policy from mineral (or
hydrocarbon) resources, see Hujo, K. (2012).
4. See CEPAL (2013).
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Changing Elites, Institutions and
Environmental Governance
Benedicte Bull and Mariel Aguilar-Støen
Introduction
The topic of elites has always been controversial in Latin American
social sciences. Elites have been studied indirectly as landowners, cap-
italists, business-leaders or politicians, and have also been approached
directly using concepts and theory from elite studies. Although there
is a significant amount of literature on the role of elites in democratic
transformations (see e.g. Higley and Gunther, 1992), elites have often
been considered to be an obstacle to the formation of more demo-
cratic, prosperous and egalitarian societies (e.g. Paige, 1997; Cimoli
and Rovira, 2008). This is also the case in the literature on envi-
ronmental governance, in which elite groups are often considered to
be an obstacle to sustainable development and an obstacle to estab-
lishing more equitable influence over the use and benefits of natural
resources. Therefore, although an elitist conservation movement has
long existed in Latin America, struggles to protect the environment
from overexploitation and contamination have commonly been related
to struggles against local, national and transnational elites by subaltern
groups (Martínez-Alier, 2002; Carruthers, 2008; chapters 1 and 2 in this
volume).
Over the last decade a number of changes, which might have an
impact on the composition and attitudes of elites, have occurred in
Latin America. Such changes could have consequences for environ-
mental governance in the broad sense of the concept, as outlined in
the Introduction of this book. Out of 49 presidential elections in the
2003–2013 period, 22 were won by centre-left candidates, and with
the exception of Mexico and Colombia, centre-left governments were
in power in all the large economies in Latin America for most of this
137
138 Changing Elites and Institutions
period (Bull, 2014). Many of these governments represent groups that
have previously been marginalized from politics and antagonized by the
elites, including indigenous and environmental movements. With the
changes in the global political economy, including the rise of China and
a number of other emerging economies, Latin America has also seen the
entry of a number of new economic actors, including new transnational
companies and new lenders. Furthermore, in key sectors, new tech-
nologies have changed the production structure and therefore also the
concentration of resources – and, in turn, possibly the composition of
elites.
In spite of several such changes, the initial optimism regarding
implications for environmental governance has subsided. In 2010,
environmentalist Eduardo Gudynas (2010) rhetorically asked the new
governments: If you are so progressive, why do you destroy the environ-
ment? In the aftermath, several other questions have been posed about
why governments that publicly rejected genetically modified agriculture
later promoted it; why they accelerated the issuing of mining conces-
sions in spite of protests from their former constituencies; and why they
expanded logging and oil exploitation in vulnerable areas in spite of
pledging to protect them.
The aim of this chapter is to provide new insight into the elite dynam-
ics that may provide answers to some of the questions outlined above.
The chapter empirically interrogates elite shifts based on six case studies,
outlining how new elites have emerged, how old elites have contin-
ued to influence politics and the economy, and how the relationship
between new and old elites has affected environmental governance in
the region.
For our analysis we use a “resource-based” definition of elites in
environmental governance: “Groups of individuals that due to their eco-
nomic resources, expertise/knowledge, social networks, or positions in
political or other organizations stand in a privileged position to influ-
ence in a formal or informal way decisions and practices with key social
and environmental implications” (Bull, 2015: 18). This is a multifaceted
definition of elites that allows for the existence of both parallel and
competing elites. Nevertheless, our analysis places particular emphasis
on elites that control economic resources, including business elites and
landowners. Therefore below we discuss the relationship between the
concept of elite and that of class, and we discuss how elites and classes
are considered to contribute to or hinder democracy and development,
how they might change, and how they might be thought to impact
environmental governance.
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The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. The second part
presents the puzzles motivating our study. In most cases these refer
to environmental practices or environmental policies that were less
sustainable than what was expected. Yet there are also cases in which
surprising progress has been made. The third part summarizes the
different problems of elites as discussed in the literature. The discus-
sion includes the structural limitations to the transformative poten-
tials related to a shift in the command of liberal political institu-
tions, the predominance of “elite circulation”, and what we call the
“state/development” imperative based on a Weberian understanding
of the need for state construction. The fourth part discusses different
ways in which our case studies illustrate and confirm the problems
discussed in the elite literature: how entrenched elites have hindered
structural transformations towards an environmental governance that
ensures more sustainable and equitable production; the conflicts over
land use and how they have their roots in institutions that are kept weak
due to historical control by elites; and how new governments accom-
modate their politics to the demands of the elites. However, some of the
findings also challenge the rather pessimistic outlook of elite theory. In
the fifth part we concentrate on the role of global economic transitions
and technology, and elite shifts. The sixth part discusses the possibilities
for change due to the emergence of new elites with different attitudes
towards environmental governance. These include both new political
elites and new knowledge elites. Finally, the conclusions are presented.
The puzzles: Progress and setback in environmental
governance under leftist governments
In 2009, when El Salvador got its first president supported by a leftwing
and former guerrilla party (Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación
Nacional (FMLN)), it was a major break with the past. Before Mauricio
Funes’ electoral victory, El Salvador had been ruled for 20 years by the
same business elite-led party (Alianza Republicana Nacional (ARENA)).
During this period the country had undergone a major economic
transformation from an agroexport country to one dependent on remit-
tances and the service sector (Segovia, 2002). This conversion brought
temporary relief to the environmental impact of agroexport-oriented
agricultural production, of which the most damaging products were
cotton and sugar (Hecht et al., 2006). Nevertheless, when Funes took
power, the country faced a triple crisis – economic, social and environ-
mental – which enhanced the vulnerability of the population to natural
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catastrophes. Yet the country was also characterized by significant rural
as well as urban political mobilization, and by the existence of various
organizations that had developed sophisticated alternatives to the con-
ventional agricultural development model. In spite of this, the Funes
government struggled hard to set El Salvador on a different path, and,
in the end, new ideas related to alternative agricultural development
became marginalized in the national agenda, while there was no con-
sensus on why no new development model was allowed to emerge while
the old one continued to perform badly.
In Bolivia, Evo Morales – who came to power in 2006 with his Proceso
de Cambio (process of change) – gave priority to family and small-scale
agriculture over industrialized agriculture. This also implied a rejection
of all GM organisms due to their environmental and health implica-
tions. This position echoed the viewpoints of a broad array of social
movements upon which the governing party, MAS, was based. Since
coming into power, MAS has been in deep conflicts with the country’s
old elite, with their stronghold in the “half-moon” states (Santa Cruz,
Beni, Pando y Tarija) and controlling most of the country’s economic
sectors, including agriculture. Paradoxically, during the government of
Evo Morales, the amount of genetically produced soy in Bolivia more
than doubled (Zeballos, 2012), and the question of how the government
could make this compatible with the official anti-GM discourse became
more and more pressing.
Argentina has also been marked by deep conflicts between the gov-
ernments of Nestor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner of
the Peronist party (Partido Justicialista) and agricultural elites. Yet, at
the same time, Argentina has become one of the major producers of
genetically modified soy in the world, with major implications for the
structure of the agricultural sector as well as for the environment (Trigo,
2011). Why was there so little public debate about it?
In Ecuador a major puzzle regarding biotechnology also arose. A major
shift in the governance of the country occurred when Rafael Correa
came to power, leading a broad coalition (Alianza PAIS) with strong par-
ticipation from both indigenous and environmental movements. The
platform for the coalition strongly rejected GM organisms and other
uses of biotechnology in agriculture. However, once in government,
Correa strongly promoted their use.
The mining sector is probably the most controversial in Latin America
today, with its notable expansion, and its obvious environmental and
social impacts, along with the large number of conflicts mining has
generated across the region (see also chapters 2 and 11). In Guatemala,
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in the silver mining project El Escobal in the south-eastern part of the
country, a transnational company (Tahoe Resources Inc.) and national
elites face the protests of the indigenous Xinka people and their organi-
zations. However, in spite of stated good intentions by the government
as well as the companies, repressive practices against the protesters
have continued and there has been virtually no room for dialogue. We
attempt to explain why it has proved so difficult to mediate between the
conflicting parties.
However, there are also positive cases. In the Brazilian states of Acre
and Amazonas, there have been significant improvements in forest pol-
icy and forest protection over recent years. This stands in stark contrast
with the rather disappointing record regarding forest protection of the
federal government during the three consecutive governments led by
the Worker’s Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT)), those of the Luiz
Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–2007 and 2007–2011) and Dilma Rousseff
(2011–2014) administrations. Moreover, advances in forest governance
have occurred in states governed by different parties. What can explain
Acre and Amazona’s success?
Environmental policies and practices are not only influenced by
domestic and local politics. There are also questions to be asked of inter-
national initiatives. One of the international initiatives with the most
far-reaching consequences for forest governance in Latin America at the
moment is the project known as Reducing Emissions from Deforesta-
tion and Forest Degradation (REDD). In spite of its rhetoric of inclusion,
not all involved parties seem to have found their views expressed in
the initiative. Instead, REDD is generating its own “elite” and its own
discourse, and the question is how this can really address the pressing
issues in Latin America’s environmental governance.
Our approach to answering these questions has been to focus on elites.
Thus in the following section we will discuss what elite theory might say
about the questions above.
The “elite problem” in theories of development, democracy
and environmental governance
The recent increase in interest about elites and development in aca-
demic literature is closely connected to an increasing consensus about
the importance of institutions for development, and the role of elites
in shaping those institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Amsden,
Di Caprio and Robinson, 2012). A focus on elites and institutions is
in no way new in development theory. It has been a central element
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in Weberian-inspired development theory, from Gunnar Myrdal to the
literature on the “developmental state”1 (Myrdal, 1968; Woo-Cumings,
1999). Elites have sometimes been considered a hindrance to the emer-
gence of such a state. As argued by Myrdal, “In fact, [elites] are best
defined as people who are in a position to hinder reforms or to manipu-
late them, and, in the end, to obstruct their implementation” (Myrdal,
2010 [1979]: 335). However, others have considered elites to be capable
of the efficient and productive channelling of resources, although they
have frequently also acted as rent-seekers and have directed resources
towards favoured and inefficient social groups (Amsden, Di Caprio and
Robinson, 2012: 5).
Much less discussed is the relationship between elites, institutions
and sustainable development, a dynamic that also necessitates the anal-
ysis of environmental governance. The literature referred to above is
almost exclusively focused on economic growth and industrial upgrad-
ing. Furthermore, the term “institutions” is largely equated with “state
institutions”, and “development” is understood as economic growth at
the national level. This literature has, to a very limited degree, prob-
lematized the environmental sustainability of development, and its
distributional implications are only considered to the extent that they
have consequences for long-term national economic growth. In other
words, distribution of the benefits of growth and development across
social groups and geographical areas is only considered a problem if it
leads to decelerated growth – for example, if the majority are too poor
to constitute a market or lack the health and education to provide the
necessary human resources.
This view of development is often rejected by the literature on polit-
ical ecology that takes “Capitalism and its historical transformations
[as] a starting point for any account of the destruction of nature”
(Peet, Robbins and Watts, 2010: 23). What was characterized above as
“development” is, in political ecology literature, considered to be the
privileging of certain exploitative productive systems over others, caus-
ing intertwined distributive and ecological conflicts and the degradation
of the environment (Alimonda, 2011). In the political ecology literature,
however, elites are largely “black boxed”. Elites appear as the perpetra-
tors: they are the capital owners, the business and knowledge elites, and
the groups controlling the state, thereby contributing to the marginal-
ization of people inhabiting rural landscapes and to the overexploitation
and pollution of natural resources (Carruthers, 2008). However, elites in
the political ecology literature are rarely the object of direct scrutiny.
Their interests are considered to be dependent on their location in the
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structural relations of domination, and their privileges to be derived
from their positions in the structures that configure Latin America as a
subaltern region open to exploitation according to the needs of a glob-
ally integrated capitalism. The double exploitation of people and nature
also forms the basis of the construction of the modern states, dominated
by national elites, but it is also often based on the control of natural
resources and local groups in different parts of the territory (Alimonda,
2011).
Against the backdrop presented above, we should not only ask under
what conditions we can expect elite objectives to be aligned with
national development goals. We also have to discuss how to make those
goals aligned with the interests, needs and aspirations of all popula-
tion groups across social classes and territories, as well as with those of
future generations. A common answer to the question of how to achieve
that has been to emphasize pluralism and democracy; in other words, to
ensure that there are good mechanisms of representation, participation
and accountability, which can lead to the establishment of institutions
of environmental governance with the potential of less elitist and more
sustainable development outcomes. This has been what many hoped
would occur in Latin America in recent decades after the return to formal
democracies and the historical rise of previously marginalized groups to
power in the government.
Elite theory has nevertheless never been convinced of the merits of
pluralist democracies to make societies more egalitarian. To the contrary,
elite theories of all kinds have had a quite dismal view of the potential
of democracy to transform society, a matter that is partially rooted in
their view of the state. Marxist elite theory, which defines elites based
on their relationship to capital and means of production, is generally
sceptical of the possibility for changes in the state without underly-
ing changes in the mode of production upholding it (see e.g. Jessop,
1990). As a democratic government depends on public support, it will
suffer if it presides over a serious drop in the level of economic activity
as a result of conflicts with capitalists (Block, 1977). Therefore, in spite
of the establishment of pluralist institutions, the state cannot really be
democratized within a capitalist economy.
The other major classical political-economy theory of elites and
democracy, developed by Schumpeter, was highly critical of the Marxist
equation of true democracy with socialism, although not discharging
the possibility that they could coexist.2 He does not have much more
faith in pluralism either. Schumpeter’s main point is that democracy
is inherently elitist: “democracy does not mean and cannot mean that
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the people actually rule . . . Democracy means only that the people have
the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men (sic) who are to rule
them” (Schumpeter, 1976: 285). However, this should not lead one to
be pessimistic about the decisions made in democratic institutions. The
functioning of democracy would depend on the degree to which a gov-
ernment is restrained by autonomous state powers (most importantly,
the judiciary), the self-restraint used by such powers (also parliamentary)
and the existence of an independent bureaucracy.
The so-called “Italian school” of elite theory was also sceptical of the
virtues of pluralist democracies. Originating in the writings of Mosca,
Mitchells and Pareto (see Pareto 1997 [1935]; Mosca, 1939; Michels,
1962), it defines the elite as a distinct group of society that enjoys a
privileged status and exercises decisive control over the organization of
society (Wolf, 2012: 120). Mosca regarded universal suffrage and par-
liamentarism as unable to dissolve the principle that, in any society, an
“organized minority” is able to “impose its will on a disorganized major-
ity” (Mosca, 1939: 154), while Vilfredo Pareto argued that elites would
slowly be replaced by ascending families and groups without changing
the elitist structures of society (Pareto, 1935). Yet it is this elite circula-
tion, not the revolutions led by the dispossessed classes, that would lead
to change (Pareto, 1916, cited in Hartmann, 2007).
For this study we adopted a “resource-based definition” as outlined
above, which combines some of the elements of the Italian approach
with that of the Marxist approach. The definition we adopted here con-
siders elites to potentially emerge from their control of various and
possibly overlapping resources, including organizational (control over
organizations, including the state), political (public support), symbolic
(knowledge and ability to manipulate symbols and discourses) and per-
sonal (such as charisma, time, motivation and energy) (Etzioni-Halevy,
1997: xxv). Yet we also include a focus on the actual influence that these
groups have on the environmental outcomes of changing policies and
practices.
Also, our view on how elites shift is eclectic. In the Marxist view,
rather than through a democratic shift of government, change would
emanate from below, based on the construction of political subjects
among the dispossessed classes. However, Marxism has also envisioned
changes emerging from the space opened for the “relative autonomy of
the state” in situations of weak or split class forces (Jessop, 1990). The
capitalist classes were considered to be unable to establish a “political
hegemony” by themselves, thus ensuring the dominance of the lower
classes. This is rather the role of the state, which in the process assumes
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a relative autonomy from the capitalist classes (Poulantzas, 1978). This
makes room for the emergence of a state elite that is functionally set
apart from the capitalist class.
This is an issue that is also essential to Weber, who regards the state
bureaucracy not only as a by-product of capitalism but as the most effec-
tive form of legitimate power and the source of the emergence of an
entirely new class (Weber, 1978). The structure and power of the bureau-
cracy is much more important than the electoral institutions since the
demos itself is “a shapeless mass [that] never ‘governs’ larger associa-
tions, but rather is governed” (Weber, 1978). The dilemma presented to
new political forces gaining formal power over a state apparatus is that,
while the bureaucracy may hinder a shift in policies and practices, it may
take decades to construct. Irrespective of how much popular support a
ruler may enjoy, without the instrument of a modern bureaucracy, his
or her ability to enact, implement and enforce his or her will is severely
limited.
In sum, with the exception of the Marxists, elite theorists doubt the
possibility of elite-free societies. Moreover, they all have reservations
against the belief that a shift in government will automatically result in
a shift in elites. Nevertheless, there are venues open for change. We focus
on shifts in the elites’ control of resources that result in changes in their
ability to exert influence over decisions and practices with environmen-
tal implications. In Latin America recently, we identified four such shifts,
which will be discussed below.
Leftwing governments, elite circulation and limitations
to environmental governance shifts
The first such process of change is the shift in control of political
resources related to the entering of power of centre-left governments,
many of which represented groups that had previously been excluded
from political power, including indigenous movements, labour move-
ments, environmental movements and diverse social movements con-
stituted by dispossessed groups. In spite of getting electoral support
from these groups, many of the governments have later disqualified or
consciously attempted to co-opt some of them (Zibechi, 2010; Bowen,
2011), while new elites emerge. Thus we may observe a process of “cir-
culation of the elites”, controlling political resources with a possible
impact on environmental governance.
One example of that is found in Bolivia, where groups associated with
the governing party MAS have started to gain political resources and
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power (Ayo Saucedo, 2012), but also economic resources through, for
example, the processes of nationalization of enterprises (Ayo Saucedo
et al., 2013). The soy sector has long been dominated by a landed elite,
with diverse origins (including large groups of immigrants from Brazil),
but with a common discourse on the use of GM, the benefits of indus-
trial agriculture and the desire to be independent from the Morales
government (Plata, 2008; Soruco, 2008). This traditional elite still con-
trol important economic resources (particularly through their control
of land). Nevertheless, a new group of people, with significantly fewer
economic resources than the traditional economic and political elite,
has entered the political arena and is exerting influence over the way in
which the environmental consequences of GM agricultural production
are addressed (Høiby and Zenteno Hopp, 2015). This new group is com-
posed of soy farmers who have accessed their productive capacity due to
contacts in the MAS party, and political groups. While standing quite far
apart from the old soy elite on several matters of economic policy and so
forth, they coincide with them on the issue of the desirability of expan-
sion of GM soy. Soy production contributes substantially to government
revenues and perhaps, therefore, the expansion of GM soy production
into forested areas is not rejected by the government.
In El Salvador, the entering of a centre-left government had quite
different consequences. El Salvador is a country that has historically
been dominated by a closely knit agroexport-based elite that have had
political power for most of the country’s history, historically in con-
junction with the military (Paige, 1997). Between 1989 and 2009 they
ruled through the rightwing ARENA party, led by some of the coun-
try’s richest families. Thus they awaited the coming of a government
supported by the FMLN with significant fear and contempt, and the
old elite put up both political and economic resistance. However, the
right wing was already split when the Funes government came into
power, partially due to the prior transformation of El Salvador from an
agroexport- to a service-based economy dependent on remittances from
migrants in the USA. Although the old elite families diversified their
portfolios to benefit from the new economy (Bull, 2013), the economic
transformation also produced the ascendance of new economic elites
that eventually challenged the old elite dominating the ARENA party.
That resulted in the breakout of the GANA party (Gran Alianza por la
Unidad Nacional) soon after the Funes government took power. The
Funes government attempted to include broad groups of the society in a
multistakeholder dialogue to establish new forms of governance of agri-
cultural and other productive activities. The purpose was to confront
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the grave environmental crisis in which El Salvador was submerged. The
groups that advocated a different agricultural model more focused on
small farms and ecological production included both members of the
new government, particularly linked to the Ministry of the Environ-
ment and Natural Resources (MARN), and a broad set of civil society
organizations working locally to create economies based on principles
of ecology and solidarity.
However, the government could not ignore the economic crisis, with
low or negative growth for many consecutive years. As predicted by
Block and other Marxists, the government’s dependence on the eco-
nomic elites for investment limited strongly its freedom of action.
The domestic economic elite also represented the political opposi-
tion, although it was split between ARENA and GANA. Although
ARENA, GANA and the private sector peak association ANEP (Asociación
Nacional de la Empresa Privada) initially participated in different forums
of dialogue to reach solutions to pressing problems (including the Social
and Economic Council established on the model of a similar institution
in the EU), the relationship soon soured. The government was required
to re-establish a relationship with the private sector in the context of the
US-funded Alliance for Growth program, but then chose to deal directly
with a narrow group of the country’s most powerful businessmen in
order to attempt to entice them to invest in El Salvador. In the process,
however, the development plans became more and more aligned with
the business elite’s priorities and less and less to the groups proposing
alternative models within the government (Bull, Cuéllar and Kandel,
2014). There was also an incipient economic elite emerging as a result
of the policies of the new government. This had links to the govern-
ing party, but benefited from its role in the companies established with
funds from the Venezuela-led Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our
America (ALBA) (Lemus, 2014). However, this elite showed little inclina-
tion to support the groups within a ruling party that advocated a shift
towards a more sustainable development model.
The case of Ecuador is illustrative of a different solution to similar
structural constraints. When Rafael Correa came to power in 2008, it
was as head of a broad coalition with support from grassroots orga-
nizations, and with a strong environmentalist faction within the gov-
ernment. While new groups entered the governmental corridors, these
were not considered to be a new elite but rather a counterweight to
the traditional elites in Ecuador that had previously – and simultane-
ously – incorporated and marginalized grassroots organizations (Bowen,
2011). The environmentalists in the government were able to influence
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how environmental issues were framed in the official discourse, and
important changes in the status of the environment and its relation
to human activity were introduced to the constitution of the country
(Andrade, 2012; Basabe, Pachano and Acosta, 2012). One of the changes
made was that the government openly rejected GM organisms.
However, Correa’s government was equally challenged by old elites
that, although lacking a recent past of 20 years of relatively stable rule
that ARENA in El Salvador had enjoyed, were equally enmeshed in the
international economy (both countries converted to US dollars in 2000)
and had enjoyed strong privileges in association with multinational
companies in the past. Yet Correa managed to challenge the old elites to
a quite different extent than his El Salvadoran counterpart by ensuring
income from the oil industry, strengthening the incipient mining indus-
try and engaging in a process of strengthening the Ecuadorean state.
During Correa’s second term (2009–2013) his political project was
increasingly formulated as that of a developmentalist project, resting
on the parallel strengthening of technology and industrial upgrading
and the intensification of resource extraction. This resulted in the weak-
ening of the environmentalist faction of the government and in the
emergence and gradual strengthening of a young technocratic elite.
This elite not only supported the industrialization efforts but also had
a positive view on GM organisms. These young professionals, owing
their influence to specialized knowledge of biotechnology, are becom-
ing key players in defining strategies to achieve the diversification of
agricultural production in Ecuador. Their view fits well with the devel-
opmentalist ideas pursued by Correa, seeking rapid diversification of the
Ecuadorian economy led by experts and guided by scientific knowledge
(SENPLADES, 2013). While these ideas made room for the influence of
this new technocratic elite, it is also the case that the emergence of the
technocratic elite reinforces and supports the plan.
Thus in the cases above we have seen the entry of new political
groups in government that have struggled against old elites in their pur-
suit of political and economic projects. However, in the process, new
elites have formed based on access to economic- and knowledge-based
resources in addition to political ones. Yet the elite circulation we have
seen in Ecuador and Bolivia has had a limited positive environmental
impact, as requirement for funding for social projects, the strengthen-
ing of the state, and the continued struggle against old elites have often
weighed stronger than environmental concerns. Moreover, emerging
new elites have had equally strong economic interests in the contin-
uation of an extractivist model, while political elites (particularly in the
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case of Ecuador) have sought support from groups controlling a tech-
nical knowledge and ideology of continued industrialization and the
conquering of nature.
The role of global economic transitions and technology
The second process of elite change is a shift in the control of economic
resources due to changes in the global economy. Parallel to the so-
called “left tide” in Latin America, three major interrelated trends have
occurred in the global economy: a rise in the demand and prices of com-
modities; the strongly related rise of China as a major economic power,
lender and investor in Latin America (Durán Lima and Pellandra, 2013);
and the strengthening of regional integration schemes such as ALBA,
MERCOSUR and UNASUR, which have favoured the emergence of new
economic elites associated with, for example, state-controlled or sup-
ported companies. These processes have enabled new groups to control
significant shares of the economy.
The rise of China and booming commodity prices have allowed the
South American countries to speed up debt repayment to international
institutions, and to form new economic alliances. This has resulted
in a decrease in importance of elites that have traditionally been very
influential in the region, among them those related to Western multi-
national companies, the World Bank, the IDB and the International
Monetary Fund. As a result we are currently observing new relationships
and arrangements between national states on the one hand and, on
the other hand, diverse international elites of various origins, including
North American, European, Chinese and Latin American.
In all of the cases discussed here there has been, to a certain degree,
an interplay with commodity prices, particularly the booming of the
soy market and the opportunities that new elites have had to emerge.
One case in particular, Guatemala, suggests that when rising commod-
ity prices have resulted in the entrance of new transnational elites to
the country, the scope of possibilities to influence environmental gov-
ernance and outcomes of these new elites is limited not only by the
features of the industry (i.e. mining) but also by the dynamics found in
the relationship between new elites controlling access to markets and
technology, and old elites controlling political resources and land. New
transnational elites have opted to operate within a status quo deter-
mined by the power that the traditional elite holds over major knobs
of the economy and the government, and a series of corrupt practices
and relationships between the old, entrenched elite and the government
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(Aguilar-Støen, 2015). Guatemalan business elites have been success-
ful in keeping transnational elites, including transnational companies
from Canada, Australia, the USA and Russia, in a subordinate posi-
tion. This is explained by the control of different but complementary
resources. Domestic elites control important political resources, net-
works and information; transnational companies could not operate
without such resources (Schneider, 2012; Bull, Castellacci and Kasahara,
2014). Local elites have also established different types of partnership
with transnational mining companies. In many cases, local elites have
interests in junior mining firms that are subsidiaries of transnational
mining companies. The drafting of mining legislation in Guatemala
involved the participation of Canadian and Guatemalan businessmen,
and the resulting mining law disproportionately favours mining com-
panies over the interests of local populations, including their environ-
mental concerns (Dougherty, 2011). A mix of local and foreign capital
finances mining operations in Guatemala. Canadian groups in associa-
tion with Guatemalan capital dominate metallic mineral exploitation.
The largest non-metallic mining company is the Guatemalan company
Cementos Progreso, which makes the second largest contribution to
mining investments in Guatemala (Lee and Bonilla de Anzueto, 2009).
Mining contributed 2% to the GDP in 2013 but it is estimated that,
with the development of planned exploitation, mining could contribute
approximately 4% in the future (Lee and Bonilla de Anzueto, 2009). This
growth, however, is expected to occur in a context where 51% of the
population of the country (15 million) live in rural areas and rely on
agriculture for their livelihoods.
Mining operations have caused massive protests and discontent
among local populations in Guatemala. One of the main reasons is
that the law does not require companies to inform communities about
mining operations before applying for licences. In this context, local
communities have felt that their opinion has not been considered before
mining operations have started, something to which they are entitled by
law. Another source of discontent is that mining royalties were reduced
from 6% to 1% by a new mining bill (Decree 48–97) and this is per-
ceived among the general Guatemalan population as extremely unfair.
Another source of conflict is that mining projects are often established
in areas with longstanding conflicts related to access to land and land
tenure, before the conflicts have been resolved. In most cases the gov-
ernment has responded to the demands of participation from the local
population and to the protests with violence and repression. Also, as a
response to the complaints regarding royalties, the Chamber of Industry
unilaterally decided to propose a voluntary agreement by way of which
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mining royalties could, based solely on the decision of mining compa-
nies, be increased from 1% to 3% for gold and from 1% to 4% for silver,
whereas for other activities – such as cement production controlled by
a Guatemalan family – royalties were kept at 1%. The government is
then supposed to launch agreements with local authorities regarding
royalties in their communities. This has been strongly rejected by local
populations.
In Argentina there has been quite a different process of elite shift
dependent on a combination of technological shifts, a changing world
market and political changes. Soy production in the Pampa region in
Argentina started to expand after GM soy was legalized in 1996, but it
soon expanded in magnitude in other parts of the country as well, cur-
rently occupying approximately 22 million Ha, which is between 50%
and 60% of all the cultivated land in Argentina (USDA, 2013). How-
ever, rather than being predicated on the entry of a new governing
elite, it has generated a shift in economic elites. As its leftwing gov-
ernment has drawn its main leaders from the ranks of the Peronist
party, it can hardly be considered a new political elite in Argentina.
However, soy production has generated shifts in the power relations
among agricultural producer groups. Although not completely displac-
ing the traditional landowning elite, new groups related to agribusiness
have gained significant influence in the governance of agricultural pro-
duction. This group is composed of agricultural producers, utilizing a
management model in which several individuals or companies have
different roles in the system, from renting land from landowners to
administering external investments and managing the total production
(Benchimol, 2008). They run what is commonly called “agroenter-
prises”, in which landowners, contractors and investment brokers are
involved. Such agribusinesses agreements can take the form of invest-
ment funds, agroassociations (pools de siembra), financial trust coalitions
and simple contract alliances, among others. The most recent attempt
to quantify it argued that agroenterprises are responsible for about 70%
of total grain production in Argentina (Barri and Wahren, 2010). Today
the figure is probably higher.
At the same time as the soy expansion generated a new agricul-
tural (but not necessarily rural) elite, the strained relations between
the four governments of the Kirchners (two of Néstor Kirchner and
two of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner) and the traditional agricultur-
alists contributed to the speed of the soy expansion. The main reason
behind the conflicts was the increase in export taxes on agricultural
products, particularly during the first government of Cristina Fernández
de Kirchner. However, conflicts also arose due to the perceived lack of
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governmental support for and interest in agriculture in general, due
to lack of both predictability in “framework conditions” (including
adjustments in export taxes) and technical support. This contributed
to a weakening of the influence of the old rural elite (Zenteno Hopp,
Hanche-Olsen and Sejenovich, 2015). Moreover, in a context character-
ized by high levels of uncertainty for many farmers, many of them either
leased the land to agrientreprises for soy production or turned to soy
production since its profitability was considered almost guaranteed over
time (Calvo et al., 2011). While depending on transnational companies,
first and foremost Monsanto for seed and fertilizer, there has also been
a prolonged conflict between Argentinean farmers and the agricultural
giant. Argentinean farmers first objected to paying royalties for the fertil-
izer Roundup Ready as Monsanto had failed to obtain a valid patent for
it in Argentina, and later farmers opposed the payment of new royalties
for the new soy seed BTRR2.
Initially it was also argued that GM soy would result in less environ-
mental impact than conventional soy. It was argued that soy production
would minimize soil cover loss due to the no-till method, and that
the use of the herbicide glyphosate would prevent the use of other,
and more toxic, agrochemicals applied in conventional production
(Bindraban et al., 2009). GM soy soon acquired a privileged posi-
tion among the nation’s exports and also became a main source of
governmental income. Currently the production of GM soy generates
approximately one-tenth of the GDP and one-quarter of the nation’s
export value (Loman, 2013). The conversion to the GM soy model gen-
erated a net value of US$65,435 million for Argentina between 1996
and 2010, due to savings in costs and higher profitability (Trigo, 2011).
This source of funding has been of key importance for the govern-
ment’s ambitious programmes of social redistribution. Added to this, the
economic interest by national and international agribusiness compa-
nies explains the government’s unwillingness to impose more ambitious
environmental guidelines on GM soy production. Only very recently
has there been a broader public debate due to increasing opposition
against and conflicts related to soy production, exposing the severe soil
degradation resulting from soy production and glyphosate’s negative
impact on human health, among other issues (Skill and Grinberg, 2013).
The role of knowledge and the contours of
elite reorientation
However, we also see the contours of a third process: “elite reorienta-
tion”, or, in other words, the shift in the dominating ideas of an elite.
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Both Schumpeter and Weber emphasized the orientation and capacity
of elites as a major factor in understanding the role of the state in devel-
opment, rejecting that this could be directly inferred from their position
in the capitalist economy (as the Marxists would argue). In recent Latin
American history we have two major examples of such elite reorienta-
tion: the process of democratization of the 1980s and 1990s, and the
neoliberal transformation in the same period. Neither processes of elite
reorientation happened out of the blue. Rather, the new ideas achieved
influence due to a crisis and exhaustion of prior models and a gradual
shift in interests. Currently the seriousness of the environmental cri-
sis, and the climate crisis more specifically, could open up space for new
ideas brought about by new elite groups, the reorientation of old groups,
or a new dynamic interplay between different elite groups.
Despite the numerous contradictions evident in the environmental
policies pursued by Brazil’s three leftwing governments (two under Luis
Inácio Lula da Silva and one under Dilma Rousseff), in the Amazonian
states of Acre and Amazonas a shift in elites and in the environmental
policies pursued in these states occurred at the state level. Despite the
differences (in size among other things), around 2009/2010, Acre and
Amazonas were the least deforested states in Brazil, with small Acre hav-
ing lost 14% of its original forest and Amazonas only 3% (Lemos and
Silva, 2011). Our research found that this was closely related to a shift
in elites occurring in different ways. The turning point in Acre was the
coming to power of the PT candidate in 1998, whereas in Amazonas
it occurred as a candidate linked to the old elites shifted towards a
more environmentalist and less developmentalist strategy to distance
himself from the old ruling elite in order to gain votes in the local
elections of 1992 (Toni, Villarroel and Taitson Bueno, 2015). Thus the
process at the local level has been very different from that at the federal
level. At the federal government level an “elite settlement” between eco-
nomic elites and rightwing parties, on the one hand, and elites of the
leftwing parties, on the other hand, has led to the favouring of devel-
opmental goals over the environment (Arretche, 2013). In contrast, at
the state level there has been some room for elite shifts through elite
reorientation. The autonomy given to lower politicoadministrative lev-
els in the federal model has thus been crucially important for the latter
process.
Global initiatives, such as REDD, are also fostering a possible “elite
reorientation” through the emergence of a new knowledge-based elite
that is organized in wide and often transnational networks. These net-
works have been able to influence the attitudes and strategies of certain
elites, although this has not implied a complete reorientation of old
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elites (i.e. those linked to agroexport activities) or of government elites,
particularly because of the centrality of resource extraction in economic
growth in the region (Aguilar-Støen and Hirsch, 2015). The global REDD
initiative was launched at the climate negotiations in 2005 but only
gained political traction in 2007, when donor governments agreed to
commit substantial economic resources to establish a fund that would
pay developing countries not to deforest. The principle of REDD is
relatively simple: it is based on the idea that it is possible to pay coun-
tries and communities for not cutting down their forests. However, the
implementation of REDD is not so simple. Latin America is endowed
with vast amounts of forested land but as a whole the region has
the world’s highest rate of deforestation (Hall, 2012). Because of that,
much attention and efforts have been invested in trying to success-
fully develop REDD projects in the region. These projects are, to date,
only demonstration activities that will allow implementers to under-
stand how REDD would work on the ground. That means understanding
how payments are to be implemented and to whom, how to monitor
that the area covered by forest is effectively not deforested, and how to
ensure that economic benefits are distributed in a fair manner among
those that contribute to forest conservation and constitute a legitimate
beneficiary of REDD. Since forests are valuable for a range of different
actors, from forest-dwellers to drug cartels, control of forested land is
a contested issue and thus establishing national or local REDD projects
is a complex task. In addition, many valuable non-renewable resources,
such as minerals and oil, are often located in forested areas and sev-
eral governments in Latin America have declared extractive activities
as being key to national economic development. REDD has attracted
the attention of various and disparate actors, including environmen-
tal NGOs, research centres, extractive industry companies, indigenous
peoples’ organizations and international development agencies.
REDD is a broad and vague enough idea to allow different interpre-
tations of it that can fit the goals of different actors (Angelsen and
McNeil, 2012). This has allowed these actors to distinctly define the
actions necessary to implement REDD at local levels. In the process,
certain narratives, values and visions gain prominence and those pro-
moting such ideas gain power to define how REDD should look in
specific contexts. Controlling the production of knowledge seems to
be a prominent strategy of different actors to position themselves in
the REDD debate, particularly in the countries in the Amazon basin
(Aguilar-Støen and Hirsch, 2015). The knowledge required to partici-
pate in the REDD debates is not just any type of knowledge. It has to
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be maintained and strengthened through particular networks, in which
different concepts and arguments are socially constructed and legiti-
mated through complex processes that have produced new dominant
forms of expertise and consultancy (Fairhead and Leach, 2003; Bumpus
and Liverman, 2011). These networks that are coalitions of actors who
share values, interests and practices can be conceptualized as elites inso-
far as they control key resources: the production and promotion of
specific knowledge or forms to generate knowledge and access to policy-
making forums. Ideas, values and resources circulate within networks,
and as such the networks may set the limits or boundaries of how
reality is to be understood or to set apart what constitutes expert and
non-expert knowledge. A range of different private actors and compa-
nies support REDD activities, forming alliances and promoting certain
models, particularly those that are positive to carbon markets. In this
way, REDD is offering a new regime of profit-making possibilities in
the trade of carbon offsets, but also in fostering the development of
new forms of consultancy and expertise. REDD science-policy networks
are influencing, although not necessarily reorienting, the position of
other elite actors. For example, various transnational and national com-
panies, such as mining and energy-producing companies, plantation
companies, forestry companies and carbon-market companies, engage
in REDD demonstration activities by funding specific projects. Since
dominant REDD science-policy networks have ideological positions that
do not conflict with the ideological position of corporations, it has
been possible to establish alliances between them. But since resource
extraction continues to be central to the economies of most Amazon
countries (Bebbington and Bebbington, 2012), often at the expense of
forests, the degree to which REDD elites can influence other elites is
limited. Mining, gas and oil extraction are the most important activ-
ities to generate economic revenues for most of the countries in the
Amazon basin. The development of infrastructure such as hydropower
and road-building are also priorities for these countries. All these activi-
ties are, in most cases, planned to occur in forest areas. In addition, the
agricultural frontier is expanding in many Latin American countries.
Therefore we cannot affirm that REDD elites have a strong influence in
the Amazon countries’ broader development policy-making or in the
national visions of development, but REDD elites have indeed been suc-
cessful in engaging actors from the agricultural and industrial sectors in
the funding of demonstration activities.
Taken together, the cases of Brazil and of REDD show that a shift
in elites sometimes leads to more ambitious environmental goals and
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regulations. Whether or not this happens depends on the degree to
which new elites are able to influence the positions and views of old
elites. Chapter 6 suggests that the views, aspirations and environmen-
tal orientation of elites are not homogeneous. It is conceivable that
we will see the ascendance of elites in the future with aspirations of
a more sustainable development policy and environmental governance.
It is also necessary to remember that centre-left governments in Latin
America won the elections thanks to the support of wide segments of
the population, particularly the marginalized and subaltern ones. These
governments depended on various types of alliance between different
grassroots organizations and social movements. If these movements and
grassroots organizations are able to exert some pressure on their govern-
ments to address environmental concerns in the future, we may see a
shift towards more equitable and sustainable models of environmental
governance. If popular mobilization continues to be crucial for main-
taining leftist governments in power, at some point the environmental
concerns of the population need to be addressed.
Conclusion
Back in 1977, Marxist scholar Fred Block rejected the possibility that a
leftwing government in power could make a significant change to the
productive structure of a country, as any government presiding over a
capitalist economy inevitably has to care about the creation of employ-
ment and economic growth, and therefore would never counter the
interests of the capitalists. Over the last decade we have seen a mul-
titude of strategies applied by leftwing Latin American governments
to overcome the constraints presented by old elites that are often also
political adversaries. Although, judging from media reports, the relation-
ship between the centre-left government and the old economic elites
is strained, under the surface they are more often than not character-
ized by accommodation and consent than outright conflict. However,
in the process there has been a gradual elite shift where groups that have
benefited from the centre-left governments policies gradually gain influ-
ence at the expense of old rural and business elites. This has occurred in
Argentina with the strengthening of agrienterprises; in Bolivia with the
emerging soy elite; in Ecuador with the new cadres of technocrats in the
ministries; and in a more incipient form in El Salvador with new elites
related to ALBA investments.3
In addition to new governmental policies, we have found two fac-
tors to be of key importance to the emergence of new elites: knowledge
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and technology. Controlling capital or politics without also controlling
knowledge and technology has shown to be insufficient to dominate the
development agenda and the environmental governance of it. Knowl-
edge and technology can be “bought” by those who control capital,
but this is only partly true because it is necessary to have the suffi-
cient knowledge, relevant technology and appropriate attitude towards
innovation to know where to invest in it. Also, obtaining and making
use of these resources are long-term processes. The corollary to that is
that groups that control knowledge and technology may also influence
environmental governance to an extent disproportionate to their polit-
ical position or economic resources, as we have seen in the cases of the
REDD networks, and in a different way in the Ecuadorean Ministry of
Agriculture.
This may have positive and negative implications for the environ-
ment. The control of knowledge can be an obstacle to better environ-
mental governance, such as when it is used by a technocracy to pursue
an agenda that pays little attention to environmental or distributional
concerns, or when it is controlled by a transnational company as a
means to strengthen its own profit generation. However, it can also be
used to influence the agenda in a more sustainable way, such as has
been observed in the case of, for example, El Salvador, where groups of
environmentalists with high levels of technical education were included
in the government. In spite of not having achieved the influence that
they had hoped for, they did influence parts of the governmental agenda
to become more directed towards adapting to climate change and avoid-
ing new environmental catastrophes induced by intensive export agri-
culture. The emergence of what could be called a “new, environmental
technocratic elite” was also observed in other countries, including Chile
and Bolivia (Reyes, 2012; Høiby and Zenteno Hopp, 2015). This new
technocratic elite differs from other historical groups of technocrats,
not only by being unified by a different body of knowledge from,
for example, the neoliberal economists that constitute the technocrats
supporting the neo-liberal conversion. They also show a different atti-
tude towards relating to non-elite groups. Many have been involved
in environmental movements at local, national and transnational lev-
els, and many stay in touch with communities through everything
from frequent visits to membership of Facebook groups. Although their
actual influence varies, their strengthening may lead to stronger envi-
ronmental governance over time. Moreover, where the government
favours party cadres over technically competent officials in impor-
tant positions, the likelihood that such “new technocracies” emerge
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diminishes as, for example, in the case of Argentina (Hanche-Olsen,
2013).
Yet it is impossible to ignore at least three “constants” in environmen-
tal governance in Latin America. One is the importance of global mar-
kets. During the last decade, Latin America as a region has made signifi-
cant progress in a number of social indicators, but it has also reinforced
its dependency on natural resource export, and therefore its vulnerabil-
ity to changes in the global markets for a limited set of export goods.
This is less so in Mexico and Central America than in South America,
but across the region there is little in the way of a “structural transfor-
mation” towards a production structure dependant more on knowledge
and innovation and less on cheap labour and natural resources. As noted
by CEPAL (2014), without such a conversion, it will be difficult to sus-
tain incipient processes towards a more just resource distribution, or to
counteract the serious processes of environmental degradation.
The second “constant” is limitation in resources. For leftist govern-
ments with little support from, and often in conflict with, the economic
elite, to stay in power and to implement ambitious programmes for soci-
etal transformation has required both to employ policies to strengthen
the state and to confront the opposition from old elites. State-building
has been an unavoidable priority for the centre-left governments in
Latin America to be able to deliver strong programmes of resource
redistribution to address historical inequalities, and in this way to lift
millions out of poverty. Several strategies have been employed to face
opposition from old elites: grooming new elites, confronting compet-
ing elites or allying with outside elites. Given that the international
context has been very favourable for resource extraction, focusing on
these sectors (particularly mining and agriculture) has allowed centre-
left governments to increase their revenues and deliver their promises of
resource redistribution. At the same time, larger revenues have permit-
ted governments in Latin America to transform their relationships with
traditional international elites (weakening their influence in domestic
politics) and to enter into relationships with new international elites.
In this context it can be said that leftist governments in Latin America
have taken a pragmatic approach to be able to secure their position; this
approach implies that, in development policy, economic revenues take
precedence over environmental concerns. We can then affirm that the
effects of the elite shift on environmental governance in Latin America
have been limited thus far.
The third “constant” is the abyss between the traditional elite and
non-elite groups in terms of the meaning given to nature and what
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constitutes a just governance of it, in terms of both processes and out-
come. Although, as we have shown, the elites go through processes
of change that lead to episodes of “elite circulation” as well as “elite
conversion”, we still find elite groups across the region with a very lim-
ited understanding of the local environmental impact of developmental
projects, the importance and meaning of resources such as land and
water to rural communities, and what it takes to actually reach under-
standings across cultural and class divides. Without this, reaching more
sustainable and just environmental governance in Latin America may
still be far away.
Notes
1. This approach focused on the conditions for – and evolution of – a state with
a monopoly on legitimate violence, and an institutional bureaucracy capable
of implementing policies and controlling the masses (e.g. Migdal et al., 1994;
Evans, 1995). Such a state, in which a given set of institutions’ right to tax
and demand loyalty in return for protection and the extension of benefit are
no longer questioned, is, for example, considered to be a precondition for the
high-growth policies and business–state relationship of the East Asian devel-
opmental states (Amsden, 2001) as well as the more historical examples of
development, such as that of Europe (Tilly, 1992).
2. He argued rather that “Between socialism as we defined it and democracy as
we defined it there is no necessary relation” (Schumpeter, 1976: 284).
3. The tendency observed in El Salvador would probably have been more
pronounced had we included Nicaragua and Venezuela in the study.
References
Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.A. (2012) Why Nations Fail? The Origins of Power,
Prosperity and Poverty (London: Profile Books).
Aguilar-Støen, M. (2015) “Staying the Same: Transnational Elites, Mining and
Environmental Governance in Guatemala”, in B. Bull and M.C. Aguilar-
Støen (eds), Environmental Politics in Latin America: Elite Dynamics, the Left
Tide and Sustainable Development (London: Routledge Studies in Sustainable
Development), 131–149.
Aguilar-Støen, M. and Hirsch, C. (2015) “REDD and Forest Governance in Latin
America: The Role of Science-Policy Networks”, in B. Bull and M.C. Aguilar-
Støen (eds), Environmental Politics in Latin America: Elite Dynamics, the Left
Tide and Sustainable Development (London: Routledge Studies in Sustainable
Development), 171–189.
Alimonda, H. (2011) “La Colonialidad de la Naturaleza: Una Aproximación a
la Ecología Política Latinoamericana”, in H. Alimonda (ed.), La Naturaleza
Colonizada: Ecología Política y Minería en América Latina (Buenos Aires:
CLACSO).
Amsden, A. (2001) The Rise of “The Rest” Challenges to the West from Late-
Industrializing Economies (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
160 Changing Elites and Institutions
Amsden, A., Di Caprio, H.A. and Robinson, J.A. (2012) The Role of Elites in Eco-
nomic Development UNI-Wider Studies in Development Economics (Oxford: Oxford
University Press).
Andrade, P. (2012) “En el Reino (de lo) Imaginario: Los Intelectuales Ecuatorianos
en la Creación de la Constitución de 2008”, Ecuador Debate 85: 35–48.
Angelsen, A. and McNeil, D. (2012) “The Evolution of REDD+”, in A. Angelsen,
M. Brockhaus, W.D. Sunderlin and L.V. Verchot (eds), Analysing REDD+
Challenges and Choices (Bogor Indonesia: CIFOR).
Arretche, M. (2013) “Quando Instituições Federativas fortalecem o Governo
Central?”, Novos Estudos-CEBRAP 95: 39–57.
Ayo Saucedo, D. (2012) Nuevas Élites Económicas y su Inserción en la Política, Work-
ing Paper N˚01 (La Paz: Foro de Desarrollo Friedrich Ebert Stiftung/Fundación
Boliviana para la Democracia Multipartidaria).
Ayo Saucedo, D., Fernández Morales, M. and Kudelka Zalles, A. (2013)
Municipalismo de Base Estrecha. La Guardia, Viacha, Quillacollo: La Difícil
Emergencia de las Nuevas Élites (La Paz: PIEB).
Barri, F. and Wahren, J. (2010) “El Modelo Sojero de Desarrollo en la Argentina:
Tensiones y Conflictos en la Era del Neocolonialismo de los Agronegocios y el
Cientificismo-Tecnológico”, Realidad Económica 255: 43–65.
Basabe, S., Pachano, S. and Acosta, A. (2012) “Ecuador: Democracia Inconclusa”,
in M. Cameron and J.P. Luna (eds), Democracia en la Región Andina (Lima, Peru:
IEP).
Bebbington, A. and Bebbington, D. (2012) “Post-What? Extractive Industries Nar-
ratives of Development and Socio-Environmental Disputes Across the (Osten-
sible Changing) Andean Region”, in H. Haarstad (ed.), New Political Spaces
in Latin American Natural Resource Governance (London: Palgrave Macmillan),
17–38.
Benchimol, P. (2008) La Concentración de la Tierra, Latifundios y Agro-Societies,
http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/suplementos/cash/17-3460-2008-04-20.
html, date accessed 16 November 2013.
Bindraban, P.S., Franke, A.C., Ferraro, D.O., Ghersa, C.M., Lotz, L.A.P.,
Nepomuceno, A., Smulders, M.J.M. and Van de Wiel, C.C.M. (2009) GM-Related
Sustainability: Agro-Ecological Impacts, Risks and Opportunities of Soy Production in
Argentina and Brazil. Report 259 (Wageningen: Wageningen University – Plant
Research International).
Block, F. (1977) “The Ruling Class Does Not Rule: Notes on the Marxist Theory of
the State”, Socialist Review 33: 6–27.
Bowen, J.D. (2011) “Multicultural Market Democracy: Elites and Indigenous
Movements in Contemporary Ecuador”, Journal of Latin American Studies 43(3):
451–483.
Bull, B. (2013) “Diversified Business Groups and the Transnationalisation of the
El Salvadoran Economy”, Journal of Latin American Studies 45(2): 265–295.
Bull, B. (2014) “Latin America’s Decade of Growth: Progress and Challenges
for a Sustainable Development”, in A. Hansen and U. Wethal (eds), Emerging
Economies and Challenges to Sustainability (London: Routledge), 123–134.
Bull, B. (2015) “Elites, Classes and Environmental Governance: Conceptual and
Theoretical Challenges”, in B. Bull and M.C. Aguilar-Støen (eds), Environmental
Politics in Latin America: Elite Dynamics, the Left Tide and Sustainable Development
(London: Routledge Studies in Sustainable Development), 15–32.
Benedicte Bull and Mariel Aguilar-Støen 161
Bull, B., Castellacci, F. and Kasahara, Y. (2014) Business Groups and Transnational
Capitalism in Central America: Economic and Political Strategies (Houndmills,
Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan).
Bull, B., Cuéllar, N. and Kandel, S. (2014) “El Salvador: The Challenge to
Entrenched Elites and the Difficult Road to a Sustainable Development Model”,
in B. Bull and M.C. Aguilar-Støen (eds), Environmental Politics in Latin America:
Elite Dynamics, the Left Tide and Sustainable Development (London: Routledge
Studies in Sustainable Development), 33–50.
Bumpus, A.G. and Liverman, D. (2011) “Carbon Colonialism? Offsets Green-
house Gas Reduction and Sustainable Development”, in R. Peet, P. Robbins
and M.J. Watts (eds), Global Political Ecology (New York: Routledge), 203–224.
Calvo, S., Salvador, M.L., Giancola, S., Iturrioz, G., Covacevich, M. and Iglesias,
D. (2011) “Causes and Consequences of the Expansion of Soybean in
Argentina”, in H. El-Shemy (ed.), Soybean Physiology and Biochemistry (open
access: InTech), 365–388.
Carruthers, D.V. (2008) Environmental Justice in Latin America: Problems, Promise
and Practice (Cambridge MA: MIT Press).
CEPAL (2014) Pactos para la Igualdad: Hacía un Futuro Sostenible (Santiago, Chile:
Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe).
Cimoli, M. and Rovira, S. (2008) “Elites and Structural Inertia in Latin America:
An Introductory Note on the Political Economy of Development”, Journal of
Economic Issues XLII(2): 327–347.
Dougherty, M.L. (2011) “The Global Gold Mining Industry, Junior Firms, and
Civil Society Resistance in Guatemala”, Bulletin of Latin American Research 30(4):
403–418.
Durán Lima, J. and Pellandra, A. (2013) “El Efecto de la Emergencia de China
sobre la Producción y el Comercio en América Latina y el Caribe”, in E. Dussel
Peters (ed.), América Latina y El Caribe – China Economía Comercio e Inversiones
(Mexico: UNAM).
Etzioni-Halevy, E. (1997) “Introduction”, in E. Etzioni-Halevy (ed.), Classes and
Elites in Democracy and Democratization (New York and London: Garland
Publishing).
Evans, P. (1995) Embedded Autonomy States and Industrial Transformation
(Princeton: University Press).
Fairhead, J. and Leach, M. (2003) Science Society and Power: Environmental Knowl-
edge and Policy in West Africa and the Caribbean (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press).
Gudynas, E. (2010) “Si eres tan Progresista ¿Por qué destruyes la Naturaleza?
Neoextractivismo, Izquierda y Alternativas”, Ecuador Debate 79: 61–81.
Hall, A. (2012) Forests and Climate Change: The Social Dimensions of REDD in Latin
America (London: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd).
Hanche-Olsen, E. (2013) Argentine Farmers Search for Collective Action. A Case Study
of Rural Cooperatives Within the Genetically Modified Agricultural Production in
Argentina, unpublished master thesis Latin America Studies (Oslo: University
of Oslo).
Hartmann, M. (2007) The Sociology of Elites (London: Routledge).
Hecht, S.B., Kandel, S., Gomes, I., Cuellar, N. and Rosa, H. (2006) “Global-
ization, Forest Resurgence and Environmental Politics in El Salvador”, World
Development 34: 308–323.
162 Changing Elites and Institutions
Higley, J. and Gunther, R. (1992) Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin
America and Southern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Høiby, M. and Zenteno Hopp, J. (2015) “Bolivia: Emerging and Traditional
Elites and the Governance of the Soy Sector”, in B. Bull and M.C. Aguilar-
Støen (eds), Environmental Politics in Latin America: Elite Dynamics, the Left
Tide and Sustainable Development (London: Routledge Studies in Sustainable
Development), 51–70.
Jessop, B. (1990) State Theory Putting Capitalist States in Their Place (Pennsylvania:
Penn State University Press).
Lee, S.L. and Bonilla de Anzueto, M.A. (2009) Contribución de la Industria Minera
al Desarrollo de Guatemala (Guatemala: Centro de Investigaciones Económicas
Nacionales).
Lemos, A.L.F. and Arimatea Silva J. (2011) “Desmatamento na Amazônia Legal:
Evolução, Causas, Monitoramento e Possibilidades de Mitigação Através do
Fundo Amazônia”, Floresta e Ambiente 18(1): 98–108.
Lemus, E. (2014) “La Milionaria Revolución de ALBA”, El Faro 19 January 2014,
http://www elfaro net/es/201401/noticias/14423/, date accessed 17 Novem-
ber 2014.
Loman, H. (2013) Country Report Argentina Rabobank, https://economics.
rabobank.com/publications/2013/october/country/report/argentina/, date
accessed 21 January 2014.
Martinez-Alier, J. (2002) The Environmentalism of the Poor: A Study of Ecological
Conflicts and Valuation (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishers).
Michels, R. (1962) Political Parties (New York: Free Press).
Migdal, J.S., Kohli, A. and Shue, V. (1994) State Power and Social Forces. Domination
and Transformation in the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Mosca, G. (1939) The Ruling Class (New York: McGraw Hill).
Myrdal, G. (1968) Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations (New York:
Pantheon).
Myrdal, G. (2010 [1979]) “Underdevelopment and the Evolutionary Imperative”,
Third World Quarterly 1(2), reprinted in B. Bull and M. Bøås (2010), International
Development, Volume II (London: Sage).
Paige, J. M. (1997) Coffee and Power Revolution and the Rise of Democracy in Central
America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
Pareto, W. (1997 [1935]) “The Governing Elite in Present-Day Democracy”, in
E. Eztioni-Halevy (ed.), Classes and Elites in Democracy and Democratization
(New York and London: Garland Publishing).
Peet, R., Robbins, P. and Watts M. (eds) (2010) Global Political Ecology (London:
Routledge).
Plata, W. (2008) “El Discurso Autonomista de las Élites de Santa Cruz”, in
X. Soruco, W. Plata and G. Medeiros (eds), Los Barones del Oriente. El Poder en
Santa Cruz Ayer y Hoy (Santa Cruz, Bolivia: Fundación Tierra).
Poulantzas, N. (1978) State, Power, Socialism (New York: Verso).
Reyes, C. (2012) Las Elites y los Nadies: Caso de Estudio sobre la Influencia de la
Elite Chilena en un Conflicto Ambiental, unpublished master thesis Latin America
Studies (Oslo: University of Oslo).
Schneider, A. (2012) State-Building and Tax Regimes in Central America (New York:
Cambridge University Press).
Schumpeter, J.A. (1976) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London and
New York: Routledge).
Benedicte Bull and Mariel Aguilar-Støen 163
Segovia, A. (2002) Transformación Estructural y Reforma Económica en El Salvador.
El Funcionamiento Económico de los Noventa y sus Efectos sobre el Crecimiento la
Pobreza y la Distribución de Ingreso (Guatemala: FandG Editores).
SENPLADES (2013) “Plan Nacional del Buen Vivir”, República del Ecuador Consejo
Nacional de Planificación (Quito, Ecuador: Secretaria Nacional de Planificación
y Desarrollo).
Skill, K. and Grinberg, E. (2013) “Controversias Sociotécnicas en Torno a las
Fumigaciones con Glifosato en Argentina. Una Mirada desde la Construcción
Social del Riesgo”, in G. Merlinsky (ed.), Cartografías del Conflicto Ambiental en
Argentina (Buenos Aires: CLACSO and Fundación CICCUS).
Soruco, X. (2008) “De la Goma a la Soya: El Proyecto Histórico de la Élite
Cruceña”, in X. Soruco, W. Plata and G. Medeiros (eds), Los Barones del Oriente.
El Poder en Santa Cruz Ayer y Hoy (Santa Cruz, Bolivia: Fundación Tierra).
Tilly, C. (1992) Coercion Capital and European States AD 990 – 1992 (Cambridge
MA and Oxford UK: Blackwell Publishers).
Toni, F., Villarroel, L. and Taitson Bueno, B. (2015) “State Governments and
Forest Policy: A New Elite in the Brazilian Amazon?”, in B. Bull and M.C.
Aguilar-Støen (eds), Environmental Politics in Latin America: Elite Dynamics, the
Left Tide and Sustainable Development (London: Routledge Studies in Sustainable
Development), 190–205.
Trigo, E. (2011) Fifteen Years of Genetically Modified Crops in Argentine Agriculture
(Buenos Aires: ArgenBio).
USDA (2013) USDA Agricultural Projections to 2022, Long-Term Projections Report
OCE-2013–1 (Washington: Office of the Chief Economist World Agricul-
tural Outlook Board US Department of Agriculture/Interagency Agricultural
Projections Committee).
Weber, M. (1978) Economy and Society (Berkeley: Berkeley University Press).
Wolf, A. (2012) “Two for the Price of One? The Contribution to Development of
the New Female Elites”, in A. Amsden, A. DiCaprio and J.A. Robinson (eds),
The Role of Elites in Economic Development. UNI-Wider Studies in Development
Economics (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 120–139.
Woo-Cumings, M. (ed.) (1999) The Developmental State (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press).
Zeballos, H. (2012) Bolivia: Desarrollo del Sector Oleaginoso 1980–2010 (Santa Cruz:
Instituto Boliviano de Comercio Exterior – IBCE).
Zenteno Hopp, J., Hanche-Olsen, E. and Sejenovich, H. (2015) “Argentina:
Government-Agribusiness Elite Dynamics and Its Consequences for Environ-
mental Governance”, in B. Bull and M.C. Aguilar-Støen (eds), Environmental
Politics in Latin America: Elite Dynamics, the Left Tide and Sustainable Development
(London: Routledge Studies in Sustainable Development), 71–91.
Zibechi, R. (2010) “América Latina: Nuevos Conflictos Viejos Actores”, América
Latina en Movimiento, http://alainet.org/active/39400, date accessed 10 Novem-
ber 2014.
Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License. To view





of South American Strategic Actors
Cristián Parker, Gloria Baigorrotegui and Fernando Estenssoro
Introduction
Mining activity has undeniable environmental impacts due to the
nature of its operations, processing plants and foundries. Mining com-
panies proclaim their environmental responsibility by implementing
policies that limit environmental risk and impact, while also applying
new technologies and production processes that are more respectful of
the environment. The degree of efficacy of these sustainability measures
and the degree to which companies voluntarily ensure environmen-
tal care cannot belie the fact that – no matter what – mining activity
has and will always have environmental impacts. There are two major
points of view about the subject, according to Whitmore (2006). On the
one hand, there are the views of companies – that is to say, the actors
who control the mining bulldozers and claim to ensure that everything
goes well and that mining is, or can be, sustainable. On the other hand,
there are the views of those who are affected by mining activity, such
as the communities, peasants and indigenous peoples who are displaced
without proper consultation, who suffer illnesses, and whose lifestyles,
health and environment are impacted.
This chapter will not address the mining problem from the con-
ventional perspective of whether or not mining is sustainable. The
majority of the socioenvironmental conflicts that arise around mining
are focused on this problem.1 We refer to the fact that mining con-
sumes large quantities of water and energy and is one of the most
widespread productive activities. As AngloGold Ashanti’s sustainability
report declares,2 mining activity has a direct impact on the environment
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because it requires access to land, water and energy, scarce resources that
should be shared with the communities in which it operates. Mining
processes also require “considerable amounts of water” and “significant
quantities of energy” in order to function.
The sustainable consumption of strategic natural resources such as
water and energy in South American mining is a key theme that
challenges environmental governance, but it is rarely studied by the
social sciences. This is especially true in the case of the mining sector.
Since the 2000s, the mining boom has resulted in expanded invest-
ment in all of the countries in the region, in many cases generating
socioenvironmental conflicts (Svampa and Antonelli, 2009; Teijlingen,
2012). And this trend is likely to continue in the coming years.3
The research that we present here looks into the different social repre-
sentations4 of strategic actors with respect to the sustainable consump-
tion5 of energy and water in the mining sector. These social represen-
tations of environmental issues are fundamental to understanding the
social and institutional practices aimed towards sustainable consump-
tion and environmental governance (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005). With
strategic actors we refer to members of elites who have the capacity for
long-term influence, and who may come from the private sector or the
public sector as well as from organized civil society. We include strategic
actors who are linked to a few paradigmatic mining cases in four South
American countries: Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Ecuador.
Problem under study: The water-energy-mining complex
The main questions of the study are related to the configuration of
the social representations – of an institutional nature and pertaining
to strategic actors – of water and energy, and actors’ views of nature
and development. In order to understand the viability of forms of gov-
ernance for the sustainable and equitable consumption of water and
energy in the cases studied, we want to see which different represen-
tational models can be observed and on which points they coincide.
As a result of climate change (PNUMA, SEMARNAT, 2006), nature – and
in particular water and energy – is increasingly understood to be of
strategic significance (Bruzzone, 2010; Sunkel, 2011). The aspiration to
capitalist economic growth makes these sources highly sought by both
Latin American countries and emerging powers.
In the economic interpretation of development, energy and water
are vital resources for human life and production, and they cannot be
separated from the environment. From this perspective, the strategic
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character of water and energy is linked to their availability for use in
productive processes. However, mining is an economic activity that
proportionally uses more water and energy and, for that reason, it
is more controversial in environmental terms (Norgate and Haque,
2010; Superneau, 2012). Another conceptualization of water and energy
comes from an ecological perspective, from which they are not – in a
strict sense – economic “resources”. They are rather “common goods”,
and their use has a greater value than simply their exchange value.
In this chapter we will consider – from a holistic perspective – water,
energy and mining as a complex of interrelated parts6; a complex that,
in recent years, appears to have been critical to complying (or not) with
ecological and environmental principles in Latin America.
Just as energy is required for the consumption of water, so is water
for the production of energy (Wu et al., 2013). As both resources are
indispensable for mining, it cannot function without the industrial con-
sumption of water and energy (Mudd, 2008). For this reason the mining
sector faces the huge challenge of resolving the problem of its high
water demand without affecting the availability of water for agriculture
and for the urban population, and without increasing pollution (Pizarro,
2012). As for its growing energy demand, the mining sector should seek
to satisfy it with maximum efficiency and without increasingly relying
on polluting energy sources (e.g. electricity generated by coal, gas or
oil) (Zuñiga and Ana, 2009). Along these lines, contentious scenarios
lay ahead for every strategic actor interested in defending their legiti-
macy. In other words, the water-energy-mining complex continues to
form a Gordian knot of environmental governance in the mining sector
in Latin America and beyond, throughout the socioeconomic structure.
Studying the representations of strategic actors
We have sought to study the social representations of natural resources
and their sustainable consumption among actors and institutions with
the capacity for leadership and influence in long-term public policies
related to environmental governance. Our main topic of concern is the
sustainable consumption of water and energy in the mining sector in
Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Ecuador.7 In these countries, in dis-
tinct stages and with different emphases, metal mining has become
one of the pillars of their development policies. Here we focus on the
network of actors (Bebbington, 2012) involved in cases of paradigmatic
mining projects (some in the exploration phase, most in the operating
phase) in these four countries, as shown in Table 6.1. In all countries,
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Table 6.1 Reference cases


































1. Cerro Vanguardia is a gold and silver mining project in Santa Cruz province.
2. Bajo de la Alumbrera, located in Catamarca, is one of the major metal deposits of copper
and gold in the world and is being exploited by means of open pit mining.
3. Anglo American has several, mostly copper, open pit mines in Chile: Los Bronces in the
Metropolitana region, Mantos Blancos in the Antofagasta region, El Soldado in the Valparaíso
region, Mantoverde in the Atacama region and Collahuasi in the Tarapacá region.
4. The Fruta del Norte gold and silver deposit is a Kinross Gold project that quickly entered
into conflict with the Shuar communities. It signed an initial agreement in 2011, but the
resistance as well as the company’s non-conformity with government regulations has caused
Kinross to withdraw from the project.
5. The El Mirador Project in Zamora Chinchipe province, in the Cóndor mountain range, is
a copper deposit that is in exploration and its exploitation phase has been approved. It is
one of the largest mining projects approved in recent years by the Correa government, not
without pressures and conflicts.
6. The La Colosa Project in the Tolima department is the second-largest gold deposit dis-
covered in Colombia. It is a subject of important debate in Colombia because of its social,
environmental and economic implications.
socioenvironmental conflicts have been reported. In Colombia and
Ecuador, these are primarily related to processes of exploration. In
Colombia, the La Colosa project in Tolima has encountered serious resis-
tance from local communities. A similar situation occurred in Ecuador
in the Fruta del Norte project, which has since been suspended. In Chile
the mining project Doña Inés de Collahuasi, which is partly owned
by Anglo American, has received complaints from surrounding com-
munities about water problems, and its current expansion phase is
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controversial. The Alumbrera project in Argentina received the bulk
of its complaints when overflows of its mineral pipeline and tail-
ings dam contaminated the Vis-Vis River and the valley’s agricultural
communities.
The interdisciplinary strategy of this study relies on mixed methods.
It is based on a literature review, analysis of primary and secondary
sources of an institutional nature, and 65 semistructured interviews with
members of so-called strategic actors in the mining sector: CEOs and
high executives, senior government officials, political leaders, experts
and leaders of NGOs, including community and environmental organi-
zations. The discourse analysis (van Dijk, 2008) was based on semantic
techniques. We used a structural discourse analysis, taking into account
the overall logic of semantic speech articulation, narrative structures,
semantic axes and paradigmatic axes, but focusing on the semiotic
square (Greimas, 1966).
Institutional views and actor views
The theoretical and institutional frameworks that have been developed
in regard to the industrial consumption of water and energy in the
mining sector come from various sources, primarily from international
mining institutions and experts. These expert discourses and institu-
tional discourses of companies, and of public and private institutions,
show that the concept of efficiency – as applied to water and energy –
is the most developed, extensive and referenced. This includes a set of
good practices, procedures and technologies that point to an optimiza-
tion of scarce resources in the diverse phases of the mining lifecycle.
The concepts of ecoefficiency (WBCSD, 2013) and natural capitalism
(Rábago, Lovins and Feiler, 2001) represent different perspectives on eco-
logical interrelationships between resources. These two concepts have
also been applied to the consumption of water and energy in mining,
but they are almost inexistent in the discourses of the individual actors
from the four case studies.
In regard to the efficient consumption of water and energy, and
the incorporation of renewable sources of energy in mining, limited
information is generated by corporate discourses. The production of
knowledge about the consumption of water and energy in mining is rel-
ative to the degree of development of the mining sector in each country,
being greater in Chile than in the other countries studied. Institutions
such as the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) – the
most important corporate regulatory body – have developed a set of
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principles for sustainable mining development (MMSD, 2002; ICMM,
2003). However, only one of ICMM’s 46 subprinciples refers to the
responsible consumption of water and energy in mining. In the ref-
erence cases studied, the relevance of the consumption of water and
mining is a theme of a “high level” and experts. It does not, however,
seem to be picked up by other social actors. Similarly, references to water
and energy consumption in the mining and environmental legislation
of the countries studied are scarce (OCMAL, 2012). In the rules and reg-
ulations for environmental evaluation and monitoring, these issues are
of secondary importance.
In short, the analysis of institutional discourses elucidates the impor-
tance of the principles and good practices driven by transnational
companies. They emphasize the role of international financial agencies
and institutions, such as the International Finance Corporation (IFC,
2012), and principles of environmental evaluation and report, such as
the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI, 2011) and BellagioSTAMP (IISD and
OECD, 2009).
This study underlines the existence of basic social representations that
favour environmental considerations. The interviewed actors in the four
countries were asked about the environment, climate change, develop-
ment models and the relationship of man with nature. They responded
in a few typical patterns that show their views on water and energy
consumption. Some stress the role of policies of social and environmen-
tal responsibility of the mining companies and institutions, reflecting
influential discourses at local and international levels. The alternative
discourses, which oppose mining projects, resort to interpretational
codes derived from a radical reconceptualization of the consumption
of water and energy. They focus on their uses, meanings and valuations
as associated with the notions of justice, and social and environmental
rights.
The statement against which interviewees had to declare their prefer-
ences is taken from the mainstream discourses in public policy, saying
that “ ‘Sustainable development’ in the context of my country’s needs
would be an economic growth model that mitigates negative environ-
mental and social impacts.”8 The responses were primarily “strongly
agree”, which dominated among senior public officials and business-
men, and “disagree”, which dominated among environmentalists and
(college-educated) experts. We should take note of the emphasis on
the idea of economic growth in this proposal, although it is certainly
moderated by the idea of mitigating environmental and social impacts.
Our results indicate that the concepts associated with growth that
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still dominate in public political and international institutional dis-
courses are assumed by businessmen and experts, while even most
politicians and some NGO leaders agree (77% of all interviewees were in
agreement with the statement). Despite a common terminology, social
representations of the environment and climate change, technology,
the man–nature relationship and development models point to diver-
gent positions. Yet there is a nuanced vision of the future. Asked about
whether the future of the country would be clean or polluted, 54%
declared that their country will be cleaner and 46% declared that it will
be more polluted.
Different views and discourse models
The interviews of strategic actors reveal important discourse structures,
which can be classified into four models that express specific views on
the consumption of water and energy in mining. However, this spe-
cific issue is linked to broader views related to mining and the national
development model, which generate distinct perspectives on the envi-
ronment and environmental policy (Dryzek, 2005). The aim of our
analysis was to discover the elementary structures of the meaning in
the discourses, followed by a linguistic and extralinguistic (social, polit-
ical, cultural) interpretation of the discourse. The main elements of
the four models are schematically presented in Table 6.2. These mod-
els are empirically reconstructed, built semantically through inductive
and deductive steps.
Model 1: Indispensable but responsible mining with maximum
efficiency
The first model assumes that the consumption of water and energy
should be efficient within the context of responsible mining. Its point of
departure is the unconditional affirmation of mining. In regard to water,
it seeks to make its consumption efficient and to optimize its reuse:
It seeks to reuse water, to utilize products that are biodegradable so
that there is no pollution.9
(Argentinean senior executive of a state-private
mining company)
The use of water in mining is so serious . . . that there is already
technology to achieve it . . . (de-pollution).10


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The emphasis is on the fact that water as a resource has a low rate of con-
sumption and is reused through technology. This discourse model seeks
forms of efficient water and energy consumption in mining through its
rational and balanced use.
I return to the same issue, the consumption of water, the consump-
tion of energy . . . The goal is to achieve that balance, but if you are
a consumer the balance is about the question of how to mitigate
consumption.11
(Colombian senior executive of a transnational
mining company)
The claim is made that the use of water in mining is considerably less
than in other activities because of the funnel effect: large quantities of
water are manipulated but little is consumed; recycling is very common.
This also happens in regions where water resources are abundant (the
tropical areas of Ecuador and Colombia, and even in some mountainous
areas of Argentina). Water is accumulated in pools and recycled, thus a
small amount of water is consumed and its quality is controlled.
In other areas where water is consumed (agriculture), much of the
water continues to evaporate.12
(Chilean entrepreneur of the National Mining Society)
As for energy resources, this model considers them to be an absolute
necessity for mining to function, but recognizes that they are a prob-
lem, and even a threat to competitiveness, given their cost. In particular,
Chilean and Colombian interviewees problematize the issue of energy
while the interviewees from Argentina and Ecuador tend to have a more
optimistic perspective. The point of departure is that metal mining is
recognized as intensive in terms of energy use, primarily derived from
fossil fuels or hydroelectricity. However, this rhetoric downplays the
volume of energy consumed.
If mining consumes energy, then the price of energy should take into
account the environmental impacts of generating that energy. There-
fore, having paid your energy bill, you are fulfilling your role as a
responsible consumer.13
(Ecuadorian senior executive of a transnational
mining company)
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In this discourse model, the energy issue is commodified: it is necessary
that the markets operate competitively.
What is stronger in mining and more problematic is electric energy,
this issue is very critical . . .14
(Chilean senior official in the mining industry)
Various projects . . . have been cancelled because of the high costs of
energy . . .15
(Chilean senior executive of a transnational
mining company)
Furthermore, this model fits into a neoliberal conceptual framework that
attaches greater relevance to the market than to the state.
The market (should regulate), all of us want the market. I prefer the
market . . .16
(Argentinean senior executive of a transnational
mining company)
Assuming that mining requires considerable energy for its processes,
facilities and transportation, this discourse model recognizes that most
energy comes from fossil fuels. Renewables, they claim, are not the best
alternatives because they are expensive and are not processed contin-
uously. Energy from fossil fuels (including electricity generated by gas
and coal) is more convenient because of its low price. This discourse
model proposes responsible mining that manages to establish a balance
between the pursuit of profitability, the environment and social needs:
in other words, a legitimate corporate mining activity. It privileges a
market environmentalism that prioritizes private initiative but is aware
that it should take care of certain environmental and social externalities.
It therefore proposes the “rational use of resources”, “responsible mining
consumption” and “responsible growth”.
Model 2: Integrated management, regulation and responsible
consumption
This second discourse model accepts mining as an important devel-
opment tool. However, it also incorporates reservations about its neg-
ative environmental impacts, which can be repaired through proper
regulation and institutional norms.
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It is a multiplying activity . . . the local population had nothing to do
in San Juan, but now there is mining that enhances other activities.17
(Argentinean expert and consultant on
environmental issues)
Water and energy consumption are represented by a semantic axis
of efficiency/inefficiency, where “efficient practices” oppose “ineffi-
cient consumption”. Resources are scarce and often have high prices,
especially energy, which is why efficiency must be promoted.
Being high-tech companies (big mines) . . . they should be as energy
efficient as possible.18
(international expert)
The core idea is “efficiency”. Unlike the previous model that empha-
sized technology as a transforming agent, here the emphasis is placed
on integrated and efficient management. Its goal is the responsible con-
sumption of water and energy. This “responsibility” should be assumed
by private economic agents, but in case this does not happen the
subsidiary state should determine its conditions.
It is the responsibility of the companies as much as of the authorities,
how to develop, manage and implement the projects.19
(Argentinean expert and environmental consultant)
With respect to water . . . good mining is technically realized, econom-
ically profitable and it ensures the just participation of the Ecuadorian
state, a socially responsible mining and mining environmentally
managed with strict standards.20
(Ecuadorian director of state-owned mining company)
This discourse model favours regulation through “pricing mechanisms”,
among others, that stipulate mixed policies to enable the proper func-
tioning of the market and forms of state regulation (environmental
evaluation, laws and norms, effective fiscalization). The model proposes
the establishment of clear energy policies that frame energy consump-
tion in mining. This model seeks to “regulate” the energy grid with
“rules” that are associated with “clear environmental policies”. These
“clear policies” must be given within the framework of a subsidiary
state. The state should then intervene to adequately regulate and make
the market function conveniently by establishing conditions for private
investment in the form of laws, regulations and institutions.
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The incentives are well placed when the decision maker has inter-
nalized – to the greatest extent possible – all of the potential
(environmental) costs that energy use represents.21
(Chilean senior official and ex-minister of the state)
Regulation requires planning, evaluation and control of mining activity.
From this perspective communities have to be prevented from deepen-
ing their opposition to mining projects and impeding the functioning
of institutions and regulations. A clear policy that involves “integrated
regulation” is fundamental for “legal certainty” to exist and to incen-
tivize mining investment. The responsible consumption of water and
energy in mining must point towards “sustainable growth”.
In this discourse model there are some views and positions that
are critical of the rationale of those who want to grow at any cost.
It seeks to promote responsible growth at a responsible growth rate.
For instance, an international expert recognizes that this is not nec-
essarily a consistent practice of big mines, where emphasis is placed
on the general discourse about CSR. This is not necessarily linked
to a vision of integrated, efficient and responsible management of
water and energy. In summary, this model generates a clear sense of
the consumption of water and energy in mining with explicit cen-
tral concepts, such as efficiency, recycling, integrated management
and responsible consumption. Its second focus is on establishing the
institutions and conditions that allow for better regulation and for
the establishment of certain regulations that guarantee private invest-
ment and frame the responsible consumption of water and energy in
mining.
Model 3: Sustainable development and institutional control
This model makes strong statements about water and energy consump-
tion in mining, focusing on the more political concept of sustainable
development. It assumes that mining has negative environmental and
health effects. This gives rise to various degrees of criticism of mining,
but it agrees that – under certain conditions – mining is a necessary
activity.
I think that (mining) is worth the effort because the activity, if well
developed, can be done with a relatively low level of environmen-
tal impact. I am talking about a mining at a scale . . . (that is) more
human . . .22
(Argentinean politician, advisor in Congress)
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In this discourse, mining is problematic due to contamination from
heavy metals. This is the origin of the need for efficiency and recy-
cling in water and energy consumption, and – given the environmental
crisis – the need for environmental control that guarantees sustainable
mining.
In the case of water . . . it must be addressed through strict control over
available resources.23
(Chilean politician, representative of the center-left)
. . . it should be, as I say, with the least environmental impact.24
(Ecuadorian politician, progressive Congressman)
However, this control and monitoring supposes the existence of a state
that clearly intervenes and regulates the market, and a democratic cit-
izenship that participates, monitors and combats corruption. As for
energy, the fundamental semantic axis resides in the contrast of “carbon
energy” with “renewable energy”.
And in Chile . . . the energy grid is overly carbonized.25
(Chilean politician, representative of the left)
Our indigenous discourse has always been to defend the rights
of nature . . . For that reason the president has decided to change
the energy grid, for example from thermoelectric to hydroelectric
energy . . .26
(Ecuadorian indigenous leader, progressive
representative)
In summary, this model is based on a political proposal of sustainable
development, which criticizes the environmental impact of mining but
includes mining as a factor of development. It subjects mining to con-
trols, rules and regulations, and seeks to encourage the sustainable
consumption of water and energy by promoting efficiency, recycling
and a transition to renewable energy, including this transition within
the mining sector itself. It proposes sustainable development with the
clear intervention of the state in order to guarantee a market with
clear and competitive rules. It intends to combat monopoly and corrup-
tion, and to stimulate citizen participation. In short, water and energy
consumption is perceived as a political problem and not only one of
technical management.
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Model 4: Alternative development for the protection of common
goods
This discourse model departs from a critique of the environmental con-
sequences of mining. It represents “immense risks”, “environmental
destruction”, “water pollution”, “wars” and even “death”.
Mining is non-viable or incompatible with the life of many human
beings . . .27
(Chilean environmental NGO leader)
No mining is clean – it incites serious problems; the pollution is
incredible.28
(Ecuadorian senior official, ex-Minister of State)
The main semantic axis that stimulates the discourse is “life” versus
“death”; mining has become “incompatible with life”. Human life and
nature would be in danger: peasants, indigenous and communities as
well as ecosystems would be threatened.
In this discourse, the “rights of nature” are inextricably linked to
the human rights of the affected populations, the communities and
the indigenous people. Natural resources in this discursive view are
meant for common use related to the rights of the community (resi-
dents, indigenous, etc.) and of society (the state). They are semantically
disjointed from exchange values (the mining market), and should be
neither commodified nor privatized. In general, the texts speak of the
water-energy-mining complex as a whole, in sociotechnical and in
sociopolitical terms. According to this view, as mineral reserves decrease,
the intensive consumption of water and energy further increases. While
the global mineral demand increases, the pressure for more inten-
sive forms of production (in terms of capital employed) grows, along
with policies to raise productive efficiency and efficacy in order to
achieve maximum “competitiveness” and profitability in the global
metal mining market.
In general, this discourse model goes beyond the references to spe-
cific issues such as water management and energy efficiency in terms of
industrial mining consumption. Instead, concepts of greater abstraction,
such as “ecosystems” and “carrying capacity”, are used. The intervie-
wees who fit into this model claim that both mining companies and
the authorities have agreed to water consumption that is greater than
nature’s “carrying capacity”, and that “overconsumption” of natural
resources is fostered by the “extractivist model”.
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I insist, we should put the little resources that we have left (water and
energy) towards alternatives for the future, not towards satisfying the
needs of such a small percentage of the population . . .29
(Argentinean leader of an environmentalist assembly,
when referring to gold mining)
As for consumption, the discourse associates it with the “extrac-
tivist model” and opposes it to “another development” that is “non-
consumerist”. The latter is a mode of production that relies on min-
ing “for the bare necessities” and that develops from values such as
“solidarity” instead of “competitiveness”.
We do not call them “natural resources”, but rather “common
goods”.30
(Argentinean environmental leader)
With regard to energy consumption, this discourse model clearly
favours the use of renewable energy, inclined towards non-conventional
renewables but especially insisting on thinking about the global energy
system in a different way.
We are the country of the sun, the country of water, here we have
potential and we have possibilities to generate a type of energy other
than oil.31
(Ecuadorian leader of an environmental NGO)
Compared with mining megaprojects, local projects with renewable
energy at a “human scale” are favoured in the context of another (post-
oil) energy system: hydroelectric energy and/or solar energy projects
that can be developed along with communities and local governments.
In that way, they could overcome the megaprojects’ overconsumption of
energy and water. There is talk of generating conditions so that the new
mining projects would have a reduced “ecological footprint”, “water
footprint” and “carbon footprint”. Perceptions of the intergenerational
and long-term environmental impacts are present in this discourse
model. It has strong Utopian connotations, an ideal that is inspired by
values such as the “good life” and ecodevelopment from empowered
local social actors.
In summary, this discourse model formulates social representations
of water and energy consumption in the mining sector from a codifica-
tion of meaning that proposes a systemic change with communities,
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especially those of the indigenous, as main points of reference. It is
a critical look at the current development model and public policies,
including those of the “progressive” governments. It advocates a change
in capitalist modes of production – encouraging citizen participation,
and decentralized and self-managed forms of production – with a clear
preference for non-conventional renewable energy. In general, the alter-
natives to water and energy consumption in the mining sector are
subordinate to issues of a greater magnitude. Mining should be rejected
when it affects regions that are rich in biodiversity, water resources and
ecosystems. This includes the risk of utilizing excessive amounts of water
and energy.
Conclusions: Governance of sustainable water and energy
consumption in mining?
The interviews reveal that there is a consensus of “environmentalist”
language with regard to common issues. Corporate environmental
responsibility, protection of and care for the environment, concern
about water and energy consumption, and an orientation towards
sustainable development are mentioned as necessary by all intervie-
wees.32 But beyond the discursive rhetoric, deep code analysis reveals
very different and even contradictory concepts about the following sub-
jects: the environment, the responsibility of strategic actors for resources
such as water and energy, the role of the government, and the water-
energy-mining complex, which ultimately reflects different worldviews
and epistemes about the relationship of man with nature.
In general, we observe that these different discourses are set forth
and projected at different scales (transnational, national and local) and
levels (business, government and politics, and civil society), and that
there is little room for dialogue. They maintain positions in the social
structure of elites: the first model is set forth mostly by CEO and high
executives, and some senior government officials; the second model is
affirmed by experts and also by senior officials; the third model is set
forth by politicians and experts (but is slightly more important among
politicians); and the fourth model pertains to environmental leaders and
some politicians.
The consumption of water and energy in mining, seen in the light
of the analysed discourses, is not an exclusively technical subject. The
worldviews, linked to the social positions and interests of stakehold-
ers, frame patterns of action and have an impact on the way in which
the sustainable consumption of natural resources is represented. But
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they go beyond that because of the obvious practical consequences
that they have and will have in social and political aspects. The
first two discourse models have a technical bias (hard technologies
and management technologies); the third and fourth discourse models
have ideological-political biases, the last being traversed by ecological
worldviews.
From the perspective of environmental governance, the positions
behind the models point at disagreement. They will be a great source of
conflict to the extent that some defend the thesis of economic growth,
taking ecological factors into account only as secondary externalities
(positions found in the first model). Others take an alternative stance,
proposing an ecological perspective that focuses on avoiding eco-
nomic growth and overconsumption in the neo-extractivist Third World
(positions found in the fourth model).
The analysed discourses, with few exceptions, do not take long-term
environmental risks into account. The central grid of this discursive
logic is the capacity to control and intervene in water and energy con-
sumption in mining, through technocratic (first model), normative and
institutional (models two and three), or political-environmental (mod-
els three and four) means. The abstraction of the accumulative and
latent effects of the long-term environmental impacts of the abovemen-
tioned consumption is proof that the autonomized effects of sociotech-
nical processes as a result of the increased extractive economy in the
region are unknown.
Our study of discourses confirms that most of the stakeholders who
are more likely to defend the expanded reproduction of the water-
energy-mining complex – as the basis of the socioeconomic develop-
ment of the region – do not take responsibility for the international and
global implications of local environmental behaviour. The majority of
these actors do not think in terms of a long-term global horizon. Con-
sequently, the problems of climate change and the decisions that they
implicate in terms of energy and water policy are considered without
taking into account the reflexivity of local social processes in over-
all environmental risks. The structural positions of these stakeholders
in developing countries, in the periphery of the world system, thus
condition discourses with respect to these global implications.
In this chapter we first presented the problem of water and energy
consumption in the mining sector, situated within the water-energy-
mining complex. We sought to clarify linear, sectorial and reductionist
perspectives and to approach a perspective that integrates synergies
among discourses, rules, technologies, institutions and interpretations
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both diverse and contentious elements of environmental governance.
The majority of the discourses ignore these interrelationships. There-
fore the deeper significance of the overconsumption of resources, from
which future scarcity of water and energy as well as consequences of cli-
mate change are expected, does not seem to be present in the majority
of the analysed discourses.
In view of the transition towards more sustainable patterns, it is
important to note that the first and second discourse models are asso-
ciated explicitly with a confidence in technological innovation. The
third and fourth model, on the other hand, introduce a more political
and ecological logic in their vision of resource consumption in min-
ing. The considerations about the intensity of use of water and energy
resources in mining, as well as the technological structure with which
they are associated, should be considered simultaneously as integrated
systems that assume social, political and ecological connotations. The
analysis of the processes of technological innovation linked to the shift
towards sustainable consumption of water and energy in mining can-
not neglect the associated social and political variables. In addition,
this study of social representations of water and energy consumption
of strategic South American actors demonstrates the recent increase in
environmental consciousness.
In general, we observe that there is a struggle for legitimacy going on
between conflicting discourses. The contradictory positions are opposite
poles in a space of dialogue that should be promoted by a public policy
that seeks environmental sustainability and resource governance. The
recognition of the conflict of interests and views, and the discourse mod-
els with divergent positions – whose possibility for dialogue is still an
open question – clearly demonstrate that there is a series of challenges
ahead for environmental governance and for achieving sustainability in
the extractive industries.
Notes
1. See the Environmental Justice Atlas of the EJOLT Project at http://ejatlas.org/
2. See http://www.anglogoldashanti.com/en/Pages/default.aspx
3. In accordance with the Center for Copper and Mining Studies (Cesco), with
headquarters in Santiago, Latin America will become the most important
region in the world for attracting investments for mining development, with
a record number of US$327 billion between 2011 and 2020. See the Metals
Economic Group (2013).
4. We understand social representations in accordance with Höijer (2011) and
Moscovici (1981).
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5. For more information on sustainable consumption, see Parker et al. (2012).
6. This refers to the mining-energy complex (Baker, 2012; Sharife and Bond,
2012). We have expanded this to the concept of the water-energy-mining
complex from the sociotechnical and sociopolitical perspective. In South
America, as is also shown in the case of South Africa (Sharife and Bond,
2012), it is furthermore a structure of power through which the elites have
historically appropriated those resources.
7. For information about the mining sector in Argentina, see Svampa and
Antonelli (2009); Walter and Martinez-Alier (2010); Baigorrotegui, Parker
and Estenssoro (2014); in Chile, see Newbold (2006); in Colombia, see Garay
(2013); in Ecuador, see Bustamante and Rommel (2010); van Teijlingen
(2012).
8. “El ‘desarrollo sustentable’ en el contexto de las necesidades de mi país sería
un modelo de crecimiento económico con medidas de mitigación de los
impactos ambientales y sociales negativos”.
9. “se busca reutilizar el agua, se busca utilizar productos que sean biodegrad-
ables de manera tal que no exista contaminación”.
10. “el uso del agua en la minería no es tan grave . . . ya existe la tecnología para
lograrlo . . . (la descontaminación)”.
11. “Vuelvo a lo mismo, el consumo de agua, el consumo de energía . . . El obje-
tivo es lograr ese equilibrio, donde si usted consume el equilibrio es ¿cómo
mitiga ese consumo?”.
12. “en las otras áreas (agricultura) que consumen agua, se sigue evaporando
mucha agua”.
13. “Si la minería consume energía, pues en el precio de la energía debe estar
considerado los impactos ambientales de generar esa energía. Por lo tanto,
habiendo pagado su factura de energía, está cumpliendo con su rol de
consumidor responsable.”
14. “lo que es más fuerte en la minería y es más problemático, es la energía
eléctrica, ese tema es bastante crítico . . . ”.
15. “varios proyectos . . . se han estado cancelando por los altos costos de la
energía . . . ”.
16. “El mercado (debe regular), todos queremos el mercado. Prefiero al mer-
cado . . . ”.
17. “Es una actividad multiplicadora . . . el sanjuanino no tenía qué hacer en San
Juan, en cambio, hay desarrollo minero que potencia otras actividades.”
18. “siendo que son empresas de alta tecnología (grandes mineras) . . . deberían
estar siendo lo más eficiente energéticamente posible”.
19. “es responsabilidad tanto de las empresas como de las autoridades, cómo
desarrollar, cómo manejar, cómo hacer el implemento de los proyectos”.
20. “en lo que concierne al agua . . . una buena minería que sea técnicamente
realizada, económicamente rentable y que garantice una justa participación
del Estado Ecuatoriano, una minería socialmente responsable y una minería
ambientalmente manejada con rígidos estándares”.
21. “Los incentivos están bien puestos cuando el que toma la decisión, tiene lo
más internalizado posible todos los costos (ambientales) que representa el
que use energía.”
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22. “Creo que vale la pena (la minería) porque la actividad, bien desarrollada,
puede hacerse con un nivel de impacto ambiental relativamente bajo, o sea,
hablo de una minería a escala . . . más humana . . .”.
23. “En el caso del agua . . . tiene que ser abordada a través de un control estricto
y eso con los recursos disponibles”.
24. “debe ser como digo con el menor impacto ambiental . . . ”.
25. “Y en Chile . . . la matriz energética está demasiado carbonizada”.
26. “Nuestro discurso indígena siempre ha sido defender los derechos de la
naturaleza . . . Por eso también el presidente ha decidido cambiar la matriz
energética, por ejemplo de energía termoeléctrica a energía hidroeléc-
trica . . . ”.
27. “está siendo inviable o incompatible la vida de mucha gente con la min-
ería . . . ”.
28. “Ninguna minería es limpia . . . ocasiona gravísimos problemas, las contami-
naciones son increíbles.”
29. “Insisto, los pocos recursos que nos quedan (agua y energía) debemos
emplearlos en alternativas para un futuro, no en satisfacer las necesidades
de un porcentaje tan bajo de la población . . . ”
30. “nosotros no les llamamos ‘recursos naturales’, sino ‘bienes comunes’ ”.
31. “Somos el país del sol, el país del agua, aquí tenemos posibilidades y tenemos
posibilidades de generar otro tipo de energías que en términos de petróleo.”
32. This subject is nothing new. Beck observed – in his analysis of the subjectiv-
ity of politics since the 1980s, and then accelerated since the collapse of the
Berlin Wall – the environmental concern for a threatened world that haunted
Europe. Beck said that this concern, which “united conservatives with social-
ists . . . is only appearance, programmatic opportunism, perhaps occasionally
an authentic reassessment” (Beck et al., 2001: 34–35).
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Latin America is home to alarming poverty rates and the greatest
inequality gap in the world (ECLAC, 2010). The concentration of wealth
has disadvantaged local populations and their needs, while simultane-
ously driving the degradation and destruction of natural resources. This
process has rendered serious implications for climate change (IPCC,
2007; Sandberg and Sandberg, 2010). While economic constraints are
perhaps the most important aspect of poverty, they are only one
of many that impede the personal development of the population
(Cimadamore and Cattani, 2008; Cimadamore and Sejenovich 2010).
Latin America accounts for only 8% of the world’s population, but
it is home to a significant portion of the planet’s natural resources.
This includes 46% of rainforests, 23% of forests and savannahs, 30%
of freshwater (from a stable potable source), 30% of permanent crops,
23% of arable land, 17.7% of grassland and 16% of cattle-ranching land
(Sejenovich and Panario, 1997). At the same time, as a geographical area
it has shown significant industrial, infrastructural and financial devel-
opment. This means that it has the potential to improve its productive
activities in order to meet the needs of the population. However, there is
a significant degree of social exclusion and poverty due to systematic dis-
parities in income, possession of resources and power. While the rhythm
of productive development has kept momentum, so has the destruc-
tion of natural resources and unsustainable use of biodiversity. As a
result, the high concentration of monocrops has displaced populations,
thereby accelerating the intensification of rural and urban poverty alike.
Similarly, urban development has not followed environmental princi-
ples and has therefore contributed to pollution, habitat degradation
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and adverse effects on the health of the population (Alimonda, 2006).
In order to reverse this situation, we must analyse the relationship
between the concepts of poverty and sustainable development.
Poverty levels in Latin America depend not only on monetary income
but also on the natural, infrastructural and social context in which the
poor live and which does not allow them to reverse the situation. That
would require much more than just increasing their income level; it
would require sociocultural and health measures, new homes, partic-
ipation in environmental governance and so forth. While the World
Bank (2014) predicted less poverty in Latin American in the near future,
the reports of the Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL,
2008; ECLAC, 2010, 2013) tell a contrasting story. Since the era of
neoliberalism there has been a relative decline in poverty, but the region
has maintained a high absolute level of poverty. In 2010, according to
ECLAC, there were 177 million poor people, 70 million of whom were
indigent (people whose income did not cover their subsistence).
We can indeed see that the poverty rate reached 48% of the total
population in 1990 and 44% in 2002, and only in 2011 did it drop
significantly to 27% (ECLAC, 2013). In the case of active, socially inclu-
sive, redistributive states, asset levels decreased dramatically. Although
there are positive aspects to this new situation, it should be noted that
overall funding for these actions comes from the overexploitation of
nature. Furthermore, they are contingency measures that are not based
on stable yields and can therefore be reversed. According to the ECLAC
report, the changes in poverty rate from 2002 to 2011 are as follows:
Ecuador dropped from 49% to 32%; Argentina from 35% to 5.7% (this
is debatable due to the evolution of prices within the country); and
Venezuela from 40% to 32%. These changes were primarily due to sub-
sidized employment that was reduced with the onset of the crisis. This
situation is especially serious for children. According to CEPAL (2008),
in 2000 it was estimated that approximately 36% of Latin American
children under the age of two years were at high nutritional risk (i.e.
their minimum subsistence needs were not being covered). Even in
Argentina, which can produce food for a much larger population than
it has, the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO, 2010) estimated
that in greater Buenos Aires one in five children was malnourished.
This situation has improved somewhat in subsequent years, according
to ECLAC (2013: 14):
These measurements are encouraging, with all countries reporting a
decrease in the percentage of children under 18 who are deprived
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of some basic rights (overall poverty). In the region as a whole
(14 countries, comparable over time at national level), overall child
poverty fell by over 14 percentage points over the period, from 55.3%
of children in around 2000 to 41.2% around 2011.
For the abovementioned reasons it is difficult to resolve the structural
poverty that plagues Latin America and which is the result of produc-
tion patterns, which fail to absorb the quantum and dynamics of the
economically active population and seem unable to reverse the concen-
tration of production and income. Rather than identify and analysing
these facts, though necessary, we should concentrate on analysing the
costs of past damage and how to reverse this situation structurally and
quickly.
The conflict between poverty and sustainable development
In Latin America the relationship between poverty, environmental crisis
and short-term accumulation in this age of globalization presents a par-
ticular complexity. The environmental issue is a fundamental part of the
inequality and dependency issue of the development model (Martinez-
Alier et al., 2010). In search of alternatives, theory can play an important
role by showing that we have the resources and capabilities to change
the situation. This requires better distribution and organization, which
can give us a sustainable and socially just development (Salvia, 2011).
Development indicators such as gross domestic product (GDP) only
highlight the productive face of development and ignore the degra-
dation and waste that it causes. The social destination of production
is geared towards those who can manifest themselves in the market,
thereby satisfying needs while also generating poverty and misery for
those who do not meet the minimum necessary income. The lifetime of
products is reduced to avoid market saturation, leading to a significant
generation of waste and pollution. Therefore, development indicators
must be reworked.
The development of equity accounts indicates a fruitful path
(Sejenovich and Gallo Mendoza, 1997). As a result of this conceptual-
ization, an integrated and sustainable management of natural resources,
habitat conservation, and energy and human capacity finally seems
to be possible. It is essential, however, to consider all the negative
externalities of state development projects. The production process nei-
ther begins with the traditional natural resource (because tasks must be
performed in order to regenerate the resource in an integral manner)
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nor ends with the production of goods (the provision of its “return to
nature”, in terms of waste, must be analysed in order to prevent addi-
tional contamination). The eradication of poverty – and development
of quality of life – implies a dynamic link between the individual, the
community and the environment. The satisfaction of human needs is
strongly associated with the continuous and creative participation of
social partners and public policy in the transformation of the material,
socioenvironmental and cultural conditions of production and of life.
Social struggles energize and drive both individual and social develop-
ment around situations that are changing and where there are projects
for the future.
To achieve a reduction in poverty by ensuring equality requires a
rethinking and modification of the current relationship between society
and nature. This implies, among other things, a change in the tech-
nological pattern of production and consumption as well as a more
equitable distribution of income (Anguelovski and Martinez Alier, 2014).
Although the task seems difficult, there is really no alternative. The
random occupation of space, the gigantic and uncontrolled scale of
technology, and the destructive forms of short-term and unplanned use
of natural assets and the habitat will exceed the limits of the biosphere.
The effects of such activity are already manifested in climate change,
food crises, structural poverty and social insecurity worldwide.
To the abovementioned income inequality we can add discrimina-
tion based on gender, age, language, identity, religion and different
capabilities. This gives the dominant sector an excuse to pay lower
wages to unskilled workers, thus yielding additional income. Therefore
it is crucial that the state implements redistributive policies in order
to improve employment rates and quality of life for the overall pop-
ulation. It is important to keep in mind that, depending on the year,
70–80% of the population possesses no more than 20–40% of the GDP
in Latin America. It is also essential that the government implements
a socioenvironmental system for land use, which should control the
application of social as well as environmental legislation.
However, the state does not always apply these policies. As a result,
the population suffers unmet needs and environmental degradation.
The perception of this situation and the desire for change generate
social and environmental movements that demand specific or more
profound changes. The sciences provide tools for understanding these
complex phenomena and for exploring potential alternatives, thus gen-
erating theoretical movements. In response to these social and scientific
demands, the state typically begins with the implementation of changes
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and the definition of some policies. The relative strength of these actors
determines the kind of change that is generated, as well as its future
stability. In this way, grassroots environmental governance is created
(Cimadamore and Cattani, 2008; García Linera, 2008).
In recent decades, changes in environmental governance in Latin
America have stimulated the participation of different social actors who
strive to implement environmental policies to improve quality of life
and environment. Environmental governance can advance this devel-
opment by ensuring the greatest participation of different social actors
with conflicting interests. This is undoubtedly the axis from which dif-
ferent problems can be resolved (Kooiman 2005). It demands that the
social sciences – in both theory and practice – deepen their concepts
from multiple interactive perspectives in thematic, temporal and spa-
tial respects. This line of action reinforces a more comprehensive view
of the relationship between society and nature, and strengthens the
intervention methodologies that allow for its implementation. In this
way, social science research can collaborate with social movements and
the state (and the actors involved in it) to more clearly visualize con-
tradictions and challenges. Although success is not guaranteed, this is
a vehicle that environmental movements should use intensively and
that the state should permit and promote. It is an integral part of the
democratization of the state.
This spectrum of environmental movement actions commits aca-
demic researchers to social sensitivity. It allows for their positive
interference in conflicts and enriches natural and social sciences by
incorporating research and action in the face of environmental chal-
lenges. Especially in Latin America, it is essential to rethink development
issues in order to make the concept of sustainability more holistic. To do
so, we must overcome the economic and social constraints to accessing
products and services. The poor do not reach the minimally required
threshold, and as a response they form social movements to demand
more jobs and income. If the struggles are truly economic, they are inte-
grated into a situation of greater social and cultural marginalization.
At the same time, they attempt to address the overaccumulation of cap-
ital and power, taking advantage of a number of disparities among the
population. This is the case for gender (where women are remunerated
with lower wages than men and demand real equality); ethnicity (by
claiming equal treatment); language (allowing for a multinational soci-
ety); age (developing a policy of inclusion and protection for children
and the elderly); difference in religion (where freedom of conscience is
claimed); nationality (equal treatment); identity (where several concepts
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that address the history, their relationship with nature, and their rela-
tionship with a diversity of worldviews, society and nature are artic-
ulated); and different capabilities (respecting apparent limitations and
enhancing capabilities).
The same fundamental categories that allow us to analyse the trans-
formation of nature and its relationships will reveal the obstacles
that inhibit the sustainable management of natural resources and the
improvement of the quality of life of the population. This process
demonstrates how the “organic whole” works – production, distribu-
tion, exchange and consumption. Instead of meeting the needs of the
population, it only increases the income of the wealthiest. This gener-
ates negative externalities in both ecological and socioeconomic terms
(Sejenovich, 2012).
Therefore, in order to increase the quality of life, we must implement
different policies, actions and strategies that allow us to achieve our
goal of sustainable development (Redclift, 1987). These objectives must
overcome the myths about development that have been generated over
several decades in Latin America – they must become countermyths or
“fallacies”, as demonstrated by Kliksberg (2014).
The role of social rights
The definition of “poverty” – always normative by nature – is relative.
It depends on the epistemic frame in which the minimum conditions
and life needs required for their survival, development and reproduc-
tion are set. In contrast with the economist perspective of “welfare” –
which is rooted in neoclassical (welfare economics) and developmen-
talist (favouring the gross output and income share) approaches – the
concept of “quality of life” recognizes poverty not only as an unfair
deprivation of basic human necessities but also as directly related to
sustainable development.
Sustainable development is highly sensitive to the relationship among
environmental dynamics, socioeconomic processes, sociocultural orien-
tations and the sociopolitical actions of those who are subject to these
conditions (Stahler-Sholk, Vanden and Kuecker, 2008; UNDP, 2014).
In this regard it should be noted that improving the quality of life
implies a dynamic link between the individuals and their environment.
The satisfaction of human needs is strongly associated with the con-
tinuous and creative participation of social partners in transforming
reality. This means a process in which the conflict energizes and drives
development, both individual and social, around changing situations.
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It is worth noting that – for individuals as well as for the collective –
needs and satisfactions are perceived from within a frame of representa-
tions. Likewise, values are determined by the place occupied in the social
structure, at a particular time and in a given society. We must also con-
sider that the struggle for adequate quality of life refers to relationships
with objects and with a potentially peremptory and changing nature.
Considering that individuals are driven also by subjective perceptions, a
range of meanings emerge as the subject is formed from the material as
well as the imaginary aspects of the object (Salvia, 2011).
Therefore, rather than material gains (goods) that we obtain from
a better quality of life, we should consider the struggle among the
involved social sectors and the ways people can develop their capa-
bilities. The latter could be a greater objective – to strive for the com-
prehensive development of the population. Therefore, the processes of
each ecosystem are analysed through three different sets of satisfaction
rights necessary to “sustain” the relationship between development,
environment and quality of life.
Right to livelihood: This right establishes the need to ensure the items
or natural, technological and social processes that allow people to con-
struct a convivial society. This includes a conservative and productive
management of one’s habitat to maintain overall health.
Right to protection: This is the right to personal development by way
of a productive, healthy, satisfying and creative job, striking a dynamic
balance with the environment. This includes the right to be protected in
a legal and material sense against acts of aggression, abuse or discrimina-
tion (economic, ethnic, social, cultural, religious or related to gender).
It likewise addresses the full integration of women into society and the
triumph over the exclusive assignment of reproductive responsibilities
to women, thereby ensuring equal access to productive resources and
benefits.
Rights to levels of understanding and to participation: In this case it is the
ability to develop and pursue personal, familial and community projects
in search of a sustainable better life within an active and growing sys-
tem of environmental governance as an efficient instrument (Asotorga,
Ame and Valpy, 2004). This law also takes into account autonomous
political and community participation in matters of public order, with-
out restriction or constraint. This entails overcoming the condition of a
mere consumer, adopting the multiple physical and cultural functions
of an individual and his or her interpersonal relationships.
By taking into account the interdisciplinary and multiscale method-
ology of environmental governance, we present short illustrative cases
Héctor Sejenovich 193
of four projects in Argentina and Uruguay which meet the criteria of
ecosystem representation and progressive levels of social rights.
Illustrative cases
To analyse how society transforms nature to improve quality of life, one
must employ an interpretative framework that can be accessed through
interdisciplinary exercises. In this section we briefly describe four case
studies to define the needs/rights that can overcome levels of poverty
based on different analytical levels and territorial characteristics (rural,
urban and extractive).
The transformation of society – the systemic relationship among pro-
duction, distribution and consumption – is always the result of the
rationality imposed by a historical social formation. The latter imprints
a particular modality on the process of transformation and then deter-
mines the social destination of production (for whom it is produced),
the technological form (how it is produced), a certain level of pro-
duction (where it occurs) and a demand for natural resources and a
particular habitat (with what natural and social resources it is produced).
It gives priority to cases that obtain short-term gain and generates con-
crete products that meet certain criteria, negative externalities that are
generally not considered (Sejenovich, 2000). All nature is socially medi-
ated and social relations operate in a natural structure with which they
constantly interact, in such a way that all sectors form part of the
manifestation of the society–nature relationship.
An example of the integrated and sustainable use of natural resources
is the ecosystem of the basin of the Angostura river, where the village
of Tafi del Valle is located. In the mountainous area of northwest-
ern Argentina, in the province of Tucumán, this area is similar to the
Peruvian highlands (Valdivia and Gilles, 2006; Gonzalez et al., 2010).
The socioeconomic process comprises an integrated management of a
protected territory to overcome the existing grazing area. Environmen-
tal production policies attempted to replace the introduced fauna with
a native species, such as the camelid.
As for food and nutrition security, it is evident that subsistence
rights are being regularly met. Stable employment, however, has not
been guaranteed. However, the use of the landscape for activities of
responsible tourism is also an important potential source of employ-
ment. Regarding the pressure (both tangible and intangible) on natural
resources, yearly and seasonal population increase give rise to rural dis-
tricts. In terms of rights of protection and participation, the guarantees
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maintained for the original population should be kept in mind. This
includes access to means of communication – and participation in gen-
eral community initiatives – for the original population and the native
communities. Through the integrated and sustainable management of
resources in a highly fragile area (48,000 Ha), 130 people have come to
permanently occupy the land. This therefore guarantees the eradication
of poverty, considering the cultural and communal aspects that already
exist in the area.
A second example explores the strategy for sustainable development
pursued by Gualeguaychu, and the impact of pulp mills in the commu-
nity of Fray Bentos, Uruguay. The city of Gualeguaychu is developing
a number of important industrial activities and implements agricul-
tural and service activities – especially those involving tourism – in its
ecosystems. The development of tourism and agriculture cemented the
foundation for a more comprehensive and prolonged growth. This same
growth has been threatened by the installation of two cellulose com-
plexes on the Uruguayan shore, which have had negative impacts since
2003. In response, the population protested through legal and not-so-
legal means, such as the occupation of highways and border bridges.
Multiple studies have been conducted to demonstrate and quantify the
environmental damage and lost profits that these projects would gener-
ate. They are not limited to ecosystems, infrastructure and urban areas;
they also have direct effects on the population itself. The environmen-
tal costs are calculated according to the reduction of assets, which is
measured on the basis of the harm to nature (Sejenovich et al., 2008).
The calculation of environmental damage and profit loss was not
developed in hopes of retribution but as a strategy to put pressure on
the international capital that supported the contaminating initiative.
The population resorted to all legal means, including claims to interna-
tional agencies and banks. They even went so far as to get the executive,
legislative and judicial branches of the Government of Argentina to
appeal before the International Court in The Hague. Although they were
not entirely successful, they did prevent a company from being estab-
lished and were responsible for the diffusion of the methodology of the
Environmental Citizens’ Organization Assemblies throughout the entire
Southern Cone. They were sprouts of the environmental governance
movement, where all sectors were expressed. This project is an initiative
in the country with the highest incidence of identity crisis among the
native population. In the struggle against the impacts of pulp mills in
Fray Bentos, the population has essentially been fighting for the right
to maintain a healthy environment and a stable landscape with little
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intervention since the time of their ancestors, who wanted to bequeath
them the land.
Given the environmental damage, it was essential to develop activit-
ies related to the environment in order to value knowledge about
local products. Environmental damage and lost profits would exceed
the allowable amount of the investment. In each of the ecozones, the
potential for integrated and sustainable management can be analysed
against the potential loss of biodiversity, costs (of managing natural
resources) and benefits (considering the integral and sustainable use
of biodiversity), and the lost profits that are its result. If calculated as
negative externalities of the project, the total of the land value dam-
ages (US$172,037,600), the value of homes (US$320,000,000) and the
damage to health (US$68,726,000) should reduce the companies’ prof-
its to the extent that the project could be economically unviable. At the
very least, it should offer incentives for a more sustainable implemen-
tation. Despite the pressure exerted at every level, the huge power of
international capital managed to ignore the externalities (and not pay
for them), and instead to install the pulp mill with a very high rate of
return.
Another instance of the nature–society contradiction can be found
in the soyabean industry in Argentina. Concentrated in the Pampas
region, the nucleus of the most fertile land in the country, it is another
example of an oligopolistic accumulation of natural resources. The soy-
abean monoculture brings with it high productivity and a series of
direct and indirect negative impacts. These include degradation and
waste of natural resources, habitat pollution, and impacts on the popu-
lation in economic, social, cultural and especially health terms. In fact,
an increased incidence of cancer has been found and is likely due to
the effect of the agrochemical glyphosate (Carrasco, 2012; Dougnac
Martínez, 2013; IARC 2015). This danger was recently echoed by the
World Health Organisation (WHO).
The monoculture of soyabean (Slutzky, 2011) – currently the pri-
mary export crop of Argentina – has replaced cattle grazing and other
crops, such as cotton, lentils, milk, meat and rice. As a result, there
have been shortages and increases in the Argentinean food basket.
This expansion is made possible by the hegemony of financial capital
that rents fields and machinery for monoproduction, thus displac-
ing small and medium farmers. This ultimately results in poverty
and displacement to urban areas, and furthermore to the expansion
of the agricultural frontier into land that is not meant for agricul-
tural use (Bustamante and Maldonado, 2008). Given that soyabean
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production has displaced traditional foods, cultivation directly affects
the Argentinean food structure and the right to subsistence. Much
has been written about the alternatives to soyabean production, ori-
ented towards comprehensive and sustainable resource management
and poverty alleviation. For example, agroecology can be a highly pro-
ductive process on a per-hectare basis. This maintains diversity, ensures
the full use of land and provides an answer to rural poverty. This strategy
will enable widespread environmental governance in rural ecosystems
precisely because it involves the grouping together of occupations to be
able to research, monitor and manage all of the plants. In turn, this gen-
erates significant revenue for the producer group. It also entails potential
advantages in terms of the nutrition and diversity of food supply. How-
ever, a change of this nature would involve major changes in the line of
interest within their respective elites.
The Matanza-Riachuelo Basin (Cuenca Matanza-Riachuelo (CMR))
project serves as our final example. The CMR spans part of the city of
Buenos Aires and 15 surrounding municipalities, encompassing an area
of 2,338 km2 (the length of the main channel is 70 km). It is estimated
that 5.3 million permanent residents and at least 3 million more com-
muters use CMR for transit. It is considered to be the centre of Argentine
industrial development, but 23,523 companies which are active in the
region have been registered as potential sources of pollution.
Ever since the colonial period, the contamination of the basin
has generated significant actions, such as moving salt production to
improve the water quality. It then suffered a second contamination
from new industries, which affected the health of the population
(ACUMAR, 2007). As a result, the state was sued by the direct victims
in a case involving the Supreme Court of Argentina (2006). Known as
the “Mendoza Cause”, it was based on the implementation of court
orders to restore the watershed and to improve the quality of life of the
population. To meet this objective an interinstitutional body called the
Matanza-Riachuelo Basin Authority (ACUMAR) was established. Accord-
ing to official data (2014), 459 industries have been converted; 289 have
been closed; 1,364 have initiated a restructuring process; and 1,436 have
presented plans to expand.
The right to livelihood is being met through decontamination to
improve the health of the population. This includes the installation of
sewage and clean-water pipelines, and the building of new homes and
villas to eliminate slums and precarious housing. As of now, 17,771 peo-
ple have benefited and 85% of the area’s population will have clean
water, better satisfying their needs and improving their quality of life.
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A greater participation process has also been observed in the advisory
body of the ACUMAR, which includes universities and NGOs. It is safe
to say that environmental governance is becoming more effective by
improving environmental conditions, poverty and subsistence issues,
but they are changes that need to be accelerated (AySA, 2009).
The construction of major infrastructural projects allows us to visu-
alize the fundamental aspects of watershed management. With the
decontamination of the CMR and the solution of the problems of hous-
ing and services, there is no doubt that one of the main obstacles
associated with poverty will be overcome.
Key trends and the struggle for sustainable development
From the illustrative cases discussed here, the experiences and expertise
of consultants, and other global studies, several general considerations
about the relationship between environmental governance and poverty
in Latin America have arisen.
Powerful economic groups continue to adopt highly concentrated
exploitation and environmental degradation policies that violate
not only socioeconomic resources of local livelihoods but also the
sociopolitical capacity to design, plan and implement sustainable
socioenvironmental development. Environmental policies are often not
heeded. At different levels of government the state has failed to define
the full potential and limitations that should regulate monocultures,
especially that of soyabean cultivation. In fact, tax returns generated by
this activity are privileged and no existing laws apply to regulate them.
An example of successful environmental regulation is the case of the
Forest Act and the Environment Act in Argentina, where environmental
planning is legislated. Agricultural confederations such as the Rural Soci-
ety, the Agrarian Federation, Coninagro, CRA, various trade associations
and the Chamber of Commerce have succeeded in imposing their inter-
ests on developing soyabean activity. This often overshadows the claims
and legal actions of other social actors, including those of the state.
The soyabean expansion case in Argentina can be expanded to the
whole region as the ecosystems that have already been transformed
(the humid pampas grasslands, subtropical jungle, scrubland, gallery
forest) occupy a critical percentage of arable land in Latin America.
The organization of the state apparatus is not neutral. The institutional
legal structure in Latin America is essentially developmentalist and will
therefore favour the amount and dynamics of production, regardless
of its impact, if environmental policies are not enforced. Although the
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impacts of economies of scale have generated cost reductions, they are
not translated into prices. Rather than improving the welfare of the gen-
eral population, the oligopolistic market conditions have allowed large
companies to increase profits. As a result, the “progressive spill” did not
occur. In general, the rate of accumulation appears to impose oligopolis-
tic structural rules of impoverishment, inequality and social exclusion.
This is in addition to the processes of ecological impoverishment that
result from ecosystem homogenization and environmental degradation.
These negative outcomes drive disputes in all illustrative cases. In
Matanza-Riachuelo Basin, the creation of an intergovernmental body –
ACUMAR, which has as its first priority to preserve and restore the
Matanza-Riachuelo watershed with a range of public and non-public
organisms – shows positive developments. In urban ecosystems the sit-
uation is not very different, but there are sociopolitical conditions that
make the control, regulation and guidance towards socioenvironmen-
tally sustainable projects more feasible.
However, overall urbanization in Latin America exceeds the guide-
lines of environmental planning, and this is reflected in almost all
countries. The operation of watersheds and respect for their charac-
teristics, under the onslaught of settlement infrastructure, remains a
deficit that is frequently raised by environmental movements. One
of the most serious problems is the political-economic action carried
out by national governments in such projects – along with public
action to develop megainfrastructural projects – to resolve problems that
have been generated by the improper management of watersheds and
ecosystems.
The developmental-productivist paradigm remains hegemonic when
it comes to great solutions that affect most of the socioeconomic and
sociopolitical regulatory institutions of social reproduction at local,
regional and national levels. Many of the presidents’ speeches at the
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) Summit,
in February of 2013 in Santiago de Chile, showed excessive optimism
in regard to development actions without exploring certain limits that
they really must consider. In any case, they should outline the progress
that has been made in mobilizing public awareness and institutional
improvements. This is the result of forces within and outside the gov-
ernments, which fight for a solidary management of nature and among
social sectors. To advance, it is important to overcome the temptation
of criminalizing protest and for movements to deepen their creativ-
ity in action. If these aspects are satisfied, a better quality of life for
disadvantaged sectors is possible.
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Conclusion
The study of different socioeconomic environmental scenarios, under
a rights-focused approach, provides purposeful lessons for envision-
ing the relationship between environmental governance and poverty
in Latin America. The organizational forms of the state and its oper-
ations should be reoriented to better achieve sustainable development
(Kliksberg, 2014).
We observe fundamental contradictions between society and nature.
The most general is between economic cycles (short term) and ecologi-
cal cycles (longer term), presenting incompatibility between temporal
horizons. Now is the time to respect the timeframes of regenera-
tive mechanisms. Other contradictions arise from the heterogeneity of
ecosystems versus the trend to homogenize exploitation for maximum
profit through economies of scale. Following a short-term economic
objective, only natural resources with competitive global (and some-
times national) advantage are being used; a comprehensive and appro-
priate use of resources could prevent the existing diversity from being
wasted. This practice is widespread in Latin America, where the gen-
eration of short-term income generates ecological, social and cultural
impoverishment in the long term.
Furthermore, the administrative structures of the state are predom-
inantly defined by a sectorial vision: production and short-term effi-
ciency are privileged, the importance of interaction is minimized, and
there is generally little room granted to the participation and articula-
tion of science, technology and the quality of life of the population.
Integrated and sustainable management of nature in environmental
governance eventually overcomes the apparent contradiction between
protecting the environment and stimulating production.
It is clear that, taking comprehensive production into account, there
is a vast increase in production, income, employment, tax base and
financial jurisdiction. At the same time, the environment is taken into
account in an active and integrated manner, thus preventing the loss of
biodiversity.
The ability to generate these productive strategies requires, without a
doubt, a training programme to understand the techniques of integrated
resource management. Actually, all countries with complex ecosystems –
and specially those whose forested areas are predominant – apply this
principle. We must keep in mind that Latin America possesses nearly
half of the world’s tropical forests. It increasingly requires new planning
processes that incorporate the population from the outset, along with
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the development of scientific interdisciplinary analysis. More and better
participation, and a substantial improvement in training, are a priority
for all governments. This aspect was particularly stressed at Rio+20.
Environmental governance of the land, patrimonial accounts, envi-
ronmental assessment of investment projects, evaluation of environ-
mental impacts, strategic environmental assessments and so forth are
emerging as important alternatives. According to ECLAC (2010:140),
“Territorial heterogeneity in Latin America calls for selective and tar-
geted strategies. Local development, understood as a bottom-up process,
mobilizes endogenous potential to build territories that are better able
to create and drive their own capacities.” The objectives of the National
Environmental Governance Project in each country must reverse the
process of poverty generation and, in turn, give more momentum
to tasks already under way to directly improve the situation. Habitat
improvement and policies to combat environmental degradation are
systematically integrated with the possibility for a better life. In addi-
tion, the use of unusual environmental policies in Latin American
countries – such as tax policies, credit, tariff or integration – all signify
that there is a long way to go.
While these ideas are technologically plausible, and are also key for
the sustainability of the planet, it is worth reiterating critical doubts
that arise from both historical experience and theory. They question the
ability of the current model of accumulation and the political regime of
domination to advance socioeconomic and environmental sustainable
development, without significant changes. The historical scenario seems
to prolong an insurmountable contradiction between the interests to
produce, distribute and consume, and the need to ensure social and
environmental human life. Therefore, a greater organization and activ-
ity of environmental social movements emerges as a possible alternative.
An organizational form for sustainable development within envi-
ronmental governance involves a holistic view, a direct relationship
between research and action. It is a combination of the short, medium
and long term, and of a generally high level of participation among
civil society and social movements. It proposes implementing the nec-
essary changes and taking actions that can lead to more successful forms
of environmental governance and a better quality of life. Economic
understanding must be open to all necessary actors, which requires
reformulating the conditions for recovery and reproduction of capital
with ecological, economic, social, technological and political implica-
tions. Only then do the desired reduction of poverty and reconciliation
with nature truly begin.
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Forest Governance in Latin
America: Strategies for
Implementing REDD
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Introduction
Global interest in and attention to forests have grown as concerns about
global warming and climate change have taken a heightened position
in international policy debates. Forests have been repositioned in inter-
national arenas as repositories of global value for their contribution to
carbon sequestration and climate mitigation (Fairhead and Leach, 2003;
Peet, Robbins and Watts, 2011). In this context, Latin American forests
are seen as globally important in fighting climate change.
Carbon emissions in developing countries, particularly in Latin
America, are related mostly to land-use and land-cover change. In Latin
America, energy accounts for only 28% of regional emissions, whereas
land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) accounts for 67%
(Barcena et al., 2010). Forests cover about 11.1 million km2 and savan-
nahs 3.3 million km2, comprising several different types of vegetation.
The region as a whole has the world’s greatest forest loss (Pacheco
et al., 2010). Most of the forest conversion in Latin America occurs in
the Amazon basin. Some countries are already being pressed to reduce
emissions related to land-cover change, particularly deforestation. Polit-
ical pressure comes from the international arena in many forms and is
exerted by several actors: sovereign states, international organizations,
media, civil society networks and others.
Several Latin American governments have turned to climate poli-
cies as an opportunity to improve environmental governance. Current
discussions focus on a set of policies known as REDD in developing
countries plus carbon-sequestering forest activities. REDD was originally
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designed as a payment for environmental services – that is, a volun-
tary transaction where a well-defined service (or a land-use system likely
to secure that service) is being “bought by a buyer from a provider, if
and only if the provider secures the service provision” (Wunder, 2005).
REDD is based on the idea that it is possible to reduce deforestation by
offering economic compensation to forest users for not changing the
use of forestlands. It is seen as a win–win approach that would poten-
tially address the trade-offs between forest conservation and economic
development. Some analysts claim that REDD projects have the poten-
tial to generate enough money to end deforestation in tropical countries
(Nepstad et al., 2009).
Although originally presented as an “apolitical” technological fix
(cf. Li, 2007), REDD has encountered much criticism, and early propos-
als faced fierce political resistance. The neoliberal idea of the commodi-
fication of nature seemed repellent to individuals and even to countries,
which fear that developed countries would use their economic power
to increase or leave unaddressed their carbon emissions at the expense
of developing countries. There were also fears that REDD would bene-
fit actors who have historically been responsible for deforestation, such
as ranchers and large-scale farmers, while excluding the less privileged
forest-dwellers, who cannot bear the transaction costs of carbon mar-
kets and do not even have the title to their lands (Boyd, Gutierrez and
Chang, 2007; Blom, Sunderland and Murdiyarso, 2010).
REDD proved to be much more complex than a simple carbon-market
arrangement. Since it is a project “in the making”, it necessarily leaves
room for bargaining and negotiations as to how forest and climate poli-
cies will take shape in specific contexts. As a result, REDD quickly moved
from strictly carbon storage to having multiple objectives, including
biodiversity conservation and the enhancement of local livelihoods
(Angelsen and McNeill, 2012). This even more complex mechanism is
not yet settled. There are important struggles at international, national
and local levels to define how REDD should be implemented.
REDD can be seen as a multilevel project of environmental gover-
nance. By environmental governance we mean “a set of mechanisms,
formal and informal institutions and practices by way of which social
order is produced through controlling that which is related to the envi-
ronment and natural resources” (Bull and Aguilar-Støen, 2015: 5). Some
decisions regarding REDD are taken at the global level, other decisions
are taken at the national level and finally actions, projects and initia-
tives are implemented at the local level. This complexity might result in
the hybridization of REDD, and, as the idea is appropriated by different
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actors, such hybridization might also result in subtle or open power
struggles among actors at the different levels.
REDD emerged as a global initiative from the climate negotiations,
but it is going to be implemented in countries with very different
approaches to combating deforestation, technical capacity, institutional
and political settings, levels of decentralization of forest governance,
budgets and so forth. Therefore it is possible to expect REDD to unfold
in quite different ways across the region. To understand and analyse the
diversity in which REDD is evolving in Latin America, in this chapter
our analytical focus will move across different scales and will make use
of some paradigmatic examples, with special emphasis on the coun-
tries representing such cases. Our analysis will show that despite their
initial opposition, some groups of actors support REDD and are taking
advantage of the new opportunities that the scheme offers. REDD ini-
tiatives, for example, have become an economic opportunity for both
state and national governments as well as for international and regional
environmental NGOs.
This chapter is organized as follows. After this introduction, we
present our main analytical argument. The following section examines
the phased approach to implement REDD in Latin America. In the third
section, we present what we have identified as three general strategies to
implement and shape REDD across the region. In the next section, we
discuss some examples of how pilot projects are taking off in the region.
Finally, we present our conclusions.
Hybrid environmental governance and REDD
Forests in Latin America are territories where several conflictive interests
meet. However, there is no consensus on the conceptualization of the
causes and consequences of deforestation. Diverse conceptualizations of
deforestation are closely related to claims over forest management and
over resources (Fairhead and Leach, 2003). Forests are socially, culturally,
ecologically, economically and symbolically valuable to different actors,
including indigenous peoples, local users, governments, corporations,
illegal cartels, NGOs, nations and the globe, albeit in different ways and
for different reasons (Fairhead and Leach, 2003). All these actors have
different potentials to exert power and access arenas to influence REDD-
related policy-making.
The very notion of “environmental governance” implies that there
is some sort of hybridity in terms of the actors, and in the mecha-
nisms and practices it involves. This means that both public and private
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actors participate on various scales, in producing models and frames for
governance. By focusing on REDD we pay attention to emergent gover-
nance arrangements that include state actors, subnational governments,
multilateral institutions, scientists, NGOs and business (Karkkainen,
2004).
The conceptualization of REDD, its formulation, negotiation and
implementation involve a range of actors because the necessary
resources for such tasks are not controlled by a single entity. As our anal-
ysis will suggest, these resources function as sources of legitimacy for the
participation of different actors in REDD. By legitimacy, we mean who is
making “the rules of the game” in REDD preparations and negotiations.
We see legitimacy as a source of power to create and support certain poli-
cies and practices, while simultaneously hindering others. Legitimacy
rests, among other things, on the shared acceptance of rules by differ-
ent groups of actors with shared interests on the issue to be governed
(Bernstein, 2004).
REDD, however, is still a project “in the making”. Because of that, this
chapter only aims to examine two processes: (1) how different countries
engage with REDD; and (2) how different actors within these countries
get involved in a range of activities seen as necessary for the future
implementation of REDD on the ground. In other words, our analy-
sis will not focus on the outcomes of the REDD initiative because such
outcomes are still uncertain.
Our proposition in this chapter is that REDD as a concept has been
“black-boxed” (Latour, 1987; Forsyth, 2003; Goldman, Nadasdy and
Turner, 2011). By that we mean that those engaged in REDD do not
consider it necessary to further discuss or question what REDD means.
This does not imply, however, that there are no other actors – who
perhaps are not directly involved in REDD negotiations – who actu-
ally question and challenge the initiative. REDD policy-making reflects
how different interests are negotiated between different actors on vari-
ous geographical scales. In this chapter we will argue that a “distortion”
of REDD – from a simple market mechanism to a complex multistake-
holder, contested political processes – is one of the ways that the idea
gets wide support from a range of actors and makes the hybridization we
refer to above possible. REDD as a concept is broad and vague enough
to permit different interpretations that would fit the goals of different
actors (Angelsen and McNeill, 2012). This has allowed countries in Latin
America to pursue different paths regarding the emphasis given to how
to finance REDD (fund based or carbon markets) and what issues should
be addressed before REDD actions are implemented.
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To support our proposition we discuss three different strategies used
by Latin American countries to engage or resist the REDD initiative.
Also, the “distortion” works at more local levels by allowing different
actors to get involved in planning activities. We will also discuss plan-
ning activities in the Amazon region to support our proposition and
will show how there are some key resources that galvanize the participa-
tion of certain actors in REDD preparations. By key resources, we mean
resources that can be “traded” to gain legitimacy to participate in REDD
processes at local levels. As we will show below, access to networks and
knowledge production are among such key resources.
REDD in Latin America and the phased approach
In 2010, during the conference of the parties of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC), governments
agreed to adopt a phased approach for REDD. The idea of a phased
approach came from a report (Angelsen et al. 2009) prepared by the
Meridian Institute for the Government of Norway. The idea put for-
ward by the report by Angelsen et al. (2009) was adopted by the UNFCC
Cancun agreement1 (Agrawal, Nepstad and Chhatre, 2011). The Cancun
agreement stipulates that countries participating in REDD should imple-
ment activities by phases. These phases are (1) development of national
REDD strategy plans and capacity-building; (2) implementation of
national plan and demonstration activities; and (3) results-based actions
with full measuring, reporting and verification. So far, most Latin
American countries involved in REDD are in Phase 1. Guyana is in Phase
1 but has already received funding from Norway that would correspond
to phases 2 and 3; Brazil is in Phase 2, entering Phase 3 (Figure 8.1).
There are many mechanisms for financing Phase 1, including pub-
lic funds from the countries implementing REDD or from donors:
the Forest Investment Programme supported by the Climate Invest-
ment (Multilateral Investment Banks), the UN-REDD programme, and
the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) of the World Bank.
The latter two are the main sources of funding, and some countries
such as Bolivia,2 Peru and Ecuador have applied to both. On the
other hand, Brazil established its own Amazon Fund in 2008, through
which reduced deforestation is going to be financed in the coun-
try. Guyana established the Guyana REDD investment fund (GRIF) in
2010 as part of a cooperation agreement with Norway in the frame-
work of the Low Carbon Development Strategy (LCDS) of Guyana.3
The LCDS of Guyana was prepared by the consultancy firm McKinsey,
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Figure 8.1 Latin American countries in relation to their participation in REDD
and the phased approach
and Guyana’s president embarked upon an international campaign to
attract funding for the initiative. Venezuela and French Guyana do not
participate in any REDD initiatives under the United Nations or the
World Bank.
In 2013, Norway was the single major financial contributor to the
UN-REDD Programme, FCPF, the Brazilian Amazon Fund and the GRIF.
Norway contributes 82% of the total budget of the UN-REDD Pro-
gramme, 44% of the total budget of FCPF, 87% of the total budget of the
Amazon Fund, and 100% of the GRIF.4 The country is one of the major
players in defining REDD at the global level and has some influence on
the way in which REDD is advancing at national levels.
The incorporation of the phased approach launched by the Meridian
report in the UNFCC’s Cancun agreement contributes to stressing a
particular way of prioritizing the activities necessary for the implemen-
tation of REDD. This particular approach is being reproduced in national
contexts because its proponents believe in the technical superiority of
the approach and because it promotes comparability and compatibil-
ity between countries, but not necessarily a solution to the problem
of deforestation (Fairhead and Leach, 2003). As it might seem obvi-
ous to most, the driving forces behind deforestation vary enormously,
as do the political and economic settings in each country, the inter-
ests and alliances among different actors, and the roles played by the
state and non-state actors. The challenges associated with deforestation
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in the region are as political as technical, but the phased approach
de-emphasizes other dimensions of the problem.
In the phased approach, institutional arrangements and technical
capacity to measure deforestation are emphasized. REDD will rely on
the specific target of measuring reduced emissions from deforestation.
In Latin America, in addition to Brazil, only Mexico and Costa Rica have
comparable technical capacity in place to measure forest-cover change.
Consequently, a strong emphasis in readiness preparations in all other
countries in Latin America is currently placed on strengthening tech-
nical infrastructure to monitor forest change.5 A strong emphasis on
measuring and monitoring forest cover has a depoliticizing effect on
the understanding of deforestation’s causes, consequences and risks to
impose control mechanisms that might harm local livelihoods (Scott,
1998). If the causes and consequences of deforestation are not properly
understood in each country, it might be that those who live closer to
forested areas bear the blame for deforestation and the responsibility for
avoiding it.
The three REDD strategies in Latin America
Several Latin American countries (Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Peru and
Venezuela) have been sceptical about offsets from carbon emissions trad-
ing, as declared by the countries at the BASIC Ministerial Meeting on
Climate Change in Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil, in September 2013.6 The min-
isters called for environmental integrity and stressed that “results-based
payments shall not be used to offset mitigation commitments by Annex
I countries [industrialized countries]”. The ALBA7 countries have held
the same position.
Although the ideas that led to the intellectual elaboration of REDD
in part emerged in Brazil (Santilli et al., 2005), the country opposed
any attempts to include forests and deforestation under the scope of
the Kyoto Clean Development Mechanisms. Without Brazil, any such
mechanism would be doomed to fail, considering the magnitude of
the country’s tropical forests and its rate of deforestation. It is argued
that, because of the long history of early initiatives to conserve forests
in the region, Latin American countries are in the lead of early efforts to
implement REDD (Hall, 2011).
Governments in Latin America have taken different approaches to
implement and shape REDD efforts. We have identified three strategies.
The first, which we will refer to as the “assertive strategy”, is character-
ized by efforts made by the central government to frame REDD within
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an existing or emerging forest-climate policy framework. Brazil, Mexico
and Guyana, for example, are employing this strategy. Countries fol-
lowing guidelines or directions decided at the global level and efforts
to accommodate such guidelines in the national context characterize
the second strategy, which we will call the “accommodating strategy”.
Costa Rica, Guatemala, Argentina, Chile, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay,
Uruguay, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador and Suriname are pursuing this strat-
egy. Open opposition to certain aspects of REDD or a lack of initiative
to implement REDD characterize the third and last strategy, which we
will call the “resisting strategy”. The countries following this path are
Nicaragua, Bolivia, Venezuela and French Guyana. In the paragraphs
below we will use one or two countries to illustrate each of the strate-
gies. First we present the assertive strategy because this represents one
pole in the continuum between taking the lead and resisting a project.
Next we present the accommodating strategy, which represents the situ-
ation of most Latin American countries and thus represents the middle
ground of the continuum. We finish with the resisting strategy at the
other end of the continuum.
The assertive strategy: Brazil
While most other countries in Latin America were still working to put
human capacity in place to deal with REDD within their ministries of
the environment, Brazil launched the Amazon Fund in 2008. This, how-
ever, represents the way in which the position of Brazil evolved from
resistance to leadership.
For many years the Brazilian Government was a fierce opponent
of any attempts to include forest- and land-use change in the inter-
national negotiations to reduce carbon emissions. This position was
justified on the grounds that developed and developing countries share
common but differentiated responsibilities concerning global warming.
Many opponents of such proposals were afraid that carbon credits would
allow rich countries to keep pouring carbon into the atmosphere at
the expense of developing countries. Furthermore, Brazil was concerned
with any potential threats to its sovereignty and control of its forests
resources, particularly in the Amazon. Any clause addressing deforesta-
tion could be interpreted as an obstacle to developing the region as the
state saw fit.
Even though President Lula himself supported this realist view, as he
made clear in 2007 during the opening of the UN General Assembly
(Hall, 2008), change in the Brazilian position came from within the
government. When President Lula took office in 2003, he appointed
Marina Silva, a former senator and rubber tapper leader, as minister of
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the environment. She promoted some institutional changes that ulti-
mately led to a turnaround in the Brazilian official position. The first
change came by opening up new opportunities for participation of civil
society organizations in policy-making. Knowledge networks formed by
activists and scientists developed stronger ties with government officials
and became more influential. A related second change was an adminis-
trative reform in the Ministry of the Environment. In 2007, Silva created
the Secretariat of Climate Change and Environmental Quality, whose
top officials were committed to the creation of carbon compensation
mechanisms.
Activists and scientists had been discussing proposals to create com-
pensation mechanisms to pay for avoided deforestation since the early
2000s (Santilli et al., 2005). By the time their peers ascended to the
new secretariat, the government’s efforts to control deforestation were
already paying off. Therefore the idea of being compensated by reducing
deforestation made much more sense to government officials.
Another crucial component of the policy network supporting com-
pensation was Amazonian state governments. As proposals evolved
towards compensating carbon stocks, governors saw an opportunity to
channel resources into their states, particularly where there are vast
areas under protection. Protected Areas (PAs) have traditionally been
considered a burden for state and municipal governments. The benefits
of conservation are global, but the perceived costs are local, particu-
larly due to land-use restrictions. The economic losses imposed on states
could therefore be, at least partially, offset by this new source of revenue.
In 2009, a few months before the UNFCCC COP 15, the governors of all
nine Amazonia states met and wrote a letter to the president, pointing
out that Brazil was lagging behind other developing countries in the car-
bon market. They argued that if Brazil was to receive more funds from
carbon credits and to reduce its own carbon emissions, REDD mecha-
nisms had to be included in the international carbon market under the
UNFCCC (Toni, 2011).
The Amazon Fund was launched as a means to obtain funding from
donors to finance the Plan of Action for Protection and Control of Defor-
estation in the Legal Amazon. The Amazon Fund was created within the
Brazilian National Bank of Social and Economic Development (BNDES).
The mobilization of civil society, particularly international NGOs8 and
other environmentalists since the 1990s, and the engagement of politi-
cians at the state and federal levels have been important for the
advancement of REDD-like ideas based on assumptions of the efficiency
of economic payments for environmental services to curb deforestation
(Hall, 2011). These ideas are also supported by several governors in the
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Brazilian Amazon and coincide with those of the president and the min-
ister of the environment, contributing to create conditions necessary for
the Brazilian involvement in REDD. For the Amazon Fund, the govern-
ment of Brazil pledged to allocate US$500 million, but it is estimated
that an additional investment of US$1 billion per year would be required
to fully implement the plan (Meyer, 2010).
Brazil has the technical capacity to monitor changes in forest cover
through remote-sensing technology and to ensure transparency to deal
with the fund through institutional structures and mechanisms. By
2008, Brazil had already put in place some of the conditions to be
enabled by Phase 1. This in part explains Norway’s support of the
Amazon Fund, which placed Brazil in phases 2 and 3. The Norwegian
support of the Fund is contingent on demonstrating avoided defor-
estation against a historical baseline (results-based payments). Norway’s
involvement is also based on ideas of economic rationality, altruism and
self-interest9 as a humanitarian/environmental protection actor.
The establishment of the Brazilian Amazon Fund can be explained
by the combined effect of the activities and initiatives of NGOs, state
governors in the Amazon region, and politicians in key positions (the
president and the minister of the environment). Norwegian support
through Norway’s International Forest and Climate Initiative (NIFCI)
gave the scheme the final thrust to get the fund started. The Amazon
Fund is important for advancing the Brazilian approach to REDD. This
approach is well established in existing Brazilian institutions and is in
accord with the country’s views and priorities.
Brazil’s REDD strategy has been characterized by a strong involvement
of the central government, but NGOs and lower levels of the public
administration have also played a role. The advanced technical capacity
of Brazil in terms of remote-sensing and the establishment of a historical
baseline of forest cover place the country in a privileged position in
regard to the phased approach promoted at the international level. The
alliance of Brazil and Norway for financing the Amazon Fund has given
Brazil’s strategy a very advantageous starting point.
Brazil’s approach to financing REDD efforts has been based on the idea
of a centralized fund that would allow the country to avoid the volun-
tary carbon market for financing reduced deforestation. However, the
growing involvements of other networks, particularly those in which
governors of the Amazon states are involved, have pushed the coun-
try towards additional mechanisms for financing avoided deforestation,
particularly through their partnership with the governors of California
and Illinois.10
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In the following subsection we present the accommodating strat-
egy, which is used by most countries in the Latin American region
as mentioned above. To illustrate we use the cases of Colombia and
Costa Rica.
The accommodating strategy: Colombia and Costa Rica
REDD preparation activities in Costa Rica and Colombia have advanced
quite differently from those in Brazil. Colombia has the most decen-
tralized public administration in Latin America. Over 40% of total
government spending is allocated by subnational governments against
an average of 15% in the rest of Latin America (Alesina, Carrasquilla
and Echavarria, 2005). The administration of forest and other natural
resources is also decentralized (Alvarez, 2003). Costa Rica, on the other
hand, represents a case of highly centralized forest governance. We will
first describe Colombia and subsequently Costa Rica.
The lead for the REDD process in Colombia has been taken by the pri-
vate sector, particularly business-friendly international NGOs (BINGOs),
and not by the central government. Colombia has one of the most
decentralized environmental administrations in Latin America. Local
environmental authorities (Regional Autonomous Corporations (CARs))
are in charge of the management and administration of all natural
resources and environmental issues in the area of their jurisdiction.
Although CARs receive a portion of their budget from the central
government, they also generate income through tax revenues that come
from projects implemented in their jurisdiction. In this way CARs
hold significant power to decide the direction of both environmental
conservation and development projects.
The Colombian Government highlights the involvement of the pri-
vate sector in the financing of environmental conservation efforts in
various white papers (e.g. the National Strategic Plan for Green Markets
produced by the Ministry of the Environment and the National Devel-
opment Plan 2005–2010). A general perception from the Colombian
Government is that private investments with little state regulation in
remote forest regions are more economically efficient because they lower
their intervention costs and could also offer better-adapted development
options. A quote from an official of the Ministry of the Environment
illustrates the position:
The market in a way takes care of redistributing the resources at local
levels. It is a lot simpler . . . it lower our costs . . . so, if the state does not
receive the [REDD] money it does not need to invest in the regions
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where they are receiving the money . . . well that is good . . . the gov-
ernment does not need to invest in those regions; in a way they take
care of themselves.
All BINGOs operating in Colombia and some local NGOs expressed the
same view during our interviews; they too want to increasingly involve
private funds in current forestry and development mechanisms.
Within this context, REDD preparations have been largely led by
NGOs. The BINGOs working in the country (WWF, Conservation Inter-
national (CI), The Nature Conservancy (TNC)),11 in collaboration with
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and
one local NGO/consulting firm (Corporación Ecoversa), created the
Colombia REDD Table in 2008 (Mesa REDD-Colombia). Other pri-
vate organizations (the Fund for Environmental Action and Children
(FAAN), the Natural Patrimony Fund and the Nature Foundation) as
well as the Ministry of the Environment and the Institute for Environ-
mental and Meteorological Studies (IDEAM) joined the Colombia REDD
table a year after its creation. Participation in the REDD table was not
open to all those who were interested. Instead, the control of certain
resources (i.e. knowledge, networks and technologies) legitimate and
facilitate their participation. Civil society organizations, universities and
others who are not considered “REDD experts” by the terms established
by the REDD table are excluded.
The REDD table in Colombia has positioned itself as a legitimate net-
work to be consulted or to provide inputs on various REDD-related
issues. For instance, the funds provided by the FCPF for REDD prepa-
ration activities are administrated on behalf of the government by an
NGO (FAAN). The REDD table is the most active and important network
that disseminates information concerning REDD in Colombia and that
reports to the World Bank.12
The Colombia REDD table strongly supports the inclusion of car-
bon markets in the mechanisms to finance REDD. This has also been
the position of Colombia in the international climate negotiations, in
which it has insisted on countries’ freedom to choose between different
financial sources, markets and/or an international fund. The voluntary
carbon market is a salient project among members of the Colombia
REDD table, partially due to the engagement of international and some
local NGOs with actors interested in, connected to or involved with
the carbon business. These actors include the local public environmen-
tal authorities (CARs), national and international business partners (i.e.
mining and energy-producing companies, plantation companies, forest
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companies, carbon-marketing companies), international research orga-
nizations, development cooperation agencies, and indigenous and Afro-
Colombian leaders. These engagements would allow the channelling of
funds from a range of private businesses directly into carbon-market
projects that could eventually become part of REDD.
The REDD programme in Costa Rica is seen as a means to strengthen
and broaden the Payment for Environmental Services (PES) programme.
PES emerged in Costa Rica in the 1990s as a response to the perceived
problem of deforestation and forest loss. Between 1986 and 1991, the
country lost 4.2% of forest cover per year (Sanchez-Azofeifa, Harriss and
Skole, 2001), suggesting that Costa Rica had one of the highest defor-
estation rates in the world. The launching of REDD occurred ten years
after Costa Rica became the first country in the world to establish a
system of PES in 1997. The financial structure of the Costa Rican PES
programme is a hybrid of market-like mechanisms, subsidies and state
regulations. This is evident in the way that the programme is funded:
while it receives 3.5% of the revenues from a tax on fossil fuels, it
also depends on loans from the World Bank, from a series of grants
from the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), from NGOs, from con-
tracts with national companies (Pagiola, 2008) and from international
governments. The German Government, through the German Recon-
struction Credit Institution (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW)),
provided US$12 million for a five-year contract in 2007, and in 1996,
Norway bought 200,000 tonnes of carbon-emission reduction credits
for US$10 per tonne (Russo and Candela, 2006). The REDD national
strategy is being discussed within the framework of the national PES
programme. Because the current PES programme is unable to cover the
demand for payments for environmental services, which is very high,
REDD is seen as an avenue to increase the coverage of the national PES.
Costa Rica applied to the FCPF in 2008 to fund the REDD readiness
preparations.13 A grant was approved in 2010. In Costa Rica, public insti-
tutions are leading the REDD readiness preparations. The PES experience
and Fondo Nacional de Finaniciamiento Forestal (FONAFIFO) largely
shape the REDD process. FONAFIFO’s board of directors is the REDD
coordinating entity in Costa Rica. The board will include one represen-
tative from indigenous people’s organizations and one representative
from civil society.
FONAFIFO carried out a series of dissemination and outreach activ-
ities to engage with different stakeholder groups. As for indigenous
peoples, it has invited the Indigenous Integral Development Associa-
tions (Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Indígenas (ADIIs)) to participate
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in information meetings and activities. Indigenous leaders contest the
legitimacy of the ADIIs in representing indigenous peoples. In 1982, in
an effort to make the indigenous territories legible to the state (cf. Scott,
1998), the Government of Costa Rica established the ADIIs as the legal
representative bodies of indigenous peoples.
To carry out PES in indigenous territories, the government designated
the ADIIs as the collective representative institutions of indigenous
peoples vis-à-vis FONAFIFO. The ADIIs became responsible for distribut-
ing the benefits from PES in indigenous territories and for helping
FONAFIFO to implement PES in the indigenous resguardos. Currently,
indigenous leaders challenge this decision, arguing that the ADIIs are
official government bodies that “represent” and govern each indigenous
territory by law, but do not necessarily represent or respect traditional
ways of organization and are not accountable to indigenous peoples.
FONAFIFO carried out a series of early information dissemination work-
shops and it has engaged in an initial dialogue about the REDD process
with a range of stakeholder groups, and with indigenous peoples in the
Atlantic and Pacific areas through the structure of the ADIIs.
Costa Rica recognizes carbon, insofar as it is considered an environ-
mental service, as property of the landowner, by law. The country has
chosen a national approach to reduced emissions accounting and the
development of a national baseline for avoided deforestation. At the
international level, Costa Rica, similar to Colombia, advocates for a mix
of funding for REDD. The approach in Costa Rica is towards a central-
ized REDD programme. In Colombia, on the other hand, the approach
is towards a decentralized system. These two different approaches reflect
the way in which forest governance is understood in the two countries.
In the following subsection we will analyse the third and last strategy,
using Bolivia as the example.
The resisting strategy: Bolivia
Bolivia has resisted REDD as part of carbon markets and offsets, based
on the idea of environmental justice and the non-commodification
of nature. The current Bolivian position on REDD was first commu-
nicated in a letter to the General Assembly of the United Nations in
2008, emphasizing “direct compensation from developed to develop-
ing countries, through a sovereign implementation that ensures broad
participation of local communities . . . ”. In its second communication
to the UNFCCC in 2009, Bolivia stated that the country did not sup-
port carbon markets “or the possibility of developing new flexibility
in this area”, and called for domestic action for emissions reduction,
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under the argument that the “carbon market allows developed countries
to continue to pollute at home while developing countries face unfair
restrictions”.
The position was not a complete rejection of REDD but rather an
attempt to reshape it and to broaden the international perspective on
both forests and carbon. Different actors were involved in the planning
of a national joint programme in Bolivia, beginning in 2008, and Bolivia
was one of the first pilot countries in the UN-REDD programme from
2009 onwards. A REDD team was set up in the Ministry of the Envi-
ronment (MAYA) as part of a larger national strategy for curbing defor-
estation (Estrategia Nacional de Bosque y Cambio Climatico, MAYA,
2009). The setting up of a national REDD programme was supported
by German (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
(GIZ)) and Danish cooperation at the time, and a parallel process was
started with the FCPF of the World Bank. The UN-REDD programme
was presented for civil society actors in 2010, and four indigenous and
peasant organizations approved a capacity-building plan.
Beginning in 2010, different currents both inside and outside the
government caused confusion about the Bolivian position. At the Peo-
ple’s Conference for Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth
in Cochabamba in April 2010, where many Bolivian officials also par-
ticipated, a declaration rejecting all forms of REDD/REDD+/REDD++
was presented.14 Following the conference, the negotiation team from
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (with representatives from the Unidad de
Madre Tierra) brought the Cochabamba position to the climate negoti-
ations in Cancun as promised, while the Ministry of the Environment
signed off on the UN-REDD programme on the condition that UN-REDD
would respect the Bolivian position against carbon markets.15 The col-
laboration with the World Bank was halted, and Bolivia never handed
in a signed version of the formal document Readiness Plan Idea Notes
(R-PIN).
The confusion and lack of advancement of the UN-REDD programme
in the 2008–2011 period also opened up the arena for private actors and
NGOs to get involved in REDD-like activities. Local communities have
reported that private actors (represented by NGOs, a Santa Cruz-based
company and local businessmen) contacted communities, asking them
to sign “REDD contracts” that involved the lease of land for 90–100
years, in exchange for untouched conservation areas and the “selling of
oxygen”. The government later stopped the attempts.
In 2008 the national NGO Friends of Nature Foundation (FAN), with
support from the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, set up an
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indigenous REDD project in the Amazon (Beni Department). The gov-
ernment, originally a partner in the project, withdrew in 2010. Several
regional and local indigenous organizations also withdrew, making the
argument that the NGO would have too much power over the project
and the resources involved. Furthermore, the local communities par-
ticipating in the project rejected the component regarding quantifying
emissions reductions, and the project was left only with select compo-
nents that addressed sustainable forest management, the enforcement
of Brazil nut collection and enhanced control of the area against illegal
logging. The project was in operation until 2012.
Later in 2011, a conflict between the central government and the low-
land indigenous organization Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de
Bolivia (CIDOB) over a road-building project through the national park
TIPNIS led to a rupture in contact among the ministries, public agen-
cies and the indigenous organization, hampering the possibilities for
further dialogue about the UN-REDD project. The plan for initiating the
participatory planning process for the UN-REDD programme was set on
hold. Meanwhile, CIDOB called for direct REDD funding to indigenous
areas and for the self-management of funds.
A parallel process was started in 2011 to develop a mechanism for
the sustainable management of forests, and joint climate-change mitiga-
tion and adaptation efforts. The process involved a number of national
NGOs, academics and public entities, such as the Authority for For-
est and Land (ABT), the National Institute for Agricultural Innovation
(Iniaf) and the Forest Directorate in MAYA. Bolivia hoped that the mech-
anism could be supported through an alternative REDD scheme outside
the carbon market. The mechanism was included in the Law of Mother
Earth in 2012, with an emphasis on holistic management of the forests.
A team was set up to facilitate the exchange of information and meet-
ing arenas. As public entities had poor official records of deforestation
in Bolivia, the participation of the NGOs (e.g. FAN) with such expertise
was crucial for the team. Former officials, the Noel Kempff Museum of
Natural History and representatives from research institutions and social
organizations contributed with important experience and information,
forming a final project document that was presented to the UN-REDD
in 2012.
In 2011, Bolivia informed the policy board of the UN-REDD pro-
gramme about its desire to modify its original National Programme
document. Two contradictory communications, which were sent from
Bolivian officials to the policy board in December 2011 and March 2012,
led the board to freeze the funds and send a high-level mission to Bolivia
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in June 2012. The mission concluded that there were several challenges
concerning the mechanism (e.g. the lack of an incentive system based
on verified reductions of emissions, the targeting of drivers, and the lack
of full participation from the indigenous organization CIDOB in the
making of the mechanism) and that the project was not eligible for full
financing by the UN-REDD programme. Later, contrasting declarations
about the participation of indigenous organizations in the making of
the mechanism were also communicated to the UN-REDD policy board.
The mission finally recommended that the National Joint Programme
be implemented in its original form, and that it neither be redrafted
nor replaced with the new Bolivian mechanism. Bolivia agreed to con-
tinue with the programme, and a small part of the UN-REDD financing
was channelled to the mechanism (such as the register of all forest
initiatives, forest inventory and the mapping of land-use change).16
The proposal for an alternative mechanism was marginalized by pow-
erful REDD donor countries in the international negotiations, claiming
it would lead to the fragmentation of the REDD project. Finally, in 2013,
Denmark, Switzerland and the EU granted support of over US$43 mil-
lion to the Bolivian mechanism. At the international level, Bolivia has
worked insistently with the inclusion of non-market-based approaches,
such as joint mitigation and adaptation – methodological issues related
to non-carbon benefits – and it continues with its strong opposition to
carbon-market mechanisms.
Due to opposing currents both within and outside the Bolivian Gov-
ernment, different actors in Bolivia have pursued slightly different
strategies to influence and shape REDD, from complete rejection to the
reshaping of the initiatives, locally, nationally and internationally. How-
ever, the rejection of carbon markets has been a common position across
the majority of actors involved, as well as the integration of indige-
nous rights and the recognition of different functions of the forests. The
role of indigenous organizations and indigenous autonomy is still to be
defined in the Bolivian mechanism, along with clear strategies to work
with the drivers of deforestation.
In the following section, we shift our focus to analyse ongoing
efforts at local and national levels. We will focus on demonstration and
readiness activities, and the actors involved in them.
REDD projects in Latin America
An important component of the planning phase of REDD is
demonstration and readiness activities. These are projects implemented
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at the local level to test the options available for countries and com-
munities. REDD projects can be seen as a means to understand how
REDD will unfold on the ground; REDD demonstration activities are
seen as means to learn lessons for future REDD implementation. These
early implementation projects influence debates about REDD, the ways
in which so-called co-benefits are being addressed, and who is involved
and who benefits from REDD.
In principle, REDD country strategies to be defined in Phase 1 are
the first step in the implementation of REDD national policies. National
REDD strategies would define the current situation in each country and
the direction in which the country is going to move in terms of reduced
carbon emissions from deforestation, addressing so-called co-benefits
and defining who would benefit from economic payments. In practice,
however, numerous REDD projects are taking place before the design
of a country’s REDD strategy is finished or in parallel with its develop-
ment. Early implementation projects are informing the policy-making
process in each country and at the global level. Proponents of REDD
projects stand in a better position than other actors, who do not have
any experience with such projects, to influence REDD debates because
not having knowledge about REDD is a barrier for being included in the
official debates.
We have identified three approaches employed by actors involved in
early REDD planning, implementation and readiness projects, and the
consequences of such approaches. The first one is knowledge production
and dissemination. Second is the creation of technologies or standards
to legitimize or validate projects. The third approach is enrolment in
new, emerging or alternative networks. In what follows we analyse these
three approaches by highlighting who is involved, the resources mobi-
lized to employ each approach, and the outcome. It is worth saying that
these approaches are not mutually exclusive, and different actors within
each country put distinct emphasis on each of these approaches.
Creation of knowledge and dissemination of information
Our findings indicate that, to a great degree, networks involving NGOs
and international research institutions with support from development
cooperation agencies and private actors are creating and disseminating
knowledge about REDD in the region. These networks systematize infor-
mation about REDD in Latin America and at the global level. They are
having a great influence in defining what a REDD project is, who the
legitimate implementers are, who will benefit from it and how. The
Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), the NGO Global
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Canopy Programme,17 and the voluntary REDD database18 created at
the Oslo Climate and Forest Conference in 2010 produce compilations
and databases that include all types of REDD-like projects.
The majority of REDD projects are being initiated or planned by pri-
vate actors in private lands, including national and international private
companies, and local and international NGOs (WWF, CI, WCS, TNC,
IUCN and Rainforest Alliance). In some cases, pilot projects are executed
with the participation of state governments in coalition with BINGOs.
Fair-trade cooperatives, carbon certifiers and research institutions are
also involved in pilot projects. Pilot project proponents act as de facto
researchers, testing REDD implementation modalities, and producing
information and knowledge about the projects.
As for funding sources for the projects, development cooperation
aid money, particularly from Norway and Germany, as well as private
funds, is the most important source. But here it is necessary to explain
in more detail what types of private fund are involved. The range is
wide and includes (1) direct investments in particular projects from
investors from the USA, Europe, China and India; (2) direct invest-
ments from companies (e.g. the largest Brazilian mining company, Vale);
(3) investments that private companies make in BINGOs; and, simi-
larly, (4) partnerships between local NGOs and private companies as
part of their CSR portfolio; (5) a plethora of alliances among domes-
tic NGOs and local-level environmental authorities (CARs), national
and international business partners (mining and energy-producing com-
panies, plantation companies, forest companies and carbon-marketing
companies), international research organizations, development cooper-
ation agencies and indigenous leaders.19 These alliances influence the
emphasis given to particular components in the projects.
The outcome of this approach is that private actors and research insti-
tutions, which are often international organizations, are creating knowl-
edge and disseminating information about REDD in Latin America. The
consequence of this is that these actors position themselves better than
public institutions or national research centres and have better resources
to influence the international debate. Even Bolivia, with a government
strongly sceptical about NGOs, saw the need to include these actors
as they have better forest data (e.g. maps) than the government. The
way in which they gain this privileged position is by accessing funding
from private sources or international development cooperation agen-
cies, coupled with the privileged position in neoliberal environmental
governance that they have maintained since the 1990s. To overcome
complex issues such as those related to ownership of the land, most
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projects are initiated or planned on private lands. In the following
subsection, we focus on measurements to validate REDD projects.
Measures to validate projects
NGOs, corporations and research institutions are involved in creating
standards to certify carbon offsets that can be traded in the volun-
tary carbon market or in a future REDD carbon market. Organizations
involved in pilot projects are also creating standards to demonstrate how
they involve local populations in REDD projects.
An illustrative example of this is the Rainforest StandardTM (RST).
This was developed by Columbia University in New York in collab-
oration with private environmental funds from Bolivia, Peru, Brazil,
Ecuador and Colombia. According to its proponents, “this standard inte-
grates carbon-accounting, socio-cultural/socio-economic impacts and
biodiversity outcomes into one single REDD standard20”. Projects cer-
tified with Royal Forest Society (RFS) can be registered in the Climate
Community and Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA)21 and in the Verified
Carbon Standards (VCS),22 to be traded in the voluntary carbon market.
The alliances and associations built among NGOs, the private sector
and research institutions contribute to the creation of facts, standards,
knowledge and concepts seen as accepted “truths” (cf. Goldman and
Turner, 2012). These accepted truths are shaping the direction of REDD
in the Amazon basin before governments have managed to put a plan
of action into place. For example, in Colombia, where the readiness pro-
cess is still incipient, BINGOs and local NGOs managed to include the
RST as a standard to certify REDD projects by the government in the
national REDD strategy. Projects that do not comply with the RST will
not be included in the national REDD register of Colombia, and their
proponents will not be invited to participate in the debate.
In the following subsection, we focus on alternative channels that dif-
ferent actors are using to engage in REDD. These are particularly relevant
in creating a counterbalance to mainstream views and values.
Alternative channels
REDD networks as described above, in which BINGOs and local NGOs,
development cooperation agencies, private actors, government agencies
and research institutions participate, are channels where REDD knowl-
edge is being produced and circulated. Such networks have a form of
agency in the creation of environmental knowledge that is validated
and re-enforced at different levels. Access to REDD networks is not open
to all of those who could be interested or affected by REDD policies and
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projects. Participation in REDD networks is conditioned by overriding
narratives on deforestation and by the role of monetary incentives in
tackling deforestation (see Forsyth, 2003). Activists seeking to influence
existing networks may have to decide between working within such
dominant rules and establishing alternative and competing networks
(Forsyth, 2003; Taylor, 2012). In this way, networks become important
resources to advance alternative views and values.
Initially, indigenous peoples were sceptical about REDD and rejected
carbon markets because they did not consider them to be offering real
solutions to climate change (see the Anchorage declaration adopted
by the participants at the indigenous people’s global summit on cli-
mate change in 2009).23 Indigenous organizations in the global South
criticize carbon markets and carbon-sequestration projects for their
oversimplified portrayal of ecosystems and forests, and for ignoring
the socioeconomic, political and institutional implications of carbon
sequestration for indigenous peoples.
Indigenous people’s organizations in Latin America, and particularly
in the Amazon basin countries, have since engaged in existing net-
works that support REDD, or in alternative networks that are sceptical
about REDD and carbon markets. The different paths taken by differ-
ent indigenous people’s organizations are in part explained by previous
engagements with other organizations and by their own experiences
with REDD. Indigenous people’s organizations’ choice of position is also
influenced by their experiences of negotiating with their governments,
and the organization’s own visions and priorities.
During the 12th session of the UN Permanent Forum on Indige-
nous Peoples in 2013, indigenous people’s organizations presented two
opposing views on REDD, later communicated at COP19 in Warsaw.
Some organizations oppose REDD on the grounds that it weakens exist-
ing national legal frameworks to protect indigenous people’s rights,
particularly in regard to territorial and collective land rights, consul-
tation and autonomy, and their opposition to carbon markets and
the commodification and fragmentation of nature. Other organiza-
tions look at REDD as an opportunity to strengthen the land rights of
indigenous peoples and their local management, and to control their
territories with the help of direct funding.
The experience of some indigenous people’s organizations with
so-called “carbon cowboys”, particularly in Brazil, Peru, Bolivia
and Colombia, has made them extremely aware of some of the
risks that REDD projects might entail. Peruvian, Brazilian, Bolivian
and Colombian indigenous organizations denounced the fact that
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indigenous leaders signed disadvantageous contracts with private com-
panies. On the other hand, some groups are already developing long-
term land-use plans that involve REDD mechanisms defined in their
own terms. That is the case of the Suruí in Brazil (Toni, 2011).
The Suruí live in a 247,000 Ha reserve in the state of Rondonia, and
93% of their land is still preserved (Suruí, 2009). The Suruí population
was 5,000 people when they first made contact with non-indigenous
Brazilians, but currently only about 1,000 individuals live inside their
lands or in the nearby cities. During the 1980s an intense migration of
non-indigenous people to the Western Amazonia took place. By the end
of that decade, the population had decreased to roughly 250 members.
Despite this drastic reduction of their population, the Suruí started to
organize themselves in the 1980s. They created the Metareilá Suruí Asso-
ciation in 1989 to defend and preserve the Suruí’s cultural and territorial
patrimony.
In 2000, Metareilá started a participatory diagnosis to assess the poten-
tial of the Suruís and their territory. Based on this diagnosis, it designed
a plan for the use of the territory for coffee cultivation (one of the crops
introduced to their land by the invaders), for the management of Brazil
nuts, and for the restoration of areas degraded by illegal logging.
With the support of other NGOs (Associação de Defesa Etnoambiental
Kanindé, Amazon Conservation Team, Forest Trends, Idesam), the Suruís
decided to set aside 13,575.3 Ha of forests for 30 years, which will avoid
emissions that average 7,423,806.2 tonnes of CO2. The project was val-
idated in conformance with the Climate, Community and Biodiversity
Standards in 2012 (RA-VAL-CCB) and with the Verified Carbon Standard
in 2013. Despite the broad alliance that prepared the project, Metareilá
has full rights over carbon credits and will be the sole recipient of the
financial benefits.
The design of the Suruí Carbon Project included an extensive con-
sultation process, training for community members, development of
a baseline for carbon accounting, and analysis of the legal framework
regarding indigenous peoples and forest carbon. The Suruís initiated this
process in accordance with their own demands; they saw the sale of car-
bon credits as an opportunity to complement a long-term plan for the
development of their community.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have looked at different strategies employed by Latin
American countries and actors in their meeting with the global forest
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and climate initiative, REDD, from resistance to accommodating to
assertive strategies. Brazil has been one of the major actors in the ini-
tiative after it changed its strategy from resistance to a more offensive
approach and managed to align REDD with its own domestic interests.
A strong actor such as Brazil has the resources, knowledge and power
to shape REDD in its interests, and with the focus on results-based pay-
ments, the country is in a privileged position. It has also succeeded in
sovereignty issues in international negotiations, such as those related
to monitoring, reporting and verification/national forest monitoring
systems.
The experiences of the countries that have followed the accommodat-
ing strategy show how the history of environmental governance in each
country affects the implementation of the REDD initiative. Colombia
has, to a large extent, left the initiative in the hands of private actors
and local authorities, while Costa Rica has applied a model of “hybrid”
governance and a centralized REDD programme. Bolivia has stood out
in Latin America as one of the fiercest opponents of carbon markets,
something that has affected its possibilities and willingness to take part
in the initiative. Bolivia’s commitment to the inclusion of civil society
demands in environmental governance and the anti-commodification
rhetoric has formed its responses to the global initiative. However, there
are divergent opinions, especially among the indigenous organizations,
about the right path to follow. Indigenous organizations with recog-
nized titles to their land believe that REDD can bring new opportunities.
However, although Bolivia’s position has been similar to that of Brazil
to a large extent, with national sovereignty and opposition to offsets as
focal points, Bolivia has instead been seen as the “activist state” that is
trying to fragment REDD. It was not until 2013 that Bolivia won support
for its alternative mechanism to forest and climate efforts.
These three strategies illustrate how the “black-boxing” of REDD
has allowed for the emergence of quite different hybrid models of
negotiating environmental governance at the international level.
Our research reveals that there is a constellation of actors shaping the
direction of REDD+ in Latin America. That constellation varies from
country to country and includes among others, donors, BINGOs and
national NGOs, research institutions, and in some cases different levels
of government. Through their engagements in networks that promote
and advance a narrative in which markets and monetary compensations
offer the solution to deforestation, these actors are in a privileged posi-
tion to participate in the co-production of knowledge and policy, and to
advance their agendas.
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For some governments, engaging in REDD – at least at the discur-
sive level – does not conflict with their priorities in other sectors,
such as oil exploitation, soy expansion, the expansion of large-scale
cattle-ranching, and mining and infrastructure development, which all
represent threats to the forests and further deforestation. REDD is seen
as an alternative that will allow for the ending of trade-offs between
forest conservation, poverty alleviation and economic development.
A good example of how this change is unfolding can be found in
the partnership between Norway and Brazil. Thanks to REDD, Brazil
became the largest receiver of Norwegian development cooperation aid,
which is an enormous paradox given that Brazil is one of the fastest-
growing economies in the world. At the same time, but not necessarily
as a consequence of such collaboration, Brazil has drastically decreased
deforestation in the Amazon.
NGOs have the technical and rhetorical expertise to participate in
negotiations in national and international arenas. They also have con-
nections with farmers, indigenous and traditional populations, govern-
ment officials and bureaucrats. That makes them a privileged set of
boundary organizations (Guston, 2001) that can help to break resistance
against REDD and to open channels for the implementation of pilot
projects. They have been particularly strengthened by REDD due to this
role. They are becoming knowledge-providers to governments, donors
and local organizations, which has opened the doors for them to policy-
making forums. Environmental NGOs are now in a better position to
offer business alternatives to corporations and other private actors. Aside
from their role as boundary organizations, they are also brokers in REDD
implementation and have a direct stake in the negotiations.
The black-boxing of REDD has allowed for the construction of a large
and diverse network that supports the initiative. The widespread ques-
tioning of the market premises of REDD has led to a broadening of the
concept to accommodate disparate interests, ideologies and represen-
tations of what forests are and why they should be conserved. That
is why countries that have been vocal against REDD, such as Brazil
until the mid-2000s, are engaging in REDD preparedness. Accordingly,
some groups that initially opposed the mechanism, such as indigenous
populations, have pilot projects in their lands as REDD might offer an
alternative to strengthen their land rights. However, many indigenous
organizations remain critical of carbon markets.
The way in which REDD is going to be financed is still an open ques-
tion. Although it was born as a market mechanism to trade carbon,
political mobilization from different actors has resulted in discussions
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that challenge the market orientation of REDD, and many actors in the
Latin American region advocate for a global public fund to finance the
initiative. The political opposition of several actors in Latin America has
also resulted in a broadening of the focus of REDD to multiple aspects
of forests and their related environmental services. In some countries, at
the domestic level, it is increasingly assuming the format of a public pol-
icy, whereas in the global arena it resembles what Angelsen (2013) has
called a “performance-based aid” mechanism. This means that develop-
ment cooperation funds are used to finance REDD on the condition that
countries demonstrate that they achieve certain levels of performance in
terms of reduced deforestation.
Notes
1. http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf. See also Angelsen
et al. (2009: 3).
2. The final Readiness Plan Idea Note (R-PIN) was never signed by the Bolivian
authorities.
3. http://www.lcds.gov.gy.
4. Other donors contributing to UN-REDD are, in order of the size of their
contribution, the EU, Denmark, Spain, Japan and Luxembourg. Germany
provides 34% of the total budget of the FCPF. Other donors include
Australia, the UK, the USA, Canada, the European Commission, the Nature
Conservancy and two private companies: BP Technology Ventures, an
alternative energy company with venture investments in projects specific
to biofuels, wind and solar energy; and CDC Climat, a company that
includes emissions trading and energy investments in its portfolio. The
other contributors to the Amazon Fund are Germany and the Brazilian






5. See Readiness Preparation Plans of Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Guyana and
Suriname.
6. In addition to the four BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and
China), representatives from Argentina, Fiji (as chair of the G77 and China),
Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela were at the BASIC meeting. http://www.
twnside.org.sg/title2/climate/info.service/2013/climate130904.html
7. The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America is a regional orga-
nization launched in 2004 and is made up of eight countries: Antigua and
Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines, and Venezuela.
8. Brazilian environmentalists and NGOs (Instituto Socio Ambiental (ISA),
Greenpeace, Instituto Centro de Vida (ICV), Instituto de Pesquisa Ambiental
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da Amazonia (IPAM), TNC, CI, Amigos da Terra Amazonia Brasileira
(AdT), Instituto do Homen e Medio Ambiente (IMAZON) and WWF-Brazil)
launched the Zero Deforestation Campaign. This was based on ideas of
strengthening the participation of state governments in forest governance,
payments for environmental services, strengthening of protected areas and
support for indigenous peoples.
9. According to the former Norwegian oil and energy minister Terje Riis-
Johansen, the allocation of Norwegian money to the Amazon Fund con-
tributes to opening doors for the Norwegian oil industry in Brazil. Paradox-
ically, thanks to the commitment to the Amazon Fund, Brazil – one of the
largest and fastest-growing economies in the world – has since 2009 become
the largest recipient of Norwegian foreign development aid. http://www.dn.
no/energi/article1975276.ece « rainforest millions open oil doors ».
10. The Governors Climate and Forest Task Force (GCFT) brings together
subnational-level authorities from Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Indonesia, coun-
tries in Africa, and the governors’ offices of California and Illinois. In this
project, California and Illinois will potentially be able to purchase carbon
offsets from projects in developing countries, as part of the cap-and-trade
programme of these states, which will use a market-based mechanism to
reduce greenhouse gases. The GCFT receives funding from the Gordon
and Betty Moore Foundation, ClimateWorks, the Climate and Land Use
Alliance, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad), and
the David and Lucile Packard Foundation. Collaborating partners include
NGOs from Brazil (Institute for the Conservation and Sustainable Develop-
ment of Amazonas -DESAM and Amazon Environmental Research Institute –
IPAM), Indonesia (Kemitraan), Mexico (ProNatura), a transnational private
company (ClimateFocus), and the US-based private research organizations
the Carnegie Institution for Science and the Woods Hole Research Center.
11. WWF, CI, TNC.
12. See the report of the due diligence mission of the World Bank to Colombia,
15–27 January and 22–23 March 2012. http://documents.worldbank.org/
curated/en/2012/04/16508452/colombia-fcpf-redd-readiness-project-aide-
memoire-april-18th-25th-2012
13. In addition to the FCPF, other sources of funding include GIZ through
the REDD-CCAD-GIZ programme, which has financed different activities in
Costa Rica with special emphasis on forest reference level; the Norwegian
development agency (Norad); and USAID.
14. Later it turned out that the Bolivian officials were against the total rejection
of REDD.
15. The UN-REDD team respected the Bolivian position at the time and said they
would not intervene in the funding for the Bolivian programme.
16. In total, US$1.4 million. Source: Diego Pacheco.
17. The REDD desk is funded by the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, the
Climate and Land Use Alliance, the Department of Climate Change and
Energy Efficiency of the Australian Government, GIZ and USAID.
18. http://reddplusdatabase.org.
19. Interview FAN; interviews Colombia.
20. http://cees.columbia.edu/the-rainforest-standard and interview FAN.
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21. The CCBA is a partnership between research institutions (CATIE, CIFOR, and
ICRAF), corporations (the Blue Moon Fund, The Kraft Fund, BP, Hyundai,
Intel, SC Johnson, Sustainable Forestry Management, and Weyerhaeuser)
and NGOs (CARE, CI, TNC, the Rainforest Alliance and WCS).
22. The VCS was established in 2005 by the Climate Group, the Interna-
tional Trading Association and the World Business Council for Sustainable
Development. It is one of the world’s most widely used carbon-accounting
standards. Projects across the world have issued more than 100 million car-
bon credits using VCS standards. VCS headquarters are in Washington, DC,
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Rights, Pressures and Conservation
in Forest Regions of Mexico
Leticia Merino
Introduction
The drivers of environmental degradation and the strategies to counter
them are the subjects of heated debate. Several conceptual and pol-
icy approaches consider the key factors of this degradation to be the
weakness and instability of property rights over natural resources. The
commons perspective, on the other hand, emphasizes the viability and
potential of the self-governance of shared resources such as forests. This
perspective calls for a better understanding of the roles of local users and
their institutions – understood as “rules in use” – with regard to natural
resources (Ostrom, 1991; McKean, 2000; Berkes, 2006; McCay, 2007).
In this literature, collective action is understood as cooperation and
coordination to solve collective dilemmas related to the management
of the commons (Cárdenas, 2008; Meinzen-Dick, 2010). The influence
of the commons perspective goes beyond academia, gaining recogni-
tion among some international funders, environmental agencies and
practitioners. It follows the repeated failures of previous efforts of inter-
national aid to halt deforestation through the support of governmental
agencies.
This approach has led to two important policy proposals: (1) the
decentralization of control over common resources to lower levels
of government, including local user groups and stakeholders (Ribot,
Agrawal and Larsson, 2006; Agrawal and Ashwini, 2009); and (2) the
devolution of property rights to local users in order to create incentives
and a commitment to sustainability (Whyte and Martin, 2003; Molnar
and Alcorn, 2006; Barry, 2008). Although the “commons school” has
had limited academic influence in Latin America, the region has been
marked by proposals to decentralize forest governance and devolve
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rights to local communities. Such initiatives have been coherent with
the struggles of local communities over land and natural resources
all over the region. The “devolution” of forestlands to local popula-
tions has been an intense learning process, with a range of outcomes
that need to be better documented and understood. This extends from
the forest concessions to “comunitarios” in Petén Guatemala, the offi-
cial recognition of traditional rights over the lands of the indigenous
“mizquito” in Nicaragua, and the indigenous reserves in Panamá, Brazil
and Bolivia; to the forest property of Afro-American communities in
the Colombian Pacific and rubber tappers in Brazil. Experiences of col-
lective action, local governance, rural development and conservation
coexist with cases of conflict, elite capture and forest deterioration.
“Community forestry” has been a positive option for conservation and
local livelihoods in different regions.1 However, community-based gov-
ernance is neither a panacea nor a reality to be taken for granted. The
outcomes of these experiences derive from a variety of historical as well
as recent factors, on which public policy often has major impacts.
Mexico stands as a singular case of community-based forest gover-
nance in Latin America. Mexican communities gained legal rights over
lands and forests long before anywhere else in the contemporary world.
At the same time, Mexico’s deforestation rates were some of the high-
est in the world for decades (1970–1990).2 Forests cover more than 60%
of the country, providing important ecosystemic services that benefit
a range of actors.3 During most of the twentieth century, the forest
industrial sector searched for access to low-cost raw materials. Backed by
government agencies that promoted economic growth, their position
weakened with the implementation of NAFTA. Since 1994 the Secretaria
de Medio Ambiente Recursos Naturales y Pesca (SEMARNAP) has pro-
moted conservationist measures that sought to minimize forest use in
order to protect the megabiodiversity within, often drastically limiting
human presence in forested and wild areas.4 Conservationist policies
have gained influence in public opinion, backed by national and inter-
national environmental agencies. They tend to regard deforestation as
a generalized process in the country, mainly driven by collective prop-
erty regimes and rural poverty. Local communities are the legal owners
of the majority of Mexico’s forests. Although they were favoured by
agrarian reform, they have rarely received coherent policy support to
develop forest-based livelihoods and to become forest stewards. Most
forest communities have weak political voices and exercise little influ-
ence on other social sectors. Community residents value and benefit
directly from many of the forest’s ecosystemic “services”: goods for
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domestic consumption and the flow of goods harvested and processed
for commercial purposes. For them, the forest has patrimonial value and
represents a legacy to be passed down from their elders to their children.
The relationships between relevant stakeholders – including federal
and state governments – are permeated by poor coordination, pro-
nounced economic and political asymmetries, and misconceptions.
Conservationists tend to dominate in the context of global concern
over climate change and biodiversity loss. For international agencies and
for the federal government, forests and climate-change policies are the
fields of experts and the central government. They favour the recen-
tralization of control over rural landscapes. Forest communities tend
to be seen as obstacles to conservation and the mitigation of carbon
emissions. Commoners’ perceptions of environmental change,5 their
increasing “climatic” vulnerability, their livelihoods and governance are
mostly disregarded. The accomplishment of general mitigation targets
is often prioritized over local adaptation needs.
Based on empirical research carried out in 103 forest communities,
this chapter will discuss some of the main demographic and socioeco-
nomic conditions of Mexico’s forest communities, land-tenure features,
forest use and local perceptions of pressures on forest areas. In addi-
tion, the relationship between local institutions, forest economies and
social capital is analysed. Although the analysis focuses on Mexico, the
experiences of community forest tenure and community forestry may
provide useful insights into the general interaction of local communi-
ties with forests. This could be applicable to forest regions and forest
policies in other Latin American countries.
Forests in Mexico
Forest tenure and property rights
Mexico has ecological, social and historical features that are similar to
those of many Latin American countries. Much of the lands are forested
and mountainous, and most forest areas are inhabited spaces.6 Forest
regions are home to nearly 12 million people in Mexico, many of whom
are indigenous and are living under conditions of extreme poverty
(INEGI, 2010). Community property remained in place during the three
centuries of the colonial rule (16th and 19th centuries) and continued
to exist in areas where colonial control remained incomplete due to dif-
ficult access. During the nineteenth century, many communities lost
their lands as privatization policies were imposed by the central gov-
ernment. Indigenous presence and collective property were regarded as
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backwards and saw privatization as imperative for economic modernity
(see Chapter 1).
Despite these similarities, Mexico is a unique case in Latin America
because powerful social movements brought about extensive land-
tenure reform when the state tried to resolve popular claims. The
government’s recognition of collective tenure as the basis for agrarian
reform was guaranteed in the 1917 federal constitution. Today, 70% of
forestland is under collective tenure, while more than 50% of commu-
nities have forest cover (Warman, 2000; Bray and Merino, 2004; Merino,
2004; Bray, Merino and Barry, 2005).
Across the entire world, public property of forests (often under conces-
sions to third parties) is the prevailing institutional arrangement. Only
from the late 1980s to the early 2000s did communities and local groups
obtain rights over forests in other Latin American countries, such as
Nicaragua, Bolivia, Brazil, Guatemala, Peru and Colombia.
There are two legal types of collective holdings in Mexico: ejidos and
comunidades agrarias.7 Ejidos were created when the government granted
land to groups who demanded it, including former hacienda workers.
Comunidades agrarias resulted from the official recognition of the histor-
ical rights of indigenous communities. CONAFOR estimates that today
30,305 communities collectively own 105 million Ha of forest. Legally,
comunidades agrarias are able to incorporate young members at their will,
while ejido members can only pass on their rights to a single successor.
Community forests have to be commonly managed, and their division
or sale is legally prohibited.8
In spite of the legal status of communities, their rights are clearly
limited: the Mexican state maintains the right to regulate forest use.9
Second, as in most of Latin America, water and underground resources
are legally public property, giving governments the right to directly use
these resources or to grant them in concession to third parties. Finally,
according to Mexican legislation, mining holds a national priority status
over conservation and mitigation of global greenhouse gas emissions.
Forest policies
Since the late 1940s, industrial development based on an import sub-
stitution model became a national priority in Mexico. As in other
large Latin American countries such as Brazil and Argentina, strong
centralized governments assumed the role of directly promoting this
model.
Small rural producers were given the role of providing staple foods at
low cost, thereby enabling low industrial salaries.10 The state did not
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consider members of forest communities to be capable of managing
forest operations. Instead, long-term concessions of community forests
were imposed in different regions in order to give industries access to
raw materials. Similarly, communities lost their rights in almost half of
the forestland where logging bans were imposed to protect river basins.
From the perspective of some commoners, these policies made forests
an obstacle to real ownership of the land. Confronted by continuous
local resistance, forest industries were organized for short-term prof-
its and they kept their rate of reinvestment as low as possible. In the
1970s, forest industries were nationalized. The Mexican state used the
profits of forest exploitation for investments in other economic sectors.
Forest regions under logging bans suffered strong deterioration as pri-
vate forest industries continued their operation in those areas. Logging
activities were carried out without any restrictions or provisional mea-
sures (Bray and Merino, 2004; Merino, 2004; Boyer, 2005; Merino and
Segura-Warnholtz, 2005; Bautista, 2007).11
In the 1970s this economic and political model started to show
signs of exhaustion. With regard to forest policies, neither conces-
sions nor logging bans accomplished their economic or environmental
goals. Forest deterioration increased while most industrial logging plants
operated below their installed capacity.12 Concessions favoured “rent
extraction” over sustained exploitation, reinvestment in forest protec-
tion and long-term management systems. This led to a “disinvestment”
and consequently resulted in the loss of forest resources, value and
productivity.
By the early 1980s, when the concessions were close to expiring,
many communities claimed the right to regain the use and control of
their forests. Social mobilization, support of civil society groups and
the closing of many state-owned industries enabled communities in
Mexico to win this struggle. After having worked for concessionaries for
many years, community members realized that timber extraction could
be profitable and sustainable. Some communities engaged in commu-
nity forest production. Their initiatives were supported by a progressive
group within the federal administration: the Dirección de Desarrollo
Forestal (DDF), which held the view that communities could be both
efficient producers and forest stewards. The DDF promoted the organi-
zation of community unions to create economies of scale that would
enable communities to hire technical advisors who were previously pro-
vided by the federal government. Through these unions, communities
gained a stronger presence both in politics and in the market (Alatorre,
2000; Bray and Merino, 2004; Chapela, 2005). In 1986 a new forest law
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banned concessions and granted communities the right to be consulted
on the implementation of any policy that restrained their property
rights.
Communities with the most valuable forest assets and good orga-
nization showed remarkable achievements. They reinvested most of
their profits from forest businesses in improved forest-management sys-
tems, building and providing for the maintenance of forest roads. They
also acquired industrial equipment, and organized their own technical
and administrative teams. Not only did forestry provide employment
and income to local residents but its profits were invested in local
public goods: schools, clinics, community celebrations, roads and trans-
port. Some communities adopted environmental agendas to promote
sustainable harvests, minimize environmental impacts and diversify
forest use. Since the 1990s a group of communities were granted for-
est certification under the Forest Stewardship Council scheme. There
are currently 39 certified community forests in Mexico, amounting to
655,206 Ha.13
These successful forms of community forest management created
local incentives for conservation, improved quality of life in marginal-
ized regions, and favoured democratic governance of forest commons.
Some certified communities have even gained international recogni-
tion.14 The experience of the ejidos of southern Quintana Roo was
replicated in the neighbouring tropical forests of Petén-Guatemala,
where Mexicans trained local user groups and thus supported the
establishment of community forestry operations.
Sustainable forest management and production – one of the strate-
gies proposed to halt deforestation – require coherent and continu-
ous long-term support to local users. However, government support
for community forestry faded during the late 1980s and early 1990s.
With the implementation of NAFTA, the national market was abruptly
opened and community producers were unable to compete with US and
Canadian forest producers. At the same time, the over-regulation of
forest activities by the Mexican state led to high transaction costs.
Finally, subsidies for tropical agricultural, cattle holding15 and the
extension of illegal logging led to the disruption of some community
forestry initiatives during that period.16 NAFTA therefore put pressure
on the productive initiatives of forest communities. While some export-
oriented subsectors in agriculture, manufacturing and services benefited,
many small and medium-sized (urban and rural) businesses failed in
the absence of policies to protect and promote their productivity and
competitiveness.
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In 1994 the federal administration created the Ministry of the Envi-
ronment, SEMARNAP, with forest management as part of its jurisdic-
tion. SEMARNAP’s main natural resources policy was the expansion of
the protected areas system and a simultaneous increase in regulations
for activities such as forestry. Nevertheless, SEMARNAP also renewed
support for community forestry, creating two small programmes:
PRODEFOR (Programa para el Desarrollo Forestal) and PROCYMAF
(Programa de Conservación y Manejo Forestal), a joint initiative of
SEMARNAP and the World Bank. PROCYMAF was a pilot project based
on the recognition of a variety of socioeconomic and ecological condi-
tions of forest communities, and on the need to continue to build fine-
tuned strategies to address the diversity of local contexts.17 PROCYMAF
was influenced by the international advocacy in favour of participatory,
decentralized, pro-poor forest policies that emerged during the 1990s
and 2000s. Its main goals were to strengthen communities’ social capi-
tal, and their productive and institutional capacities. After a few years,
PROCYMAF presented some important achievements, such as a grow-
ing system of forest area under certification, the creation of numerous
community forest enterprises, the adoption of participatory land-use
planning, the definition of community rules for local forest governance,
and the establishment of regional committees of forest communities.
After the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) took over the national
government in 2000, Mexico’s economy and governability were increas-
ingly characterized by corruption and authoritarian practices. Aiming
to increase its legitimacy and to show political strength, the PAN gov-
ernment launched an extensive “anti-drug war”. In the context of
economic and institutional failures, widespread corruption, persistent
poverty and inequality, this led to the spread of violence to many
regions. Criminality against the population became common, involving
criminal gangs but also the police and the army (Cendejas, 2015).
At the same time the PAN administrations (2000–2012) responded
to environmental concerns that tried to give forest policy a high pro-
file. Between 2000 and 2008, public investment in forests increased by
7000% (Figure 9.1). The distribution of these public funds expressed
a conventional conservationist vision. About 70% was invested in
the establishment of forest plantations and massive reforestation pro-
grammes. In general, these investments yielded poor results.18 Some
12% of the funds were used for the Programme of “Payment for Envi-
ronmental Services” (PES), and were given to forest owners who gave up
forest use.19 Only 10% of the federal forest budget was used to support
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Figure 9.1 National annual budget of CONAFOR according to different forest-
related projects in Mexico (in million pesos), 2001–2008
Source: Merino and Ortiz (2013).
Forest communities in Mexico
Forest communities in Mexico exist in a range of socioenvironmental
contexts. This study is based on an analysis of a sample of 102 forest
communities, which basically tested two main hypotheses (following
Cárdenas, 2006):
• forest conditions and sustainable forest use depend largely on the
robustness of local institutions;20
• institutional robustness relies on interlinked characteristics of forest
users, namely, social capital and dependence on forest resources.21
The sampled communities are distributed across five states: (1) Oaxaca
in the south, where 19 indigenous groups (mainly Zapotecos and
Mixtecos) constitute the majority of the population; (2) Guerrero, also
in the south, with an important presence of Nahuas and Mixtecos; (3)
Michoacán in central Mexico, home of the Purépechas; (4) Jalisco in the
west, whose mountains are home to the Huichol people; and (5) Durango
in the north-centre, with five indigenous groups, mainly Tepehuanes.22
Together these states add up to more than half of the forestland of
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Mexico, where approximately 70% of the nationally produced timber
comes from. As a whole, these forest regions have a lower population
density and lower deforestation rates than the rest of the temperate for-
est areas.23 The remainder of this chapter will provide a detailed analysis
of forest conditions, use and governance in the studied areas.
Forest types and uses
The sampled communities are located in the mountain range along the
Pacific coast and the central neovolcanic axis, at high altitudes. These
areas frequently have important altitudinal ranges of non-forested lands
and different types of forest vegetation, including temperate forests
(pine, pine-oak, oak, fir and cloud forests), as well as dry and humid
tropical forests (below 1,500 to 500 m above sea level. Distinct types of
forest are perceived, used and managed in different ways.
Forest uses vary according to forest type (Table 9.1). Firewood is the
only type of wood collected in almost all type of forest. Commercial
logging – the most important income-generating forest activity – takes
place in about half of the pine and pine-oak community forest areas.
Agriculture and grazing – sometimes based on the removal of the forest
cover – take place in the dry and tropical forests. Interestingly, com-
munity conservation initiatives, sometimes supported by government
programmes, are not present in tropical humid and tropical dry forests
within the sample. The latter type of forest has the greatest biodiversity
and number of endemic species, and it represents the most endangered
forest type in Mexico.24
In summary, sustainable use options are limited or absent in most
of the community forests analysed in this study. The lack of these
Table 9.1 Different uses of forest by community residents in Mexico











Pine 6525 60 62 58
Pine-oak 81 60 18 48
Oak 92 80
Fir 45 70
Cloud26 41 30 80
Tropical dry 61 75
Tropical humid 75
Source: Survey on Forest Communities with Temperate Forests in Mexico, IIS-UNAM.
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opportunities endows forests with low social value. Under such con-
ditions, forest areas are prone to highly impactful activities, such as
mining or commercial plantations.27
Forest size and tenure issues
Forest resources are valuable assets for the majority of the communi-
ties, particularly those that own forest resources of commercial value.28
In most cases, however, forest areas are relatively small. Only 10% of the
communities have more than 10,000 Ha, while half of them are smaller
than 2,000 Ha and 20% of communities possess forests of between 500
and 300 Ha.
The governance of communal forests has the potential to generate a
range of social benefits, including more participation in forest protec-
tion (Merino, 2005; Agrawall and Ashwini, 2009). However, collective
tenure does not necessarily lead to equal access to forest resources
for all community members, or to equal incentives to protect them.
The two types of communal forest in Mexico – ejidos and comunidades
agrarias – present important differences. In ejidos, which are predomi-
nant in Durango, Jalisco and Michoacán, many families do not have
property rights, while comunidades agrarias own 95% of the forests in
Oaxaca. Ejidos also face serious ageing problems – 88% of the rights
holders are at least 40 years old and 28% are over 60 years old. In con-
trast, 64% of the residents in comunidades agrarias are younger than 40.
The different age structure results from the legal rights of comunidades
agrarias, which facilitate the inclusion of new members.
Collective tenure in Mexico remains strong in spite of the many pres-
sures that it faced before and after the 1991 legal reform that enabled
the privatization of ejido lands (Wayne, 1998; Warman, 2000). Sales of
ejido lands occurred in 30% of the sampled communities.29 In 82% of the
communities, local authorities declared that the majority of community
members favour the maintenance of collective property.
Conflicts over land tenure are not rare in the case studies. In par-
ticular, intercommunity conflicts over borders occur in 34% of the
cases. Intracommunity conflicts over the limits of individual plots were
reported in 21% of the studied communities. Conflicts over borders
are more frequent in comunidades agrarias, where these problems have
remained unresolved for generations. Such conflicts usually have nega-
tive impacts on forest conditions due to unclear ownership. According
to local authorities, they favour deforestation and illegal logging, and
therefore create challenges for implementing protective measures.
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Forest Communities performance
The performance of forest communities was measured by five indices:
(1) pressure on forest areas; (2) protection and conservation activities;
(3) social capital and organization; (4) local institutional strength; and
(5) community forest economy30. Table 9.2 summarizes the main results,
divided into five rank categories.
Table 9.2 Indices of forest communities’ performance








35.9 27.2 22.3 9.7 4.9
Social capital and
organization
3.9 23.3 53.4 16.5 1
Local institutional
strength
27 27 36 10 0
Community forest
economy
69 13.6 7.8 5.4 3.9
N=103.
Source: Survey on Forest Communities in Mexico, IIS-UNAM.
The pressures on forest areas index combines (1) occurrence of illegal log-
ging; (2) forest fires and pests; (3) grazing in forest areas; and (4) land-use
change. The results show that pressures on forest areas are remarkable
in nearly 37% of the sampled communities, while a very similar pro-
portion of the community forests face low levels of pressure. It is worth
mentioning that questions have arisen during the past decade about
the perception of change (increase or decrease) in forest pressures. Most
of these pressures have a socioecological basis. In particular, effects of
global change add a level of uncertainty regarding the occurrence of
fires and pest outbreaks, as well as in rainfall and drought patterns.
A significant share of these communities (16.5%) reported recent forest
losses.
The conservation and protection activities index combines variables
related to (1) monitoring of forest areas in order to address forest fires,
pests and illegal logging; (2) local organizational and technical capac-
ities to face these pressures; (3) initiatives of reforestation; and (4) the
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existence of community conservation areas. This index was built to
capture practices that favour conservation rather than actual conser-
vation or degradation of forest areas.31 Protection and conservation
practices are low in the majority of the cases (63%). However, in 27%
of the communities where conservation and protection activities were
ranked as “low”, communities perform basic protection activities such
as fire-fighting. It is interesting to note that the proportion of commu-
nities with very poor conservation practices is similar to the percentage
of communities where forest pressures are perceived as “high” and “very
high”. In communities where conservation and protection measures are
moderate (22.3%), residents are engaged in the monitoring of forest
areas.
Only in 14.6% of these communities were conservation and protec-
tion practices classified as “high” and “very high”. A relevant finding
is the presence of community conservation areas, particularly in the
comunidades agrarias with indigenous background (61% of the sampled
communities in Oaxaca, and 58% in Guerrero). Community conserva-
tion is also significant in 44% of the ejidos and comunidades agrarias in
Michoacán, and among 38% of the ejidos in Durango. Many of these
conservation areas are located in areas identified as water-capture sites
and have been established as part of community projects to protect
water sources.
The social capital and organization index includes (1) frequency of
community meetings; (2) strength of local governance systems; (3) par-
ticipation in community meetings; and (4) non-paid community work.
This index is particularly important as social capital and organization are
considered by the “commons school” to be preconditions for forest gov-
ernance and sustainability (Ostrom, 2009). Social organization in ejidos
and comunidades agrarias faces a variety of challenges and has important
downsides: the exclusion of women and young people; conflicts created
by the “elite capture” of benefits of common resources; and the “costs”
of traditional practices of governance and reciprocity. Increasing out-
migration puts social organization under additional stress, as it drains
crucial human resources needed for local governance and generational
replacement. This adds to the challenge of maintaining social capital
across different generations. These pressures are particularly strong in
about one-quarter of the sampled communities (27.2%), where the value
of this index is “low” and “very low”.
Governance based on local participation takes place through regular
community assemblies to discuss collective issues, make decisions and
formulate rules about the following issues: use and management of the
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forest commons, use of the profits of the communal productive ini-
tiatives, and relationships with government programmes. Community
members take part in different positions of the local governance system,
mostly on a voluntary basis. In addition, non-paid community work –
which takes place in many cases – serves as a base on which to build and
maintain collective infrastructure, public services, forest protection and
forest-restoration activities.
Despite the organizational foundation observed in many forest com-
munities, the low percentage of communities with a higher level of
organization and social capital (17.5%) reflects the high costs of commu-
nity and common forest governance. Within this sample, lower values
of social capital and organization are often linked with the exclusion
of avecindados (family heads living in communities), lack of property
rights and little or no rights to take part in meetings or use common
resources.
The local institutional strength index is based on (1) the existence of
community rules for local governance; (2) rules related to the use and
provision for local commons (e.g. public spaces, forests, infrastructure,
community profits from forestry or other collectively held activities); (3)
community participation in the definition of the agreement; (4) aware-
ness and knowledge; (5) monitoring and sanctioning of compliance
with the rules; and (6) community members’ trust in rule compliance.
Local institutions are considered fundamental for sustainability and
governance by the “commons/collective action perspective” as they are
the result of collective agreements for commons governance and use.
Nevertheless, the definition and enforcement of local institutions are
demanding tasks. Community participation and knowledge are required
to legitimate local rules and better match the local context. Com-
munities of users and/or owners of common resources coordinate to
create collective institutions when they perceive the need and have the
conditions that enable them to do so.
In most of the communities under study, local rules refer to local gov-
ernance and, sometimes, to the extraction and use of firewood. The
values of this index express a relative weakness of local institutions: a
lower level in half of the communities’ local institutions and high in
only 10% of these communities (Table 9.2).
This pattern partially reflects the centralized forest governance in
Mexico, in which local communities are completely excluded from the
definition of use and management rules. As a result, national rules
are often inadequate for particular forests or communities in a large
and highly diverse country. In addition, frequent changes in laws and
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rules increase uncertainty and the ability of forest users to comply with
government regulations.
Conflicts between local and national monitoring systems add to the
challenges for local institutions. In Mexico a federal government agency
(the Procuraduría de Protección Ambiental) is officially responsible for
monitoring compliance with federal forest rules. Limited coordination
between the Mexican environmental enforcement agency (PROFEPA)
and the monitoring initiatives of local communities leads to conflict
between the two institutional arrangements. Imposed rules, external –
and often inefficient – monitoring and sanctioning, “crowd out” risk,
and eroded local institutions have resulted in a favouring of local “open
access” conditions (Cárdenas, 2008).
Finally, the community forest economy index combines (1) a level of
vertical integration of forest production and the capacity to add value
to forest products; (2) diversification of forest uses, taking commer-
cial and domestic purposes into account; (3) productive forest assets
owned by communities; and (4) ownership of financial assets. This
index corresponds to “forest dependence”, an important condition for
the social value of common forests, and the incentives to commit to
their governance and conservation (Ostrom, 2009).
The level of development of the communal forest economy was con-
sidered “very low” in 69% of the sampled communities. In half of the
communities, forest only provides firewood for domestic use. In the
other half, residents harvest and sell non-timber forest products (NTFP)
such as mushrooms, resin, medicinal plants and firewood.32 Individuals
or family groups who take part in these activities are often the poorest
members of the community. These products deliver very low profits due
to market control by intermediaries.
Logging remains the most important (legal) income-generating activ-
ity in forest regions. It takes place in one-third of these communities,
of which 13.6% sell timber as “stump”. In these cases, outsiders per-
form forest management and extractions with little community control.
These operations, which often have a high impact on forests, deliver
scarce local benefits, and create mistrust and opposition to commercial
forestry.
Forest management and timber-harvesting operations are carried out
in only 17% of the communities. About half of this last subgroup pro-
duced only raw material (logs) due to limited productive capacities and
financial resources to cover production costs. Nearly 10% of these com-
munities have achieved productive vertical integration, including their
own forest mills and sale of primarily tables. However, only 4% of the
248 Rights, Pressures and Forest Conservation
sampled communities have achieved vertical and horizontal integra-
tion as forest producers. They have diversified commercial forest uses,
combining timber products with NTFP and/or providing ecotourism
services. This low performance reveals the challenges faced by the com-
munity forestry industry – namely, the organization of production, how
to reach national and international markets, financial and fiscal tasks,
efficiency, accountability to communities’ assemblies, and the operation
of entrepreneurial administrations in the context of local governance
systems. Nevertheless, these communities have created local sources
of employment and income. They have financed local infrastructure
and public services with the profits of their own business. They have
also contributed to developing and strengthening human resources,
social capital and local governance (Bray, 2007). The following section
shows how the community forestry economy is related to forests and
communities.
Forest communities and community forestry
Community forestry touches upon the socioeconomic conditions of
the community as well as ecological conditions and pressures of the
forest. The indexes analysed in the previous section reveal that social
organization, forest conditions and forestry are closely related.33
Organization around local governance, and commons management
and use, is present in many forest communities. However, communities
with weak local institutions tend to report a higher level of pressures
in their forests. Conflict over community borders is particularly related
to increasing pressures on forest areas, which are almost four times as
greater as for communities that do not face this problem. In contrast,
communities that control forest management and forest production
tend to be more involved in protection and conservation activities. Fur-
thermore, communities with internal rules regarding the protection and
management of forests tend to be more successful in addressing pres-
sures on forests. Their members engage in the reduction of the risks of
forest pests and fires. They also monitor forest areas in order to observe
early signs of potential threats. Nevertheless, the level of pressure varies
considerably according to the individual forest dynamics. Fires and
pests, for example, are multifactorial, in which climatic events such as
strong and/or longer dry seasons may play an important role. Therefore,
as pressures on forests increase, local rules must be fine-tuned as well.
Not surprisingly, we found a strong relationship among social capital
and organization and local institutional strength. Basic organizational
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practices, such as collective rules in use and trust, are important
for promoting social capital. In general terms, communities with the
strongest organization are also those where protection and conserva-
tion activities are more frequent and diverse. This pattern reveals the
relevance high levels of social organization required to support local
coordination and collective action addressing forest protection and con-
servation activities. A small number of communities, however, perform
forest-protection activities at high intensity. This pattern is a possi-
ble outcome of government subsidies for reforestation. In contrast, a
reduced number of highly organized communities showed very few
protection and conservation practices. These cases reveal that commu-
nities may be organized for different purposes that do not necessarily
coincide with forest conservation. In summary, social organization
is an important requirement for performing conservation activities
but it is not sufficient for creating incentives to engage in forest
protection.
Protection and conservation activities are closely related to the devel-
opment of community forestry. The forest economy tends to be low
where local institutions are weak. As a result, limited protection and
conservation activities lead to increased pressure on forests. Interest-
ingly, pressure on forests drops considerably according to the increasing
importance of commercial forest activity in communities. In cases where
recent deforestation took place, forest economy in the communities is
weak. In general, communities with lower levels of pressure on forests
are those with the most consolidated economic forest activities. This
information suggests that as the incentives, knowledge and techni-
cal skills increase – as a result of a more diversified community forest
economy – community members are more able and willing to iden-
tify and address pressures on forests before their impacts grow out of
control.
Communities with the highest level of local forest economy34 tend to
have lower institutional strength in comparison to communities with
only vertical integration of forest production. The former needs stronger
and more diversified institutions in order to manage industrial and
commercial operations, diversify forest production and carry out mul-
tiple activities, such as timber extraction and processing. However, as
these data reveal, new economic forest activities may lack the institu-
tional support to scale up their commercial activities. If not properly
addressed, these “institutional gaps” can undermine common natu-
ral resources used in production processes, collective initiatives and
community governance itself.
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Conclusion: Community forestry beyond autonomy
In highly unequal societies such as those in Mexico and most of Latin
American countries, governments and urban societies need to over-
come the anti-rural, anti-community, anti-poor biases that are frequent
in legal frameworks, and in environmental and economic policies. For
decades, Mexican forest communities have faced adverse policies that
constrain local initiatives. These have encouraged the abandonment
of many forest and rural regions where local livelihoods have become
difficult to sustain. Research on local forest use in Mexico and other
developing countries (IFRI; Ribot, Agrawal and Larsson, 2009) shows a
permanent tension between trends of decentralization and centraliza-
tion of decision-making rights over natural and strategic resources.
Most Latin American forests are owned by central governments while
logging concessions are given to international corporations (Whyte and
Martin, 2001). Concessionaires tend to maximize short-term profits of
forest operations to reinvest outside the country. As a result, forests
become sources of revenue for national governments with limited local
control over the impact of extractions.
Not surprisingly, this model of “mining forestry” leads to the
marginalization of local people and high environmental impacts. The
last two federal administrations in Mexico (2000–2012) responded to
global environmental concerns, thereby attempting to give forest pol-
icy a high profile. Despite the increased public investment in forests
between 2000 and 2008, this budget largely overlooked the needs to
promote local productive and governance capacities, and the creation
of stable incentives for conservation.
Successful experiences of community forestry have revealed impor-
tant lessons that can change this trend. They reveal positive synergies
not only among common forest management, local livelihoods and
conservation but also with maintenance and the development of “com-
monality” based on local institutions and social capital. The results of
this research show that social capital and institutional strength are key
factors for the protection of forest commons, and for local capacities to
face traditional and emergent pressures on forest ecosystems. Human
resources and collective action are critical for resilience. The presence of
communities with forest conservation, governance and local develop-
ment in Mexico shows the viability of these initiatives, even if they still
constitute a minority.
Forests are commons whose sustained management and use require
high levels of cooperation among relevant actors. Collective action in
Mexican communities is even more necessary due to the collective
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tenure of the vast majority of Mexican forests. Communal property
can be an important possibility for favouring sustainability and the
governance of complex ecosystems, such as forests. However, despite
the relevance of legal recognition of property rights over lands and
forests to local communities, it is hardly sufficient for forest commu-
nities to achieve their economic, environmental and social potential.
The empowerment of local communities by acquiring technical and
governance capacities is equally important in contemporary contexts.
The results of this survey show the existence of many communities that
suffer forest deterioration and limited social capital. In these communi-
ties, the contribution of forest activities to local livelihoods is often very
limited. The development of a forestry economy is fundamental not
only for supporting the social and institutional development of these
communities but also for delivering protective measures for sustainable
forest use.
The experience of forest communities in Mexico shows that the
synergy between forest economy and conservation does not happen nat-
urally; it requires favourable public policies as well as access to adequate
training and technical advice.
The state has undermined community rights and livelihoods, favour-
ing communities’ dispossession. This entails a recentralization of land
control and resource management, over-regulation of resource use,
imposition of high transaction costs on legal forest use, and criminal-
ization of many local uses of natural resources. But if local governance
and environmental citizenship are regarded as assets for conservation
and governability, the state can play a key role by recognizing commu-
nities’ rights over natural resources. This would provide favourable legal
frameworks for community forest use and governance – by coordinating
with local actors to control illegal land use – and would favour markets
able to internalize sustainable management costs.
Lessons from Mexico’s community forestry experience are relevant
for other Latin American countries, such as Guatemala, Nicaragua,
Bolivia and Brazil – where governments recognize local collective rights.
In countries where most of the forestlands are owned by govern-
ments and are used by private companies, local governance, incentives
and recognition of communities’ rights can be avenues for reversing
environmental injustice and deterioration. In summary, community
forestry is not a panacea or a fixed model that can simply be repli-
cated inside or outside Mexico. Nevertheless, it represents an important
alternative to combine goals of local empowerment, forest sustainability
and rural development. While some communities in Mexico seek to
distance themselves from the state and the traditional market (see
252 Rights, Pressures and Forest Conservation
Chapter 10), other communities may find their sustainable develop-
ment path through close support from the state and market integration.
Notes
1. I consider “community forestry” to be those cases in which local communi-
ties have and practise use and control rights over the forested areas (Schlager
and Ostrom, 1992) and where they preserve the forest cover and have insti-
tuted use and management rules, regardless of the ways in which they use
forest resources.
2. About 3% yearly.
3. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment defines these “services” as provi-
sional, regulatory, cultural and support services.
4. Mexico has the fifth greatest biodiversity in the world; the top ten megadi-
verse countries host 70% of the Earth‘s biological diversity.
5. The Stockholm Resilience Center defines interrelated dimensions of global
environmental change as loss of biodiversity, ocean acidification, changes
in the cycles of phosphorus and nitrogen, land-use change, depletion of
the atmospheric ozone layer, pollution of soils and water, and aerosol
atmospheric load (Rockstrom et al., 2009).
6. Some 73% of the land has forest cover, accounting for nearly 142 million
Ha.
7. I use the term “community” when referring to both ejidos and comunidades
agrarias.
8. De facto forest division is happening in many communities.
9. In terms of the “bundle of property rights” scheme proposed by Schlager
and Ostrom (1992), community members have access, use, exclusion and
some management rights over forests. The federal government maintains
key control rights over them.
10. The Mexican diet was based on corn and beans, the prices of which were
controlled by the federal government for decades.
11. From 1950 to 1970 the national demand for forest products grew contin-
uously and the country’s economy grew by 7% annually. From 1950 to
1989, the population growth rates were close to 3% per year. These were
also years of strong expansion of the market economy in traditional rural
communities.
12. Communities with forests under concessions were not legally able to use
them, nor were they free to choose timber buyers or negotiate timber prices,
which were fixed by the Ministry of Agrarian Affairs. Nevertheless, they kept
the right to allow or refuse logging in their lands.
13. During the last decade, certified forest areas have decreased as certifica-
tion poses strong demands without giving clear access to better marketing
conditions.
14. San Juan Nuevo in Michocán; Ixtlán, UZACHI, Ixtlán, Textitlán,
Mancomunados and San Pedro el Alto in Oaxaca; Santiago Papasquiaro in
Durango; el Balcón in Guerrero; el Largo in Chihuahua; Nohbec in Quintana
Roo.
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15. Some subsidies for small agriculture were created after the implementation
of NAFTA, mainly with political purposes. This is the case for PROCAMPO,
which provided resources per hectare planted with corn, regardless of its pro-
ductivity. Subsidies to acquire cattle were maintained until recently, given
mainly by state governments.
16. It has been estimated that illegal logging is at least as great as legal pro-
duction (Consejo Civil Mexicano para la Silvicultura Sostenible – CCMSS,
PROFEPA).
17. PROCYMAF worked in the states of Oaxaca, Guerrero, Michoacán, Jalisco,
Quintana Roo and Durango.
18. By 2009, Greenpeace reported that official reforestation had a survival rate
close to 10%.
19. Payments were established based on the average price of corn at an estimated
national agricultural productivity average in areas with no irrigation.
20. Institutions are defined as “rules in use” (Ostrom, 2005).
21. This study was carried out as part of the international programme Forest
Resources and Institutions (IFRI). A global database of forests and forest
users around the world has been developed since the 1990s (Wollenberg
et al., 2007). By focusing on two hypotheses of the IFRI programme
(Cárdenas, 2006), a team from the Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales of
the National University of Mexico (IIS-UNAM) applied a survey inspired by
the IFRI conceptual approach.
22. The universe of the sample includes all the communities in these five states
with at least 300 Ha of temperate forest. It is stratified based on the propor-
tion of communities with this characteristic in each state, as compared to
the total number of communities with 300 Ha (or more) of temperate forest
in these five states.
23. The results of the survey are representative of half of Mexican temperate
forests that face less pressure. We could not include the state of Chihuahua
(the second largest timber producer in Mexico, which has the largest forest
extension and where the conditions of forest regions are similar to those of
the state of Durango).
24. Mexico’s dry forests are rich in “neo-endemism” (new species that origi-
nated in a particular region and are only found there). This is currently
the fastest-disappearing forest type. Mexican cloud forests are rich in “paleo-
endemism”.
25. This is the percentage of forests of each of type within the communities of
the sample.
26. During 1970–1980, subsidies for sun coffee based on the removal of the for-
est were the main driver of the rapid disappearance of cloud forests; since
1990, many communities have grown shade coffee, preserving forests. Some
of them are certified as organic sustainable coffee producers.
27. From 2006 to 2012 the areas subject to mining concessions in mountain
forests increased by 30%. Much of the medium- and small-scale mining
is now controlled by drug cartels, as in the southern sierra of Michoacán,
which is rich in iron ore deposits. Other activities with a high environmental
impact that are practised in dry forests include the establishment of planta-
tions (e.g. Agave cupreata, used for the fabrication of tequila), illegal cropping
and extensive cattle ranching.
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28. Mainly pine.
29. These are primarily sales of plots among ejido dwellers. In most cases, they
are not associated with privatization of the ejidos. They do not include sales
of forestland.




31. The assessment of forest conditions requires other types of research method-
ology and techniques.
32. These are wood products classified as NTFP.
33. For a more detailed description of these data, see Merino, Leticia and
Martínez Ana Eugenia, “A vuelo de pájaro. Las condiciones de las
comunidades con bosques templados en México”, www.conabio.gob.mx.
34. Industrial capacities, diversification of forest production: NTFP, environmen-
tal and touristic services and so on.
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10
Local Solutions for Environmental
Justice
David Barkin and Blanca Lemus
In the context of the prevailing abundance of diversity (biological,
ethnic), the profound social inequalities, and the trends and attitudes of
hegemonic forces in Latin America, a coherent process of environmental
governance is proving difficult and environmental injustice is aggra-
vated. In virtually every country in the region, increasing subordination
to the global market has led to dramatic transformations in produc-
tive structures and processes along with the often violent opening of
new territories to domestic and foreign investment in renewable energy
projects, primary production for international markets, and natural
resources exploitation. These changes are provoking direct confronta-
tions between, on the one hand, domestic policy-makers, well-financed
investors positioned to operate in international markets, purveyors of
technologies, investors with concessions in regions and sectors recently
opened to foreign investment, and, on the other hand, organized groups
from many parts of society who see these penetrations as a menace to
their productive systems, to their livelihoods and their health, while
also being destructive of their communities, their cultures and the
We are deeply indebted to the members of the Local Solutions teams partic-
ipating in the Environmental Governance in Latin America project for their
contributions to this chapter; this formulation would not have been possible
without the continuing exchanges in the communities over the course of the
past three years. The contributions of Gustavo Esteva, Mario Fuente and Victor
Toledo have also been important. Special thanks are due to the critical contribu-
tions of the participants in the seminar in heterodox economics in the doctoral
program in economic sciences at the Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, and
the active participation of the specialists in ecological economics in the partici-
pating communities. Of course, responsibility for this text is exclusively that of
the authors.
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ecosystems on which they and we all depend. Regardless of where one
turns in the region, there is an increase in the number and intensity of
conflicts between groups committed to promoting economic develop-
ment (i.e. growth), and those claiming to speak for the planet and/or
the welfare of the large majority of the population or particular minori-
ties, who feel excluded from these processes and are bearing the brunt
of the negative impacts of these activities.
This chapter addresses some of the underlying causes of these con-
flicts by giving voice to some of the actors who are actually involved in
developing their own alternatives to the development proposals of the
hegemonic forces driving the transformations in their societies. These
alternatives emerge from groups whose organizations are shaped by dif-
ferent cosmologies, products of their multiple ethnic origins, and by
the profound philosophical and epistemological debates of the past
half-century that emerged from numerous social movements propos-
ing different strategies for achieving progress, improving wellbeing and
conserving ecosystems. While many past confrontations among social
groups have produced compromises modifying individual development
projects, few have created some space for the emergence of alterna-
tive social and productive structures that respond to the demands for
local control of the governance process to assure local wellbeing and
responsible environmental management.
The analysis draws on an important emerging literature that proposes
a different epistemology and methodology, reflecting the direct partici-
pation of a diversity of communities around the world in research about
themselves and their possibilities for implementing different approaches
to improving their wellbeing. In spite of the widely separated regions
and traditions from which they come, there are striking commonali-
ties in their reflections on how research should be conducted and how
they might collaborate with “outsiders” in their search for ways to
advance in their pursuit of an improved style of life and their ability
to govern themselves. A notable early contribution from this intellec-
tual and academic current was published by a Maori sociologist (Smith,
2012), reacting to the tendency of scholars from the principal academic
institutions in New Zealand to make assumptions about local social
structures, production possibilities, and the possibilities of and com-
petence for innovations of their “aborigines”. Since this early text, a
burgeoning literature has emerged, not only emphasizing the method-
ological limitations of much Western scholarship in the Third World
but also extending the critique to epistemological, ethical and cosmo-
logical planes. The contributors to this process argue that since social
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categories are deeply embedded in institutions, profound difficulties
arise when trying to understand the discourse and proposals of peoples
of other cultures, especially those distanced from societies rooted in the
Judeo-Christian tradition; the obstacles can be traced back to the very
essence of the differences in value systems and the relationship of soci-
ety itself to the world which we inhabit (e.g. Apffel-Marglin and Marglin,
1996; Apffel-Marglin, Kumar and Misra, 2010; Venkateswar and Hughes,
2011; Stephen and Hale, 2013). The area of intercultural dialogue has
proved particularly fruitful, going beyond both universalism and cul-
tural relativism, to engage in cultural relativity and cultural pluralism
for a democratic, just and peaceful harmonization of conflicting inter-
ests (Panikkar, 1979, 1995a, 1995b; Vachon, 1995; Dietrich et al., 2011).
The increasing interest in the commons, as a world emerging beyond the
market and the state, expresses the new protagonism in the social and
political scene of old and new communities (Ostrom, 1985, 1986, 1990;
Linebaugh, 2008; Walljasper, 2010; Bollier and Helfrich, 2012; Barkin
and Lemus, 2014; McDermott, 2014).
This approach clarifies the difference between dominant concepts
of environmental governance and our understanding of the problem,
along with its applicability to the work of the communities with which
we are collaborating. As generally understood in Western social science
literature, and excellently set forth in the introductory materials in this
book, environmental governance is an extension of the process of public
deliberation and policy formulation, to integrate into the sociopolit-
ical parameters additional considerations of the impact of society on
ecosystems, locally and globally. This relatively new field of political
and social action has become poignantly crucial in recent years, as the
depths of the environmental crises that we are living have made their
impact increasingly evident. In our work we have clearly identified the
problem of governance with the challenge of assuring that we examine
the origins of the problems and the proposed strategies to address the
intimately related matter of social justice.
In this chapter, however, we focus on the contrasting conceptions of
the functioning of the political process and the possibilities for change.
The dominant conception derives from a vision in which the world
economy is central, a behemoth comprising a variety of national and
regional units forming a single interconnected network of markets that
feed a process of capital accumulation. This network of markets is con-
trolled by a small group of powerful economic interests, backed by their
national governments within an international institutional framework
that reinforces their control over national and international economies.
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The prevailing model of international politics and environmental gov-
ernance is firmly grounded in the dynamics of the global marketplace,
the private ownership of property and the means of production, creat-
ing an increasingly unequal distribution of income, wealth and power
within societies and on a global scale, as well as producing a devastating
impact on the environment.
In contrast, our research identifies myriad local and regional groups
trying to overcome centuries of repeatedly being relegated to ever more
inhospitable regions while also being targets of oppression, as a result of
an unequal form of integration, transforming them from independent
peoples into victims of colonialism and (inter)national capitalist “devel-
opment”. By emphasizing their rejection of the market-driven forces
that control and distribute resources, they are seeking to design and
implement different approaches to decision-making, based on a set of
values that generally privilege collective solutions and wellbeing over
individual gains and assume a cosmocentric view. These approaches
emerge from a different and more complex set of objectives, rooted
in historical experience, cultural traditions, and intergenerational rela-
tionships and responsibilities that situate their choices in a longer time
horizon than that typically considered by the dominant methodolo-
gies that guide environmental governance at present. Because they
attempt to bring to the centre of social life politics and ethics, dis-
placing from it the economy, they explicitly reject the primacy of
an economic calculus in making fundamental decisions about society,
economy or ecosystem management. As a consequence, their decisions
often result in proposals that are at odds with the policy prescriptions
offered by the institutions with which they must interact, whether it
is for the management of specific natural resources or for addressing
problems of political, social and/or economic dynamics. As a result,
these communities are actively building alliances among themselves,
regardless of whether they are located in contiguous regions or asso-
ciated through sectoral or cultural organizations that offer platforms
for strengthening their ability to negotiate with local and national
authorities, or resist the imposition of policies or projects to which
they are opposed. In the process, they are seeking to isolate them-
selves from the hegemony of these international forces and episte-
mologies, forging their own institutions to create spaces of greater
autonomy, in political, social and productive spheres, defending their
ways of life and their territory from assimilation into the interna-
tional economy or its outright seizure/appropriation by international
capital.
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These communities, as examined in later sections of this chapter, are
searching for new ways to strengthen their societies and improve their
ability to govern themselves. In many cases, this involves a redefinition
of their identities, combining knowledge of their cultural heritage with
present-day understandings of the significance of their cultural roots
and the history of their struggles against many of the numerous forms
of injustice to which they continue to be subjected. These struggles have
“never been a blind, spontaneous reflex to objective economic condi-
tions. [Rather, they have] been a conscious struggle of ideas and values
all the way” (Thompson, 1959: 110). As such, the communities have
been able “to hold fast to the vision of collective good”.1
It is striking that a common feature of solidarity in many of these
communities is a growing realization of the importance of this heritage
and history, its contribution to their own definitions as peoples, as com-
munities, whose collective identities and belief systems have generated
unique forms of organization and social dynamics. These organizations
are discovering new ways of integrating their belief systems, their cul-
tures and their relationships to their environments into cosmologies
that lead to creating contrasting models of society, models that directly
address the demands for social justice and sustainability while protect-
ing the whole panoply of traits that define a people.2 While the current
uncertainties have encouraged the emergence of different forms of local-
ism, isolationism and often violent fundamentalism, most communities
are not trying to go back in history but to discover in their tradi-
tions inspiration, and wise and sensible alternatives for their current
predicaments.
While forging these new models of society, the communities are
actively engaged in a complex process of defining (or redefining) their
identities. It no longer suffices to declare that they are of one or another
ethnic origin, or that they are peasants of one or another tradition. This
search for identity is complex, involving the combination of numerous
concentric and competing contexts, coming from national and local or
regional cultures, ethnic origins and environmental features that impact
on social structures. Coming, as it does, from a different point of ori-
gin, the demand for social justice, for example, cannot consent to the
idea that profound inequalities are part of the human condition; or that
changes in the legal system can legitimate the plunder of community
resources or planetary equilibriums. This discussion necessarily leads
to a profound distinction between the nature of the social contract on
which each society is constructed, posing the question of whether the
individual has the right, in the ultimate instance, to assert his or her
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individual interest at the expense of the community’s, a right which is
generally questioned within the communities with which we are collab-
orating. For many of them, they are not individuals but singular persons,
knots in nets of relations, for whom the community is the first layer of
their personal being.
Of course, these discourses also define trajectories for social progress.
The dominant market-based approach identifies an increase in mate-
rial production as the leading indicator. Economic growth, as valued
in the marketplace and measured by monetary units aggregated into
indices of gross national product (GNP), clearly devalues changes in the
status of women, the wellbeing, or the impact of production on nat-
ural resources and the ecosystems. In contrast, the version emerging
from Latin American community initiatives generally incites broader
discussions about lifestyles and community organization; approaches
simplified as Buen Vivir (“good living”), mandar obedeciendo (govern
through obedience, command by obeying) or comunalidad (communal-
ity) are concepts that imply moderation as part of complex strategies
for constructing alternative organizations. Our consultations with the
communities to which we refer in this chapter identified five basic prin-
ciples for this process: autonomy, solidarity, self-sufficiency, productive
diversification and regional sustainable management.3
In what follows, we summarize our direct collaboration with commu-
nities and alliances of local groups involved in the process of trying
to consolidate their own governance structures capable of respond-
ing to their visions of an appropriate society consistent with assuring
wellbeing and sustainability. It takes as its point of departure their strug-
gles to consolidate alternative programmes to produce the basic goods
needed to assure their livelihoods and to strengthen their ability for
self-governance, while attempting to respect the possibilities and lim-
its of their environments. What is striking about these collaborations is
the extent to which the participants are well informed of the burgeon-
ing discussions of epistemologies that explicitly question the logical
structures of dominant governance and development models;4 many of
these seemingly academic debates have become an integral part of the
discussions and design of strategic proposals by these local groups to
understand and implement programmes for local and regional advance.
If presented in clear and simple terms, complex theoretical debates
produce in the communities an “Aha! effect”: they have already been
discussing the issues.
While most of the detailed fieldwork that we are documenting is
based on intensive interactions with communities in the Mexican state
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of Oaxaca, the materials for this chapter draw on additional contri-
butions produced by people actually involved in local and regional
processes in other parts of the region, and with others who are emerg-
ing from resistance movements to implement their own proposals for
consolidating a material and institutional basis for improving mate-
rial wellbeing and assuring their capability for promoting ecosystem
balance.
An alternative understanding: A different point
of departure
Forging their own solutions is an ambitious endeavour for peoples
proposing to overcome discrimination, marginalization and systematic
efforts by colonial powers of yore or by today’s power elites to rele-
gate them into ever more isolated corners of their territories. What is
remarkable about the histories we are discovering and the collabora-
tors we are fortunate enough to meet is the wealth of proposals with
which they are experimenting and the tenacity with which they con-
tinue to resist efforts to integrate them into national and international
economies as underprivileged individuals in increasingly polarized soci-
eties. Our efforts to invite various communities to collaborate, helping
us to understand their approaches to governance and their aspira-
tions, also added another dimension to our understanding of current
day social dynamics, one that is not lost on the analysts shaping the
process of globalization, but perhaps is underestimated or even mis-
understood by academia. In its assessment of the likely global trends
regarding national security in 2015, the director of Central Intelligence,
as head of the United States Intelligence Community, was informed by a
group of outside experts in 2000 that indigenous resistance movements
in Latin America will be one of the principal challenges for national
governments in the next 15 years:
Indigenous protest movements . . . will increase, facilitated by
transnational networks of indigenous rights activists and supported
by well-funded international human rights and environmental
groups. Tensions will intensify in the area from Mexico through the
Amazon region . . . [It goes on to report:] Internal conflicts stemming
from state repression, religious and ethnic grievances, increasing
migration pressures, and/or indigenous protest movements will occur
most frequently . . . in Central America and the Andean region.
(Tenet, 2000: 46, 49)
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Although we concentrated our efforts on collaborating with groups
in a limited number of regions in Mexico with high concentrations
of ethnic populations, it quickly became clear that resistance move-
ments are proliferating throughout the hemisphere, partly in reaction
to state policies to promote local integration into national and interna-
tional development projects, by permitting outsiders privileged access
to natural resources and to construction of infrastructure, in territories
traditionally controlled by these peoples.5 What we found, however,
was that there are also positive developments motivating communities
throughout the Americas to strengthen their abilities to govern their ter-
ritories, by better understanding the relationships between themselves
and their surroundings while also engaging in deliberate efforts to build
alliances among themselves and transnational organizations capable of
defending their claims in international arenas.
The need for this process of organization has become increasingly evi-
dent as conditions within each country, and, internationally, changed
dramatically. A concerted effort to accelerate the region’s internal inte-
gration and connectivity with the global economy, as well as to facilitate
the access of international enterprises to domestic resources as part of
a drive to promote domestic growth, is changing the map of Latin
America (Bessi and Navarro, 2014), impacting first and foremost indige-
nous communities in the hemisphere. These analysts summarized the
problem:
The reordering of territory has blurred borders in both economic
and political terms with projects such as the Mesoamerican Project
(previously Plan Puebla-Panama) and the Initiative for Regional
Infrastructure Integration of South America, which both entered into
force after 2000.6 Their primary objectives include the construction of
transportation and telecommunication networks, as well as energy-
generation projects such as hydroelectric dams and wind farms. They
also plan to designate national parks, protected areas, Heritage for
Humanity sites, cross border conservation areas, transnational parks
(also called Parks for Peace), ecological and biological corridors and
networks of protected areas . . . The design of these projects is indeed
strategic, and ‘progressive’ governments are presenting them as a
development opportunity.
(in Navarro and Bessi, 2014)
Ana Ester Ceceña, a Mexican economist, added (in Bessi and Navarro,
2014):
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What will happen with IIRSA is that local governments will be forced
to be more disciplined because they will be brought in line with
global markets. There are 500 transnational companies that produce
half of global gross domestic product; when one looks at IIRSA’s
design and these companies’ projects, they complement one another:
The groundwork is being laid for the circulation of communication,
merchandise, raw materials and energy . . . Capital needs a reordering
of territory – considering this as a type of historical-social construc-
tion – in order to continue reproducing itself, as much in terms of
materials as in power relations, of accumulation of capital and prof-
its. The ordering enables access on a large scale to certain types of
material from the earth.
In characterizing this latest form of neoliberal development, Gustavo
Esteva (in Bessi and Navarro, 2014) observed: “Indigenous people are
on the front lines of a battle, fighting a war that is on behalf of all of
us, because it is there that the capitalist system looks to relaunch a new
form of accumulation.”
Indigenous peoples are increasingly insistent on demanding the
recognition and integrity of their territories, many of which are threat-
ened by the grandiose proposals of global capital; their actions are
confronting directly these schemes, and changing the maps of the
Americas in the process. They have strengthened their resolve to pros-
ecute their historical claims as they become increasingly skilled in
achieving the enforcement of the agreement ratified by the ILO to guar-
antee prior consent of native peoples with territorial claims for outsiders
to undertake activities or exploit natural resources in their regions.7
Accompanying the changing map is a new consciousness of the signifi-
cant differences in understandings of even the most elemental concepts
in their exchanges with their interlocutors in the states of which they
are a part: although a significant discrepancy occurs throughout the
Americas, as different social groups and peoples question governmental
procedures to charge a single agency with implementing unified policies
for the myriad ethnic groups in their countries,8 an even more serious
source of conflict involves the very notion of property and the apparent
freedom with which outsiders (government agents) can discuss the pos-
sibility of alienating people’s claims to land or natural resources. This
problem arises because of the profound differences between the his-
torical significance attached to the different concepts of property and
territory; for many groups, territory is an all-encompassing term with
complex implications that are not easily incorporated into prevailing
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market-based understandings of the significance of land or property.
This is so essential that even the Organization of American States finds
itself obliged to take note of its consequence in the context of the
demand to draft an American Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples. This discussion is central to our understanding of the underly-
ing basis of the prosecution of demands for autonomy by native peoples
(OAS-CJPA, 2003: 1–2):9
Territorial rights are a central claim for Indigenous Peoples in the
world. Those rights are the physical substratum for their ability to sur-
vive as peoples, to reproduce their cultures, to maintain and develop
their organizations and productive systems . . . Indigenous Peoples
have strengthened their organizations and developed a more orga-
nized struggle to reclaim their rights. Central among those demands
are the issues related to land, territories and natural resources . . . these
rights are not merely a real estate issue . . . Rather indigenous land
rights encompass a wider and different concept, that relates to the
collective right to survival as an organized people, with control of
their habitat as a necessary condition for the reproduction of their
culture, and for their own development, or as Indigenous experts pre-
fer, for carrying ahead “their plans for life” (“planes de vida”) and
their political and social institution.
Indigenous areas, then, are a complex amalgamation on which the
very existence of these peoples depends. This is clearly defined in the
Brazilian Constitution, which gives renewed strength to the ancestral
possession as a basis for the territorial rights characterized by four sig-
nificant traits: (1) permanent ancestral possession; (2) areas necessary
for their productive activities, including the reproduction of flora and
fauna; (3) areas necessary for their cultural reproduction, and for their
survival as a collective; and (4) habitat with the physical capacity and
shape to allow the full functioning of the mechanisms of authority and
self-government of the indigenous people. These territories are the habi-
tat necessary for their collective life, activities, self-government, and
cultural and social reproduction.10
Problems arise when the state seeks to exercise its sovereignty or
eminent domain, to build infrastructure, to exploit or license the
exploitation of natural resources, or any other action or project that
might affect indigenous lands and the use of their territory. Interna-
tional law now restricts this possibility, obliging the previous fair and
serious consultation with the affected indigenous peoples (Convention
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169, ILO, endnote vii). Since indigenous peoples are consolidating their
constitutional and legislative demands to codify symbolic and political
elements of autonomy and self-government, as elements of internal self-
determination, governments are finding themselves treading on new
“ground” as they attempt to reconcile global visions of “development”
with local efforts to achieve wellbeing.
Throughout the Americas, governments continue to assume that
prices of both landed property and natural resources can be fixed accord-
ing to market processes, and in the best of circumstances negotiators of
goodwill can arrive at mutually beneficial agreements for their exploita-
tion, thus assuring their “unlocking” to promote national development
by trading them in the global marketplace. In these circumstances it
seems almost incomprehensible to the dominant powers that local
groups might object to the terms of these negotiations, refusing to
even discuss the possibility of placing a forest enterprise, a mine or a
power-generating facility in their regions as it would upset a delicate
historical and spiritual balance that they consider threatening to their
social structure or cultural integrity, defined in terms of one or more
many non-monetary dimensions for which financial compensation is
inconceivable.
The nature and scope of this struggle is very old. At the end of the
colonial period, for example, in the XVIII century, the areas claimed
by the indigenous peoples in Mexico were called “Indian Republics”,
meaning they did not represent only a piece of land but a whole
way of life and government, in spite of being subordinated to the
Spanish Crown. This struggle also has very old precedents: known as
the Magna Carta and the Charter of the Forests, the King and the nobil-
ity in England agreed, at the end of “the long twelfth century”, to
establish limits on their power to assure the subsistence of the com-
moners (Linebaugh, 2008: Ch. 2). The traditional struggle for land
provoked the first social revolution of the XX century, in Mexico, and
played itself out with diverse intensity in all Latin American coun-
tries during the last hundred years. The upheaval of the last 20 years
represents a political mutation from such tradition to a struggle of
territorial defense, as expressed in the Declaración de Quito (2009) by
the International Commission for Integral Agrarian Reform of Vía
Campesina: “For the agrarian reform and the defense of land and
territory”. This implies a profound conceptual shift: “A specific form
of relation to the land is claimed which is markedly different to the
one imposed by public and private developers in the last 50 years.
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It expresses a sovereign practice of the collective will, which does
not contain separatist elements but openly challenges governmental
institutions. The political form of this claim is usually presented as
autonomy”.
(Esteva, 2010: 65)
Territorial defence is also a new central theme in the cities. The old tra-
dition of illegal settlement, which shaped most Latin American cities
during the twentieth century, is today complemented by active move-
ments to redefine urban life. The most spectacular case was Argentina
(2001–2002), but from Oaxaca (2006) to Brazil (2014), vibrant move-
ments express the vitality of new social subjects and new forms of social
protagonism (Colectivo Situaciones, 2002; Mariotti et al., 2007; Zibechi,
2008; Giarraca and Teubal, 2009).
Building the commons: Local solutions are collective
endeavours
This complex process of differentiating territory from property and clar-
ifying the significance and importance of social ownership and mem-
bership as distinct from individual activities encompasses yet another
important dimension: the communities generally think of themselves
as part of a regional, and even a global, commons. But unlike the for-
mal discussions of the concept in much of the academic literature, their
understanding of the commons cannot simply be reduced to a collec-
tion of “common pool resources”, such as air, water and other natural
resources shared by all that were the focus of the debate set off by Garret
Hardin’s “tragedy” (1968);11 rather their activities are much more akin
to what one of the leading historians of the process describes as the
“active movements of human commoning and the worldwide demands
to share wealth and safeguard common resources on every continent”
(Linebaugh, 2008: 280). The organizations that are so engaged are not
involved in shaping “an alternative economy, but rather an alternative
to the economy” (Esteva, 2014: i149). The commons are extended to
encompass the social and cultural components of collective life; they
are not simply a set of things or resources. Rather, like many other
aspects of the societies we are discussing, the organizations they are
creating bestow great importance on social relations within the commu-
nity, as well as a firm commitment to ensure the conservation and even
the enlargement of the commons. This relationship reflects a collective
and enduring transformation of the way in which society conceives
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and manages itself while also developing the basis for collective and
communal management.
Protecting, defending and governing the commons are complex
and risky processes. Complex, because they encompass all aspects of
social and biological existence. Risky, because they involve challeng-
ing the de facto powers and questioning the legitimacy of their “rule
of law” – that is, the legal system that is creating and perpetuating
a profoundly unjust society, exacerbating social disparities and accel-
erating environmental destruction. This dispute about the nature of
the state stems from a rejection of the philosophical underpinnings
of the hegemonic order, based on the idea of a single “social con-
tract” that presupposes the possibility of applying universal norms,
such as “social justice”, “equality” or even “democracy”, impartially
to attend to the needs of all social groups.12 For this reason, it also
involves a prima facie repudiation of the legitimacy of national “author-
ities”, which assume their right to transfer community resources –
the commons – to others, for whatever reason, without regard for
the wellbeing of the people, local decisions, or historical and envi-
ronmental considerations, as is common practice in mining, forestry
and water management, although it now extends to complex issues
of bio- and nanotechnology in many nations today.13 Thus the efforts
to promote solidarity among diverse social groups call for a political
approach that requires each to extricate itself from the dominant social
and political institutions that are incapable of attending their particular
needs.
But consolidating the foundations of this society entails much more
than undertaking specific activities or establishing appropriate institu-
tions for governance or management. The solidarity society requires
personal commitments from each member to assume responsibility for
the wellbeing of others and for limiting individual claims for access to
collective resources (Robles and Cardoso, 2008; Martinez Luna, 2010).
To strengthen these foundations it is essential to begin with a common
vision of society as a whole, whose point of departure is reversing the
historical tendency for the personal enrichment of a few at the expense
of the many; as such, they incorporate collective decisions to assure
transparency and direct participation in decision-making, and univer-
sal responsibility for administration or implementation of this dynamic.
This challenges the presumption of the freedom of the individual within
the group, obliging each member to carefully measure their impact on
others, and the whole, and be guided by reference to their impact on
the collectivity in their decisions and actions. In historical terms, and
specifically in the light of practice in today’s globalized society, it calls
for a redefinition of peoples’ relationship with their society, rejecting
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the notion that one person has the unfettered right to withdraw from,
or even oppose, the commonwealth after having participated in the
process of arriving at a decision.
This point of departure has important implications for the way in
which priorities are determined and activities are organized. Perhaps one
of the most striking and demanding of these is the need to reverse the
hierarchical organization of the workplace: of course, people should be
paid for their work, but they should not have to submit to demean-
ing and authoritarian social relations to satisfy their basic needs. The
existing proletarian organization of society is part of an underlying con-
dition of the helplessness of the workers, unable even to survive without
entering the labour force; the alternative under construction here starts
from the presumption that all members of society enjoy the legitimate
right to a socially determined way of life, independent of their contribu-
tions to production or output. Their participation in collective activities
becomes rooted in a sense of duty and belonging to the community, but
also an obligation that is explicitly enforced by communal authorities.
Such an approach eliminates the double alienation of modern labour:
from the fruits of work and from the logic of creative activity.
Creating the foundations for communal governance:
Generating and managing surplus
The decision to create autonomous forms of self-government within
the framework of the nation state represents an audacious challenge
to the prevailing model of governance, and of social and economic jus-
tice based on representative democracy and its marriage with the free
market. Rooted in the commitment to define and defend their territo-
ries, the process involves creating new institutions and processes for the
social appropriation of both the natural environment and the produc-
tive systems that they have created to assure their ability to maintain
and strengthen their community, to provide for their basic needs, and
to facilitate exchanges with partners (barter) and in the marketplace.
The mechanisms established by the communities for management often
involve complex dynamics for mutual consultation among different
groups within the communities, as well as forms for delegating respon-
sibilities to members on the basis of expertise and social commitment,
or for assuring broad political participation and accountability. Thus it is
not only the choice of activities themselves but also the implementation
processes that are crucial to the design of the social mechanisms that
contribute to the desired outcomes related to equity and sustainability.
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In the following discussion of individual projects with which we have
come into contact (see the next section), an interesting facet of the
analysis is not only the choice of technique but also, and often just
as important, the nature of the activities themselves; they speak to a
concern for addressing the socially defined basic needs of people in the
communities while also creating a balance between the use of natural
resources and the restoration, regulation of land use, and conservation
of the ecosystems from which they are drawn.
What makes these activities unique is that they are being organized
by groups that come together on a voluntary basis to ensure their via-
bility and continuity. In many cases they are trying to regenerate the
social fabric eroded by both external and internal forces. While we
focus on the collective nature of decision-making, it is just as significant
to understand the mechanisms that make possible the consolidation
of the community and its ability to advance. During our interactions
with the communities in their search for solutions that provide the
wherewithal for moving forward, we identified a central feature that
contributed to this success – one that also explains their ability to con-
solidate the capacity to implement the collective governance model
that is fundamental to society’s continuity and its possibility to assure
improvements in the lives of its members: the explicit organization of
social and productive resources to generate surpluses for “reinvestment”
and “redistribution” (Baran, 1957).
The centrality of surplus in community management is an often invis-
ible and misunderstood facet of the administrative process. Much of the
literature describes rural communities in general and indigenous groups
in particular as living at the margins of subsistence, as the poverty in
material means limits their ability to advance and reduces the scope for
broadening the range of activities they can undertake. In contrast, our
dealings with communities throughout the Americas reveal the abil-
ity and commitment of many to produce this surplus and manage it
collectively, using it to reward members who have made important
contributions in producing it and channelling the rest for collective
purposes.
By focusing attention on the processes of producing and managing
surplus within the limits for satisfying socially defined needs and the
possibilities of their ecosystems, this collective management structure of
the diverse local projects has proved effective in constructing a frame-
work for environmental justice that is proving so elusive in the larger
societies of which they are a part. Unlike those other parts of soci-
ety closely tied into the global market economy, these communities
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have created possibilities for organizing themselves to ensure that their
members need not suffer from extreme poverty and unemployment.
As a result, they are generating a productive potential far greater than
might be appreciated by a simple accounting of the financial resources
that they have at their command. Some of this potential is well docu-
mented in the literature, as is the case of the “voluntary” labour that
is expected from all members for collective tasks involving building
and maintaining infrastructure or conserving ecosystems (e.g. tequio,
minga). The social mechanism for assigning and rotating administra-
tive and political positions so important for governance is another way
in which resources that are often invisible in the market economy or
formal accounting calculus are generated in these communal organiza-
tions. But, just as important, the commitment to universal inclusion or
participation also creates a corresponding responsibility from the mem-
bers to contribute to collective tasks – assuring that most individuals will
be involved in a multiplicity of activities for their own benefit and that
of the community.
Surplus has existed in human organization from time immemorial.
Even when there were no formal institutions for exchange and accu-
mulation, the construction of large and small projects to channel water
or create monuments is testimony to the ability of societies to advance
beyond their immediate needs, building projects to increase productive
capabilities or the grandeur of their “leaders”. What distinguishes the
myriad communities guided by cosmologies removed from those based
on material gain and individual benefit at the expense of the whole is
their ability to promote a broad participation for advancing the general
welfare. Most recently, these societies have improved their possibilities
for implementing new projects, taking advantage of advances in sci-
ence and technology while also critically incorporating knowledge and
contributions from the past, generating opportunities for increased or
more efficient production as well as more effective means for improving
their wellbeing and ability to protect their ecosystems. By examining
the availability and mobilization of surplus, the communities are better
equipped to consider how best to implement their long-term visions.
What is striking about the individual experiences with which we have
been associated is the clear understanding by many of the partici-
pants and the leadership of the ways in which particular activities may
contribute to overall goals.
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Communal approaches to environmental justice
Communities across the Americas are involved in designing and imple-
menting local solutions that contribute to their broad struggle for
environmental justice under circumstances of harassment and overt vio-
lence exercised by state powers in the societies of which they are a
part. While a great deal of energy must be devoted to protecting them-
selves from encroachment by forces attempting to control their natural
resources and subject them to the various disciplines of markets and
political systems, it is remarkable that they continue to mobilize locally
and nationally while associating internationally with other communi-
ties and NGOs to consolidate new lines and technologies of production,
and experiment with ways to improve existing activities.
These actions are the product of the complex interaction of dynamic
forces within the communities and reactions to outside pressures. They
are part of a search for a unique identity that has become increas-
ingly important as these peoples assert their legally binding rights to
self-determination as defined by their varied histories and their under-
standing of the privileges accorded them by the ILO Convention 169
and similar agreements promulgated by other international bodies, and
the ongoing efforts in the Organization of American States (2003) to
draft a similar commitment (endnote ix). In Mexico, as elsewhere,
this process has a long history, which was codified in its constitu-
tion of 1917, as indigenous communities were recognized and granted
collective rights by the agrarian reform.14
During the last half of the twentieth century, Mexican communities
waged an unrelenting and difficult battle to assert their rights to control
the lands over which they were able to retain or regain control after
the revolution. They were particularly effective in wresting exploita-
tion contracts for their communal forests from private firms that had
been given concessions to manage them (Bray and Merino-Pérez, 2004).
Today there are a variety of management plans in effect, testimony to
skills that the communities have acquired as they attempt to recon-
cile pressures for ensuring conservation with the need to create jobs
and generate incomes. The literature offers rich accounts of this variety
of strategies, and many studies explore the relationship between these
approaches and the cosmologies of the participating communities, par-
ticularly in community-managed forests, which comprise 71% of the
nation’s forests (e.g. Bray, Merino-Pérez and Barry, 2005; Cronkleton,
Bray and Medina, 2011; Barkin and Fuente, 2013; Stevens et al., 2014).15
The movement to reassert indigenous identities in Mexico was fur-
ther strengthened in the aftermath of the 1994 uprising in Chiapas
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by the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) (Muñoz, 2008).16
Since then the activity and visibility of indigenous peoples through-
out Mexico has increased, along with a gradual recognition of their
importance in the population, because of, and in spite of, the growing
intensity of repressive actions by the state and other actors, including
private corporations given concessions in these territories, and orga-
nized groups in various parts of the society.17 While a recounting of
the initiatives being implemented in these communities would be too
lengthy for inclusion here, suffice it to say that the discussion of many
of them within the framework of the National Indigenous Congress, and
the increased circulation of information and meetings among members
are contributing to strengthen the resolve and ability of members to
carry their projects forward.
In connection with their efforts to gain recognition and elaborate
local management strategies, control of water resources has been partic-
ularly contentious as communities try to assert their rights to adequate
supplies and protect their sources. We are accompanying a number of
communities in their efforts to reinforce control in their territories by
developing systems for managing water resources and organizing to
impede encroachment by national and state-level authorities trying to
limit their historical access. These movements are now inextricably com-
bined with others in opposition to large-scale construction projects for
dams designed to harness waters for electricity generation or for long-
distance transfer between water basins to supply urban areas where
ageing infrastructure and excessive growth in consumption are causing
shortages due to a lack of administrative and technical capabilities of
dominant bureaucracies. As a result, many communities that have his-
torically been able to satisfy their own needs and even share surpluses
with neighbouring communities are now finding themselves involved
in coalitions with others defending their water sources, along with ecol-
ogists who are generally arguing that the engineering and public works
approaches of the public sector are inappropriate and simply postpon-
ing the day of reckoning with regard to the need for a more ecologically
informed approach to water management.
An interesting finding in our collaborations with communities
involved with protecting water sources is the combination of traditional
and leading-edge technologies applied to protect their natural sources –
the streams and springs on which they depend. This combination of
technologies with direct community involvement in water manage-
ment contrasts sharply with the national water authorities’ approach
that eschews local diversity, preferring a homogenous administrative
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model conducive to centralized management and engineering solu-
tions. In response to the great differences in local conditions, there
are many examples of water-saving technologies being implemented
by communities, such as installing composting toilets and separating
grey from black water flows to allow for low-cost and passive biological
processing conducive to restorative environmental practices. A partic-
ularly noteworthy project, Water Forever, transformed 1 million Ha of
barren plateau and steep slopes using “appropriate” technologies to con-
struct a large number of low-impact landscaping projects, including rock
dams and ponds to channel surface flows and collect run-off, recreating
underground aquifers and structures found in some of the oldest irri-
gation projects in the Western Hemisphere from the eleventh century.
This project, which began in the 1980s, is noteworthy because it com-
bines community-managed agroecological and agroindustrial activities
and enterprises belonging to the participants, creating jobs and prod-
ucts that are proving attractive to consumers for their social, ecological
and nutritional qualities (Hernández Garciadiego and Herrerías, 2008).18
In Bolivia, the experience of the “Water War” of 2000 in Cochabamba
is still vivid in people’s memories as local water committees continue
to organize actively while resisting the state’s efforts to manage the
commons (Fogelberg, 2013; Dwinell and Olivera, 2014).
These community-based management proposals embrace important
parts of their members’ collective existence but cannot provide for all
of the needs of the community. Having adequate water supplies and
sustainable models for forest management offer important points of
departure for building stronger and more resilient communities. Unfor-
tunately, recently the pressures on national governments to increase
energy production from renewable sources are heightening the con-
flicts with indigenous communities threatened with being flooded out
of their territories;19 in Mexico, the refusal of the government to per-
mit indigenous communities to undertake their own microhydroelectric
power projects is clear evidence of the fear of the degree of independence
that such activities would promote.
In spite of these obstacles and conflicts in the power and water sec-
tors, numerous communities are undertaking productive activities to
supply basic needs and create goods that can be traded for other prod-
ucts. Ongoing efforts are oriented towards identifying new activities
that make use of available renewable resources to produce goods that
might be advantageously exchanged with others to provide for these
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basic needs. The objective of this approach is to induce social dynam-
ics that bring the producers together into stronger organizations that in
turn become part of their communities.
As part of this effort, many groups are accompanying communities
in introducing complementary activities and assisting them to mod-
ify technologies or introduce new ones that would strengthen their
organizational capabilities to contribute to the collective wellbeing.
The objective of these undertakings is to contribute to community
efforts to strengthen their own capabilities to govern themselves. One of
the most significant organizations engaged in accompanying people in
strengthening their communities and enabling them to better meet the
challenges of assuring a better style of life is Vía Campesina (VC). This
group has a presence in 73 countries, representing more than 200 mil-
lion members. Its purpose is to promote food production by using
agroecological techniques to move groups of producers towards greater
self-sufficiency. In 1996, VC expanded and redefined food sovereignty,
associating it with the capacity to determine autonomously what to
eat and how to produce it (Rosset, 2013).20 Its achievements are best
reflected in the somewhat controversial decision of the FAO to declare
2014 the International Year of Family Farming (CEPAL/FAO/IICA, 2014),
where the organizations declare rather wistfully: “Countries look to fam-
ily farming as the key to food security and rural well-being.” VC also
noted that this was the first time in its almost 60-year history that the
organization made reference to the theme of agroecology, one of the
principal strategies that can assure farmer control of agriculture and an
appropriate response to the need for ensuring food security for societies.
Other social groups are actively engaged in activities that promote
social, political and productive changes to contribute to improving
their own lives as well as those of others while attempting to conserve
and enhance environmental quality or sustainability. In Mexico, the
local Caracoles in Chiapas are contributing to this objective, directly
improving the lives of hundreds of thousands of its members while
also portraying a model of social organization and change that con-
tinues to have a powerful effect on other communities as well as in
other countries.21 There is ample evidence that its activities are improv-
ing wellbeing, contributing to diversifying the economy, and increasing
productivity in a region where perhaps as many as 500,000 people are
participating; they have achieved a high level of self-sufficiency in food,
health and education (Baronnet et al., 2011).
In South America, Andean communities are similarly involved in
promoting collective strategies known as Buen Vivir (Sumak Kawsay
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is a Latinized version of an expression in Quechua).22 Throughout
the Americas, groups of communities are involved in mobilizations to
defend their territories, cultures and societies from trespassing by people
who lust after their resources or institutions that would erode the basis
of their differences. There are groups such as Idle no More in Canada, the
Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) Confederacy in eastern North America, the
Landless Workers Movement (MST) in Brazil, the Mapuches in Chile,
and numerous others throughout the region, as well as the National
Indigenous Congress, the Network of Environmentally Affected Peoples
and the Movement Against Mining in Mexico. Similarly, there is a coali-
tion of indigenous peoples in the Americas and a series of international
NGOs that are promoting strategies for better resource use, but most of
the mobilizations are still defensive groupings helping to defend groups
against others trying to take control of their resources, or organizing
to forestall activities that might contaminate their lands or their waters
(Vergara-Camus, 2014).
Accompanying these actions of resistance, many communities are
involved in other constructive activities, promoting collaboration with
university and civil society researchers who are helping to explain the
value of the work, while contributing to diversifying economies and
improving production in sustainable ways (Toledo, Garrido and Barrera
Bassols, 2013; Toledo and Ortiz-Espejel, 2014). One application that has
proved particularly illustrative involves the inclusion of unsalable avo-
cados that were causing an environmental burden in diets to fatten
hogs in backyard settings, resulting in metabolic changes to produce
low-cholesterol meat, improving incomes as they are being marketed
at a premium in local markets. In this case, as in others based on a
similar paradigm, indigenous women were especially benefiting, as they
implemented the projects and were soon recognized for their leadership
capabilities (Barkin, 2012; Fuente and Ramos, 2013).
In a different approach, scholar-activists are working with producers
in diverse regions to protect and enhance production of a traditional
Mexican alcoholic drink, mezcal, modifying the traditional planting
and harvesting techniques of agaves, taking care of the forest, and
enriching community life by promoting cooperative production that is
contributing to raising incomes and rehabilitating ecosystems (Delgado-
Lemus et al., 2014). In Guerrero, this work is part of an ambitious
programme of the Grupo de Estudios Ambientales (Illsley et al., 2007)
for collaborative promotion of local forms of Buen Vivir and ecosystem
restoration that was awarded the Equator Prize in 2012 by the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP). In another region of Oaxaca,
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four communities continue to care for their mulberry trees, raising silk
worms to produce the traditional thread that they then weave into
highly attractive and fairly priced garments, displayed and marketed
locally and through a well-curated textile museum; elsewhere, others are
experimenting with new plantings of perennial indigenous cotton vari-
eties (that were cultivated before the Spanish Conquest) that are ideal for
handicraft weaving as an alternative to genetically modified cotton that
currently dominates the industry. In Peru and more recently Bolivia,
a well-established technical promotion and development organization,
Pratec, is deploying effective approaches to community-based learning,
improving production in the multiple ecologies of the Andean world,
focusing on potatoes but carefully balancing its work to support broad-
based, diversified progress (Gonzales, 2014).23 Ecotourism is another,
more controversial, activity because it involves an explicit opening of
the community to outsiders who are frequently unable to comprehend
the magnitude of the cultural and economic chasm that separates them
from their hosts (Barkin, 2002).
Elsewhere, indigenous peoples, peasants and industrial workers are
all exploring new routes to reorganize their workplaces and contribute
to improving living standards for themselves and their communities.
New production systems are being invented as workers occupy closed
factories, continuing operations by changing management and incen-
tive systems (Ness and Azzellini, 2011). In many cases the initiatives
have not only placed the direct producers in control of the enterprises
but also often created possibilities that include the community in deci-
sions and incorporate the impact on the environment into the new
decision-making calculus.24
The prospects for alternative strategies for environmental
justice
While these initiatives are changing the map of the Americas (Navarro
and Bessi, 2014), many other developments are threatening to erode
the possibilities for improving peoples’ lives and taking better care of
the environment. Throughout the hemisphere, much environmental
governance involves attempts to minimize the deleterious social and
ecological impacts of the aggressive activities that are the foundation
of national and international development. Industrial work is intensify-
ing and ever more alienating, and labour has fewer protections; natural
resource concessions are opening up vast new territories to exploration
and production, with terrible environmental impacts. The privatization
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of public services and the deterioration in the quality of those remaining
in the public sector are a palpable threat to peoples in every country.
Even as indigenous communities are asserting their new-found rights
to proceed with forestry and water-management activities, governments
are encouraging large-scale initiatives by transnational corporations that
threaten to upset the delicate balance of productive activities on which
the communities depend for their livelihoods and for ecosystem bal-
ance. These projects pose fundamental questions about the ability of
the communities to defend their territories, including their substantial
cultural, social and productive heritage that entrenches them in their
ecosystems. The conflicts continue to this day, posing apparently irre-
solvable differences and often resulting in violent encounters, as mines,
ecotourism and other projects (and with the recent reforms, fracking
and other forms of resource extraction) threaten the very existence of
the communities. The communities generally reject the assumption
that the sacrifices that this destruction entails can be compensated
by monetary offers that would only force them onto a path of insti-
tutionalized marginalization as isolated individuals, a life of limited
opportunities without the social support systems and safety nets that
their communities offer.
The ongoing initiatives to strengthen or generate “niches of
sustainability” by peasant and indigenous communities throughout the
Americas are heartening and important. While the momentum in the
global marketplace is clearly threatening social groups and environ-
ments everywhere, the continuing successful efforts of peasants and
indigenous peoples to implement their own strategies for social and
productive change that deliberately incorporate the environment in the
process offer a window on the possibilities for making environmental
justice a reality for increasing segments of the population. This will not
happen where the capitalist structure of production and control dom-
inates. Thus the implementation of local solutions that create regions
for autonomous action will become even more significant and effective
as the spaces dominated by the global market continue to suffer from
deteriorating environments and heightened conflict.
Notes
1. Although Thompson was describing the notion of class consciousness in
post-war England, it seems appropriate to apply his analysis to indigenous
struggles in the Americas.
2. It is noteworthy that the attempt to integrate this rich heritage with the
challenges of assuring an acceptable quality of life and the conservation
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of the ecosystems appears to be a common trait among communities from
different cultures and regions. The rich and abundant literature systematiz-
ing the experiences of indigenous peoples who are continuing to defend
their own ways of life and prevent their territories from being despoiled or
wrought from them clearly demonstrates the possibility of shaping alter-
native strategies to address the same challenges as those espoused in the
dominant discourses of environmental governance that remain tied to the
institutions of the market economy.
3. The specification of “regional sustainability” reflects the importance of defin-
ing ecosystems in terms of natural rather than administrative or political
boundaries. The communities are acutely aware of the importance of respect-
ing natural constructs, such as the river basin, that require cooperation
and alliances among communities to implement sustainable management
strategies.
4. The significance of these other epistemologies is explored in important con-
tributions to our understanding by colleagues who are involved in exchanges
with peoples whose organizations and productive systems are guided by
other cosmologies. For an introduction to this other literature, see the con-
tributions of Boaventura de Sousa Santos. His Una Epistemología del Sur: La
reinvención del Conocimiento y la Emancipación Social (2009) offers a clear
enunciation of this approach. The seminal work of Robert Vachon among
the Iroquois in North America (1995) and the tradition of Ivan Illich (1977,
1982, 1992) have now abundant heirs.
5. An important effort to systematize our knowledge of these movements is
reported in Chapter 2, as well as by the research programme Environmen-
tal Justice Organizations, Liabilities and Trade (http://www.ejolt.org), which
maintains an ongoing inventory of resistance movements.
6. Both of these projects are very large-scale proposals for infrastructure invest-
ments to facilitate the penetration of large-scale capitalist organizations into
the less exploited but important and well-endowed regions (cf. http://www.
proyectomesoamerica.org/ and http://www.iirsa.org/).
7. The Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 169 (http://www.ilo.org/
indigenous/Conventions/no169) guarantees this right and, when ratified by
a nation, has the standing of a constitutional mandate. It is noteworthy that
of the 22 countries that ratified the convention, 17 are in Latin America.
8. See Benno Glauser’s insightful presentation of this problem in his exchanges
with leaders of the Ayoreo people in Paraguay (in Venkateswar and Hughes,
2011: Chapter 1). In its seven chapters, this book offers a variegated picture
of indigenous activism in many parts of the world.
9. The working group charged with preparing the American Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was formed following a resolution of the
Organization of American States (OAS) General Assembly in 1989. As of 2014
the declaration had yet to be approved, reflecting the profound differences
between the competing interests in the hemisphere.
10. Chapter VII, Article 231 of the 1988 constitution, as summarized in the
OAS document mentioned in the previous footnote. Elsewhere in Latin
America, these territorial rights are constitutionally protected (Argentina,
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru and
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Venezuela). Moreover, the newest constitutions, like those of Ecuador (1998),
included environmental and gender components.
11. At the end of his life, Hardin himself was forced to acknowledge that he only
examined the “tragedy” of regimes of open access, as those dominant today,
and not the commons (The Ecologist, 1993: 13).
12. Luis Villoro (2003) offered an insightful analysis of the differences in the
meanings of social contracts in differing social contexts.
13. Mexican laws give the government the right to expropriate common land
for public works or public interest. In 2013 the constitution was amended to
permit this faculty to be applied for the benefit of private operators.
14. The 2007 United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
(http://undesadspd.org/indigenouspeoples/declarationontherightsofindi
genouspeoples.aspx) should serve to reinforce the 1992 amendment to Arti-
cle 4 of the Mexican Constitution asserting the country’s “pluricultural
character”. Unfortunately the legislative changes were not accompanied by
adjustments in the legal structure to define the judicial relationship between
the state and the dozens of indigenous peoples. Serious conflicts continue
to arise because recent legislation (2013–2014) reinforces the state’s right to
appropriate resources on lands in territories recognized as belonging to many
of these peoples in spite of their declared opposition in the terms of the ILO
Convention.
15. The efforts to assume collective control of the forests began in the 1970s
(Simonian, 1995). Today, Mexico’s community forest movement is recog-
nized as one of the most effective and sustainable in the world, encom-
passing more than one-quarter of the nation’s land area with differing
management strategies that are cited as exemplary. The MOCAF (Mexican
Campesino Forest Producers Network) and the Mexican Civil Society Organi-
zation for Sustainable Forestry (http://www.mocaf.org.mx and http://www.
ccmss.org.mx) continue to play an important role in coordinating their
activities and providing information about their history and achievements.
16. Cf. http://enlacezapatista.ezln.org.mx.
17. The very definition of “indigenous” in the Census was modified in 2010
as a result of the inadequacy of the previous categorization, based on flu-
ency in a native language. While Bonfil Batalla mentioned there being about
8 million in his path-breaking book (1987), the Census reported only 6 mil-
lion in 1990. Today, however, there are about 18 or 20 million people who
consider themselves indigenous (Toledo, 2014). The Mexican indigenous
population is the largest of any country in the hemisphere; Bolivia, Ecuador
and Guatemala have larger proportions.
18. This project continues to mobilize the participation of more than 100,000
people in a region that has been in operation for more than a quarter of cen-
tury. By focusing on a range of activities that create numerous opportunities,
requiring an ever-increasing range of skills, the region is encouraging people
to remain, strengthening communities and improving people’s welfare.
19. The scope and intensity of conflicts originating from paradigmatic clashes
with regard to the appropriate model for managing water and its use is such
that a whole issue of the UNDP’s Human Development Report (2006) was ded-
icated to the theme. Similarly, UNESCO’s 2013 World Social Science Report
(2013) addresses the need for a new kind of social science occasioned by the
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scope of the social impacts of environmental changes resulting from con-
flicting models of environmental management and the legitimate rights of
indigenous peoples.
20. Cf. http://viacampesina.org.
21. Five Caracoles or Good Government Councils were established in 2003 to
implement a local governance structure in Zapatista territory.
22. There is ample literature describing and evaluating this approach, and sim-
ilar proposals for alternative strategies to improve the quality of life in
a “sustainable” manner that emerged from indigenous cosmologies (e.g.
Bretón, 2005, 2013; Huanacuni, 2011; Acosta, 2013; Lang, 2013).
23. The breadth of this creativity can hardly be captured in this discussion. For
more details about the projects mentioned in this paragraph, consult the fol-
lowing webpages: http://geaac.org, http://www.equatorinitiative.org/index.
php?option=com_winners&view=winner_detail&id=67&Itemid=683&lang=
es, http://www.museodetexitoaxaca.org and http://www.pratec.org. Among
the groups participating in our project, peasant and indigenous commu-
nities are engaged in urban agriculture, waste separation for reutiliza-
tion, and rainwater harvesting. Near the centre of Oaxaca’s capital city,
one of these initiatives received a national prize for Local Management
and Governance in 2012 (http://oaxaca.me/recibe-san-bartolo-coyotepec-
premio-nacional-por-el-cuidado-ecologico).
24. A review of many of these initiatives, involving different organizational
models and cooperation among producers that encompasses not just the
productive aspects but also the governance institutions that are now incor-
porating whole communities into the management process (e.g. Lavaca,
2003; Rebón, 2004; Giarraca and Teubal, 2005; Sitrin, 2006; Webber,
2011; Bollier and Helfrich, 2012; Burbach, Fox and Fuentes, 2013; Piñeiro,
2013).
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Responses to Large-Scale Mining
in Latin America
Mariana Walter and Leire Urkidi
Introduction
This chapter studies the emergence and spread of community consul-
tations in large-scale metal mining projects in Latin America. These
consultations are different from the free, prior and informed con-
sent (FPIC)-related consultations, or consulta previa, that are fostered
by national governments. From Tambogrande (Peru) in June 2002
to Mataquescuintla (Guatemala) in November 2012, 68 consulta-
tions/referenda have been conducted in Peru, Argentina, Guatemala,
Colombia and Peru. In all cases the result has been a large opposition
to mining projects. This process is occurring in a context of growing
pressures to extract mineral ores in Latin America and an increasing
number of related socioenvironmental conflicts (see Chapter 2). The
particularity of these consultations is that these are not commissioned
by national governments as part of official procedures to consult com-
munities but instead are promoted by environmental justice movements
(EJMs), usually with the support of local governments.
The emergence and spread of consultations in Latin America remains
poorly studied. Studies addressing mining consultations/referenda have
focused on the first four cases: Tambogrande, Esquel, Sipakapa and
Majaz/Río Blanco (Muradian, Martinez-Alier and Correa, 2003; Subies
et al., 2005; Haarstad and Floysand, 2007; De Echave et al., 2009; McGee,
2009; Walter and Martinez-Alier, 2010; Fulmer, 2011; Urkidi, 2011;
Bebbington, 2012a); along with the wave of consultations in Guatemala
(Holden and Jacobson, 2008; Rasch, 2012; Trentavizi and Cahuec, 2012).
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Nevertheless, the cases that followed, their connections and the institu-
tional features of consultations have received poor scholarly attention.
This research is born from the curiosity of understanding how and why
these consultations have emerged and spread, and how community
consultations are challenging the governance of mining activities.
Analysing the cases of community consultations conducted in Latin
America from 2002 to 2012, we claim that these consultations (1)
emerge in the context of environmental justice struggles and crim-
inalization; (2) aim to reclaim the right of affected populations to
participate, in empowering forms, in high-stakes decision-making that
affect their lands and livelihoods; and (3) are a hybrid institution, the
product of a dynamic multiscalar process where non-state and state
actors, and formal and informal institutions, are mobilized to challenge
the centralized governance of extractive activities.
Struggles over the governance of mining activities
in Latin America
As mentioned in Chapter 1, there is an ongoing shift in views that
frame resource regulation from those that are led by state-based institu-
tions of resource management (government) to a wider environmental
governance perspective. The governance approach addresses the myr-
iad of actors and institutions that guide the ways in which (global)
environmental issues are addressed across different scales (Bulkeley,
2005).
State-centred frames are increasingly unsatisfactory and anachronis-
tic to understanding different ways in which regulation is constructed
and reconstructed. Recognizing the different spatial grammars at play
becomes necessary in order to understand the emergence of hybrid
forms of environmental governance and their implications (Bulkeley,
2005). Hybrid forms of governance challenge the conventionally recog-
nized social roles of markets, states and, more recently, communities,
as new dynamics and alliances are formed. Hybrid governance entails
the formation of complex political spaces: networks of social, economic
and cultural relations, actors connecting from distant locations, sharing
networks with common social and political objectives.
In this chapter we refer to hybrid governance as a process of institu-
tional bricolage where different (non-state and state) actors shape insti-
tutions that combine formal and informal components in a multiscalar
dynamic. We conceive scale as an epistemological, not an ontologi-
cal, entity. Leitner, Seppard and Sziarto (2008: 159) conceptualize scale
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“as a relational, power-laden and contested construction that actors
strategically engage with, in order to legitimize or challenge existing
power relations”.
Hybrid institutions can be addressed from different theoretical per-
spectives. Instrumentalist approaches assume that actors are political
and social entrepreneurs who actively use their social capital to build
institutions that strive for optimal resource management. It is usually
claimed that, to use social capital appropriately, institutions must be
properly embedded in the cultural and social context from which the
norms to support purposive decision-making are drawn (Ostrom, 1990).
However, it has been claimed that concepts of embeddedness foster a
functional and static conceptualization of culture and tradition that
obscures the complex dynamics of institutional construction and evo-
lution (Cleaver, 2001). Cleaver (2002: 17) claims that “the evolution
of collective decision-making institutions may not be the process of
conscious selection of mechanisms fit for the collective action task (as
in Ostrom’s model) but rather a messier process of piecing together
shaped by individuals acting within the bounds of circumstantial
constraint”.
In her studies of institutions for common property resource manage-
ment in Tanzania, Cleaver (2001, 2002, 2013) develops the concept
of “institutional bricolage” as a process by which people consciously
and unconsciously draw on existing social and cultural arrangements
(rules, traditions, norms, roles and relationships) to shape institutions
in patch-together institutions to change situations (Cleaver et al., 2013).
In this dynamic, the resulting institution is a mix of modern and tradi-
tional, of formal and informal practices. Institutional bricolage offers a
compelling approach to understanding the way in which hybrid insti-
tutions can be the result of a complex and dynamic assemblage process
where contexts, conflicts, needs, scales, actors, and formal and informal
institutions come into play to produce a particular hybrid institution.
Environmental Justice Movements (EJMs)
Latin American anti-mining movements and organizations played a
central role in the emergence and spread of consultations. In this section
we outline some key features of this actor, its central demands and its
scalar dynamics.
Latin American anti-mining movements have been framed as EJMs
because they demand socioecological equity and fair decision-making
processes in the governance of mining activities (Urkidi and Walter,
2011). Recently, questions of participation and voice have been at
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the forefront of environmental justice studies (Schlosberg, 2007). The
concept of environmental justice was born in the 1980s in tandem
with Afro-American social movements fighting environmental racism
(Bullard, 1990). Since then, the concept has travelled among social
movements and has been appropriated by other social groups and
movements in the world. As a result, national and regional environmen-
tal justice networks have emerged in Latin America in recent decades
(Carruthers, 2008). Mining concerns and anti-mining movements have
a central place in these Latin American networks.
It has been pointed out that the concept of environmental justice
entails a politics of scale because it refers to the spatial and social
distribution of environmental impacts and economic benefits, and to
the scales, institutions and agents that regulate environmental deci-
sions (Kurtz, 2003). Some political geographers express criticism regard-
ing EJMs’ “militant particularism” (Harvey, 1996), according to which
movements have to find a way to cross the problematic divide between
actions that are profoundly embedded in place and local experience,
on the one hand, and a wider movement and discourse on the other.
According to this perspective, local loyalties and identity politics of
resistance movements prevent engagement in wider and emancipating
politics of scale. We claim, however, that EJMs tend to transcend place-
based militant particularism (Kurtz, 2003). EJMs build strategies and
discourses that transcend the particularities of local demands, acknowl-
edging the structural roots of their struggles and establishing solidarity
networks with other communities and groups (Urkidi and Walter, 2011).
These networks have been key for anti-mining groups in Latin America,
such as OCMAL and the No a la Mina platform in Argentina.
EJMs should not be seen as static but rather as learning and flexi-
ble movements that expand and contract in space as conflicts unfold
and movements jump scales (Smith, 1996; Leitner, Seppard and Sziarto,
2008). There are different spatialities at play in contentious politics (e.g.
scale, networks, place, mobility), and participants usually draw on sev-
eral at once (Leitner, Seppard and Sziarto, 2008). The analysis of EJMs
should also acknowledge this spatial complexity. We claim that these
features of EJMs played a central role in the shaping of community
consultations.
EJM concerns usually address three key dimensions of environmental
justice: distribution, recognition and participation (Schlosberg, 2007).
These can be seen as key lenses through which EJMs frame injustice.
EJMs address not only inequity but also, and sometimes centrally, the
Mariana Walter and Leire Urkidi 291
political processes that construct environmental inequities. Anti-mining
groups in Latin America frequently argue that the approval of mining
projects involves the misrecognition of the material and cultural depen-
dence on water and land of the affected populations and that it ignores
the concerns expressed in local participatory stages, or that it lacks such
spaces altogether (Muradian, Martinez-Alier and Correa, 2003; Haarstad
and Floysand, 2007; Urkidi and Walter, 2011).
The main features of the procedures that govern mining activities
are shared by most Latin American countries. Indeed, Latin American
mining laws were developed under similar guidelines drafted by inter-
national financial institutions (e.g. the World Bank) (Chaparro, 2002;
Bridge, 2004). The approval of mining projects is centralized in the
national (or provincial, in the case of Argentina) government, and is
based on the assessment of an environmental impact report. Partici-
pation arenas are set in relation to this technical document and are
non-binding. Civil society actors can usually present allegations (e.g.
online or on paper) and, sometimes, can express their views in front of
a public audience where the technical document is presented. Usually,
law requires that these concerns be addressed by the mining company
when providing the final environmental impact assessment that has
to be approved by the national government (usually by the mining or
environmental departments). However, EJMs claim that participation in
mining decisions is mainly “informative” and insufficient, when not
secretive (Janhcke Benavente and Meza, 2010).
Projects affecting indigenous communities are under specific regula-
tions. Most Latin American countries (all those studied in this chapter)
have subscribed to the 169 ILO Convention, which requires the prior
and informed consent of communities before decisions about activities
that could affect them are made, a process that should follow custom-
ary procedures. This right is usually ignored or misapplied (Janhcke
Benavente and Meza, 2010). However, even if put in practice, the way
the 169 ILO Convention and other international documents (e.g. the
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People) frame “consent” is
ambiguous and does not necessarily imply a binding power to commu-
nity views (McGee, 2009; Janhcke Benavente and Meza, 2010). As the
cases presented in this chapter illustrate, and as pointed out by other
studies (e.g. Janhcke Benavente and Meza, 2010), the way decisions
regarding mining activities exclude or mistreat local actors, their val-
ues, concerns and institutions is fuelling unrest and frustration among
the affected communities.
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The rise and spread of mining consultations in Latin
America
In order to study the process of emergence and spread of Latin
American mining consultations, we identified and analysed all cases
of metal-mining consultations/referenda fostered by EJMs from 2002
(Tambogrande) to 2012 in Latin America. We considered those con-
sultations/referenda that were not fostered by the central government
or private companies as part of an official consultation process, and
aimed to consult the local citizens at large whether or not a com-
munity/municipality/district was in favour of large-scale metal mining
activities in their territory.
We reviewed and triangulated primary and secondary, and activist and
academic, sources (e.g. newspapers, activist and government websites,
reports, scientific papers). As the analysis unfolded, we identified the
main commonalities and differences, and developed a series of hypothe-
ses for the emergence and spread of consultations that made us revisit
and expand our sources: an iterative process that led us to refine the
findings outlined in this chapter.
We identified 68 metal-mining consultations in five Latin American
countries: Peru (2002, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2012), Argentina (2003, 2012),
Ecuador (2011), Colombia (2009) and Guatemala (57 municipal consul-
tations from Sipakapa in 2005 to Mataquescuintla in 2012) (Tables 11.1
and 11.2). We grouped the cases into three main “travel paths” accord-
ing to the connections and similarities of consultation cases, not their
chronological order. In this vein we aim to identify how consultations
have been transmitted from conflict to conflict as a useful participation
institution. For each “travel path” we highlight the key elements of the
leading case(s), identify how consultations emerged, their institutional
features and the EJMs involved, and analyse the multiple spatialities at
play in the transference of consultation experiences among EJMs.
The first travel path presents the main features of the first consulta-
tion case in Tambogrande (2002), the spread of the experience to other
Peruvian communities and its arrival in Ecuador. The second travel path
outlines the key features of the Argentinean process triggered by Esquel
(2003). The third travel path addresses the Guatemalan wave of con-
sultations born from Sipakapa (2005), and the arrival of this experience
in Colombia. The case of Guatemala presents some particular features.
While the first case of consultation (Sipakapa) occurred in the context
of an active conflict, most of the following cases were part of a regional
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We explain the Sipakapa consultation in more detail and refer to the
following cases as a regional process.
Emergence and spread in Peru and Ecuador
Tambogrande conflict (Piura)
Tambogrande is located in one of the poorest departments of Peru
(Piura), with an arid climate that requires dams and irrigation canals
(built with World Bank support) to sustain its agricultural export-
oriented activities. The conflict was triggered by the Manhattan Min-
erals project, whose main deposit was located under the town of
Tambogrande. Critical voices pointing to the environmental and social
impacts of this activity, led by a local farmer and agrarian engineer
who had emigrated from Lima, fostered the formation of the Frente de
Defensa de Tambogrande y el Valle de San Lorenzo in 1999. This organi-
zation became the main local opposition to the project in collaboration
with the local church and the National Coordinating Confederation
of Communities Affected by Mining (CONACAMI) (Portugal Mendoza,
2005).
As the Frente was unable to engage in an exchange of views and
concerns with the national government, local unrest rose (Portugal
Mendoza, 2005). In March 2001, after a period of strikes, massive
mobilizations and violent events in Tambogrande, the local leader
Godofredo García Baca was shot dead by a hooded gunman (Muradian,
Martinez-Alier and Correa, 2003). These events made the mining con-
flict nationally and internationally known (The Economist, 23 June
2001), thereby engaging new national and international support. Pro-
fessionals from Piura and Lima constituted a working group to elaborate
technical arguments and reports against the project, succeeding in
involving transnational organizations and networks in the local struggle
(Bebbington, Humphreys Bebbington and Bury, 2011).
Local tension was growing and social movements became concerned
with a possible escalation of violence (Portugal Mendoza, 2005; Cabellos
and Boyd, 2007; McGee, 2008). In this context, the Frente, its allies and
Tambogrande’s mayor – who was not clearly positioned before – agreed
on the need to conduct a consulta vecinal (neighbours’ consultation), a
peaceful and democratic mechanism to channel local unrest and express
local views (Portugal Mendoza, 2005; Subies et al., 2005; Bebbington,
Humphreys Bebbington and Bury, 2011).
The municipality of Tambogrande issued the Municipal Ordinance
No. 012-2001-MDT-C, which created the consulta vecinal as a mechanism
for citizenship participation at the district level. The ordinance was
Mariana Walter and Leire Urkidi 301
based on international, national and municipal rights, and on laws
regarding citizen participation (international treaties, national and
municipal laws, constitutional articles and the Environment Code),
setting the basic legal structure that would later be used in all fol-
lowing consultations in Peru. While ILO 169 was not referenced in
the Tambogrande consultation ordinance (it was added in the follow-
ing Majaz/Río Blanco municipal ordinances), it was used in activist
discourses (Fulmer, 2011).
The National Office of Electoral Processes initially recognized the
consulta and agreed to provide support. However, a formal complaint of
unconstitutionality and illegality by the Ministry of Energy and Mines
(MEM) reduced the final involvement of the office to advising and
lending election materials (National Electoral Office, 2002). The tech-
nical advice of national and transnational groups and the financial
collaboration of transnational organizations such as OXFAM were key
to conducting the consultation (Portugal Mendoza, 2005; Bebbington,
Humphreys Bebbington and Bury, 2011). Moreover, organizations such
as the Mineral Policy Center, the Environmental Mining Council of
British Columbia, OXFAM, and Friends of the Earth from Costa Rica
and Ecuador contributed to building the legitimacy of the consultation
by acting as observers, supporting and disseminating the experience
(Muradian, Martinez-Alier and Correa, 2003).
On 2 June 2002, the consulta calling all district inhabitants was held
and resulted in a massive rejection of the mining project (Portugal
Mendoza, 2005). The participation mechanism followed the same pro-
cedures of a regular election (secret vote, registered voters, ballot boxes,
etc.) (see Table 11.1). The consultation was not recognized either by the
mining company or by the national government, which claimed that
the EIA formal assessment was the legally binding decision-making pro-
cess. The following month the Frente prevented three public audiences
through organized protests. Finally, the public company revoked the
Manhattan mining licence based on administrative grounds, thereby
suspending the project. In November 2002 the president of the Frente,
Francisco Ojeda, won the municipal elections (Portugal Mendoza, 2005).
Majaz/Río Blanco conflict (Piura, Peru)
As the Tambograde struggle was coming to an end, a new and
relevant mining conflict was emerging nearby in the provinces of
Ayabaca and Huancabamba (Piura Highlands) concerning the explo-
ration of a copper-molybdenum mining deposit by a subsidiary of
Monterrico Metals. The conflict of Tambogrande not only contributed
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to introducing mining scepticism in the region but was also a source
of experience and support for local groups and authorities in this
new struggle (Diez Hurtado, 2007; Bebbington, 2012a). For instance,
the group of organizations and individuals supporting the Frente in
Tambogrande – then formalized as Red Muqui – later in the conflict
fostered the formation of the Majaz Support Group to create a bridge
of experience, technical expertise and strategies among movements
(Bebbington, 2012a).
The Majaz mining project was located in the peasant communities
of Segunda y Cajas and Yanta (comunidades campesinas), lands that are
administered under particular institutional arrangements legally recog-
nized by the state (Bebbington, 2012a). The company did not comply
with the required approval of the community assembly, triggering
rejection and formal complaints (Bebbington et al., 2007).
In 2004, two “massive” mobilizations were conducted involving thou-
sands of peasants concerned by the environmental (water), economic
(agriculture, tourism) and social (land access) impacts of the mining
project and its lack of recognition of local institutions. These protests
resulted in police clashes, injuries and the death of two peasants,
Remberto Herrero (April 2004) and Melanio García Gonzalez (July 2005)
(Bebbington, 2012a). From 2004 to 2007, local activists denounced
cases of activist kidnapping, tortures and persistent criminalization (dis-
credit campaigns, unjustified imprisonment, legal prosecution) that
even reached the UK justice courts (OXFAM, 2007, 2009; Cobain,
2009).
In 2005, mayors, local leaders and social organizations fostered the
formation of the Frente por el Desarrollo Sostenible de la Frontera Norte
del Perú (FDSFNP). The organization, critical of the mining project
and the role of the national government, was composed of provincial
and district government representatives, peasant communities, rondas
campesinas, defence fronts from Huancabamba, Ayabaca, Tambogrande,
and other anti-mining groups from the region.
Tension and distrust rose as negotiation attempts by the regional and
national governments were failing and the government issued measures
to limit public participation rights (Diez Hurtado, 2007; Red Muqui,
2009; Bebbington, 2012a). In this context, a consultation was promoted.
As in Tambogrande, the consultation was seen as a peaceful channel
of participation that would ease local tensions. The municipalities of
Ayabaca and Huancabamba approved municipal ordinances, calling for
a consulta vecinal (Bebbington, 2012a). The consulta resulted in a 94.5%
rejection of mining activities in the district.
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While in Tambogrande the national government minimized the
weight of the consultation, in this instance it actively tried to pre-
vent it. A vociferous campaign criminalized the consultation and its
proponents, stating that the referendum was illegal, communist and
politically manipulated by international NGOs that intended to delay
the country’s development (OXFAM, 2007; McGee, 2008). However, the
Peruvian ombudsman and the human rights national council of the Jus-
tice Ministry declared that, even if this mechanism was non-binding, it
was legal under constitutional law (OXFAM, 2009; Red Muqui, 2009;
CISDE-ALAI, 2009). Moreover, the Majaz consultation led the national
ombudsman of Peru to initiate a process of regulation of indigenous
consultation rights. What is more, both in Majaz and Tambogrande
(and in Esquel, Argentina), mining activities were halted and therefore
became examples of successful cases.
Toquepala expansion project (Candarave), Tía María project (Islay,
Arequipa), Kañariaco project (Lambayeque) in Peru
After these two consultations in Piura (North of Peru), there were three
others on the south and central coast of Peru, where national orga-
nizations and networks played a key role in spreading the experience
and providing support. The following consultation in Candarave (2008,
Tacna region, Atacama Desert) is different from previous cases because
it took place in an area with ongoing large-scale mining activities. The
conflict that led to the consultation emerged when the mining com-
pany started negotiations to expand its water-use permits. Local and
provincial governments, the irrigation users (Junta de usuarios de riego)
and the local fronts of defence opposed new permits. They pointed to
the need to decrease mining water use due to a regional water scarcity
crisis that was affecting agricultural production and forcing peasant out-
migration, and to the need to compensate for these impacts. In January
2008 the mayor of Candarave called for a consulta vecinal (Municipal
Ordinance No. 001-2008-MPC/A) with the support of the provincial
governor, local defence fronts and the Junta de Aguas. The consulta
had observers from national and international NGOs who also provided
technical support (Radio Uno, 2008). Consultation participants (67% of
eligible voters) answered two questions: 92% rejected new mining activ-
ities, and 94% opposed the use of underground and superficial water for
mining activities.
The fourth mining consulta in Peru occurred in 2009 in the province
of Islay (Arequipa Department). Islay is a dry region inhabited by peas-
ants and indigenous groups. The conflict emerged in 2008, with the
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Southern Copper Peru Corporation Tía María large-scale copper mine
project (Gutierrez Zeballos, 2011). Concerns regarding impacts on water
availability and local livelihoods fostered the formation of the Frente
Amplio de Defensa del Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales. This
movement led to the organization of a regional front with the support
of local groups, the mayor of Valdivia and national organizations such
as the CONACAMI, Cooperacción, Red Muqui and the Coordinadora
Andina de Organizaciones Indígenas (Gutiérrez Zeballos, 2011; Red
Muqui, 2011).
On 27 September 2009, the six districts of Islay conducted a consulta
vecinal. The provincial mayor refused to call for a provincial referen-
dum. In some districts, consultations were called by local mayors who
issued ordinances. In other districts, consultations were led by social
movements, following the same procedures (CAOI, 2009; Gutiérrez
Zeballos, 2011). The process was observed by a national congressman,
members of the Flemish NGO Broederlijk Delen, and the Peruvian
NGOs Transparencia Civil and CONACAMI (Márquez, 2009). The aver-
age turnout was 48.5% (considering the districts where voter lists were
available), and 93–98% opposed the Tía María project.
The national government did not recognize the referendum and,
some months later, called for a public audience to present the project’s
EIA. With the assistance of national and transnational organizations,
around 3,000 technical comments on the EIA project were submitted.
Moreover, a series of regional strikes were organized as dialogue spaces
were perceived as sterile. These strikes were marked by hard police
repression, activist criminalization, three deaths and more than 400
injuries (Gutiérrez Zeballos, 2011). In the midst of this violence, a report
by the United Nations Office for Project Services, requested by the gov-
ernment and communities as an “independent” review, concluded that
the EIA had serious deficiencies (UNOPS/PNUMA, 2011), forcing the
MEM to suspend the project.
The fifth consulta of Perú took place in 2012 in the northern dis-
trict of Kañaris (region of Lambayeque). The Kañariaco mining project
was a large-scale copper mine, in exploration stages, owned by the
junior Canadian company Candente Copper Peru SA. The project was
located in a cloud forest area inhabited and cultivated by two Quechua-
speaking communities (municipality of Kañaris, 2012). In an assembly
in 2012, the community of San Juan de Kañaris decided to conduct a
consulta comunal (community consultation) (Fedepaz, 2013). The min-
ing company and the MEM claimed that a consultation had already
been conducted following official procedures.
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The community consultation followed the procedures of regular com-
munal elections (secret, registered voters) without the support of local
governments; the result was a 91% mining rejection (1,896 votes, 47.4%
turnout). The process was supported and observed by CONCAMI, the
Red Muqui and leaders of local organizations. The regional governor,
the Ministry of Agriculture, and representatives of regional offices of
development and production, and energy and mines, also participated
as observers (Servindi, 2012).
When this consultation occurred, the national government was pro-
moting a law to regulate indigenous consultation rights. The question
of whether the Kañaris are peasant or indigenous, and hence entitled to
FPIC according to ILO 169, triggered a wide debate (Greenspan, 2013).
While the national ombudsman and transnational indigenous groups
recognize the FPIC for Kañaris, the government denies this right and
claims that the government consultation is the valid one. In 2013 the
Candente mining company stopped mining exploration, pointing to
low copper prices as the reason.
Ecuador, Kimsakocha project (Azuay)
In October 2011 the first mining community consultation of Ecuador
took place. The conflict arose from an open-pit project owned by a
junior Canadian company. Concerns rose regarding the impact on water
resources among indigenous and peasant groups located downstream
from the project area (Pérez Guartambel, 2012). The idea to conduct
a consultation emerged in the context of growing pressure from the
national government to promote mining activities in the country, in the
midst of verbal and legal delegitimation and criminalization campaigns
against Ecuadorian indigenous and anti-mining activists (interview with
local activist, 2012). Moreover, local indigenous and peasant leaders
were in contact with Latin American indigenous, anti-mining and
human rights movements, in particular from Ecuador and Peru (inter-
view with national anti-mining movement leader, 2012). In June 2011,
local indigenous leaders led the organization of a continental peoples
meeting with a strong emphasis on the impact of mining agendas on
the environment and indigenous groups (Pérez Guartambel, 2012).
A community consultation was called by the Junta de Aguas, an
indigenous and peasant organization that administers access to house-
hold water. The consultation was grounded in ILO 169, the UN Dec-
laration on the Rights of Indigenous People and the Ecuadorian Con-
stitution (Pérez Guartambel, 2012). The vote was carried out in the
parishes of Victoria del Portete and Tarqui. The organization was led
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by local leaders of the Federation of Indigenous and Peasant Organiza-
tions of Azuay, with the support of national indigenous organizations
(Ecuador Runakunapak Rikcharimuy/Movement of the Indigenous Peo-
ple of Ecuador (ECUARUNARI), La Confederación de Nacionalidades
Indígenas del Ecuador/Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of
Ecuador (CONAIE)) and the mayor of Victoria del Portete. The consulta-
tion followed the Junta de Aguas election procedures: one vote per water
right (a family can have more than one right). The vote was secret and
for registered water right owners (head of family, not individuals). The
consultation had national and international observers from organiza-
tions and the national ombudsman office. Days before the consultation,
newspaper pages and leaflets calling people not to vote were distributed.
There was a 67% turnout with a 92.3% opposition to mining activities.
Provincial and national governments did not recognize the vote and led
a strong, discrediting campaign.
Argentina
Esquel project (Chubut)
The second consultation conducted in Latin America took place in
Esquel in March 2003. The city of Esquel (28,089 inhabitants) is a main
settlement of Argentinean Patagonia, an arid region also inhabited by
Mapuche indigenous communities. In 2002 some 25% of the popula-
tion were unemployed and 20% were under the poverty line. The arrival
of Meridian Gold, a US junior mining company, with the intention to
extract a gold and silver deposit located 6.5 km away from the city
triggered the first mining conflict in the country.
The use of cyanide leaching techniques and the risks of water pol-
lution in a water-scarce environment stirred initial concerns. The per-
ception that the urgency to approve the project was undermining the
quality of the technical assessment and was excluding local concerns
led to the formation of a neighbours’ assembly (Asamblea de Vecinos
Autoconvocados (AVA)) opposed to the mine. The AVA brought together
neighbours and organizations with different backgrounds, specialists
in law, chemistry, medicine, geography, journalism and education,
Mapuche groups and inhabitants of Esquel’s poorer areas who became
key information channels to marginal areas of the city. The movement
deployed a range of strategies, from legal and administrative queries to
mobilizations, technical arguments and advocacy networking. As the
AVA jumped scales, contacting and obtaining the support of regional,
national and international activists, organizations and networks, the
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Esquel conflict started to be understood as part of an environmentally
unjust process affecting many communities in Latin America (Urkidi
and Walter, 2011).
Members of the AVA became acquainted with Tambogrande’s con-
sultation via the internet. The AVA also established contacts with the
Mining Policy Center (now Earthworks), an NGO that supported the
Tambogrande consultation and that would later finance (along with
Greenpeace Argentina) the visit of an American hydrogeologist, who
had also been in Tambogrande, to Esquel (Colao and Claps, 2005).
Two representatives of the local Deliberative Council, close to the
AVA, presented a municipal ordinance proposal to call for a consulta
popular (popular consultation/referendum) using a legal mechanism
present in the provincial constitution. While the proposal was initially
rejected, the mounting tension in Esquel fostered its approval by most
political parties as a way to pacify local unrest.
A few days after the consulta popular, which resulted in an 81% rejec-
tion of the mining project (75% turnout), mining activities were halted
and the Chubut legislature approved a provincial ban on open-pit min-
ing. The Esquel case became a national referent (Svampa and Antonelli,
2009; Walter and Martinez-Alier, 2010). The AVA created an online plat-
form (www.noalamina.org) that is still a key source of information for
Argentinean and Latin American activists.
The Esquel case showed the strong political power that a non-binding
consultation could have. In the years that followed, as mining invest-
ments were rising, more EJMs tried to foster similar consultations.
In particular, the Government of the Province of Catamarca, the poor-
est province of Argentina where the oldest and largest mine operates (La
Alumbrera), managed to stop at least three attempts of consultation in
Tinogasta and Andalgalá in court.
Lonco project (Neuquén)
The second consultation in Argentina took place in the municipality
of Loncopue. After a series of legal setbacks and different intimida-
tion campaigns aimed at social movements and Mapuche indigenous
communities, exploration activities were advancing without permits or
consultation procedures. A local priest became involved and brought
the matter to the town, connecting the urban movements with rural
indigenous groups. A lawyer and anti-mining activist from Esquel, who
was living in Loncopue, transferred his professional and activist expe-
rience to the emerging movement, advising and supporting the legal
strategy (Yappert, 2009).
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The call for a binding referendum to approve/reject a municipal
law forbidding large-scale open-cast mining activities was fostered
by Mapuche communities, neighbourhood assemblies, environmen-
tal groups and, as in Esquel, some politicians whose political parties
were pro-mining at the provincial and national levels but who aligned
themselves with anti-mining groups locally. With a 72% participation
turnout, 82% voted in favour of a mining prohibition, but the provin-
cial government presented a legal claim of unconstitutionality to disable
the referendum (Yappert, 2009).
Guatemala and Colombia
Guatemala: Sipakapa, Escobal and the wave of consultas in West
Guatemala
The third Latin America bottom-up mining consultation after
Tambogrande and Esquel (Argentina) occurred in Sipakapa (Guatemalan
highlands) in June 2005. In 2003, Montana (now owned by the
Canadian GoldCorp) obtained the exploitation permit for the Marlin
gold mine in the municipalities of Sipakapa and San Miguel Ixtahuacan.
These municipalities are inhabited by peasants who mostly identify
themselves as indigenous. In Sipakapa, 87% live in relative poverty and
33% in absolute poverty (SEGEPLAN, 2002).
Research and interviews underline the fact that the first meetings held
by the company with local groups and leaders were non-transparent,
arbitrary and pro-mining (Van de Sandt, 2009; Urkidi, 2011). The oppo-
sition to mining in Sipakapa was born from the mistrust that arose
among many community leaders in regard to information activities.
Indigenous leaders met local priests and national groups (Movimiento
de Trabajadores Campesinos, MadreSelva, Centro de Acción Legal
Ambiental y Social de Guatemala (CALAS)) in order to get informa-
tion about mining (Van de Sandt, 2009). These national organiza-
tions were already within Latin American networks (e.g. MadreSelva
within OilWatch) and distributed information about the environmental
impacts of mining activities. Local leaders from Sipakapa visited other
gold-mining areas in Central America, such as Valle de Siria in Honduras,
and got in touch with regional networks against mining (e.g. Central
American Anti-Mining Network).
In December 2004 a community that blocked the passage of a truck
heading to the mine in a neighbouring province was strongly repressed
by police and military forces, resulting in the death of the peasant Raul
Castro Bocel (Prensa Libre, 18 January 2005; Castagnino, 2006). The
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public resonance of these events forced the mayor of Sipakapa (in favour
of mining) to arrange a public meeting to discuss the mining issue. This
meeting led to a municipality agreement to conduct a consultation,
based on the Municipal Code (2002) and ILO 169. The idea to con-
duct a consultation had been circulating since the beginning of 2004,
born from an Italian priest who was acquainted with the Tambogrande
experience (Van de Sandt, 2009).
The consultation was organized through the articulation of local,
national and international organizations: the Municipal Development
Council (Consejo Municipal de Desarrollo (COMUDE)), the parish and
its catechists, the Linguistic Community of Sipakapa, the local justice
of the peace, MadreSelva, the National Association of Maya Lawyers,
the Catholic Church of San Marcos, and the Indigenous Advocacy of
Human Rights, among others. National and international observers
and human right activists were called in to verify the process. The
Guatemalan Constitutional Court rejected an appeal of Montana to ban
the consultation. On the same day of the consultation, flyers saying
that the consulta was not going to occur were distributed in Sipakapa,
presumably as a boycott by Montana.
However, 45% of the registered electorate took part in the consul-
tation and 98% voted against mining. The voting was carried out in
each community; some voted by a show of hands, others by secret
ballot. In 2007 the Guatemalan Constitutional Court declared that the
Sipakapa consultation was valid under ILO 169 and the Municipal Code,
but that it was non-binding since such conventions and laws were
imprecise and not coherent with the constitution, and also because min-
ing activities were of national public interest. Hence the municipality of
Sipakapa had no authority to decide on the matter (Xiloj and Porras,
2008).
The Marlin mine was in full operation in 2013, despite the consulta-
tion and different legal demands in relation to environmental impacts
and the violation of human rights.1 However, the process of Sipakapa
was a milestone in the Guatemalan resistance against mining. The expe-
rience has been reproduced in 56 other consultations on metal mining
in the country from 2005 to 2012 and more than 600.000 people
have taken part in them, becoming one of the most relevant polit-
ical processes of recent years in the country. A documentary on the
Sipakapa consulta (Revenga, 2005) played a central role in spreading the
experience throughout Guatemala and Latin America.
Some 52 of those 57 consultations occurred in western Guatemala
and most of them in the highlands, as part of a regional campaign to
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reject mining activities. The Western People’s Council (WPC), where
the Huehuetenango Natural Resources Assembly had a central role, led
the spread and organization of consultations. The WPC is a regional
network organized in 2008 as a coalition of provincial organizations
working in the defence of natural resources and local leaders of the
municipalities that have held consultations. Its main objective is to
develop a community-based strategy against mining. There are also
national and international networks and NGOs2 supporting the devel-
opment of the consultations. However, one key characteristic of the
Guatemalan process is the synergies between the anti-mining move-
ment and the municipal governments in the organization of most
consultations, and the active incorporation of local leaders in the
regional network (Mérida and Krenmayr, 2010; Urkidi, 2011).
More recently, other cases of consultations that are not directly related
to the WPC work are emerging in other areas of Guatemala. The con-
sultation on the Escobal project in Santa Rosa is not part of the wave
of consultations of western Guatemala, even if it has also been influ-
enced by the Sipakapa experience. The context of Santa Rosa differs
from the highlands, as most of its population are non-indigenous. There
are, however, some Xinca communities. The conflict arose in 2010 when
Tahoe Resources and Goldcorp were to start a metal mine in the area
that might affect a nearby lake and its related water resources. A local
committee was organized and, between 2011 and 2012, four consulta-
tions were developed in nearby towns with the support of the regional
diocese, a national environmental organization (MadreSelva) and local
governments. However, no consultation has been permitted in San
Rafael Las Flores; the mine is in operation, the local population are
highly divided, and violent events and criminalization processes have
taken place over the last few years (OCMAL, 2013).
Apart from Sipakapa and Santa Rosa, the rest of the Guatemalan con-
sultations are not associated with imminent mining projects but with
exploration or research licences, so that they could be understood as
preventative consultations. Indeed, no new exploration licences were
granted in the country from 2008 to 2012. Table 11.2 presents more
details about the cases of preventative consultations of Guatemala.
The Guatemalan Government has not accepted community referen-
dums and has proposed to regulate them with a specific law (Prensa
Libre, 23/02/2011). The WPC defends that the current legal frame-
work is sufficient to accept the consultations and their results, and that
further regulations would just lead to more restrictive conditions for
participation (Nisgua, 2011; Prensa Libre, 23/02/2011).
Mariana Walter and Leire Urkidi 311
The Guatemalan anti-mining movement seeks to be inclusive in many
senses, resulting in heterogeneous consulting processes. Mainly indige-
nous but also non-indigenous communities have been consulted (these
last ones not appealing to ILO 169 but just to the Municipal Code
(2002)), by secret ballot or by show of hands, in municipal or just
communitarian consultas. In some cases, mainly in Huehuetenango,
non-registered people have been able to take part in indigenous com-
munity meetings. This has led to greater participation of women than
in other voting processes since women are proportionally less frequently
registered than men in Guatemala (Mérida and Krenmayr, 2010). Such
consultas have also spread to other extractive projects in Guatemala,
such as hydroelectricity.
Colombia, Mandé Norte project (Carmen de Darién, Chocó)
Between 24 and 28 February 2009, the first community consultation on
mining in Colombia took place. The conflict started with the arrival of
Muriel Mining (Río Tinto and other companies), and the initial con-
sultation activities led by the government and company to obtain the
communities’ approval to explore for copper, gold and molybdenum
ores. Exploration sites were located in Afro-descendant and indige-
nous peoples’ lands, including their homes and sacred areas, in the
departments of Antioquia and Chocó. Indigenous and Afro-descendant
communities started to search for information and contacted a national
church organization working in the area. A support group was cre-
ated, bringing information, documentaries (e.g. the Sipakapa case) and
activists from other countries and communities to Carmen de Darién
(Jahncke Benavente and Meza, 2010). Communities claimed that the
official consultation process was not adequately conducted, excluding
affected communities and endangering their livelihoods. As a reac-
tion to local unrest, the national government militarized mining areas,
intimidating and limiting community access (Jahncke Benavente and
Meza, 2010; Movice, 2012).
Communities, inspired by the Sipakapa experience, promoted the
organization as an interethnic consultation, following their own pro-
cedures (own language, registered, older than 14 years old). Human
rights, indigenous, church and anti-mining organization representatives
from Colombia, Paraguay, Honduras, Guatemala, Germany and Canada
observed the process (CENSAT, 2009).
The consultation was grounded on international and national indige-
nous consultation rights, including the Colombian Constitution’s spe-
cial consideration for indigenous consultation rights. The legality and
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legitimacy of the process was confirmed by an important verdict (T-769,
2009) of the Colombian Constitutional Court, which led to the suspen-
sion of the project. Nevertheless, in the year that followed, campaigns
to delegitimize local communities and further intimidation actions
were conducted by the government in the area. In January 2010 the
Colombian army conducted air bombings (Movice, 2012).
Consultation attempts have also been deployed by other non-
indigenous communities in Colombia. During 2011, social movements
in the department of Santander tried to conduct a popular consultation
framed around the protection of water to stop gold-mining develop-
ments in upstream Páramo areas. This initiative was politically blocked
(Comité por la defensa del agua y el páramo de Santurbán, 2012).
Recently, in July 2013, the municipality of Las Piedras (Tolima region)
conducted a popular consultation on mining activities, resulting in a
60% participation and 99% rejection of a large-scale mining project to
be carried out by Anglo Gold Ashanti (EJOLT, 2013).
Discussion
The cases of consultation analysed in this chapter represent an innova-
tive governance experience that seeks to ensure inclusive participation
in mining activities. Moreover, this governance perspective goes beyond
local/global, formal/informal, state/non-state divides. These points lead
to four aspects of consultations, which are elaborated in this discussion.
Contexts: Conflicts, exclusion, criminalization and violence
The mining conflicts that led to consultations involved high-stake strug-
gles. Mining disputes revolve around how the spatial and social distribu-
tion of uncertain benefits and impacts of mining activities are defined,
and which are the legitimate scales of participation and decision-making
to govern this activity. Consultations are neither the first nor the only
action deployed by EJMs, but instead are promoted alongside a range
of strategies (e.g. negotiations, mobilizations, legal and technical alle-
gations, dissemination activities) aimed at influencing and challenging
centralized mining governance institutions.
The discourses deployed by anti-mining movements in our cases
reflect Schlosberg’s (2007) key dimensions of environmental justice:
recognition, distribution and participation. Anti-mining groups see the
approval of mining projects as the misrecognition of their material and
cultural dependence on land and water, and also as a disregard of their
views and customary procedures (Muradian, Martinez-Alier and Correa,
2003; Haarstad and Floysand, 2007).
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Social movements opposing mining activities claim that developing
mining activities jeopardizes local (and supralocal) livelihoods. Com-
munities in Peru, Guatemala, Colombia and Ecuador signal the risks
to their livelihoods, which are dependent on agriculture, cattle and
forests. Concerns about health also appear, with high relevance in
Esquel (Argentina) regarding cyanide use. Worries about water quality,
and availability for local economic activities and household use, are
common to all studied cases.
While the affected communities signal such concerns as grounds to
redraft or even stop a mining project and national mining plans, gov-
ernments and companies claim that these decisions are not for local
communities to make. Central governments argue that mining is an
issue of national interest and experts within a national decision-making
process should have the last word. Governments and mining compa-
nies frame local alarm as an exaggeration that undermines the positive
impacts of mining. Moreover, critical communities’ and EJM’s views are
being labelled by Latin American national governments as irrational,
ignorant, anti-development, politically driven, promoted by foreign-
ers’ interests or by a radical, subversive environmentalism (Bebbington,
2012b), hand in hand with criminalization processes (OCMAL, 2011).
Official participation arenas become frustrating spaces given the par-
tial information that is shared and the powerless participation modes
they offer (Cole and Foster, 2001). As decision-making procedures are
unable to address local communities’ concerns, disputes form around
these procedures and their decisions (Muradian, Martinez-Alier and
Correa, 2003; Suryanata and Umemoto, 2005; Walter and Martinez-
Alier, 2010; Urkidi and Walter, 2011). It is becoming increasingly
common for EJMs to prevent or boycott public audiences, as these are
seen as an empty requisite for project approval (Jahncke Benavente
and Meza, 2010). There were cases of boycotts of public audiences in
Tambogrande, Toquepala, Tía María, Esquel and Loncopue. Indigenous
communities rejected and misrecognized the alleged consultation pro-
cesses led by mining companies and governments in Peru, Colombia
and Guatemala. In Ecuador and Argentina, indigenous communities
claimed that formal consultation never occurred (Urkidi and Walter,
2011; Pérez Guartambel, 2012).
Furthermore, one of the findings of this research has been the role
played by violence in the fostering of consultations. Human Rights
claims have been identified as a particular root of Latin American
EJMs (Carruthers, 2008). Mining referenda have emerged in contexts
of repression and criminalization of activists, where concerns regarding
the physical and psychological integrity of activists were rising. In this
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line, consultations can be seen as an innovative form of protest that
aims to foster participation, promoting a democratic setting that pro-
tects its participants. These consultations have succeeded in pacifying
local tensions, at least for a while.
While contexts of activist and protest criminalization and repression
are not new in mining struggles, the particularity of these cases has been
the ability of EJM to transform a risky protest environment into a demo-
cratic participation process. To do so, EJMs have constructed a hybrid
participation institution.
Community consultations: A hybrid institution
Latin American mining consultations/referenda are based on the claim
that communities – whether indigenous or not – have the right to partic-
ipate in high-stake decisions that affect their livelihoods, a right deemed
legitimate by affected communities. This right is recognized in a variety
of indigenous and non-indigenous, international, national and munic-
ipal norms and rights (Jahnchke Benavente and Meza, 2010; Fulmer,
2011). However, how participation is framed by regulations and actors
varies widely, being mostly informing and non-binding. As analysed by
Arnstein (1969) in his eight-rung participation ladder ((1) manipulation,
(2) therapy, (3) informing, (4) consultation, (5) placation, (6) partner-
ship, (7) delegated power and (8) citizen control), there are different
levels of exclusion/involvement and empowerment. As pointed out by
Arnstein, as we step down the ladder, frustration rises. Communities are
struggling to climb this ladder.
Community consultations reclaim and rebuild the right of affected
communities to participate, in meaningful and empowering ways, in
decisions regarding high-impact activities that affect them. With this
aim, in each context, communities strive for local participation rights
appealing to, combining and reshuffling available regulations, rights
and local traditions. This process of institutional bricolage draws on
a particular mix of formal and informal, and modern and traditional,
institutions according to the particular context.
For instance, communities are expanding and resignifying, in their
discourse and practices, the way “consultation” is framed in ILO 169 –
and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peo-
ple – forcing new debates about the convention’s reach (McGee, 2008;
Fulmer, 2011). ILO 169 asserts that consultations should be conducted
by states. However, the studied consultations are not organized by
the central government (Jahncke Benavente and Meza, 2010; Fulmer,
2011). Community consultations appeal to ILO 169 consultation rights,
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stretching the convention’s reach according to what is considered just
and legitimate by affected communities. In a similar vein, the way in
which consultations appeal to national, municipal and international
participation laws and rights in order to allow for a local referenda on
mining challenges the national-government scale monopoly in mining
decisions.
In each context, this hybrid institution is legitimized by reference
to tradition and/or to the social perception of what are the accept-
able ways of doing things (Cleaver et al., 2013). A relevant source of
(internal and external) legitimacy of consultas/referenda is rooted in the
procedures used to consult people that appeal to democratic values and
to indigenous consultation rights. In most cases, communities put in
place hybrid procedures that combine democratic participation insti-
tutions (e.g. official election procedures), indigenous customary rights,
and experiences/lessons from previous consultations. In most consul-
tations, including many indigenous communities in Guatemala, the
consultation followed the same procedures as those of a regular elec-
tion: formal call to vote, registered voters, the secret vote and the quality
of the process as certified by external observers, as in Tambogrande.
In Sipakapa, each of the 13 communities consulted chose its own proce-
dure: some followed a traditional Western election format, while others
voted by a show of hands or other formats. However, the consultation
was called by the municipality and all members of the municipality
could vote (even non-indigenous). In Sipakapa, indigenous customary
votes were the most criticized by the government and by companies
that claimed that their result could be manipulated (Fulmer, 2011). The
consultation conducted by indigenous groups in Colombia followed the
example of Sipakapa by merging procedures.
Some forms of (hybrid) governance that would include diverse social
actors and visions a priori have been criticized because they continue
to exclude disempowered groups (Ford, 2003; Cleaver et al., 2013).
In contrast, consultations are organized by, and take into account,
marginalized groups such as indigenous peoples, women and peas-
ants. As a result, consultations usually stretch the reach of formal and
informal institutions in order to foster local participation.
Consultations are more than the sum of existing regulations and
rights but, while grounded on these, they reclaim their scope and mean-
ing based on what is deemed legitimate and just by local communities.
Moreover, the significance of community consultations is that commu-
nities are not only mobilizing and discursively struggling to contest
the governance of mining activities but are also deploying innovative
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strategies to demand empowering and democratic participatory institu-
tions. The community consultations studied here are a form of political
mobilization, a form of protest grounded on democratic and indigenous,
formal and informal institutions.
The roles of movements, governments and state bodies
While EJMs have played a key role in the emergence and spread
of consultations, a particular feature of community consultations has
been the role played by local governments. Community consultations
combine the formal and informal capabilities (i.e. rule-making, manage-
ment, communication) and different forms of power (e.g. legitimacy,
networks, resources, trust) of social movements and local governments.
Cases of consultations conducted without alliances with local gov-
ernments are the exception. In some cases local governments rapidly
align with social movements or even play a central role in the forma-
tion of movements critical of mining activities (e.g. Majaz, Toquepala,
Guatemala’s wave of consultations). In other cases, local governments
change their position as conflicts unfold and finally allow or support
consultations in order to preserve local governability or local power (e.g.
Esquel, Sipacapa), sometimes adopting a position that differs from their
national political parties.
However, the legitimacy of consultations is in dispute by different
actors within states and governments. While national governments and
mining departments reject, ignore or criminalize (define as illegal acts)
these participatory events, some local and provincial governments – as
well as national and regional departments, authorities and tribunals –
recognize this participation institution (e.g. National Electoral Office,
Constitutional Court, ombudsman, Human Rights National Councils,
Ministry of the Environment).
The alliance with local governments was key to building the legit-
imacy of consultations (Red Muqui, 2009), framing them as a formal
local (and democratic) participation institution, not a mere anti-mining
social movement strategy (Muradian, Martinez-Alier and Correa, 2003).
The fact that the first cases of consultations were conducted with the
support of local ordinances contributed to building the grounds for
legitimating the following wave of consultations, conducted with or
without this formal support (e.g. some municipalities in the Tía María
consultation in Peru and the Kimsakocha case in Ecuador). Moreover,
the involvement of social movements reduced, in some places, the
distrust that many rural communities have in relation to government
bodies, including municipalities. In Guatemalan consultations, the fact
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that actors not directly related to the municipal government were also
promoting the consultas was pointed out as a source of local trust
and willingness to participate (interviews Guatemala 2009; Mérida and
Krenmayr, 2010). We could also say that the legitimacy of consulta-
tions is, in part, both a cause and a consequence of the hybrid alliances
formed between local governments and social movements.
The involvement of local governments and the diverse positions
adopted within state and government bodies regarding community con-
sultations reflect the heterogeneity of interests and values across these
structures. This feature of consultations points to the need to further
problematize the role of governments and the state in environmental
governance frameworks. Hybrid institutions led by civil society, such
as community consultations, do not necessarily aim to “bypass gov-
ernments” (as pointed out by Delmas and Young, 2009) but, on the
contrary, to anchor part of its legitimacy in some of its bodies (local
governments).
Currently, the strength of the consultation’s legitimacy grounded in
its “legality” (i.e. formal institutional support) is becoming a weak-
ness as the struggle is now revolving around the formalization of
consultation rights (i.e. regulating consultation procedures) by central
governments, with risks of co-optation, exclusion and denaturalization
of the institution.
A multiscalar institutional bricolage
Finally, we would like to point out that, while consultations could be
framed as a hybrid institution that exemplifies a process of governance
from “below” (Paterson, Humphreys and Pettiford, 2003), the strength
and legitimacy of this institution is multiscalar. Analysing the spread
of consultations in Latin America, we identify that this institution was
fostered hand in hand with a diversity of spatial processes that have
been key in its emergence, spread and legitimation in Latin America.
Along these lines, consultations can be seen as the result of a dynamic
multiscalar process of institutional bricolage.
Mining consultations are promoted by social movements composed
of a myriad of groups, including indigenous and peasants’ movements,
farmers, (urban) professionals, local priests, teachers, community lead-
ers and NGOs. As mining conflicts unfolded, these social movements
engaged with networks and organizations (e.g. environmental, anti-
mining, human rights, indigenous, Catholic) that move across multiple
geographical scales. In the wave of consultations in Guatemala, national
anti-mining networks fostered the participation of local actors and
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leaders. These networks circulate information, experiences and strate-
gies, and promote the mobility of activists to learn and share experiences
among communities, to Latin America and international forums, to for-
eign (e.g. UK courts in the Majaz case) and international tribunals (e.g.
Sipakapa to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights).
Additionally, among the EJMs and networks driving the spread of
consultations, some were born from the first mining consultation expe-
riences: Tambogrande, Esquel and Sipakapa. These first cases are relevant
mining conflicts at national and transnational scales and have become
milestones in the mining consultation processes in Latin America and
in their own countries. Red Muqui, born from the Tambogrande con-
flict, was a key provider of information, experience and materials for
the Majaz/Río Blanco case and following consultations. The “Noalam-
ina” platform, coordinated by the Esquel anti-mining movement, is a
key provider of information and resources for Latin American commu-
nities. In Guatemala, the great multiplication of mining consultations
is partially grounded in the national and international repercussion of
Sipakapa’s experience. With the support of different national NGOs and
associations, two regional networks were created around mining and
hydropower conflicts (Huehuetenango Natural Resources Assembly and
the Western Peoples Council). There has been an experience-sharing
process, where new consultations have been organized by knowing
and learning from previous ones, via these national and transnational
organizations and networks (Red Muqui, 2009; Jahncke Benavente and
Meza, 2010).
Organizations and networks have not only played a key role in spread-
ing the experience of previous consultations but also provided logistical,
technical and sometimes financial resources. A range of transnational
actors have also supported consultations as observers, contributing
to building the international legitimacy of these processes. OXFAM,
Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, the Mineral Policy Centre, Peace
Brigades International, Nisgua, Catapa, Rigths Action in Sipakapa and
Mining Watch are among the international observers that have been
present in Latin American mining consultations.
Furthermore, as consultation experiences multiplied in Latin America,
national and transnational networks have deployed efforts to sys-
tematize and strengthen the ongoing experience and its lessons, by
organizing international events (e.g. Bi-national encounter Ecuador-
Peru on Community Consultations, 28 February 2012) and elaborating
reports (e.g. McGee, 2008; CISDE-ALAI, 2009; Jahncke Benavente and
Meza, 2010; Mérida and Krenmayr, 2010; Duthie, 2012). National and
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transnational movements have also supported legal strategies – to
defend the legality of consultations and condemn human rights abuses –
at national and international tribunals (Constitutional Court case in
Colombia, Interamerican Human Right Commission presentation of
Sipakapa), thus systematizing and denouncing the growing number of
criminalization cases (e.g. OCMAL, 2011).
When considering how consultations have travelled among Latin
American communities, we point out that the internet and
documentaries are powerful transporters of testimonies and experiences
among distant people and places. While the role of the internet has
been discussed in previous studies (Bickerstaff and Agyeman, 2009), we
also found that documentaries are significantly contributing to social
learning processes.
Sipakapa’s documentary was a key source of inspiration in the orga-
nization of the Embera Katio indigenous consultation in Carmen de
Darien (Colombia, 2009) (interview with Colombian activist, Jahncke
Benavente and Meza, 2010). An indigenous leader that led the
consultation of Ecuador also underscored the relevance of videos
and documentaries to explain the implications of large-scale mining
activities.3 The documentaries on the Choropampa mercury spill in
Cajamarca (Peru) and the cases of the Tambogrande and Sipakapa con-
sultations have been widely distributed in the region (Choropampa:
el precio del oro, 2002; Sipakapa no se vende, 2005; Tambogrande:
mangos, muerte, minería, 2007). These and other documentaries have
shown the impacts of large-scale mining activities and the strategies
of anti-mining groups, contributing to a regional EJM learning pro-
cess. In this regard we agree with Bickerstaff and Agyeman (2009)
that there is a promising line of research to be explored in rela-
tion to the development of “assemblage” perspectives – coming from
the actor-network theory (ANT) – when analysing how people, texts,
machines, devices and discourses relate and collectively constitute envi-
ronmental justice scales. How to conceptualize the role of these devices
in processes of institutional bricolage could be explored in further
detail.
Colombian activists highlight how Carmen de Darien’s indigenous
communities were moved to see – in the documentary on the Sipakapa
consultation – other indigenous groups faced with similar struggles,
telling similar histories and learning from their consultation experience
(interview with Colombian activist). Documentaries played a central
role in making affected communities acknowledge that their conflict
was not local but simultaneously local, national, regional, global and
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structural. In this process, a common perspective is constructed and
solidarity linkages are strengthened.
The construction, the spread and the sources of legitimacy of this
hybrid institution (i.e. community consultations) are embedded in a
complex and dynamic interplay of actors, discourses, networks and
strategies that move among multiple scales. The political power of con-
sultations is related to the ability of supralocal social movements to
move and disseminate these events at multiple scales, creating new sup-
ports and reactions. Consultations, whether vecinal, popular, comunitaria
or inter-étnica, are embedded in municipal, national and international
norms and rights that are reclaimed by EJMs. In this regard, Latin
American mining consultations are a multiscalar institution since they
are constituted by (and constitutive of) actors, strategies, regulations and
discourses rooted in different, multiple and changing scales.
Conclusions
The process of meeting, consulting and voting is part of the function-
ing of many indigenous and peasant communities and organizations
in Latin America. However, the mining consultations studied in this
chapter, while nurtured and legitimated by these traditions, are some-
thing different. Mining consultations constitute a common institution
in the current Latin American anti-mining protest cycle. Consultations
reclaim and resignify the right of the local population and indigenous
peoples to participate, in empowering ways, in high-stake decisions
affecting their lands and livelihoods. Consultations are put forward not
just as a form of protest but also as a decision-making event that chal-
lenges official decision-making institutions. Moreover, consultations
show how we should move beyond analytical polarizations and try to
understand the tensions and dynamics in the process of governance
hybridization through cross-scale interactions, discourses and practices.
Notes
1. In 2010 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights ruled in favour of
the precautionary closure of the project because of potentially harmful health
and environmental impacts.
2. Mainly environmental and human rights associations and NGOs from Europe
and Canada (CATAPA, Network in Solidarity with the People of Guatemala –
NISGUA or Rights Action, among many others).
3. Interview conducted by Sara Latorre and Stalin Herrera with local leader,
shared with us.
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This collection represents a milestone in the political ecology of
environmental governance in Latin America. Given the enduring ten-
sion between the environment and development, its overarching pur-
pose in my reading of the text is to elucidate the headway, obstacles
and potential of our times to achieving the aspirations and goals of
sustainable development, particularly in some of its early versions.
Because this is a highly contested concept, and one that some of the con-
tributors to this volume would most likely reject, I use it heuristically.
It offers a platform from which to discuss the necessity of environmental
governance that genuinely addresses environmental protection, social
equity and broad-based political participation in the context of (largely)
capitalist development; and this, in my view, is the central subject of the
book.
Much has changed in the world since the Brundtland Commission
first launched the idea of sustainable development in the mid-1980s:
the end of the Soviet Bloc, free-market globalization, the rise of emerg-
ing market economies and profound transformations in manufacturing
processes, just to name a few. Latin America transitioned to democratic
governments, it benefited from sustained economic growth in the 2000s
with some improvement in poverty alleviation, and it weathered a world
recession. The region also witnessed an unexpected resurgence of the
left. Left governments that would have been targets for decisive destabi-
lization by the USA during the Cold War have successfully asserted their
sovereignty, survived, and even thrived in some cases. This volume asks:
What is the significance of these changes for advances in environmental
governance that seriously addresses the problem of environmental
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sustainability beyond end-of pipe treatment, that supports and pro-
motes sustainability of livelihoods by subordinate peoples, and that
offers meaningful political participation in the context of the current
stage of capitalist development?
The first significant contribution of this book is that it moves us sub-
stantially closer towards establishing an empirical baseline on where we
stand with respect to these vital questions. In my reading, the overall
tenor of the chapters is this. For all of the region’s economic prosperity
over the past decade and relative success in reducing poverty, pushing
up the salience of the environmental issue area in the policy process
with an emphasis on alternative technologies, livelihoods and mean-
ingful participation from below has not gained much political traction.
Indeed, in some cases we even see backsliding.
That said, the volume establishes that there have been advances in
pushing up the salience of the environmental issue area in general.
This is no small matter given the very low priority that environmental
issues had for political leaders grappling with debt, economic restruc-
turing, political instability and the imperatives of finding their way to
a stable development model in the 1970s and 1980s. Today, no major
stakeholders in government, business, civil society or academia take a
cornucopian hands-off human ingenuity and the price system shall pro-
vide position (see Chapter 6). Although many believe in the imperative
of development, they acknowledge that environmental concerns cannot
be ignored.
The terrain then logically shifts to questions regarding the contested
meanings of development, social equity, environmental sustainability
and broad-based political participation; the competing conceptualiza-
tions of relations of domination and subordination in society embedded
in those meanings; and their social, political, economic and cultural dis-
tributional consequences. In short, the book starts from the right place:
the classic questions of what type of development, and development for
whom.
The collection’s political ecology approach points us in a fruitful
direction to tackle these questions. The editors start from the analytic
distinction that I, and others, made long ago between market-based and
livelihood or bottom-up grassroots development models of sustainable
development (Silva, 1994, 1997). To this they add a neodevelopmental
model born of the left turn in Latin American governments, which fea-
tures a return of the state and economic nationalism in development
policy. The ascent of left governments initially fuelled expectations that
the alternative approaches to the environment and development would,
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at last, find favourable political support after decades of market domi-
nance. The book, in an unflinching yet realistic analysis, accounts for
hopes dashed.
The volume’s more significant contribution, however, is that it reveals
a more complex reality. It shows how those left governments straddle
various approaches, how they juggle or mix them. On the one hand, the
neodevelopmental state plays a larger role in the economy and society
than a neoliberal state, but it accepts market dictates such as GM organ-
isms, carbon swaps, a focus on public and private nature conservation,
and the expansion of megaextractive projects in mining, agribusiness
and energy. On the other hand, some states under left government
rule challenge the market-oriented approach that dominates the inter-
national climate-control regime. Moreover, although left governments
fight anti-megaproject protests, they do not always ram them through
no matter what the consequences. At times they cancel projects. More
optimistically, the book also reminds us that states are not unitary
rational actors. Agencies, departments and even a ministry or two
may support projects and policies that advance alternative, livelihoods
approaches to the environment and development. Since states operate
in the context of democratic regimes, organized subaltern groups and
their communities can ally with supportive agencies to survive and, in
a few instances, grow. At minimum the struggle continues.
In addition to these advances in the characterization of contemporary
environmental governance in Latin America, we also gain an elegant
picture of the logic behind its current construction in chapters 2, 4 and
5. Latin American states, their governments, elites, class structures and,
of course, economies are part of a world capitalist system, and generally
in a subordinate position within it. Absent revolutionary breakdowns
of existing polities, market-oriented and supportive development poli-
cies in general, and environmental policies specifically, are logically the
norm and incremental reforms at the margin are about the most we can
expect. The state is organized accordingly.
The collection makes it clear that it is within this context that we
need to understand unquestionable advances in institutional capacity-
building in the environmental issue area. The environment is firmly
on the policy agenda. All Latin American states have built up min-
istries, agencies and departments for the environment. The technical
knowledge and the national and international networks of their profes-
sional staff have expanded by leaps and bounds over the past 30 years.
Their infrastructural reach has intensified. But they are at the service
of states and dominant elites that must respond to the vicissitudes
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of world markets for their continued reproduction and development.
Thus environmental protection regimes have improved by instituting
environmental impact reporting, advances in end-of-pipe treatment,
adoption of polluter pays principles, and nature conservation. How-
ever, we should not be surprised that they are consonant with market
or neodevelopmental approaches to environmental sustainability that
often disregard questions of social sustainability or that, at best, only
seek to compensate – usually poorly and belatedly – for losses to
adversely affected communities.
The book drives home a further telling point. How do at least nomi-
nally progressive governments juggle these contradictions? By using the
commodity boom to substantially expand their welfare effort in social
assistance, education, health and infrastructure development. Many of
these welfare policies are now reaching not only the urban poor but,
significantly, the rural poor. Some governments have also concentrated
on substantially raising minimum wages. Thus previously marginalized
peoples, at least statistically, have been lifted out of poverty and seen the
life chances of their children improve. Judging by electoral returns, gov-
ernments successfully argue that the aggressive expansion of resource
extraction makes these compensatory policies possible.
In short, we gain a concise, well-defined specification of Latin
American environmental governance regimes understood as the princi-
ples, norms, rules and procedures that infuse governing environmental
institutions, their managers, their policies and their operations. This is
an important step forward. It clarifies policy agendas and bounds policy
prescriptions. It also sets up the relationship of official institutions to
society: who’s in, under what conditions, and who’s out.
This significant contribution to Latin American political ecology is
developed in the first half of the volume. The opening chapters, how-
ever, stress that Latin American environmentalism is also infused with
a widespread, deep-seated concern for livelihoods, environmental jus-
tice and alternative production models that is unique to the region (see
Chapter 1). These concerns cannot simply be ignored and swept under
the carpet. Note to technocratic policy-makers: Resistance to policies
that do so is to be expected. To believe otherwise is wishful thinking at
best, or an act of willful, arrogant domination at worst.
The second half of the book explores the multifaceted reality of resis-
tance to market and neodevelopmental policies and their lack of social
and environmental justice and sustainability. But it does so within
the context of a more holistic conceptualization of environmental
governance. This permits us to begin to discern the larger significance
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of fragmented, local resistance for the construction of a more inclusive
form of environmental governance in Latin America.
Herein lies the second major contribution of the volume to under-
standing Latin American environmental politics. Governance is gener-
ally understood as how the state organizes systems for rule, meaning
that citizens obey its maxims, institutions and policies (Weber, 1978).
It is also about the state effectively controlling citizen behaviour and
instructing its citizens in how to behave properly (Foucault, 1997).
In sum, the focus is on the state’s capacity to foster and maintain order
with a minimum of overt conflict and coercion. Effective governance
systems channel societal tensions in ways that minimize open con-
flict. Ineffective ones fail to do so. Either way, resistance conflict and
institutional change are external to the governance regime.
The editors understand this and, as I argued above, do us the ser-
vice of specifying for the first time how Latin American states and their
elites organize for rule in the environmental issue area. But they go fur-
ther: they argue that resistance, conflict and coercion are not external
to governance; they are an integral part of governance. Governance is
a dialectic process that involves order and resistance. Understood this
way, we can get at the potential sources of institutional change in Latin
American environmental governance. This is the crucial issue for those
interested in the question of how to open up policy space for concerns
about livelihood, social and environmental justice, and alternative,
small-scale, ecofriendly environmental policies. Even more importantly,
this approach to environmental governance opens up a path to figuring
out the broader, cumulative policy and political impacts of fragmented,
localized, heterogeneous and territorially marginal protests. I will come
back to this theme later.
The book, correctly, underscores two major paths to change. That they
are both represented in one volume is rare and permits us to appreciate
more the strengths and weaknesses of each. One argues that commu-
nities of marginal, subaltern social groups – of which there are many –
should disengage from the policy process (see Chapter 10). They would
be better off devoting their energies and scarce resources to creating their
own alternative worlds by practising the principles of solidarity, social
justice, freedom, autonomy, and alternative knowledge and production
modes they espouse (see Chapter 3). Their multiplication coupled with
networking among themselves will corrode the dominant society and
force change, either because the dominant society collapses under its
own weight or because it must adapt to avoid being overtaken. We
see this position most clearly in Chapter 10. Questions remain about
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how those networks might expand, how their experiences can overcome
resource deprivation in the midst of more or less functioning capital-
ist societies, and what the “tipping points” might be. Eventually, these
experiences would also have to engage in politics and articulate with
other actors, but which and how remains underexamined.
The other potential path for change involves engagement with estab-
lished political systems at the international, national or subnational
scale or combinations of them to effect institutional and policy reforms.
For example, national left governments more connected to their social
bases may seek to modify international regimes that favour market-
oriented policies in ways that accommodate alternative approaches,
as seen in Chapter 8 about REDD. By the same token, communities
may attempt to use REDD as an opportunity to promote projects with
a more alternative, livelihoods cast as described in Chapter 9 about
community forestry in Mexico. Perhaps most promising of all was
the experience depicted in Chapter 11 of communities making multi-
scalar alliances with local government, national government agencies
and international organizations to organize consultations on unwanted
megamining projects promoted by national governments, transnational
corporations and multilateral lending institutions. Their application of
national and international standards for conducting such extraofficial
consultations was inspiring, as was the fact that such campaigns at times
contributed to stopping the project.
The weaknesses of engagement with politics are well known. How can
one avoid co-optation as leadership loses touch with its social bases?
Will engagement merely result in cosmetic or symbolic changes or sim-
ply serve to disarticulate environmental justice movements (EJMs)? Will
political allies betray such movements? What opportunities must EJMs
seek to create in the face of unfavourable structural conditions? How
can they scale up successful experiences? These are the perennial hard
questions to which we have no good answers. This book, and similar
research, suggests that networking analysis, which is gaining increasing
attention, might be a fruitful way to go (von Bülow, 2010).
This brings me to a third major contribution of this volume to
pushing the frontiers of Latin American political ecology. It offers a
cogent and readily apprehensible approach to multiscalar analysis. All
too often, analyses of problems that involve multiple scales simply
devolve into descriptions of a bewildering multiplicity of actors with
different interests and power resources. It becomes difficult to under-
stand the relationship between them and how outcomes are affected.
This book, because of the careful groundwork it has laid with respect to
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the specification of dominant governance regimes and its relationship
to sources of resistance, overcomes those weaknesses. We understand
the logic behind the multiscalar relationships that are forming, break-
ing apart and reconfiguring, thus we are able to easily follow them and
apprehend their significance for the larger questions that stand at the
centre of this collection. This is a manageable method that travels well
in new and evolving situations.
This is a significant advance because a sign of our times is the increas-
ing complexity of our multiscalar world, its fragmentation, hetero-
geneity, compartmentalization and segmentation. These characteristics
permeate the environmental issue area, exacerbated by its intersection
with economic, political and social structures. It is also one of the few
arenas in our contemporary stage of capitalism where private property
rights are hotly contested. This book reminds us that careful specifica-
tion of ideal types can help us to make sense of the mixed types that
exist in reality and the logical consequences for social action that fol-
low from their characteristics. Hybrid types and bricolage cease to be ad
hoc descriptive, and often confusing, assemblages, and they acquire real
analytical bite.
In sum, this volume makes valuable empirical, conceptual, analytical
and methodological contributions to the political ecology of environ-
mental governance. It establishes an empirical benchmark from which
to assess change or a lack thereof by carefully specifying actors, inter-
ests, power, and the structures and ideational frameworks in which
they exist and operate. It provides a theoretical framework grounded
in the everyday reality of the vast sea of marginalized peoples caught
on the receiving end of harsh systems of domination, systems that are
characterized with equal attention to reality. Consequently, the book
constitutes an important advance from earlier efforts in Latin American
political ecology (Painter and Durham, 1995).
Where do we go from here? This collection points us in fruitful direc-
tions. Its specification of the concept of environmental governance and
its political ecology operationalization offers an innovative common
framework for analysis. But what do we expect from improved environ-
mental governance? Here is a question that merits further exploration.
The book proposes that at minimum it should provide spaces for alter-
native, more ecofriendly approaches to inclusive development. That
opens up another persistent problem: how to integrate subaltern social
groups in a manner that does not compromise their autonomy, and
with alternative forms of ecofriendly, low-impact, small-scale economic
production that includes conservation measures.
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Of course, examples of poster projects abound, but the issue is not so
much technical as political. What are the conditions under which those
isolated experiences might thrive and expand? As I mentioned previ-
ously, one path the book points to is the disengagement of marginalized
peoples from the political process with a focus on building the alterna-
tive world they dream of. This suggests more work on the conditions
that facilitate this process and its scaling-up through networking, as well
as thinking about tipping points for the dominant society.
Engagement with politics by organized subaltern groups is the other
path. I have already suggested the types of research needed to advance
further on this front. The larger question, to expand on the point above,
involves the conditions under which, in the context of contemporary
capitalism, spaces for progressive environmental governance can be cre-
ated, supported and scaled up to a meaningful proportion. Those who
argue for disengagement clearly think it is an impossible proposition.
The burden of proof is on those who focus on social movement resis-
tance that engages authorities over time, seeking reforms to existing
arrangements.
In an earlier comment I submitted that the book offers some start-
ing points. I would like to expand on that by suggesting that a tighter
focus on the outcomes of resistance might be useful. Given the decen-
tred nature of much resistance, asking what the cumulative effects of
the multitude of local actions are could be a fruitful research agenda.
Understanding the causal mechanisms behind those results would also
be advantageous. The classic approach has been to focus on proposed
or enacted legislation. However, we must transcend that approach. One
research strategy might be to analyse the effects of protest on the dif-
ferent stages of the policy process, such as agenda-setting, initiation,
formulation, implementation and evaluation. Going beyond that rela-
tively superficial level, one could also research deeper changes in the
distribution of power. This includes significant changes in access to
power by subordinate groups, often requiring institutional reforms; dif-
fusion of new values; and improvements in movement resources to
support the consolidation of new channels of access to power or new
values.
By the same token, we need to improve our understanding of the
causal mechanisms that influence those outcomes. Chapter 11 suggests
that networking across multiple scales and the appropriation of exist-
ing principles, norms, rules and practices for other purposes might be
an avenue. We can build on that and other works that focus on net-
works (von Bülow, 2010), but we must also expand our analytical tools
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to distinguish between direct effects and those mediated by third par-
ties (Silva, 2013). That would advance analysis and contribute to the
formulation of innovative strategies and policy proposals.
Expanding these lines of research can help us with another vital issue.
An oft-stated goal is to develop the participation of subaltern social
groups that demand alternative forms of ecofriendly, small-scale eco-
nomic production in the policy process. But what constitutes “real”
participation and how do we get it? Yes, it must be deliberative and
binding, and protest seems to be the only way to advance on this issue,
but there is much more to it than that. A more social scientific for-
mulation to guide us might be: How do we specify the dimensions
of the concept and the consequences of different participatory mech-
anisms for containing political tensions, and in whose interest? What
combinations of multiscalar action and ideational innovations are con-
ducive to positive results? In this vein it might be useful to think about
plausible alternatives or improvements to existing institutions, which
might be informal rather than formal (Rodrik, 2007). The alternative
consultations analysed in Chapter 11 are an example of this.
This book’s approach to environmental governance unequivocally
moves the discussion about environment, development and social jus-
tice past its current point of relative stagnation. To the extent that
it highlights participation, conflict and resistance to environmentally
and socially damaging development models it suggests that negotia-
tion is another critical feature of environmental governance. Analysis
frequently stresses maximum demands and outcomes benchmarked
against them. But we also need to explore intermediate outcomes. Nego-
tiation is about compromise, not capitulation. This raises additional
questions worth further research. What are “exploited” actors willing
to settle for? What is a second-best option? Where and what are those
spaces for negotiation, formal or informal? What role does protest play
in the negotiation process? Raising these questions in no way means los-
ing sight of the potential for divisiveness or co-optation of movements
when they begin to negotiate with governments or companies.
I conclude with the following brief reflection. Latin American polit-
ical economy in general (and this collection in particular) focuses on
natural resource extraction and the ever-present penetration of capital-
ism into rural or frontier regions where customary and collective forms
of social organization are still relatively strong. Hence the environment
is an issue area in which property rights and conceptions about eco-
nomic, political and social organization are contested in places far from
the urban centres. Moreover, with increasing frequency, indigenous
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cosmologies, presuming their affinity with nature, are invoked. What
about environmental problems in urban areas? Do appeals to indige-
nous cosmology help or hinder? How does it travel to urban centres?
These questions notwithstanding, is there a way to harness a dispos-
sessed urban social subject around environmental issues in ways that
facilitate alliances with rural actors? We know from history that rural-
urban alliances of popular sectors tend to have greater power in pushing
more radical reforms. Is it possible to construct such alliances for envi-
ronmental governance along the lines this book advocates? It might be
wishful thinking but the question is worth asking for the problem of
environment and development is not only a rural one; it affects all.
We know very little about the urban side of the equation. Perhaps we
should re-examine our assumptions.
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